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E. A. Litton

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INTRODUCTION TO
DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

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DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

by

EDWARD ARTHUR LITTON

New Edition

EDITED BY

PHILIP E. HUGHES
M.A., B.D., D.Litt.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

EDWARD ARTHUR LITTON was born in Dublin in the year 1813 and received his schooling at Winchester College. In 1832 he entered Balliol College, Oxford, and three years later graduated with a double first in classics and mathematics. In 1836 he was elected a Fellow of Oriel College, of which college he became Dean at the beginning of 1843 until his marriage at the end of that year. His ordination took place in 1840. From 1851 to 1854 he was Vice-Principal of St. Edmund Hall. In 1856 he was Bampton Lecturer, and Select Preacher to the University in 1861. From 1856 to 1870 he was Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Durham. He became Rector of St. Clement's, Oxford, in 1858, and then in 1860 Rector of Naunton, near Cheltenham, Gloucester, where he remained for the rest of his active life. He died at Kingstown, near Dublin, on August 27, 1897.

Litton's published works include the following:
Sermon on John iii. 5 (1850), *The Church of Christ* (1851), *University Reform* (1851), *Intellectual Religionism Portrayed: The Gospel not a Ceremonial Law* (1853-4), *The Mosaic Dispensation considered as Introductory to Christianity* (Bampton Lecture, 1856), *The Collection of the Old and New Testaments* (1856), *Parochial Sermons* (1859), *A Guide to the Study of Holy Scripture* (1861), *Miracles* (1868), and *Introduction to Dogmatic Theology* (published in two parts, 1882 and 1892).

The *Introduction to Dogmatic Theology* was not only his last but also his main literary work. Its scope and objects are explained by the author in his Preface to the First Edition (which follows). The work immediately won and thereafter retained the admiration of the Church's leading scholars. In 1912, twenty years after the appearance of the first edition, Dr. Henry Wace, then Principal of King's College, London, and subsequently Dean of Canterbury, wrote that it " surveys more comprehensively than any English book on the subject the general course of theology in early, medieval, and modern times, and illustrates the principles of the various systems, whether Catholic or Protestant, which have from time to time prevailed" ; and Dr. Arthur J. Tait, then Principal of Ridley Hall, Cambridge, praised it as " a work which ought to be in the hands of every one who is engaged in preparing either others or himself for the pastoral office," and as " a comprehensive, balanced, thorough treatment of dogmatic theology from the standpoint of a loyal son of the Church of England."

Dr. W. H. Griffith Thomas, author of the well known book, *Principles of Theology* (first published, posthumously, in 1930), who was at one time Principal of Wycliffe Hall, Oxford, and subsequently Professor of Systematic Theology, Wycliffe College, Toronto, acknowledged that he was " deeply indebted to Litton's *Introduction to Dogmatic Theology*, which for clearness of view, firmness of grasp, balance of statement, and forcefulness of presentation, remains unsurpassed among works on Anglican Dogmatics."

The many pervading excellencies of this volume the reader will discover for himself, to his own benefit, spiritual and intellectual. That here and there, in our judgment at least, certain weaknesses are discernible will be apparent from the footnotes which we have ventured to add in our editorial capacity. Footnotes, it will be appreciated, are added more often than not when it is felt necessary to call in question some conclusion or conjecture ; but they must not be interpreted as reflecting the editor's judgment of the work as a whole. This is reflected rather in the pleasure and satisfaction with which he has undertaken the labour of preparing a new edition. There are so many more places where the editor would have been glad to add notes of approval and admiration ; but this, of course, was not what was required of him. It is only fair to add, also, that Litton, between the publication of this volume and his death, was so far from being satisfied with some of the conjectures he had offered concerning eschatological questions, that the concluding section on Eschatology was entirely omitted in the Second Edition. The producers of the Third Edition (1912), however, felt that, taking everything into consideration, it should be replaced ; and by this decision we have been content to abide.

Throughout, the work has been reset and the text broken up into much shorter paragraphs, thus making for more pleasurable reading as well as a better general impression visually of what continues to be a work of outstanding value.

I am indebted to Mr. Gervase E. Duffield for valuable assistance in the reading of proofs and the compiling of the index.

PHILIP E. HUGHES.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION

It has been subject of remark by one of our Bishops[1] that there exists no work from an English pen on Dogmatic Theology, which could be recommended to candidates for Holy Orders as an introduction to that study. The criticism is just. Our theology, copious and valuable on isolated topics, is singularly deficient in works corresponding to those of the great foreign theologians, Romish and Protestant, in which a systematic survey of the whole field is taken. Hence such treatises as those of Martensen and Van Oosterzee have been largely read by our students, and no doubt with profit. But independently of some graver defects, a translation seldom succeeds in fully conveying the sense of the original; and the original itself is commonly too racy of the soil whence it sprang to fall in readily with English habits of thought and expression. There seems room therefore for, at least, an attempt in this direction, and without professing to be a Manual for Candidates, for which perhaps it is hardly fitted, the following volume aims at being primarily a Compendium of Dogmatic Theology on the subjects treated of, and indirectly a doctrinal commentary on, such of the Thirty-Nine Articles as belong thereto; not, however, as is usual, on each Article separately, but on the Articles as grouped under the heads to which they may be referred; which, since several of them really present but different sides of the same subject, is the first step towards a clear view of the system on which they are founded.

A few words may be in place on the position which the writer occupies. It has been matter of debate whether or not the Anglican Church is a Protestant Church, and whether or not she possesses a theology of her own, neither that of Rome nor yet of Geneva, but occupying a midway position between the two. With all such questions the writer has no concern. Whatever may be the character of the Anglican Church as a whole, the Thirty-Nine Articles, at any rate, admit of no doubt as to their parentage; at least as regards those points on which they differ from the Church of Rome. For, as is well known, they consist of two quite distinct portions, one of which contains the doctrines common to us and the Romish Communion, the fundamental doctrines of the Ecumenical Creeds which both accept, while the other has reference to the points of controversy between us and that Communion. There can be no question that on these latter points the

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[1] Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, Charge, 1867.

Anglican Church, if she is to be judged by the statements of the Articles, must be ranked amongst the Protestant Churches of Europe ; and of the two families of foreign Confessions, under that of the Reformed rather than that of the Lutheran type. And such she is generally considered to be. Yet it may be alleged that the character of the Anglican Church is not to be determined from the Articles alone, but from her formularies as a whole, and there may be some ground for this assertion. But whether such is the case or not, a discussion of this delicate topic is foreign to the purpose of the present work. It makes no pretensions to frame, or to represent, a theology of the Church of England, as an insular production ; a task very difficult in itself, and doubtful in its results. In respect of the leading points of controversy alluded to, its aim is simply, from a comparison of the public Confessions of the Reformed Churches, amongst which, as far as the Articles are concerned, our own is to be ranked, to expound the dogmatical system which goes by the general name of Protestant as distinguished from that of Rome.

Independently of the difficulties attending an attempt to establish a special Anglican theology on such points, the writer must avow his conviction that, in a scientific point of view, all such attempts will probably end in failure ; and that there are only two systems of Dogmatic Theology, coherent in structure and capable of scientific exposition, the Romish and the Protestant ; these words being understood not in the popular sense, but of the principles of the respective systems, as they are found stated in the public Confessions of Faith, and elaborated in the works of the principal theologians, on either side, since the Reformation ; a Bellarmine and a Möhler on the one, a Chemnitz, a J. Gerhard, and a Quenstedt, on the other ; worthy successors, all of them, of the great scholastic divines of the Middle Ages. The experiment, in fact, of such a Via Media theology was made many years ago in one of our universities under the most favourable auspices ; but it produced no permanent result. The golden mean, in its actual application, was found to involve as many difficulties as either extreme. An example may be the subject of Scripture-interpretation. The Romish doctrine of a living, infallible expositor in the person of the Pope is quite intelligible, has the merit of simplicity, and, *if only the fact could be proved*, removes many perplexities ; the *genuine* Protestant doctrine, too, stands on its own ground, equally intelligible. The Via Media theology adopted neither the one nor the other, in its integrity. It admitted, in some sense, the right of private judgment, it denied the infallibility of the Pope ; but its admission of the right of private judgment was accompanied with the proviso that the conclusions arrived at should always be in accordance with 'the voice of Catholic antiquity.' How or where the voice of Catholic antiquity, ruling disputed points of interpretation, was to be ascertained, could never be satisfactorily made out. In fact, the prime architect of this theology has himself demolished his building. We are told, on his plenary authority, that 'as a doctrine, it is wanting in simplicity, hard to master, indeterminate in its provisions, and without a substantive existence in any age or country.'[1] Or as he has tersely expressed it in another work : 'The Via Media was an impossible idea ; it was what I had called standing on one leg ; and it was necessary, if my old issue of the controversy was to be retained, to go further one way or the other.'[2] A writer may be pardoned who accepts the judgment of so great a master, and ventures to think that nothing in Dogmatic Theology that will satisfy the demands of consecutive thinkers is likely to be produced except on the lines either of genuine Romanism or of genuine Protestantism.

This does not imply but that within the main lines on either side subordinate differences have not always existed, and may always be expected to exist. The symbols of the Lutheran and the Swiss Churches are easily distinguishable, and the Sacramentarian controversy threatened at one time to produce a rupture between them ; and even in the Romish Church, a considerable latitude of private opinion is, very properly, allowed. But these internal differences do not affect the essential principles of the respective systems ; and in expounding, for example, the theology of Protestantism, it is unnecessary to draw a distinction between the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches : they both agree in certain fundamental points as against Rome, and refuse to be combined with the system of the latter into a *tertium quid.*

The writer has aimed at compression throughout, and therefore historical details and subordinate points of discussion have been, as much as possible, avoided, or briefly referred to in notes. In some parts he may seem to have transgressed this rule by a rather copious citation of passages from Confessions of Faith and theologians. On such abstruse subjects as, e.g., the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, Original Sin, and the like, the writer was not indisposed to shelter himself under the authority of great names. Moreover, where doctrines are ascribed to a system, or an author, it seems only fair to quote the *ipsissima verba* in which they are expressed. He also indulged the hope that some readers may be induced to explore for themselves the treasures of thought which lie buried in the ponderous tomes of what may be called the scholastic age of Protestantism, that is, the two centuries succeeding the Reformation. No better corrective of the loose habits of thought prevalent in our day exists than a perusal of writers who for learning, depth, and, above all, precision of language, have few equals.

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[1] Cardinal Newman's preface to his *Prophetical Office of the Church*, third edition, 1877.

[2] *Apologia*, p. 260.

The writer only wishes further to observe that it has been his aim to introduce to the notice of English divines that branch of theology which in Germany has received the name of 'Symbolik,' and of which Möhler's work is probably the specimen best known to us ; that is, a scientific comparison of the dogmatical systems of the two great divisions of Western Christendom, exhibiting their fundamental doctrinal differences, rather than the popular aspect which they severally present to the world. In the Elizabethan age, and for some time subsequently, this branch of study, though not systematically cultivated, generally formed part of the theological equipment of our divines ; as may be seen in the works of Jewell and his contemporaries, in the smaller treatises of Hooker, and, later on, in those of Bishop Hall, Field, and Davenant. Circumstances, to which it is unnecessary here to refer, brought about a neglect of it ; our Universities ceased to contain or send forth champions of genuine Protestantism ; with the result that, when the Oxford movement began many years ago, it bore in the eyes of the clergy and many distinguished laymen the aspect of a new discovery ; instead of being (as it was) Romanism under a new guise, that is, Romanism shorn of some of its most prominent peculiarities, such as the formal co-ordination of tradition with Scripture as the rule of faith, the addition of five sacraments to the two appointed by Christ, the abuses of Purgatory, the supremacy of the Pope, and the like.

Romanism (including its mutilated counterpart, Anglo-Catholicism) is a religion of the incarnation, the virtue of which is communicated by sacraments ; Protestantism is a religion of the atonement, the virtue of which is appropriated by direct faith in Christ, His word and His work, not, however, to the exclusion of sacraments in their proper place. Broadly, this is the difference. On neither side are these cardinal facts of revelation, or their connexion, denied ; there could have been no atonement if there had not been an incarnation ; but the stress laid on the one or the other, and particularly differences of view as regards the instrument of appropriation, may affect our whole conception of Christianity and lead to widely divergent theological systems. To explain this, and to make it clear that some modern theories on, among other points, justification, the nature of justifying faith, and the sacraments, are nothing but a revival of the scholastic theology, on which Romanism itself is founded, is the general design of the work.

With the exception of the topics, the rule of faith and man before and after the fall, the earlier part of the work deals but little with modern controversies ; controversies, that is, which have arisen since the Council of Trent. Happily, the principal divisions of Western Christendom all accept the three creeds, and the decisions of the early Councils on the Holy Trinity and the Person of Christ. With the latter part the case is different. Eschatology, perhaps, excluded, the matter is distinctly controversial, and on points which, to the present day, are warmly debated. The plan of the author rendered this necessary ; but he trusts that no expressions, or insinuations, have fallen from him inconsistent with the temper which ought to govern theological controversy.

PRELIMINARY

1. *The Province of Dogmatic Theology*

THE word ‘dogma’ occurs in the New Testament in the sense of injunctions or ordinances to which obedience was required, such as the decree of Cæsar (Luke ii. 1, comp. Acts xvii. 7), the decisions of the Apostolic Council at Jerusalem (Acts xvi. 4, 17), and the precepts of the Mosaic law (Ephes. ii. 15 ; Col. ii. 14) ; and not in the sense of doctrines proposed to faith. In the writings of the early Fathers, the word signifies the fundamental truths of Revelation, such as they were delivered by the Apostles in their oral teaching and their writings, and before they became acted upon by the speculative intellect of the Church. Philosophy assigned to each science its peculiar dogmata, or first principles ; and those of Christianity were its historical facts with their inspired explanations. But since religion leaves no faculty of man unaffected by its influence, and appeals to the intellectual as well as the emotional part of his nature (as indeed faith, the most comprehensive of its synonyms, always presupposes something to be believed), it was inevitable that in process of time attempts should be made to systematize and arrange the materials furnished partly by Scripture, and partly by the implicit faith of the Church ; and this necessarily in the current language, and under the influence of the philosophy of the age.

This scientific action was materially promoted by the appearance of successive heresies. Each, as it grew to a head, called forth in opposition all the resources of argument, from whatever quarter, which the Church could summon to her aid ; and no Christian truth emerged from the conflict the same in its mode of expression, and in its established connection with other truths, as it descended into the arena. A legitimate development, not of new truths from the old, but of the mode of exposition of the old, was coëval with Christianity, and is inseparable from the idea of a living body like the Church ; it finds a place in Scripture itself, in which the progression of Christian doctrine, from its first elements to its more perfect exhibition, is evident, though, from the form in which by Divine wisdom the New Testament was cast, and the special function which Scripture discharges in the Church, a systematic arrangement of doctrines, and especially as distinguished from Christian practice, is not to be looked for in it.

This reflex action of the intellect on the faith of the Church is the source of dogmatic theology, and furnishes its true idea. Hence may be obviated sundry misconceptions of its nature. It is not, for example, a mere stringing together of texts or passages of Scripture under certain heads ; which may be a preliminary to the formation of Biblical, but is not in itself dogmatic, theology. Of course a Christian dogmatic theology must, of necessity, be a Biblical one ; so far, that is, as it ever appeals to Scripture as its ultimate authority ; but formally the two are not identical. The Church, in its true idea, being the Communion of Saints, the temple of the Holy Ghost (Ephes. ii. 21, 22), possesses a relative independence as regards spiritual illumination : the voice of the Holy Spirit in Scripture is one thing, and the work of the same Spirit in the Church is another, though the two are inseparably connected ; and hence the Church may, for the time being, and for a special purpose, dissociate reflection upon her own faith from the authentication of it by Scripture : and in so doing, she lays the foundation of that branch of theology to which the name of 'dogmatic' is properly to be assigned.

Nor is it, as sometimes seems to be supposed, merely a system of logical analysis and deduction, like the scholastic theology, with no basis in the living Christian sentiment, the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit, in the Church. Severed from this latter, it no doubt merits the strictures that have been levelled against dogmatic theology in the mass, but which apply only to a limited and inaccurate conception of it.[1] Still less may it assume the position of an arbiter of the faith, dictating its 'sentences' to the submissive reception of the Christian body ; to which assumption the word 'dogmatism' probably owes the sinister meaning commonly attached to it. No order or class, in the Church, whether ecclesiastical or scholastic, is empowered thus to rule the Christian conscience ; and dogmatic theology loses its value if it is not a living reproduction of what is already held, in solution as it were, by the Christian community at large to which the writer belongs.

From these observations it will be seen that the dogmatic theologian occupies an essentially different position from that of a philosophic inquirer into the claims of Christianity. He is presumed to be neither outside nor above the Church, but in it ; a partaker of its life, an expositor of what he himself believes and has experienced. To this branch of theology the maxim emphatically applies, *Pectus theologum facit.* A dogmatic theology free from all prejudication, the author of which is supposed to come to his subject with his mind a *tabula rasa*, is a misnomer ; and not less so is one which affects to be an exposition of individual opinion rather than of the common faith of the Church. Nor does he take up the position of an apologist. Dogmatic theology presupposes the Divine origin of Christianity to be admitted, and occupies a midway position between the study of evidences and the homiletic functions of the Christian minister.

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[1] Such, *e.g.*, as that of the late Bishop Hampden, who, in his otherwise instructive 'Bampton Lectures,' appears to identify dogmatic theology with the subtleties of scholasticism.

But here questions arise which seem to present difficulty. What are we to understand by the Church of which the dogmatic theologian is supposed to be a member ? And where is its accredited profession of faith to be found ? Before the schism of East and West the reply was easy ; the faith of the Church—not the *fides quâ*, but *quæ creditur*—expressed itself, on certain fundamental points at least, in the Ecumenical creeds, or the two earliest of them. Heresies, on these points, had come and gone, proving themselves to be such, not by the Vincentian rule *quod omnibus*, *quod semper*, *quod ubique* (' what has been believed by all, always, everywhere, is true ')—an unsatisfactory one at best, for of what value was it (to take one example), at a period when, as one of the Fathers complains, the whole world almost had become Arian ?—but by their very want of vitality and permanence, as the branch from which the sap has been diverted of itself withers and drops off. On this basis of the creeds the work of John of Damascus (A.D. 730) contained a valuable, though limited, survey of Christian doctrine ; but it was the first, and the last, of the kind which could lay claim strictly to the title of Catholic. After its separation from the East, the Western Church busied itself with questions in which the Greek Church, even if no rupture had taken place, would have felt little interest ; and the West itself, at the Reformation, became split up into separate Churches, bound together by no tie, except the acceptance of the three creeds, and each with a Confession of Faith of its own, more or less polemical in character.

The result is that a Catholic dogmatic theology, except as regards the fundamental doctrines of the creeds, is now only an idea, incapable of being realized ; for a writer on the subject must belong to one or the other of the sections which divide Western Christendom, and must, if he is to produce anything of value, be an exponent of the theology of his own particular communion : he must identify himself with its teaching and traditional sentiment. And thus, in the present day, any such system must be more or less of a partial character ; it is the dogmatic theology of the Romish, or of the Lutheran, or of the Reformed, or (as some would say) of the Anglican, Church. If we consent, as we well may, to merge minor differences, at any rate the

Romish and the Protestant systems stand out in strong contrast ; and it may be affirmed that no Romanist could fairly expound a system of Protestant doctrine, and probably the converse equally holds good.

The other question is, Where is the traditional theology of each particular Church to be found ? Not primarily in the works of its theologians, still less in the varying teaching of schools or parties, which may from time to time make their appearance, and then pass away. The authorized public Confessions of Faith are the proper standards to appeal to ; it is they that impart a definite character and historical continuity to each Church. As long as these Confessions are not repudiated, or altered, by the body in its corporate capacity, they must be taken to decide the position which, in the controversies which agitate Christendom, that Church occupies. And on this ground, if the Thirty-Nine Articles are to be considered as the distinctive, as they certainly are the principal, dogmatical formulary of the Anglican Church, there can be no doubt as to her position. The chief theologians, however, of each Church, if not primary, may be very important secondary sources of information ; and the more so in proportion as they lived nearer to the time when the Church first assumed its distinctive features. Hence the earlier are, in this point of view, more valuable than the later. Some of the works of such writers have enjoyed an almost symbolical authority in their respective Churches ; as, *e.g.*, those of Jewell and Hooker in our own, those of Melanchthon in the Lutheran, and those of Calvin in the Swiss Protestant Churches. Where the meaning of the Confessions may be obscure or ambiguous, the comments of those who either assisted at the drawing-up of such Confessions, or have been held most accurately to represent their spirit, are justly deemed of the greatest assistance towards arriving at a conclusion. But no name, however venerable, and no school of opinion, however for the time prevalent, can be of much use in this point of view, if, instead of building on the foundations already laid, it aims at raising a new structure not in harmony therewith : such attempts to alter the essential character of a Church can only be of detriment to it ; they must impede its natural growth, and therefore efficiency, and may issue in its dissolution.

2. *The Literature of the Subject*

The Patristic remains of the first centuries contain many valuable dogmatical treatises, that is treatises on special topics, but hardly any the aim of which is to exhibit the faith of the Church in a connected system, the proper province of dogmatic theology. Some attempts, however, in this direction were made, as, *e.g.*, by Clement of Alexandria, and especially by Origen in his work *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*; but they were defective in many respects, and moreover seem to have led to nothing beyond themselves.

John of Damascus, to whom allusion has been already made, may be considered the founder of this branch of theology. His work *De Fide Orthodoxa* is a summary of the decisions of councils, and of the statements of the principal Greek Fathers, especially Gregory Nazianzen, on the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation; and deservedly obtained a high reputation not only in the Eastern Church, but in the Western also, as soon as it became known through the medium of translations. And with it the literary activity of the Eastern Church on this subject seems to have come to a close. The main defect of the work is its almost total silence on anthropological questions, or those relating to human agency in the work of salvation; nor does it treat of the Church, its idea, functions, and ministry.

To supply these deficiencies was the appointed work of the Western Church. But though in the controversial treatises of Tertullian, Ambrose, and above all Augustine (with whom must be joined the 'Augustine' of the middle ages, Anselm, the father of the scholastic theology) the materials were furnished in rich abundance, they were not collected and arranged until the great theologians of the properly scholastic period undertook the task, and performed it in a manner which must extort the admiration of even those to whom the general features of scholasticism are repulsive. What a marvellous monument of industry and acuteness is the *Summa Theologiæ* of Thomas Aquinas, the 'angelic doctor'! And the same may be said of the works of his fellow-labourers in this field. But its slavish submission to ecclesiastical authority on the one hand, and its unwarranted employment of Aristotle's philosophy on the other, rendered the scholastic theology but a meagre expression of the Christian faith; and at the first breath of the religious impulse of the Reformation it tottered to its fall.

The material principle of Protestantism, justification by faith only —or, in other words, the doctrine that the Christian believer enjoys direct access to God through Christ, without the intervention of the Church—and its formal principle the supreme authority of Holy Scripture, were alike foreign to the spirit of this theology, which accordingly found no congenial home in the Reformed Churches. Yet it had too deeply struck its roots wholly to disappear. The first Reformers, while protesting against its Pelagian tendencies, made use of its terms and received arguments—they could not do otherwise if they were to be understood ; and to this day we employ its language without perhaps suspecting whence it is derived. No writer is appealed to with greater deference by the Protestant theologians of the seventeenth century than Thomas Aquinas. But though the scholastic theology continued to furnish the shell of theological discussion, it lost its power as a living system.

It was the Reformation that gave birth to what we now mean by the term ‘ dogmatic theology.’ The public confessions on either side —such as that of Augsburg, with its Apology, on the one, and the decrees of the Council of Trent, with its Catechism, on the other—are in reality compendiums of this science, of no mean literary merit, a praise especially due to the Romish Catechism. At an early period of the movement Melanchthon's *Loci Communes* (A.D. 1521) appeared, a work pronounced by Luther to be worthy of admission into the Canon ; it was much enlarged, and in some points of doctrine modified, in subsequent editions. The most distinguished commentator on it, and indeed the chief Lutheran theologian of that century, was Martin Chemnitz, whose *Loci*, and especially his *Examen Concilii Tridentini*, are classical works. The school of Melanchthon occupied a middle position between the fully developed Lutheranism of the *Formula Concordiæ*, drawn up A.D. 1579, and the doctrine of the Swiss Calvinistic Churches. For these latter Calvin performed the same service which Melanchthon had done for the Lutheran ; and in his *Institutes* produced a work which for lucidity and philosophical depth surpassed all similar attempts of that age, and exercised a vast influence throughout the Reformed Churches of Europe, our own not excepted. It has not been superseded by any subsequent work on the same basis, viz., the doctrine of absolute predestination.[1]

The seventeenth century was the scholastic age of Protestant theology, and witnessed its most important productions. Such works as the *Loci* of J. Gerhard (best edition that of Cotta, 1762–81, in twenty quarto vols.), and the *Theologia Didactica-Polemica* of A. J. Quenstedt (died 1688), remind us of the labours of Albert the Great and Aquinas ; but they are in a great measure free from the defects which have consigned their predecessors to the shelf. Equally exhaustive in their treatment, they are far more Scriptural, and less prone to indulge in idle subtleties. With these lights of the Lutheran Church are to be associated the names of Baier, Buddeus, and Hollaz (the two latter of the next century) ; while the Reformed Church may boast of such writers as Beza, Gilbert

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[1] [The basis of Calvin's *Institutes* was nothing so narrow as the doctrine of absolute predestination, but rather the absolute sovereignty of Almighty God in Creation, Redemption, and Judgment as revealed in the teaching of Holy Scripture. Editor.]

Voetius, and F. Turretin. It is from the writers of this period that the student will derive the most solid instruction.

The Romish Church has never been so productive as the Protestant in this branch of theology. Two great theologians, however, she possesses—Bellarmine and Bossuet: the former a controversialist, armed at all points, and though not always fair in his statement of the opinions he opposes, eminent for learning and acuteness; the latter of classic rank in the literature of his country.[1]

The history of dogmatic theology in recent times is its history in Germany; for in England, with the exception of some isolated treatises, little attention has been paid to the subject. After the dreary reign of rationalism, of which the works of Wegscheider and Bretschneider, at the beginning of this century, may be taken as the culminating point, there has been an auspicious revival of the old orthodox theology, under a form more suited to modern taste: among others of less note, Nitzsch, Twesten, Thomasius, Philippi, and Martensen deserve honourable mention as having contributed to the change. None of these would dissemble their obligations to the celebrated Schleiermacher, who, though he can hardly find a place in the ranks of orthodoxy, yet, by recalling attention to the fact that the true basis of dogmatic theology is to be sought in the inner life of the Church, communicated an impulse in the right direction, which has been widespread and lasting. But for the history of recent German theology the reader is referred to works which expressly handle that subject.[2]

It remains briefly to notice the arrangements that have been adopted by different writers. The ordinary one, for a long time, was that of *Loci*, or heads: thus J. Gerhard's great work treats, in order, of Scripture, Person and Work of Christ, Creation, Freewill, Justification, Sacraments, Church, Christian Ministry, Civil Magistrate, Wedlock, Death, Resurrection and Judgment, and a Future State. The want of a central governing principle in this method produced attempts at a more scientific one, and the *Loci* gave place to systems such as that of Calvin, who treats, first, of God the Creator; secondly, of Christ the Redeemer; thirdly, of the Holy Ghost; and lastly, of the Church —an arrangement evidently founded on the Apostles' Creed: or that of Quenstedt—1. The end of Theology (God); 2. Its subject (man); 3. The sources of salvation (Christ); 4. The means of salvation (Church, etc.). The trichotomy of the Apostles' Creed, the doctrine concerning the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, has been recently revived as

[1] See especially his *Histoire des Variations*, etc.

[2] As, for example, Farrar's Bampton Lectures.

a foundation by Marheineke and Martensen ; it is however open to objection, as more suited to the dogmatic theology of the Greek than to that of the Protestant Church. The method of *Loci*, on the whole, offers as many advantages as any other ; and in the present work, at any rate, which is intended to be indirectly a commentary on the Thirty-Nine Articles, seems the appropriate one. The topics, however, may be disposed in a natural order. The first thing, obviously, is to settle what is the supreme authority in matters of faith, or the Rule of Faith ; Christian Theism, including the Holy Trinity, naturally follows ; the the State of Man unfallen and fallen, with a section on the Angels ; and then the Person and Work of the Redeemer.

THE RULE OF FAITH

'Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation: so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an Article of Faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation. In the name of Holy Scripture we do understand those Canonical books of the Old and New Testament of whose authority was never any doubt in the Church. . . . And the other books (as Hierome saith) the Church doth read for example of life and instruction of manners; but yet it doth not apply them to establish any doctrine. . . . All the books of the New Testament as they are commonly received, we do receive, and account them Canonical' (Art. vi).

'The Old Testament is not contrary to the New: for both in the Old and the New Testament everlasting life is offered to mankind by Christ, who is the only Mediator between God and Man. Wherefore they are not to be heard which feign that the old Fathers did look only for transitory promises. . . . The Law given from God by Moses, as touching ceremonies and rites, does not bind Christian men, nor the civil precepts thereof ought, of necessity, to be received in any commonwealth' (Art. vii.)

'The three Creeds, Nicene Creed, Athanasian Creed, and that which is commonly called the Apostles' Creed, ought thoroughly to be received and believed: for they may be proved by most certain warranty of Holy Scripture' (Art. viii).

'The Church hath power to decree rites and ceremonies, and authority in controversies of faith: and yet it is not lawful for the Church to ordain anything that is contrary to God's Word written, neither may it so expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another. Wherefore although the Church is a witness and keeper of Holy Writ, yet, as it ought not to decree anything against the same, so besides the same ought it not to enforce anything as necessary to salvation' (Art. xx).

'When they (General Councils) be gathered together (forasmuch as they be an assembly of men whereof all be not governed by the Spirit and Word of God), they may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining to God. Wherefore things ordained by them, as necessary to salvation, have neither strength nor authority, unless it may be declared that they be taken out of Holy Scripture' (Art. xxi).

'Credimus unicam regulam et normam, secundum quam omnia dogmata omnesque doctores æstimari et judicari oporteat, nullam omnino aliam esse quam Prophetica et Apostolica scripta quum Veteris tum Novi Testamenti. . . . Hoc modo luculentum discrimen inter sacras Veteris et Novi Testamenti literas et omnia aliorum scripta retinetur, et sola scriptura S. judex, norma, et regula, cognoscitur, ad quam ceu ad Lydium lapidem omnia dogmata exigenda sunt et indicanda, an pia, an impia, an vero, an falsa, sint. Cætera autem symbola, et alia scripta, non obtinent auctoritatem judicis hæcenim dignitas solis Sacris Literis debetur), sed duntaxat pro religione nostra testimonium dicunt, eamque explicant, ac ostendunt quomodo singulis temporibus Sacræ Literæ in articulis controversis in ecclesia Dei a doctoribus qui tum vixerunt intellecta et explicata fuerint' (Form. Concord., lib. symb. Eccl. Luth., edit. Francke).

'Credimus scripturas canonicas utriusque Testamenti ipsum verum esse verbum Dei: et autoritatem sufficientem ex semet ipsis non ex hominibus habere. Et in hac scriptura S. habet universalis Christi Ecclesia plenissime exposita quæcunque pertinent cum ad salvificam fidem tum ad vitam Deo placentem recte informandam. Nihil dissimulamus quosdam Vet. Test. libros a veteribus nuncupatos esse Apocryphos, ab aliis Ecclesiasticos, utpote quos in ecclesiis legi voluerunt quidem, non tamen proferri ad auctoritatem ex his fidei confirmandam. Illam duntaxat Scripturæ S. interpretationem pro orthodoxa et genuina agnoscimus quæ ex ipsis est petita scripturis (ex ingenio utique ejus linguæ, in qua sunt scriptæ, secundum circumstantias item expensæ, et pro ratione locorum vel similium, vel dissimilium plurium quoque et clariorum expositæ) cum regula fidei et caritatis congruit' (Conf. Helv., lib. symb. Eccl. Ref., edit. Augusti).

'Confitemur sanctos Dei viros divino afflatos spiritu locutos esse. Postea vero Deus . . . servis suis mandavit ut sua illa oracula scriptis consignarent' (Conf. Bel. iii., *ibid.*).

'Profitemur nos amplecti sacras canonicas . . . S. S. . . . instinctu Spiritus S. primitus scriptas. (Dec. Thor. i., *ibid.*).

The subject of the Rule of Faith does not, in our Articles, occupy its proper place, which, as is evident, should be antecedent to the discussion of particular doctrines. As it forms a main point of controversy between the Romish and the Reformed Churches, the compilers were probably actuated by the laudable desire of exhibiting the common faith of Christians on the doctrines of the Holy Trinity, and the Person and Work of Christ, before noticing differences. But in a system of dogmatic theology, such an arrangement is out of place. If the symmetry of the system is to be preserved, and the subordinate doctrines to be properly estimated, the depository of the faith must be ascertained before its contents become matter of discussion. The doctrine of our Church, in common, as has been seen, with the foreign Protestant Churches on this point, is that Holy Scripture, by which is to be understood the Canonical books of the Old and New Testaments, is, as having been given by inspiration of God, the sole Rule of Faith (*norma credendi*), and the supreme judge of controversy ; and further, that whatsoever is necessary to salvation may be plainly and sufficiently read therein, or proved thereby. This general statement branches out into several particulars.

3. *The Canon of Scripture*

By the word Canon (*κανών*) was meant, originally, not a catalogue of the inspired writings, but the fundamental doctrines of Christianity which were to be a rule, or guide, in public teaching. These sometimes, as in the Apostles' Creed, appear in short summaries, sometimes are referred to by writers (Irenæus, Tertullian, etc.) as well known and acknowledged by the Churches. It is in this sense that St. Paul calls the measure of divine truth which the Philippian Church had attained to a Canon (Phil. iii. 16). Since this Canon of truth, whether inward in the heart, or expressed in writing, derived all its validity from its presumed correspondence with the teaching of the Apostles, and since this latter, after their decease, could be found with certainty only in their writings, it became a matter of vital moment to ascertain, with all care and diligence, what were those writings, which, when collected together, might for ever form an authentic record of Apostolic doctrine. The result of this pious labour is the volume of our New Testament, all the books of which we receive as they are commonly acknowledged. As regards the Old Testament, we accept the judgment of its proper historical guardians, and consequently exclude some of the books which the Council of Trent (Sess. iv.) admits, but which the Jews did not acknowledge as on a level with the others. The whole, as forming the standard of faith and morals, came to be called the Canon, and the writings contained in it Canonical.

For the history of the formation of the Canon of the New Testament, or rather of the evidence to its existence from an early age (for the actual process of its formation is involved in obscurity), the reader is referred to works which treat expressly of the subject, such as Westcott *On the Canon*, and especially Kirchhofer's excellent work. For our present purpose, a mere sketch will be sufficient.

We observe, then, that from the first our present books are cited as Scripture, that is, as books *sui generis*, possessing an authority which belonged to no others ; that they were publicly read in Christian assemblies as the Word of God ; that catalogues were formed of them, of which thirteen, of a date previous to the fifth century, are extant, and which, though in some of them certain books are omitted, all agree in containing no other ; and that the oldest version, the Peshitta, contains these and no others. Commentaries were written on them, and they were appealed to by heretics and unbelievers (with few exceptions) as well as by orthodox writers, as authentic records of the Christian religion.

Notwithstanding this general agreement as to what books were to be accounted canonical, it is impossible to assign the particular time when the collection was made, or the persons who were engaged in it. No traces exist of this question having been formally discussed in any Council ; that of Laodicea, A.D. 364, which has been improperly supposed to have fixed the Canon, merely giving a catalogue of the books already received. Unlike the books of the Old Testament, those of the New were addressed to Churches scattered over the known world : time, therefore, was needed, both for a circulation of the books and for a general recognition of their authority. When to this we add the difficulties of transcription and communication, and the political disadvantages under which for several centuries Christianity laboured, preventing the assembling of any Council to determine this and similar questions it cannot be a matter of surprise that the Canon should only gradually have assumed its present form.

One circumstance that must have retarded the work was the swarm of Apocryphal writings which appeared soon after the Apostolic age, and which commonly laid claim to Apostolic origin. To sift the evidence for these spurious compositions must have been a work of no small difficulty ; and it speaks highly for the diligence and judgment of the early Church, that none of them appears in its catalogues, is quoted as Scripture by the Fathers of that age, or was read in the assemblies of Christians.

The books which Eusebius, a writer of great research and impartiality (A.D. 315) calls ὁμολογουμένοι, that is, universally and without controversy admitted, are our present ones, with the exception of the Epistle to the Hebrews, that of St. James, that of St. Jude, the second of St. Peter, the second and third of St. John, and the Apocalypse : these, he says, were questioned by some, though received by the majority.[1] They are just such as, from their nature or contents, we might expect to have been of tardier recognition. For either, like the Epistle to the Hebrews, those of St. James and St. Jude, and the Apocalypse, they do not expressly assert their Apostolic origin ; or, like the second and third of St. John, they were addressed to individuals, which evidently would render it more difficult to prove their genuineness. Whatever may be the deficiency of evidence for these books, it must never be forgotten that it is comparative, and that those for which there is the least, rest on testimony incomparably stronger than can be adduced for any Apocryphal writing. Nor must it be forgotten that the very hesitation and reserve with which the disputed books were received adds weight to the judgment of the early Church, where it was unanimous. From the candidly-expressed doubts of the first three centuries in regard to some books we derive the same benefit in estimating the claims of the rest as we do, on the fact of our Lord's resurrection, from the incredulity of St. Thomas.

Nevertheless, these disputed books cannot be placed exactly on the same level with the rest. We admit them into the Canon as, on the whole, sufficiently attested, but we cannot now repair the disadvantage under which they labour, as having been not universally accepted by the ancient Church. The doubts which were then felt propagate themselves, unless fresh evidence should come to light, which is not likely. Comparatively, therefore, with the others they occupy, as regards the external testimony, an inferior position, and on this account have sometimes received the name of Deutero-Canonical.[2]

The Canon of the New Testament being established, that of the Old to us Christians at once follows. For by our Lord and the Apostles our present books of it are quoted and classified, and no others. Amidst the censures that Christ directed against the Jews of that age, he never charged them with adding to or corrupting their Scriptures. By their traditions they frequently 'made the Word of God of none effect,' but the Word itself they left intact. Tradition points to the return from the Babylonish captivity as the time when the task was undertaken of collecting the books, which, after the destruction of the temple, had become dispersed; and the same tradition makes Nehemiah and Ezra, especially the latter, principal agents in the prosecution of the task. To the collection thus formed, whether by Ezra or not, his own writings, together with those of Nehemiah and Malachi, that were written before Ezra's death, were added, and the Canon of the Old Testament completed. It was, with the exception of a few insignificant sects, acknowledged by the Jews throughout the world. Though a number of apocryphal writings, most of them of Alexandrian origin, appeared subsequently to the last of the prophets, and some became incorporated in the Septuagint translation, it does not appear that even in Egypt they ever obtained canonical authority, and certainly not among the Jews of Palestine. It was, therefore, in disregard of the unanimous tradition of the appointed guardians of the Old Testament, as well as of the facts of history, that the Church of Rome pronounced, at the Council of Trent, that all the books contained in the Vulgate, apocryphal or otherwise, should, under pain of an anathema, be accounted as sacred and Canonical (Sess. iv., c. 1).

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[1] *Eccl. Hist.*, lib. iii. 27.

[2] 'Ubi desunt primæ et veteris ecclesiæ firmæ, et consentientes testificationes, sequens ecclesia, sicut non potest ex falsis facere vera, ita *nec ex dubiis potest certa facere*' (Chemnitz, *Exam. Con. Trid.*, lib. i., 22).

We now proceed to the properly dogmatical aspect of the question. On what grounds, let us ask, do we receive a book as canonical ? The ultimate ground can be no other than our conviction that it is, or contains, the Word of God ; in other words, that (to speak at present only of the New Testament) it is an authentic record, written under special inspiration of the Holy Spirit, of the Christian revelation. This, however, only leads the way to the further question, How do we arrive at this conviction ? And the reply of the Romish Church is that the authority of Scripture depends on the decision of the Church ; or, in other words, that the canonicity of a book is to be admitted because the Church affirms it. It is true that this is not openly avowed in the decisions of the Council of Trent, but it is virtually assumed. For when the Council anathematizes all who do not receive as sacred and canonical, *e.g.*, the books of Tobias, Judith, and Wisdom, and the two books of the Maccabees, which notoriously never had a place in the Jewish Canon (the original Hebrew), and were never unanimously accepted by the ancient Christian Church, but, on the contrary, were rejected by those Fathers who were acquainted with Hebrew, and who made the subject their special study,[1] it is obvious that it claims the power of fixing the Canon by its own plenary authority. It is only an accident how far the power may be exercised. The Council stops short at certain books which, no doubt, have been esteemed in the Church; but the principle may be extended to any books, whatever their contents or the attestation they enjoy. For the principle is, that the existing Church of Rome is the final court of appeal to decide what books are to be esteemed Canonical and what not.

Against this principle the Reformed Churches protest. In the first place, whatever may be the functions of the Church in this matter, it is certainly not the existing Romish Church, nor the Romish Church of the sixteenth century, from which we receive the Canon, but from that early Church which makes no pretensions to be an independent, infallible authority, but exercises its functions only in connection with the facts of history. The Tridentine Fathers were in no better position to determine these questions than we are. But, in the next place, the Reformers denied that *any* Church, or even the Church Catholic, possesses the authority claimed. By them the office of the Church, in relation to Scripture, is defined to be 'a keeper and a witness'; a keeper inasmuch as to its custody the sacred records are committed, to be jealously guarded from addition, mutilation, or deprivation; and a witness inasmuch as it is incumbent on the Church to hand down, from age to age, the chain of evidence which proves these books, and no others, to have been from the first acknowledged.

So far, no doubt, it is the Church that first introduces her members to the knowledge of the Bible, and, moreover, accompanies this introduction with her own testimony to its supernatural origin and priceless value; but this is a very different thing from assuming a power to *make* a book canonical by a simple authoritative decision. The Church, in this matter, discharges an office similar to that of the Samaritan woman in John iv, who invited her fellow-townsmen to come and see a man who had told her all that ever she did: she was the means, or occasion, of their becoming acquainted with the Messiah, but she did not make Him what He was, nor could she produce saving faith in them: they believed, when they did believe, not because of her saying, but because they had heard Him themselves, and perceived that it was indeed the Christ. The Scripture is never fully received on its proper grounds until a similar personal experience is wrought in its readers.

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[1] *E.g.*, Jerome, whose catalogue agrees with ours. The apocryphal books found an entrance into the LXX version, and thence passed into the Old Latin translation; from which they were received into the Vulgate.

It must not be dissembled that the witness of the Church to the canonicity of a book comes to us with a great weight of authority (authority in the classical sense of the word *auctoritas*, viz., prevailing moral influence), though not with that claimed for it by the Council of Trent ; but it is important to point out wherein this authority lies. The nearness of the primitive Church to Apostolic times, its knowledge of the original language, the sources of evidence then probably accessible which now no longer exist, and other like external advantages over us, are no doubt of great moment ; but they by no means exhaust the question. If they did, then *any* body of historical testimony, say of heathen writers possessing the same advantages, would be of equal value.

The witness of the Church is valuable because it is the witness of the *Church ;* that is, of the body which possesses, by covenant promise, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, the same Divine agent who inspired the books. The Church, therefore, of the Apostolic age had a spiritual tact and perception which, independently in a measure of the external testimony, enabled it to discriminate between the genuine writings of the Apostles, or Apostolic men, and spurious compositions. It was by its exercise that such a writing as the Epistle to the Hebrews, of which the human author, the *auctor secundarius*, is doubtful, gained admittance into the Canon, while others bearing the names of eminent Apostles were rejected. Neither species of evidence produced its full effect apart from the other : the historical led to the internal, and the internal confirmed the historical ; a reciprocal action was constantly going on, the result of which was the final settlement of the Canon. This process of mutual confirmation belongs to the evidences themselves of Christianity, and is nothing but what occurs in the departments of art and literature. For example, a picture by Raphael commends itself at once to a cultivated taste ; and a cultivated taste, without knowing the painter assigns such a picture to the bloom, not to the decadence, of the art.

And this internal evidence, the *testimonium Sancti Spiritus* in Scripture, is ever repeating itself, and is as valid now as it was in the first century. For the presence of the Holy Ghost is not limited to any age of the Church ; we, too, believe that we enjoy His gracious influences, and with them the power of discerning the voice of the Spirit in Scripture. A book written by an Apostle, in the exercise of his office, strikes a corresponding chord in the spiritual mind ; and a spiritual mind, even if the name of the author be not certainly known, feels no hesitation in accepting the testimony of the early Church as to its Apostolic parentage. The external evidence, say the Protestant theologians, can only produce an historical faith (*fides humana*) ; the witness of the Holy Spirit in Scripture itself is the source of the *fides divina*, or spiritual persuasion ; and on this, in the last resort, our conviction of its being the Word of God must be founded. So it is, in fact. The Holy Spirit in the Word, and the Holy Spirit in the heart, answer one to the other as sound and echo, or voice to voice. Christians have the mind of Christ, and therefore know, as none else can, the things of the Spirit, that is of Christ (John xvi. 14 ; 1 Cor. ii. 14, 16) ; and the testimony thus furnished by Scripture itself is direct and conclusive, it being presupposed that the external testimony corroborates, or does not militate against it. Those who disparage this source of conviction may be asked how otherwise are the laity, who have neither time nor ability for learned researches, ever to arrive at a happy persuasion that the words they read are a message from God ?

From the foregoing observations it will be seen how the inference, that because in a certain sense, we rely upon the Church to declare what is Scripture we are therefore bound to receive implicitly all else that the Church teaches, is to be met. As *against Rome* the reply is sufficient that we do not, in fact, receive the Scriptures on the testimony of the Romish Church ; but the question may arise in reference to the early Church, on whose testimony we do acknowledge that we rely in this matter. The answer, then, must be that the office, even of the early Church, is here only ministerial, not finally authoritative ; it is but the outer tabernacle through which we pass to the Holy of Holies, not the very interior sanctuary itself. The Church presents us with the book, but this does not necessarily imply that she has succeeded in exhibiting in her faith or practical system a true reflection of its contents. The Jews scrupulously guarded and handed down their sacred books, but failed to read them so as to correct their prevalent errors of faith and practice ; they handed down, in fact, their own condemnation. And so it is with the Christian Scriptures. The Church of every age that transmits them in their integrity, hands down, consciously or unconsciously, the antidote to its errors, if such there be ; and must submit to be tested by this unerring standard.

We are grateful for the care with which the sacred touchstone has been preserved and conveyed to us ; but once in possession of it, we apply it without hesitation to test the Christianity even of the transmitters—even as our Christianity of the present day may undergo a similar ordeal at the hands of our successors, and by a similar application of the Divine standard which we religiously cherish. The Bible may not have spoken its last word to the early Church ; and it may be equally true that it has by no means done so to modern Christendom.

In short, the two questions are altogether distinct, Has the Church faithfully discharged her office of keeper and witness of Holy writ ? and Is her practical interpretation of it a correct one ? We may thankfully reply to the former in the affirmative, while suspending our judgment as regards the latter. Nor would the early Church itself have demanded more at our hands. A Cyprian, a Chrysostom, or an Augustine, may not be safe guides on all points, but they would have been the first to say, Here is the inspired volume which we have received from our predecessors, and to which we, in our turn, bear testimony ; let whatever we write be judged by it, and accepted or rejected accordingly.

That the doctrine of the witness of the Holy Spirit to His own Word may be misapplied is true. It is so when a professed discerning of the mind of the Spirit in a book is held of itself to warrant its admission into the Canon : or, to state the same thing from its converse side, if, because we fancy we do not discern the Holy Spirit in a book, we conclude that we are at liberty to reject it ; as Luther rejected the Epistle of St. James because it did not come up to his conception of what a canonical book should be. But the error lies, as is often the case, not in the principle itself, but in the misuse of it. A book which comes down to us, on probable testimony, as the work of an Apostle, written in the exercise of his office, or under his immediate superintendence, and on that ground assigned a place in the Canon by the early Church, cannot be set aside on the adverse judgment of any individual Christian. For if such a one should profess that he discerns in it no trace of inspiration, the answer must be, that no individual Christian possesses a monopoly of the Holy Spirit, and that it is more probable that he should be mistaken than that the whole Church should have gone wrong. It would be a serious thing indeed were the whole Church to come round to his opinion ; but this is exactly what has never happened in the case of any canonical book. We must believe, then, that it was Luther's own fault if he failed to find spiritual nutriment in the Epistle of St. James, rather than that the epistle itself is deficient in internal evidence.

We must not put asunder what God has joined together, or invert the order which Divine Providence has established in this matter. The Epistle of St. James, or the Apocalypse, reaches our hands as part of the Canon, admitted into it by that age which had the best means of deciding on its pretensions, and accepted by all Christian Churches. It comes therefore with a *prima facie* weight of evidence in its favour—evidence, as we must believe, partly founded, as regards those who admitted the book, on the very same internal witness of the Holy Spirit which we profess to rely upon. From this its position it cannot be deposed except by a verdict of the Church universal ; and this cannot now be expected, partly on account of the divisions that prevail in Christendom, and partly because the historical evidence on which the early Church decided is, in a great measure, no longer extant : a plain intimation of Providence, that we are not to make our private—or in modern phrase 'subjective'—notions the sole ground of our acceptance or rejection of a book. And thus, though the external attestation and the internal testimony are not the same, and the one is not complete without the other, we are warranted in believing that no one who, taking into his hands a book which has been received as Canonical by the whole Church, proceeds in a humble and devout spirit to study its contents, will eventually fail to perceive therein the witness of the Holy Spirit.

It must be admitted that in some instances it is the external testimony on which we have chiefly to rely. It might, *e.g.*, be difficult to maintain that the Books of Joshua and Ruth, though we place them in the Canon, reflect their own light, or convey a conviction of their origin, so forcibly as the Gospel of St. John, or the Epistles of St. Paul ; and the same may be said of some books even of the New Testament as compared with others. The testimony of the Holy Spirit is in these more latent, does not appeal so directly to the spiritual instinct, and therefore we are compelled to make up for the deficiency by leaning more upon the historical attestation.

It is to be noted, finally, that there is reason to believe that the office of inspired men was not merely to write themselves as the Holy Spirit prompted, but to authenticate the writings of their predecessors ; a circumstance which may be thought to be hinted at in the well-known passage of Josephus (*Cont. Apion*, i. 8) : 'From the time of Artaxerxes to the present day, books of various kinds have appeared, but they are not esteemed of equal authority with the more ancient, because since that time the legitimate succession of prophets has failed.' As long as this succession continued, inquirers had an infallible authority to appeal to on the question whether a book was to be deemed canonical or not. Every reader of the Old Testament will have observed how often passages from the earlier prophets are quoted by the later ones, and thus receive an inspired attestation. In like manner St. Peter authenticates St. Paul's epistles ; and it was doubtless ordered by Divine Providence that St. John should survive to see the Canon of the New Testament virtually completed, and to give it his imprimatur.

4. *The Inspiration of Scripture*

In the preceding section the questions have been : What books constitute the volume of Holy Scripture? and What has been, and is, the office of the Church in the fixing of the Canon ? The question now before us is, On what ground do we assign to the books, thus ascertained as supreme, authority in matters of faith and practice ? To the Christian, the books received in the first instance on the tradition of the Church commend themselves by the light which they impart, as the sun is seen by his own beams ; but a further question remains : What is the measure of the intensity of the light ? The witness of the Holy Spirit in the volume seals the witness of the Church ; but *to what extent* was the Holy Spirit an agent in its composition? this is the point which now demands consideration. And the answer is : The supreme authority of Holy Scripture rests on the presumption that its authors when they wrote did so under a special influence of the Holy Spirit, differing not merely in degree, but in kind from His ordinary influences ; to which special influence the Church has given the name of Inspiration.

The plenary[1] inspiration of Scripture is rather assumed than anywhere directly affirmed in our formularies ; probably because at the time no controversy on the point had arisen, at least between the great contending divisions of Christendom. If there ever was a general consent of the Church Catholic on any question, it exists on this. East and West, from the earliest to the latest times, concurred in assigning to Scripture a pre-eminence which consisted in its being —as no other collection of writings is—the Word of God. The foreign Protestant Confessions (more explicit than our own on this point), take up the sacred tradition ; and the Church of Rome is in substantial agreement with them. That Church, as we think, has on insufficient grounds added to the number of Canonical books ; she has, in our opinion, improperly made tradition a co-ordinate authority with Scripture ; but the books which she does receive she with us assigns to the special inspiration of the Holy Spirit. It is, next to our common acceptance of the doctrines contained in the three creeds, one of the links that connect us with that Church, and makes a reconciliation at any rate within the range of possibility. From this it will be seen that it is the province of dogmatic theology not so much to prove the inspiration of Holy Scripture—for no Christian Church, as a Church, least of all our own, doubts the fact—as to define and explain what is meant by it, and to attempt to meet objections which may be urged against the received doctrine on the subject.

And, first, let the meaning of the term ‘ inspiration,’ as applied to Scripture, be fixed ; fixed for the purposes of this discussion. The etymology conveys simply the notion of ‘ in-breathing,’ or the communication of Divine influence ; for what special purpose is determined by the nature of the result. Thus Bezaleel is said to have been inspired for the work of the tabernacle (Exod. xxxi. 3) ; Moses was inspired to give the law, David to compose Psalms, the Prophets to admonish and to predict, the Apostles to preach and lay the foundations of the Church. In one of our Collects we ourselves pray for the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. The expression therefore ‘ inspiration of Scripture ’ admits of a variety of meaning : it may, *e.g.*, be understood as simply affirming that a peculiar religious geniality pervades a book : or, in a more definite sense, that the authors of certain books did indeed enjoy the privilege of a special Divine assistance as men, but not particularly so as writers ; and that this is enough to account for the position of pre-eminence which the Church assigns to Holy Scripture.

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[1] This descriptive epithet is on many grounds to be preferred to ‘ verbal.’

What was the nature and extent of the Divine influence which prompted, or superintended, those of the Apostles who did write, in the particular act of *writing ?* Was it something, if not beyond yet distinct from their general endowment of inspiration ; or was their writing such and such books merely the natural efflorescence of the latter ? As we may say, Milton was a great genius, and, therefore, naturally threw off the ‘ Paradise Lost.’ Was there, in short, a commission to write as well as to teach ? The hinge of the controversy really turns on the answer to these questions.

No little difficulty has been introduced into the subject by the indiscriminate use of the words ‘ revelation ’ and ‘ inspiration.’

It is obvious that the mode of the operation of the Holy Spirit on the mind of a writer is a matter quite beyond our ken ; the result is all that is cognizable by or concerns us. The result, then, in the case of the inspired writings, is such a combination of Divine with human agency as renders them at once Divine and human.

The older theory of plenary inspiration which makes the sacred writers to have been merely amanuenses, or passive organs, of the Holy Spirit—the theory which in modern times has received the name of mechanical—has not been able to maintain its ground. The writings of the several authors are strongly marked by the peculiar colouring which the abilities, education, or natural temperament of each were calculated to impart. An epistle of St. Paul could never be mistaken for one of St. John, and St. Peter, in his manner, resembles neither of those Apostles. Each has his own peculiar—shall we say favourite ?—topics, and expresses himself in his own way. The compositions themselves seem to have been the offspring of circumstances, and do not exhibit, on the part of their human authors, any preconceived plan. We must suppose, then, that the sacred writers, when under the influence of inspiration, were under no constraint in the exercise of their faculties, but wrote as men to men ; that the result, therefore, as it is the Word of God, is also, in a very real sense, the word of man. The Person of the Redeemer presents an analogy. He was truly God and truly man : his manhood was no docetic phantasm, but a reality (1 John i. 1) : but the mode of union is a problem which Christian speculation can hardly be said yet to have solved.

As an inference from Canonicity and Inspiration, the Protestant theologians are accustomed to predicate of Holy Scripture certain qualities, or attributes, which bear upon its fitness for the position which they assign to it in the Church ; such as truth, holiness, sufficiency, perspicuity, etc. Of these properties, perspicuity and sufficiency are of dogmatical import, and constitute points of controversy between the Protestant and the Romish Churches. With the former the subject of the present section, the Interpretation of Scripture, is intimately connected ; the latter will come before us in the following section.

In fact, a principal argument with writers of the Romish Communion against the fitness of Scripture to be the Rule of Faith is derived from its alleged obscurity ; of which they produce as evidence the variety of interpretations of which it seems capable ; both the Church and heretics appealing to it in support of their views, and in orthodox Christianity different sects, and even Churches, drawing different conclusions from the same book. As to individuals, can two Christians be found in absolute agreement as to the meaning of Scripture ? ‘ It is plain ’ (says Bellarmine) ‘ that Scripture is not *judex controversiarum*, because it admits of various senses ; nor can Scripture itself declare which is the true one. Besides, in every well-ordered state, the law and the judge are distinct. The law prescribes what is to be done, and the judge interprets the law, and decides accordingly. The question is about the interpretation of Scripture ; but it cannot interpret itself.’ And after him Möhler : ‘ It is one thing to say that Holy Scripture is the source of doctrine, and another that it is the judge in the determination of what is doctrine. It can no more be the latter than a code of laws is identical with the bench of judges ; judgment is given according to the code, but the code does not judge itself.’ In other words, Scripture needs a standing hermeneutical tribunal, invested with authority to declare its meaning as particular cases arise, without which it would be of little value. Such a tribunal is actually supplied in and through the Church ; whether by that term we are to understand the collective Episcopate, or general Councils, or the Pope, or the Pope and a Council combined.

As might be supposed, the Protestant Confessions speak otherwise, for how can Scripture be the Rule of Faith if its meaning is not apparent, at least on all essential points ? The following statement of a Polish Confession expresses the sentiment of all the Protestant Churches : 'In which Scriptures there is so much of what is plain and perspicuous that in them everything may be found that relates to faith and morals, or is necessary to salvation.' Accordingly, our own formulary declares that ' Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation ; so that whatsoever is not read therein, or may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an Article of Faith ' (Art. vi). It is true that *who* is to read Scripture and prove thereby is not here specified ; this is left to the common sense of those who accept the Article,[1] but it is plainly implied that *some one* can discover in the Scriptures statements plain enough to establish all the essential Articles of Faith, and this is all that is necessary for our present purpose. No doubt this ' some one ' may be affirmed to be a Council, or the Pope, or the ancient Church: but until it is proved that these, or any of them, possess by Divine right a power to see in Scripture what the ordinary Christian cannot see, of which we say that no proof exists,[2] the Article must retain its natural meaning,

It is hardly to be supposed that a collection of books which professes to contain a Divine revelation would be purposely written so as not to be understood. To demand reverence towards writings of this character would be to set up a kind of fetish-worship, and must be accounted wholly unworthy of Him from whom we believe them to have proceeded. The Scriptures, too (to speak at present only of the New Testament), were addressed not to schools of philosophers, nor even to the ministerial order exclusively, but to whole Churches, containing men of every degree of culture and ability. That they would be understood by these must have been the expectation of the writers ; and if they had been virtually in an ' unknown tongue,' the Apostle Paul, at least, would hardly have enjoined their being read in the public assemblies of Christians (Col. iv. 16 ; 1 Thess. v. 27 ; compare 1 Cor. xiv). Now, it is true that we, as compared with the early Christians, labour under some disadvantages for the understanding of these writings ; the language which was a living one to them, is to us no longer so ; allusions familiar to them present, it may be, difficulties now ; we possess not the advantage of living Apostles to explain their own statements ; and other sources of comparative obscurity exist. But by the providence of God, sufficient knowledge of the language, and of the history, private and public, of the times, has come down to us to put us, for all practical purposes, in the position of the first readers. And what difficulties do remain, cannot be supposed to affect the essentials of faith.[1]

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[1] ' Not a word is said ' (in Articles vi, xx) ' in favour of Scripture having no rule or method to fix interpretation by ; nor of the private judgment of the individual being the ultimate standard of interpretation ' (Tract 90, v. 1). True, but why should such a rule or method be supposed necessary in the case of Scripture more than in that of any other book ? And who can it be, after all, but an individual, or a company of individuals, that is to read and prove ?

[2] Art. xxi. On the Authority of General Councils.

Moreover, whatever the obscurity of Scripture may be, the question remains whether the sources we are referred to for its removal are themselves plainer. If it is the Creeds, their controversial clauses are, many of them, not very clear in meaning, and, at any rate, might be made the subject of prolonged debate ; if a catena of the Fathers, say of the first four centuries, it is doubtful whether, amidst conflicting statements, any consentient interpretation, except as regards a few leading passages, could be extracted from their works. In truth, of all species of tradition, the hermeneutical is the least capable of being reduced to form.[2] But, even if such did exist, it must be expressed in human language, the meaning of which itself would become subject to controversy ; the interpreters would need to be interpreted themselves, and so on *ad infinitum*. The truth is, it is not because of the obscurity of Scripture that so much controversy has arisen respecting its meaning, but because of the universal latent feeling that it is, or ought to be considered, the supreme Rule of Faith ; and if any other book, or formulary, were to occupy this position in its stead, there would be just as much dispute respecting *its* meaning. The controversy evidently would be endless, unless it could be referred at last to the decision of a living, infallible judge ; which is, in fact, the conclusion to which the Romanist is ultimately driven.

It is not, indeed, affirmed that Scripture contains no obscure passages —passages in which the allusion is not apparent, or the expression ambiguous, or the construction difficult, or the reasoning not at first sight clear, or which may be prophetical and await light to be thrown upon them by future events ; but this is only what occurs also in heathen authors, of whose general meaning we entertain no doubt. Scripture contains in itself a germinant principle, and what may be obscure, or not acted upon in one age of the Church, may come to full recognition in another. The teaching of St. Paul on the topics of original sin and predestination can hardly be said to have received its due attention before the appearance of that great luminary of the Western Church, Augustine ; nor the teaching of the same Apostle on justification, previously to the Reformation. It was not until much later that Christian men perceived that the principles enunciated in the Pauline Epistles are inconsistent with the institution of slavery, though the institution itself is never expressly condemned ; and efforts were made to remove the scandal. But these admissions are compatible with the conviction that on all the essential points of faith, morals and discipline, Scripture is sufficiently perspicuous, it being presupposed that the reader brings with him a willingness to receive what it seems plainly to teach.[1] And it may well be that some difficulties have been suffered to remain, in order to stimulate curiosity, and to lead to a more diligent study of the sacred volume.[2]

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[1] An important distinction is to be drawn between obscurity of the *subject-matter* and obscurity of the *expression*—*e.g.*, ‘ The Word became flesh ’ ; here the fact is most mysterious, but the language is plain enough. We see ‘ through a glass darkly ’ as regards many revealed facts, such as the Incarnation or the Holy Trinity ; but the question between Romanists and Protestants is not whether the *things* are obscure, but whether the *language* in which they are expressed is sufficiently plain.

[2] As is confessed by Möhler—‘ We could hardly, with the exception of a very few classical passages, discover in them (the Fathers) any general agreement of interpretation, beyond the fact that they all teach the same doctrine of faith and morals ’ (*Symb.*, p. 390). In truth, the prescription of the Council of Trent, ‘ Ut nemo contra unanimem consensum Patrum ipsam Scripturam sacram interpretari audeat ’ (sess. iv.), or any similar one, is incapable of fulfilment.

The Protestant rule of interpretation is thus enunciated in the Helvetic Confession : 'Scripture (as the Apostle Peter says) is not of private interpretation, consequently we do not approve of any and every interpretation, much less of that which the Romish Church imposes, but only of that which is sought out of Scripture itself (due regard being had to the original languages, etc.), and which agrees with the Rule of faith and charity. The interpretations of the Fathers and the definitions of Councils we do not undervalue, but neither do we assign to them unlimited authority. In matters of faith we admit but of one Judge, God Himself speaking through the Scriptures ; and as regards human opinions, the weight which we attach to them depends upon their being those of spiritually enlightened men.'[3] Here is stated the great Protestant Canon—SCRIPTURE IS ITS OWN AUTHENTIC INTERPRETER ;[4] on which, as against Rome, all the Protestant Churches are in agreement.

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[1] 'These Epistles' (St. Paul's) 'were certainly addressed to the whole Church, and were meant to be understood by men of average intelligence, who applied their attention properly. Their predestinarian meaning in parts is, on the whole, clear and decided, and the reason why their meaning is thought by many to be so very obscure and difficult to get at, is that they will not acknowledge this predestinarian meaning to be the true one. These interpreters create difficulties for themselves by rejecting the natural meaning of passages, and then lay the difficulty on the passages.' Mozley, *On Predestination*, note viii. The remark is applicable to many parts of Scripture, besides those relating to predestination.

[2] Magnifice et salubriter ita Spiritus S. Scripturas modificavit ut locis apertioribus fami occurreret, obscurioribus autem fastidia detergeret' (Augustine, *De doc. Christ.*, lib. ii. c. 7). Gerhard, *Loc.* ii. § 2.

[3] *Conf. Helv.*, i. c. 1.

[4] More explicitly enunciated in another part of the same confession, 'Hujus (scripturæ) interpretatio ex se ipsa sola petenda est, ut ipsa interpres sit sui, caritatis fideique moderante regulâ' (ii. 2).

This rule rests on a twofold foundation—the doctrine of inspiration, and the structure of the volume. Each book of Scripture being the Word of God, in a sense in which no other writing is, requires for an authentic interpretation of it an interpreter similarly gifted with the writer, and none such is or can be formed outside the Canon itself: to interpret the writings of St. Paul, so that the interpretation shall be free from possibility of error, can only be the work of another canonical writer; uninspired expositions may be valuable, but they can never be put on a level with the writing expounded. It might have been, however, that no inspired comment on another inspired writing could exist—that the Bible had been the production of one author; in which case, no doubt, the Protestant Canon would have been difficult of application. But here the structure of the volume comes to our aid. For, in fact, Scripture is not the production of a single writer (as regards its human authorship), but a collection of books by different authors, of various gifts and diversified religious experience, only connected together by the supernatural tie of inspiration. Hence, what is wanting in one may be supplied by another; and this is actually the case. The Levitical ritual is a system of dumb elements until we study it in conjunction with the Epistle to the Hebrews; the fourth Gospel could not have been dispensed with if we were to have a full portraiture of the Word become flesh; on the question of justification, St. Paul needs to be read with St. James, and both with St. John.

Now, the writing of each of these authors is really an interpretation of his coadjutor in the same field; not exactly an exposition—we cannot say that one writer comments on another—but yet really an interpretation in this sense, that the full meaning of the New Testament on any point cannot be gathered without a comparison of all the writers. And by this comparison it may be satisfactorily ascertained. If it is not St. John, or St. James commenting on St. Paul, it is the Holy Spirit Himself supplementing, through the individuality of St. John or St. James, what He had conveyed through the individuality of St. Paul; which latter, because it had been conveyed through an individual without obliterating his peculiarities of character and training, could not, without a needless miracle, present *all* the sides or aspects of Divine truth—the *πολυποίκιλος σοφία* of God (Ephes. iii. 10)—but needed the completion which it actually received from other inspired sources. Thus the books of the New Testament (to confine our attention to these) mutually interpret, and are interpreted by, each other; the structure of the volume points to its design and use; and relieves us from the necessity of seeking in other quarters than within itself instruction on the essentials of faith and practice.

The fundamental system of Christian doctrine thus elicited from a comparison of scripture with scripture, and of one book with another, is what writers on dogmatic theology call the 'analogy of faith,[1] in accordance with which doubtful passages are to be explained. It is obvious that this must be gathered from Scripture itself, otherwise it would be tradition under another name. It is not, however, a mere stringing of texts together on certain subjects, but the doctrine which lies at the foundation of the various passages which relate to a subject; substantially the same amidst the variety of forms under which it may be presented. That such a substantial identity may and must exist is an inference from the unity of the primary Author, the Holy Spirit: if the human authors, however otherwise differing from each other, derived inspiration from one source, no real contradiction, none at least affecting essential points, can be supposed possible. Whether the reader discovers this unity or not, depends more upon his moral and spiritual than upon his literary qualifications: Scripture is understood by the light itself imparts; but as the sun's rays shine in vain to the blind, so if the organ of spiritual vision be not in a sound state, it may well be that the meaning of Scripture shall be missed, or at least the analogy of faith not perceived. Nor is this without its analogy in merely human systems. The Platonic philosophy, for example, is a connected system; it is understood to lie at the foundation of the various treatises of Plato; statements or expressions in his writings which at first sight may seem to present difficulties are equitably interpreted by a reference to his philosophy as a whole; and some have not hesitated to say that no one can fully understand, still less be a successful commentator on these writings, whose intellectual and moral endowments are not in sympathy with those of the philosopher.[2]

But Romanists adduce not merely varieties of meaning in passages, but essential ambiguity in the language of Scripture; which latter may be literal and figurative, and figurative in many senses.[3] And so it may be, and is, in uninspired productions, without leading to real ambiguity. There seems to be, in fact, a confusion here between the meaning of a passage and the nature of the language employed; which latter may no doubt be figurative, or analogical, and yet not introduce a double sense. The instance adduced by Bellarmine, ‘ My sheep hear my voice ’ (John x. 27), is in point. Although the term ‘ sheep ’ is figurative, and needs to be explained from other passages, there is but one *meaning* to the passage. Or merely typical applications, or accommodations (intended as such by the Holy Spirit), are transformed into double senses : as the passage, ‘ Moses made a serpent of brass,’ etc. (Num. xxi. 8), which by our Lord is applied to Himself typically (John iii. 14) ; or ‘ A voice was heard in Ramah,’ etc. (Jer. xxxi. 15), which by the Evangelist is accommodated to the slaughter of the innocents by Herod (Matt. ii. 17, 18). But there is no real ambiguity in the meaning ; as there is in the famous oracle, *Aio te, Æacida, Romanos vincere posse.* Hence the hermeneutical Canon on the Protestant side, that each passage of Scripture admits, in the first instance, of *but one sense, and that the grammatical ;* and, indeed, it is plain that if *any* sense might be imposed on a passage, this would be tantamount to its having *no* definite sense ; and thus Scripture would become useless as a Rule of Faith.

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[1] Analogiam fidei, id est, vocem Spiritus S. in perspicuis locis sonantem (J. Gerhard, *Loc.* ii. c. 6). The expression is derived from Rom. xii. 6; where, however, it bears an altogether different meaning.

[2] 'Every man is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian' (Coleridge).

[3] 'Est Scripturæ proprium, quia Deum habet auctorem, ut sæpenumero duos contineat sensus, literalem sive historicum, et spiritualem sive mysticum' (Bellarmine, *De V. D.*, lib. iii. c. 3). The 'sensus literalis' is again divided into 'simplex' and 'figuratus'; the 'spiritualis' into 'allegoricus,' 'tropologicus,' and 'anagogicus' (*ibid.*); which are explained in the following distich:

'Littera gesta docet; quod credas Allegoria;
Moralis quid agas; quod speres Anagogia.'

There appears, therefore, nothing special in this case to warrant the assumption that a living infallible interpreter is necessary ; and we may add, that if such had been intended we should surely have been left in no doubt to what body, or individual, the authority is committed. But Romanists themselves are, or until lately were, not agreed on this point. Is then each reader to be the judge of the meaning of Scripture ? Properly understood, this is nothing but the truth. It must be the reader himself who is to judge ; and this whether he expects to extract the sense from the text itself, or betakes himself to an infallible interpreter ; for, even in the latter case, he must have previously convinced himself, by an exercise of his own judgment, that the interpreter is infallible. Directly or indirectly, the reader is the ultimate judge.

Standing tribunals, an infallible chair, would not be in harmony with a religion which aims at producing free conviction, and prefers an agreement gradually reached by conference, by study, by prayer, to one prematurely snatched by the submission of individual judgment to an external authority—that is, in fact, by the subjugation of reason and conscience to the mere ‘ subjectivity ’ of another. And thus, on the basis of the analogy of faith—‘One Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all ’ (Ephes. iv. 5, 6)—without the acknowledgment of which a Church would be no Church, but only a casual assemblage ; by preaching, by versions, by conferences, by commentaries, by treatises of all sorts, by private Christian intercourse, the meaning of Scripture is gradually approximated to, though never finally exhausted ;

in the way and by the methods intended by its Divine Author—methods not legally stringent, or authoritatively decisive, as might be suitable to the dispensation of the law, but living, plastic, spiritual, as becomes a dispensation of grace and truth (John i. 14), the manhood, not the infancy, of revealed religion (Gal. iv. 1, 15).

As regards the question of interpretation, no hermeneutical tradition either exists, or is necessary, to enable us to ascertain the meaning of Scripture. But there is another kind of tradition, to which, indeed, the name is more commonly applied, and which the Church of Rome asserts to be of equal authority with Scripture, viz., *additions* to the written Word, supposed to have come down from the Apostles by an independent channel. The traditions of the Church, the Council of Trent affirms, whether relating to faith or practice, are to be received with the same reverence as Holy Scripture itself.[1] There is an unwritten[2] as well as a written Word of God ; and the former was intended to run parallel with the latter, both conjointly forming the Church's Rule of Faith. As in the preceding section the perspicuity, so in the present the sufficiency, of Holy Scripture is the question in debate.

The Reformed Churches admit no such co-ordinate source of things to be believed as necessary to salvation. Ecclesiastical practices which have been handed down from antiquity, and are not repugnant to Scripture, they do not indiscriminately reject ; the decisions of Councils they do not undervalue ; the three Creeds they accept as agreeable to Scripture and venerable monuments of the faith of the early Church ; but none of these can claim to be the Word of God in the sense in which Scripture is, or, indeed, in any sense. 'No Word of God,' says one of the Protestant Confessions, 'at the present day exists, or can certainly be ascertained, concerning doctrines or precepts necessary to salvation, which is not written or based on the Scriptures, but has (as is alleged) been committed by unwritten tradition to the custody of the Church.'[3] The decision of the Tridentine Fathers is otherwise, and so is the statement of the principal theologian of their Church. 'The controversy between us and heretics' (Protestants), says Bellarmine, 'consists in this—that we assert that all necessary doctrine concerning faith and morals is not expressly contained in Scripture, and, consequently, besides the written Word there is needed an unwritten one ; whereas they teach that in the Scriptures all such necessary doctrine is contained, and consequently there is no need of an unwritten Word.'[1]

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[1] 'Pari pietatis affectu et reverentiâ' (sess. iv).

[2] Not that it was never committed to writing, for it is supposed to be found in the Fathers and other uninspired sources ; but that it was not committed to writing, like Scripture, by the first inspired author. 'Vocatur doctrina non scripta, non ea quæ nusquam scripta est, sed quæ non scripta est a primo auctore, exemplo sit Baptismus parvulorum' (Bellarmine, *De V. D.*, lib. iv. c. 2).

[3] *Dec. Thor. de Reg. Fid.*

The real question at issue must be clearly understood. A 'Word of God,' whether written or unwritten, conveys the idea of a revelation —something to be believed as an essential part of the Christian scheme. And it is in this sense that the expression is used in the Protestant Confessions, when they treat of this subject. 'Holy Scripture,' we say, 'containeth all things necessary to salvation; so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby is not to be required of any man that it should be *believed as an article of faith*' (Art. vi). It is not affirmed that rites and ceremonies, in themselves indifferent, should be summarily rejected if not literally found in Scripture; or that it is necessary to adduce express Scriptural authority for such as we retain. Hooker, long ago, successfully maintained against the Puritans that the Church possesses an inherent power to adapt her polity or ritual to changing circumstances, provided always that such ecclesiastical regulations are in harmony with the spirit of the Apostolic tradition as it is preserved in Scripture. She may be justified, for example, in introducing or retaining infant baptism, though no instance of it occurs in Scripture, and its express Apostolic origin may be doubtful, as 'agreeable to the institution of Christ' (Art. xxvii), or the general spirit of the Christian dispensation. 'Traditions and ceremonies' of this kind, if 'not repugnant to the Word of God,' are recognized as possessing a *relative* authority, so far as not to be needlessly infringed (Art. xxxiv); but they can with no propriety be termed part of the Word of God, or necessary to salvation. Whether retained or rejected, they stand on the lower ground of expediency or order. But these are the things which the Romish controversialist commonly adduces as instances of the 'unwritten Word of God'; a skilful extension of the term to what really does not come under it. The instances, for example, which Bellarmine relies on are, infant baptism (as distinguished from adult), the forty days' Lenten fast, and the use of the holy oil in baptism.[2] Would he himself have maintained that these things are necessary to salvation? or that a Church which does not practise them, or some of them, thereby cuts itself off from the body of Christ.[3]

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[1] *De V. D.*, lib. iv. c. 3.

[2] *De V. D.*, lib. iv. c. 9.

[3] Much confusion has arisen from the indiscriminate use of the word 'tradition' to signify either doctrines or ceremonies. 'Semper autem memoria repetendum est, statum disputationis Pontificiorum de traditionibus hunc esse:—Scripturam non omnia quæ ad *articulos fidei* et ad dogmata pietatis pertinent, habere, sed multa quæ ad *articulos fidei* necessaria sunt, credenda esse sine Scriptura, extra et præter Scripturam, ex traditionibus non scriptis' (Chemnitz, *Exam.*, lib. ii).

Confining our attention, then, to such tradition as may properly be termed the Word of God, the first question that we naturally ask is, Where is it to be found ? And the answer is precisely the same as in the case of hermeneutical tradition ; viz., that whether this unwritten word ever existed or not, that is, whether the Apostles taught more or otherwise than what is recorded in the canonical Scriptures, no church or individual is now in a position to adduce a syllable thereof with certainty. Bellarmine divides such traditions into those of which Christ Himself was the Author, those which the Apostles delivered, and those which the Church has made such[1] : nothing under any of the divisions can be produced which can establish its claims to be received as a gift to the Church, supplementary to what is contained in Holy Scripture. There is no evidence for the Apostolicity of such doctrines, as, *e.g.*, Purgatory, or the Immaculate Conception, or the Infallibility of the Pope ; and the decisions of the existing Church cannot supply the missing links of history.

It is desirable that there should be no misunderstanding on the point in debate. The vehicle of transmission is immaterial provided we have the same certainty in either case. The inspired oral teaching of the Apostles stood exactly on the same footing as their inspired written teaching : we pay no superstitious reverence to a book *as such*, that is, as distinguished from instruction conveyed orally. Let the tradition of the latter be authenticated as Scripture is, and we are ready to assign to it the same authority. It is not because they are unwritten, but because they cannot certainly be proved to be Apostolical, that traditions affecting the faith, not found in Scripture, or to be proved thereby, are to be rejected as an unwritten word ; and the sufficiency of Scripture is to be inferred from the fact, not that the words were traced with a pen, but that it is really the only Apostolical tradition which can with certainty be pronounced such. St. Paul tells the Corinthians that what he had received of the Lord he had delivered to them (1 Cor. xi. 23) ; he exhorts the Thessalonians to hold the traditions which they had been taught, whether by word or epistle (2 Thess. ii. 15), and to rebuke the brother that walked not after the tradition which he had received (2 Thess. iii. 6) ; he enjoins Timothy to hold fast the form of sound words which he had heard (2 Tim. i. 13) : either these (oral) traditions have irretrievably perished, or (as is the fact) they have passed, in another form, into the written Word, so that the Bible comprehends both the written and the unwritten Word of God, and we need not look further. In short, no Apostolical teaching is certainly extant except that which is embalmed in the New Testament ; and if any such were to be disinterred, it would be equivalent to the discovery of a new canonical book.

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[1] *De V. D.*, lib. iv. c. 2. The Church *makes* a tradition Apostolical, just as it claims the power to *make* a book canonical.

The first Christian Church was, no doubt, founded by the oral teaching of the Apostles, and continued for some time dependent on that oral teaching ; never, however, wholly without a written Word, for it had the Old Testament, and the Apostles were always careful to connect their teaching, as far as might be, with the Jewish Scriptures (Acts xvii. 2, 3, xviii. 28, xxviii. 23) ; but still, certainly, without New Testament Scriptures. And if it had been provided that a succession of Apostles, of men inspired as St. Paul and St. John were, should continue to the close of this dispensation, the Church could have been perpetuated, and preserved from error, as it was during the Apostles' life-time. This, however, was not the appointed plan. The men were to drop off in the course of nature and in succession and an Apostolate of the written Word was to take their place, the men surviving in their writings. This work commenced in due time, and continued through a series of years ; one Apostolical writing proving itself on and by another, until the Canon was complete. These writings may be obscure or defective, but it is certain that we have nothing else to rely upon as genuine Apostolical tradition.

And let us imagine what would be our tradition if, without a living Apostolate, we had nothing but a tradition of oral teaching to look to, no authentic record of what Christ and the Apostles delivered. We need not go far to form a prediction. The Jews held fast to their written Word, but as soon as ever they attempted to complete it by traditions, it was to make it void (Mark vii. 9). Certain Christian Churches retain, and profess to honour, the written Word ; but they have admitted the principle of tradition as a co-ordinate authority, and the practical aspect of their Christianity is not such as to recommend the principle It follows that a doctrine which professes to rest on unwritten tradition must be tested by its agreement with what we *know* to be Apostolical tradition, while we are not certain that anything else is ; and be accepted, or rejected, accordingly.

Pressed by these difficulties, the modern Romish controversialist modifies, by spiritualizing it, the idea of tradition. 'What,' asks Möhler,[1] 'is tradition ? It is that sentiment which belongs to the Church, and propagates itself by means of the teaching of the Church ; it is the living Word in the hearts of the faithful. To this sentiment the interpretation of Scripture in the decision of doubtful questions is entrusted ; or, in other words, the Church is the judge of controversies.

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[1] *Symbolik,* s. 38.

In an external historical form ' (where this is to be found Möhler does not attempt to explain), ' *i.e.*, reduced to writing, this inner sentiment becomes the standard and Rule of Faith. In every political community a certain national character or spirit distinguishes it from other communities, and expresses itself in the public and domestic life, the laws and customs, the art and literature, of the community. This is its guardian genius, and as long as it flourishes in pristine vigour, it preserves the continuity of the national life ; either absorbing into itself or expelling foreign elements, should they make their appearance. When it becomes feeble, internecine factions and party spirit split up the body politic, and the latter tends to its dissolution. How much more must this be the case with the Church which is the body of Christ, His perpetual incarnation, possessing a more refined and delicate organization than any earthly society. Here to allow private opinions or private interpretations of Scripture to prevail against the common sentiment would be suicide ; it is only to the whole body that the promises of its exalted Head belong, and to it alone therefore it appertains to decide.' Thus far Möhler.

It is obvious that this is a conception of tradition very different from that of Bellarmine ; and in fact, there is a great deal in it which the Protestant is not at all concerned to deny. For what is this ' common sentiment ' of the Church of which the gifted author speaks, but the spiritual illumination which is the fruit of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and which so far are Protestants from disparaging that, as we have seen (§ 3), they make it a necessary constituent in the argument for Canonicity.[1] And it is true that this gift belongs to the whole body, and to individuals as supposed to be members of the body. Moreover, it is certainly in its essence ' unwritten ' tradition, for its primary seat is the heart (2 Cor. iii. 3), from which it may never emerge in spoken or written forms. But is it an absolutely *independent* sentiment ? No, for if it is the work of the Holy Spirit it is so through the external instrument specially thereunto appointed—the written Word of God. Through this, as an instrument, mediately or immediately applied, the Holy Spirit calls the inner sentiment of the Church into being ; dissociated from the written Word such alleged sentiment, as experience amply proves is apt to become fanatical, or worse : it is not produced, nor can it be perpetuated, in its proper purity apart from the written Apostolic tradition. But what is thus dependent upon another thing can never stand alone ; it may, and it does, possess a *relative* independence, but the ultimate test of its genuineness must lie out of itself, viz., in the inner sentiment of those writings respecting which we stand in no doubt that they come from God. But it is worth while to dwell a little longer on this point.

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[1] Tradition, therefore, is an improper term to apply to it ; being a gift of grace, it is incapable of being handed down from one generation to another, as a book, a doctrine, or a practice can.

The oral teaching of the Apostles preceded their written, and the Church existed before the New Testament Scriptures. Strictly and formally, therefore, the Church cannot be said to be founded on the Scriptures as a book, but on the doctrine which the Scriptures contain.[1] And what was the order then is, by providential appointment, the order now—oral teaching precedes the written Word. Children receive the first lessons of Christianity from their parents, catechumens from their instructors, congregations from their pastors ; certainly the heathen from their missionaries. 'The Bible alone the religion of Protestants,' is a saying which, most true in its proper acceptation, may be misunderstood ; as, for example, if it be supposed to mean that scattering broadcast translations of the Scriptures is the appointed means of converting the heathen. And thus, no doubt, there may exist for a time a pure Christian faith amongst those who have never seen the Scriptures.[2] But not only has this oral teaching, if it is pure, been derived from the Scriptures, but is is the bounden duty of the Church along with it to place the inspired volume in the hands of the young within her pale, or of her heathen converts ; and to do so as soon as possible, in view of the too probable contingency of the enemy's sowing tares. Nay, a considerable part of the oral teaching itself must consist of simple exposition of the sacred text.

But as soon as this duty is fulfilled, there commences that healthy interaction between the Church and the Scriptures which was intended by their Divine Author ; the Church teaching, the Scriptures proving ; the Church speaking, no doubt, with authority (in the proper sense of the word), but ever appealing to the Scripture in confirmation of what she advances : and then it becomes difficult to distinguish how much of the common Christian sentiment has proceeded from the oral teaching, and how much from Scripture ; still more difficult to maintain that the former could have been what it is, if it is pure, without the latter. The case, then, supposed, as it must be if the argument is to be valid, of an inner tradition or sentiment, quite independent of Scripture, and ruling its interpretation, can never arise except in a Church which withholds the Scripture from the laity, and in so doing disparages Apostolical tradition itself. Where the Scriptures are freely read and habitually expounded, the spiritual perception of the Church is constantly recruited and corrected from them, so that the inner and the written tradition become inextricably intermingled.

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[1] Hence the Canonicity of Scripture is not itself an article of faith. Bellarmine remarks with truth : 'Credere historias testamenti veteris vel evangelia Marci, Lucæ, etc., esse canonica scripta, immo ullas esse divinas Scripturas, non est omnino necessarium ad salutem, nam sine fide hac multi sunt salvati antequam Scripturæ scriberentur' (*De Eccl.*, lib. iii. c. 14).

[2] Irenæus, *Cont. hær.*, lib. iii. c. 4. But, after all, Irenæus, may mean no more, with respect to the barbarous people of whom he speaks, than St. Paul does with respect to the Corinthians (2 Cor. iii. 2, 3). Bellarmine, *De V. D.*, iv. c. 7.

Should it, however, happen, as it may do and frequently has done, that the prevailing sentiment of the Church, that is, the visible Church, has, from the Scriptures falling into abeyance or other causes, drifted away from the Apostolic standard ; and this latter in the disinterred Scriptures comes into collision with the former ; how is the difficulty to be met ? A very prevalent ecclesiastical sentiment, for example, pleaded in the person of Dr. Eck, Luther's antagonist, for the sale of indulgences, and a similar one in the persons of inquisitors demanded that they, whose only crime was that could not believe certain doctrines, should be sent to the stake. There can be no doubt as to the answer. The voice of God in His written Word must control and correct the voice of God in the Church (real work of the Holy Spirit as that may be); for while the former was delivered, as we have seen (§ 4), under a special Divine superintendence, the latter enjoys no such prerogative, and is liable not merely to an admixture, but to a predominance, of human infirmity. The Romanist, however, cuts the knot otherwise. If the Church and Scripture seem to differ, so much the worse for Scripture. Scripture must give way for it is only a book which any one who fancies he understands it may make what he pleases of, while the sentiment of the Church is infallible. It is the necessary result of his theory.[1]

But, it may be urged, we have in the Creeds a Rule of Faith, and one in some measure independent of Scripture. Christendom, as a whole, accepts the three Ecumenical Creeds ; and, moreover, each Church has its own particular symbol, which, to it, seems practically its Rule of Faith ; the Romish Church, the decrees of Trent and its Catechism ; the Anglican, its Thirty-Nine Articles ; the Lutheran, the Confession of Augsburg ; the Swiss Churches, the Helvetic Confessions. If these are not, respectively, Rules of Faith, what are they ? The question is not unimportant.

The reply, then, is that, although these formularies may for certain purposes, and under certain aspects, be considered Rules of Faith, none of them is *the* Rule of Faith ; and, in fact, they are Rules in quite a different sense from that in which Scripture is. And our Church, in Article viii, is careful to guard against any misunderstanding on this point. The three Creeds, especially the earliest of them, come to us with the greatest claims to our attention, as deliberate professions of the faith of the Church of the first centuries on certain fundamental doctrines ; professions, as regards the two later, put forth after much controversy, and under circumstances which lend peculiar weight to them. But in their present form they are not of Apostolical origin. Their contents, or the main truths expressed in them, we, of course, believe to be Apostolical, otherwise we should not receive them ; but the mode of expression, the *statement* of the truths, was the work of uninspired men. They form, therefore, an Apostolical tradition only in the sense of being attempts to state, explain, or defend, the great doctrines respecting the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation, which, in an unsystematic form, are expressed or implied in Scripture.

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[1] See Möhler, *Symb.*, ss. 39, 40.

The fable which makes the Apostles' Creed the joint production of the Twelve has been long since exploded ; the various forms under which, though in substance the same, it was used in different localities, sufficiently prove that the Apostles left no such summary behind them ; or only such bare elements as, *e.g.*, 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4. This does not in the least derogate from its just authority as the oldest traditionary relic of what the first Christians believed on certain points, or from its value as a basis of Christian instruction, or as a baptismal profession of faith. But it does invalidate its claim to supersede, or to be co-ordinate with Scripture as the Rule of Faith ; for, like all other alleged traditionary relics, we cannot, in its present form, trace it directly to the Apostles. How much more does this apply to the two subsequent Creeds ; one of which is the production of a Council which 'may err even in things pertaining to God' (Art. xxi), and the other is probably a work of the fifth century.

But besides this, a moment's inspection of the Creeds proves that they are insufficient to be the Rule of Faith. The Apostles' Creed, though the Trinitarian hypothesis lies at the base of it, is so meagre in its statements on the subject that Socinians have always professed their willingness to subscribe to it. It omits, too, all mention of the Sacraments and their nature, and all allusion to the doctrine of justification ; points important enough to have produced a separation, apparently permanent, between large sections of the Western Church. The later Creeds, though explicit against Arianism and Sabellianism, do not fully supply these defects. On the whole, these venerable formularies cannot be considered a complete Rule of Faith ; and we may add, they were never intended to be so ; they were special protests against special heresies. They expressed not what the Church *was* to believe, but what she did believe on the doctrines assailed ; they are not *norma credendi* but *norma crediti*. And, as such, they can only make good their claims by proving their correspondence with Holy Scripture (Art. viii). Nor is there anything essentially permanent in the form in which they enunciate these doctrines ; the permanency belongs to the doctrines themselves. That is to say, though we may admire the precision of language in the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, and think it could hardly be improved upon, yet the Church is not tied to these or any other uninspired formularies; and even if the Creeds had perished, though the loss would have been great, the Church, taught from above, and possessing the written Word, would be able, should the necessity again arise, to frame new formularies suitable to express her faith and to expel error.

Yet the Creeds, and other symbols of particular Churches, are in a certain sense *a* Rule of Faith ; they are so to the members of the Christian society which has adopted these symbols, and made them tests of admission : the proper light to regard them in is, as terms of communion. They lay down, that is, the conditions on which an applicant is to be admitted a member of the society. In framing such conditions, the society does not arrogate to itself infallibility ; it merely states what it believes as such a society, and reminds the applicant that if he becomes a member thereof he must be supposed to share its convictions. If he does not share them, he is under no compulsion to join the society ; and if he ceases to share them, he is under no compulsion to continue a member. Our Church proposes the Apostles' Creed to candidates for baptism as sufficient to stamp a distinctive character on their profession. If the candidate agrees with this, *her* interpretation of Scripture, he is admitted ; otherwise not.

Such terms of communion are obviously a very different thing from the Rule of Faith. And what the Apostles' Creed, or the two other Creeds, are to the Church at large, each Church's particular symbol is to itself ; with this difference, that such symbol affects rather the teachers than the mere members of the society in question. Our Thirty-Nine Articles are terms of Communion for the clergy of our Church ; we do not propose them to mere candidates for baptism. Such subscription is intended, and is necessary, to provide some guarantee that our teachers accept the peculiar ecclesiastical position which we occupy in reference to other Churches. For this position is one of opposition, not merely to the ancient heresies, but to various errors (as we believe them to be) of the Church of Rome ; and to leave it open to public teachers to teach what they please on other points, provided they adhere to the doctrines of the three Creeds, would be to ignore an essential feature of our Church, and to reduce it, so far, to a nebulous haze, without form or outline. The points of difference between us and Rome constitute the really essential portions of our formulary ; essential, that is, not to our being a Christian Church, but to the justifying of our position as regards the Romish Communion of which we once formed a part. Hence the attempts that have been made from time to time, in some Reformed Churches, to substitute, *e.g.*, the Apostles' Creed as the *norma docendi* for their distinctive confession, cannot be commended. If successful, it would be tantamount to ecclesiastical suicide ; nor, for the reasons before given, can this Creed be made the Rule of Faith instead of Scripture.

It is almost needless to observe that teachers who have subscribed our symbol cannot claim a right to fall back on Scripture alone, on the ground that we make Scripture the sole Rule of Faith. For the statements of the symbol are, in fact, our Church's interpretation of Scripture ; she claims to have examined Scripture and settled what it teaches ; the symbol is *to her* Scripture or Scriptural ; and she justly may call upon her ministers either to adopt her interpretations, or to retire from her communion.

The nature of the sufficiency of Scripture may be dismissed in few words. It contains no catechism, no articulated formulary of doctrine standing out in relief ; but the essential doctrines are so interwoven in its texture, that they can no more be separated from it than the miraculous element can from the Gospels. It is the Holy Spirit addressing those in whom He dwells as one friend would another, or as a father would his children come to years of discretion ; not as a schoolmaster or lawgiver (Gal. iv. 1–7)—'The servant knoweth not what his Lord doeth, but I have called you friends ; for all things that I have heard of my Father, I have made known unto you.' And as regards matters of ritual and polity, precedents are given, principles laid down, but no positive prescriptions or minute details—a ceremonial law forms no part of Apostolic Christianity. But, whether as regards doctrine or discipline, the Church has ever found in the sacred volume all that she needs to fulfil her mission in the world, and to conduct herself to eternal glory ; all that she needs to refute heresy, or to separate from herself those accretions of error which may be expected, from time to time, to gather round her system in this imperfect state.

5. *The Relation of the Old Testament to the New*

In the Canon of Scripture we include, as has been seen, the books of the Old Testament ; but our seventh Article deems it necessary to remind us that there is no contrariety between the two main divisions of the sacred volume, neither as regards the author of salvation (Christ) nor as regards the object of faith (not transitory promises, but eternal life). It is probable that there is an allusion to the Gnostic and Manichæan heresies of ancient times, both of which exhibited a tendency to depreciate or reject the Old Testament as unworthy to have proceeded from the same Divine Author who inspired the New. These have passed away ; but opinions still differ as regards the propriety of co-ordinating the Jewish Scriptures with the Christian as a Rule of Faith : or if from the Canonicity of the former this must be allowed in general terms, how far it must be accepted with limitations ; in short, whether, though we may not *sever* the one from the other, we must not *distinguish* between them, and especially under the particular point of view now before us. Things may not be *contrary* the one to the other, and yet may differ in many important respects.

If we believe that the Jewish Scriptures proceeded from the same Holy Spirit who inspired the Christian, it is of course impossible to suppose that the former can contain anything really inconsistent with the latter ; still less can this supposition be entertained if we believe that the Mosaic dispensation, in its principal parts, viz., the Ceremonial Law and the institution of Prophecy (which also form the principal subjects of the Old Testament Scriptures), was specially intended to prepare the way for Christianity, or, as the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews expresses it, to be a shadow of good things to come (Heb. x. 1). It is thus that Christ and His Apostles speak of this dispensation ; they appeal to its prophecies, they illustrate Christian verities by a reference to its ritual, they assert its Divine origin and authority, and the first Christians were so far from supposing that in becoming Christians they were setting up any system of religion *contrary* to that in which they had been nurtured, that they continued to attend the temple services, and to observe the Jewish feasts ; and this under Apostolic sanction (Acts iii. 1 ; xviii. 21 ; xxi. 24). If later on, the Jewish ritual seemed to be waxing old and ready to pass away (Heb. viii. 13), it was only as the type begins to lose its importance in proportion as the anti-type is seen to have come. It is plain that there can be no *contrariety* between things which thus stand to each other in the relation of prophecy and fulfilment. But, as the very terms 'type' and 'anti-type' intimate, there may be a *distinction*.

The general answer then which must be given to the question, How far is the Old Testament to us Christians a Rule of Faith ? is, *so far* as it is in accordance with the clearer revelation of the New. This latter is to us the supreme authority, not only in contradistinction to human tradition, but also to those portions or features of the elder economy which, as compared with the Christian, bear the marks of imperfection, or of a merely provisional use ; and which therefore, we justly argue, have been superseded by the later revelation.

We may observe, then, that the two portions of Scripture are in complete accordance as regards the characteristics of a monotheistic religion, founded on the moral attributes of Deity, and thus distinguished as well from the impure nature-worship as from the polytheism of heathenism. Hence, whatever instruction the Old Testament imparts respecting the nature and attributes of the Most High—His spirituality, power, goodness, holiness, and all-embracing providence—belongs to us as much as to those to whom it was originally addressed. All this is *presupposed* in the New Testament. Again, the religious experience of holy men of old, as portrayed especially in the Book of Psalms, connects us with them ; insomuch that these lyrical compositions of the Old Testament have ever been found to adapt themselves readily to the purposes of Christian worship. With the exception of some portions, due to the immaturity of religion at that stage of its existence, and which our superior light enables us to separate from the mass, they adequately represent our religious experience : they fix for ever the substance and form of the emotional side of religion ; no small advantage, when we remember how easily the latter lends itself to perversion or deterioration. The typical import too of the Ceremonial Law, so far as it is declared in the New Testament, is of abiding value ; not the ceremonies themselves, but the truths shadowed forth in them and fulfilled in Christ, such as vicarious sacrifice and the covering of sin with blood. The ciphers of the Law, interpreted by the pen of inspiration itself, remain even to us a valuable source of instruction ; and the place where the Lord lay, under the veil of type and symbol, can never to Christians lose its interest. Finally, the moral lessons of the Old Testament, so much insisted on by the prophets to the disparagement of the mere ritual, remain as obligatory as ever they were. To some such extent as this the Jewish Scriptures form a portion of our Rule of Faith.

On the other hand, there are parts of them which have become antiquated by the coming of Christ. The Theocracy, *e.g.*, as a civil regimen, cannot be reproduced in the present day : the perfect fusion which it presented of the civil and religious economy, or, as we should now term it, of Church and State, was only possible where the Almighty Himself condescended to be a temporal King, and where idolatry was not only a sin but disloyalty to the Monarch, a crime *læsæ majestatis :* a truth too much forgotten by the Puritans of the seventeenth century, and not always recognized even now in its full import and inferences. 'The civil precepts' of the Law of Moses ought not 'of necessity to be received in any commonwealth ' (Art. vii). Human priests, too, and visible sacrifices have been for ever displaced in the Christian Church by the One High Priest, and His one sacrifice on the cross ; another truth which not only is set at nought in the Romish system, but seems forgotten by some modern Protestant expositors of Jewish prophecy. Again, *fulfilled* prophecy belongs rather to the department of Christian evidences than to the subject of the Rule of Faith. And, generally, the spirit of the Old Testament gendered to bondage (Gal. iv. 24) ; the Law exacted an obedience which it furnished no means of fulfilling : it provided no adequate atonement for the sins specified, while for some of a deeper dye it provided no atonement at all : and so far as this was its tendency, it is opposed to the Gospel which reveals a full atonement for all sin, and encourages the spirit of adoption whereby we cry, Abba, Father (Gal. iv. 6). The Law still has its use in convincing of sin, but so far as it is merely preparatory to the Christian standing, it is not our standard of faith or experience.

CHRISTIAN THEISM

'There is one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions; of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; the Maker and Preserver of all things. both visible and invisible: and in the Unity of this Godhead there be three Persons of one substance, power, and eternity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost' (Art. i).

'The Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father and the Son, is of one substance, majesty, and glory with the Father and the Son, very and eternal God' (Art. v).

'Ecclesiæ apud nos docent, decretum Nicænæ Synodi de unitate essentiæ divinæ et de tribus personis verum et sine ulla dubitatione credendum esse; vid, quod sit una essentia divina quæ et appellatur, et est, Deus, æternus, incorporeus, impartibilis; immensa potentia, sapientia, bonitate; Creator et Conservator, omnium rerum visibilium et invisibilium: et tamen tres sint Personæ, ejusdem essentiæ, et potentiæ, et coæternæ, Pater, Filius, et Spiritus S.' (Conf. Aug. i).

'Deum credimus unum esse essentia vel natura, per se subsistentem, immensum, æternum, Creatorem omnium rerum . . . eundem nihilominus Deum immensum, unum et indivisum, credimus Personis inseparabiliter et inconfuse esse distinctum, Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum S.; ita ut Pater ab æterno generaverit, Filius generatione ineffabili genitus sit, Spiritus S. vero procedat ab utroque, idque ab æterno, cum utroque adorandus: ita ut sint tres non quidem Dii, sed tres Personæ consubstantiales, co-æternæ, et co-æquales, distinctæ quoad hypostases, et ordine alia aliam precedens, nulla tamen inæqualitate' (Conf. Helv. c. iii).

CHRISTIAN THEISM, our present subject, may, as appears from our Articles and the corresponding statements of other Reformed Confessions, be considered under two divisions; one comprising those truths respecting the Divine nature and attributes which are common to all monotheistic religions, the other the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity, which is distinctive of the Christian faith. In the following discussion this arrangement will be adopted. It must not, however, be supposed that the Monotheism of Christianity is either borrowed from natural religion, or from other sources than revelation. The unity and spirituality of the Divine Being are here to be considered as part of the revealed doctrine of the Godhead, as resting on the authority of the Word of God, no less than the mystery of the Holy Trinity; for the Christian faith is that we worship one God in Trinity as well as Trinity in Unity.[1] Only it was the paramount object of the Jewish religion to insist upon the former truths, while the doctrine of the Holy Trinity belongs especially to the Christian revelation. But the later revelation presupposes and incorporates the earlier, so that we must not understand that the Christian faith rests on a twofold foundation, what the light of nature teaches and what Scripture teaches, respecting, the nature of God, but on the one foundation of positive revelation. How far natural religion confirms the statements of inspiration is another question, which will presently come under consideration.

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[1] Athanasian Creed.

Part I

ONE GOD

6. *Natural Theism*

Scripture teaches that there is but 'one God,' 'living and true,' as distinguished from the gods many and lords many of heathenism; 'everlasting' (in the Latin *æternus*); incapable, as pure spirit, of being represented in bodily shape, and therefore 'without parts,' whether physically or metaphysically; exempt from those human affections which we call 'passions' (παθῆ); among other attributes 'of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness,'; the Creator and Upholder of the universe. This brief description, or rather attempt at description, of what God is, is sufficient for the needs of practical piety, and further explanations may seem unnecessary. But good reasons may be given for the considerable space devoted to general Theism, as it may be called, in all the dogmatical systems of the older theologians; reasons which certainly do not seem to have lost their force under the present aspects of theological speculation.

Questions relating to the nature and attributes of God, exclusive of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, which, in Scripture, is always associated with the work of redemption, form that part of Christian Theism in which natural and revealed religion overlap each other, and render mutual aid. Reason confessedly is entirely at fault as regards the doctrine of the Holy Trinity; it could never have surmised, and can never fully comprehend, this great mystery of revelation. But Scripture itself recognizes a natural knowledge of God—a γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ (Rom. i. 19)—partly innate and partly acquired, or capable of acquirement. It even indicates the lines of reasoning by which, from facts observed or experienced, man may rise to some just apprehensions of the Divine Being, and on which philosophy has expended so much thought; as *e.g.*, the argument from final causes in Psalms viii, civ, cxxxix; that from the idea of God in the mind, in Rom. i. 19; and that from the moral nature of man, in Rom. ii. 15. If this natural knowledge of God has, in any instance, been lost, if conscience has been perverted, Scripture ascribes the result to man's own fault, to a culpable misuse of opportunities, and a depraved will (Rom. i. 20, 21, 24).

In short, if no revelation had ever been given, still man, as such, is in possession of innate notions and principles respecting the Divine Being, which he may either improve or stifle, and so rise or fall in the scale of his being. Faint, or practically inoperative, as these traces of the Divine image may be, they are not wholly obliterated. And that their existence should be recognized may be of importance to the Christian argument. For example, the evidences of revealed religion lean, to some extent, on the conclusions of natural. It has been sometimes assumed that miracles alone form the criterion of a revelation. ‘ In what way,’ asks Paley, ‘ can a revelation be made but by miracles ? In none that we are able to conceive.’ The remark is just in the sense that miracles, as a rule, are necessary to attest a Divine mission ; but not in the sense that nothing else is necessary. In Scripture the case is supposed of miracles, real ones, being wrought by a malignant power, and in support of error : in the Old Testament to seduce men from the worship of Jehovah (Deut. xiii. 1–5), in the New to promote the cause of Antichrist (Matt. xxiv. 24 ; 2 Thess. ii. 8–10).

On what ground is such a pretended revelation to be rejected ? Not solely on that of its contradicting a previous revelation, for the question is, which is the true one, not which is the earlier ? It is a case of miracle against miracle, and mere priority does not seem sufficient to warrant a decision. What else can we fall back upon but reason, or conscience, or moral intuition, or by whatever name we choose to call the faculty of moral discrimination ; and to fall back upon it as furnishing a *relatively* independent testimony ? It is true that under the light of revelation it may be difficult to determine how much of this moral perception is original, and how much borrowed. We are reminded that the ‘ religion of nature has had the opportunity of rekindling her faded taper by the Gospel light, whether furtively or unconsciously taken ’ ; but even so, a faded taper she must be supposed to have had, or to have. And in the instances cited, it seems to be taken for granted that if this natural moral sense, instead of being allowed to abdicate its office, were in active exercise, it would be sufficient for spiritual guidance to this extent at least, that if the doctrine on behalf of which the miracles should be wrought were immoral or irreligious, there would be warrant for the rejection both of the prophet and his message. It was on a principle somewhat similar that our Lord, when accused of working miracles by the aid of Satan, pointed to their beneficent nature, and asked, could Satan be supposed to operate against himself ?

In the one case and as in the other, a certain light of nature is presumed, to which an appeal may be made with decisive effect. In Deut. xiii, the Jews, as an additional motive, were directed to the temporal benefits conferred on them, for that dispensation was one of temporal inducements : ' He [the false prophet] hath spoken to turn you away from the Lord your God which brought you out of the land of Egypt ' (verse 5) ; but since this appeal could be addressed only to Jews, a wider basis must be sought in those innate notions of God and morality which are the common property of human nature, and coincidence with which stamps the doctrine miraculously attested as proceeding from God. The existence of this testing moral faculty must also be presupposed in dealing with the question of the inspiration of Holy Scripture. Deborah and the authors of the Book of Psalms, for example, were inspired prophets, though not necessarily commissioned to write, or compile, the books which record their compositions (§ 4) ; by the aid of the moral faculty, in our case, no doubt, vivified by the teaching of Christianity, we separate in these writings the dross from the ore, and ascribe the former to the mixture of human infirmity from which no prophet but ONE has ever been quite free.

And even if this connection did not exist, or might be dispensed with, natural Theism being relegated to what might seem its more appropriate place, the philosophy of religion, the Christian believer may still derive a satisfaction from perceiving that no contrariety exists between the inferences of reason and the declarations of Scripture on this great subject ; similar to that which he derives from the study of the analogy of religion as expounded by Butler. And if he has imbibed the spirit of that great apologist, he will not demand more from the natural argument than that it should lend this negative aid ; since his faith rests ultimately, not on the surmises of reason, but on the announcements of revelation.

There is another reason, too, why this topic cannot be safely neglected. From its earliest dawn philosophy has busied itself with speculations concerning the existence and attributes of God, whether there is a God, and if so, what idea we are to form of Him ; how His nature is to be defined or described : what His relation to the world, and especially to man, is. This could not be without its influence on the Church ; many of her converts from the schools of philosophy carrying with them, when they became Christians, traces of the habits of thought in which they had been nurtured. Hence, though in Church history we meet with few heresies on abstract Theism, speculations on the subject, traceable to philosophical systems, have never failed, from time to time, to make their appearance within the sacred precincts, modifying the aspects of Christian faith, and in some instances impairing its integrity. Pantheism and Dualism—the Scylla and Charybdis of ancient theistic philosophy—did not surrender their dominion without a struggle; and it would be too much to say that even in the present day their influence is not felt. What, for example, but a phase of Dualism is the notion of a *limited* Theism, lately revived, and apparently a favourite one even with writers who profess to believe in revelation? Theories of this kind, the offspring of philosophy (not always a comprehensive one), must be met, if possible, with the weapons which philosophy itself supplies; and of course this need is the more urgent, when they are propounded by those who reject revelation altogether.

A—THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

The arguments on this subject have been by some assailed as of no value for their professed purpose, while by others they have been invested with the force of a real demonstration. They seem to have suffered partly from placing them all on the same level as regards cogency, and partly from undue assumptions as to the nature of those which are of real weight. In the following brief sketch, which is all that our limits will allow, an attempt will be made to adjust their claims, and to determine their bearing on Christian faith.

7. *A First Cause*

Everything which we see around us depends upon something else as its cause: it is not self-existent, but produced. Now the proximate cause is either itself self-existent, or it is, in its turn, the effect of another superior cause; and the same remark applies to every link in the chain of causation, however high it may be traced. We must suppose, then, either the existence of a primary cause, itself uncaused, or of an endless succession of causes, none of which possesses the property of absolute independence. This latter supposition only pushes back the difficulty indefinitely; for since no link in the chain is self-existent, the whole is not so, and the question remains unanswered. On what does the whole depend? We seem thus compelled to ascend to the conception of a Being whose existence depends upon no cause external to Himself, but who is Himself the ground of His own existence (*Ens a se—Aseitas*), to whom we give the name of God.

Again everything visible is, in its nature, contingent, *i.e.*, it may, or it may not, have existed; it has no necessity of existence. And, as above, we must either suppose an endless succession of contingent existences, or arrive at last at some one whose existence is necessary. The latter hypothesis is the only one consistent with reason, and therefore we conclude that such a Being exists (*Ens necessarium—causa necessaria*).

It is obvious that these lines of thought are not really distinct, and merely denote different aspects under which we contemplate the same object. Thus the first cause of all things must exist necessarily, and a necessarily existing Being must be the first cause. It is the same fact regarded from different points of view.

The philosophical ground of this argument is what is called ' the principle of causation ' ; that is, that everything that comes into existence must have had a cause. But what is a cause ? According to some, it is merely an antecedent, and an effect merely a consequent ; and the material world exhibits nothing but a succession of antecedents and consequents : when these occur invariably in the same order, we call one cause and the other effect. But they are mere phenomenal changes, and furnish no answer to the question, Did one *produce* the other ? The principle of causation, it is argued, is not a necessary truth independent of facts, but a mere assumption founded on experience ; and experience can never give us more than the ideas of antecedent and consequent. Nothing, however, is more certain than that mere contiguity and succession do not convey the full idea of causation ; as appears from the familiar illustration of day and night, one of which invariabley follows the other, but is in no sense the effect of it. With the idea of a cause we always connect *power* to produce the effect ; we conceive some occult influence passing from the one to the other. Whence do we derive this idea ? The objections just mentioned seem to have arisen from overlooking the true source of it, viz., not the system of physical nature, but our own consciousness. It is from this, and this alone, that we gain the idea of power as distinct from that of mere succession. By an act of volition we move our limbs, and through them produce changes in matter external to us ; and when we will to move them, we put forth power in the very act ; and it is from the consciousness of this that we consider ourselves the cause of the changes that follow. By analogy, or perhaps by an act of the imagination, we transfer the idea thus gained to the case of physical antecedents and consequents, which otherwise certainly might not suggest it. How mind acts on matter is a mystery, but that it does so act as efficient cause our consciousness tells us ; and this is sufficient to save the theistic argument. Nay, to advance it a step : for we thus learn, not only that proper causation involves the idea of power, but that Mind, so far as our experience extends, is the only or the chief really efficient cause in the universe.

This last extension of the argument is of importance in view of the objections urged against it by the disciples of Comte. Causation, it is said, applies only to changeable phenomena, but matter and force, the substrata of these phenomena, are unchangeable ; their sum never varies : they are therefore, so far as we see, uncaused. Let it be admitted then that volition also appears uncaused, and that Mind only can produce mind ; the result is simply that we have two co-ordinate principles in nature : mind and volition can only claim to be co-agents with uncaused matter and force, and must resign their pretensions to an exclusive place in the production of the universe. Two first causes, to say nothing of other possible ones, are as conceivable as one. It may be questioned whether two first, and therefore necessarily existing, causes *are* conceivable, whether such a notion is not inconsistent with the common intuitions of human reason. Certainly it seems inconsistent with the avowed aim both of Comtism, and of the materialism which this latter calls in as an ally, viz., to discover the monadic primordial principle whence the universe proceeded ; for two (not to speak of more) first causes must introduce an eternal dualism into the system of things, and of substances or essences which must mutually limit each other, and therefore cannot be self-existent. But the simple answer is that just given, viz., that we can form no idea of an efficient cause except from what passes within ourselves. Matter and force, as primary sources of physical change, elude our senses altogether ; and moreover there exists no analogy between volition and mere natural phenomena which could throw light upon the mode of action of the latter ; the argument, therefore, can never be more than a conjecture. Our own consciousness remains the sole basis of our idea of causation and in this, as in other points, man is the true interpreter of nature.

But the validity of this inference from volition is itself disputed. 'The volition,' a distinguished writer remarks, 'a state of our mind, is the antecedent ; the motion of our limbs, in conformity to the volition, the consequent. This sequence I conceive not to be the effect of consciousness, in the sense intended by the theory. The antecedent, indeed, and the consequent are subjects of consciousness ; but the connection between them is a subject of experience. I cannot admit that our consciousness of the volition contains in itself any *a priori* knowledge that the muscular action will follow. If our nerves of motion were paralysed, I do not see (unless by information from other people) the slightest ground for supposing that we should ever have known anything of volition as a physical power, or been conscious of any tendency in the feelings of our mind to produce motions of our bodies, or of other bodies.'[1] It would seem more accurate to say that the antecedent, the state of the mind, is matter of consciousness ; that the motion of the body following is matter of experience ; and that the connection between the two is a mystery. No doubt, apart from experience we should never have known that volition has a power to move our bodies ; but the question is not, whence do we gain our knowledge of the connection between volition and motion ? but, what is involved in the act of consciousness, the antecedent ? When the writer admits that ' the power of the will to move our bodies ' is matter of consciousness, he seems to concede the point at issue. For this is all that is contended for, viz., that in every act of volition, followed by a motion of the body, the idea of a power is involved, and that from this we gain the true notion of a cause. From no other instance of antecedent and consequent, certainly from none of a merely physical kind, do we gain this idea ; which is tantamount to saying that to *us*, mind is the only efficient cause in the universe. As to the supposed case of a paralysed limb, our reasonings, surely must be founded not on a state of disease, but on the relation of mind and body when both are in their normal condition.

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[1] Mill, *Logic*, bk. iii. ch. 5.

Another eminent writer objects to the theory, ' that it is refuted by the consideration that between the overt act of corporeal movement of which we are cognizant, and the internal act of mental determination of which we are also cognizant,[1] there intervenes a numerous series of intermediate agencies of which we have no knowledge ; multitudes of solid and fluid parts must be set in motion by the will, but of this motion we know from consciousness absolutely nothing.'[2] But if we have no consciousness of these intermediate agencies, they are to us as if they did not exist. All that is necessary to the argument is that we should be conscious of the first and of the last link in the series, and that the idea of power should intervene. The question seems independent of intermediate agencies, or of theories respecting the agency of mind on matter ; it is concerned simply with the irresistible tendency of the human mind to ascribe to every true cause power, influence, to produce its effect.

The eternity of matter was a recognized tenet of antiquity, even with those who rejected the notion of its being uncaused. Unable to conceive the creation of the world out of nothing, most of the ancient philosophers held matter to be indeed eternal, but not self-existent ; it was dependent on the Deity, as light is upon the sun—an eternal emanation from an eternal source.[3] None but avowed atheists taught that mere matter is the sole independent principle of things; even Hylozoism endowing it with an unconscious life by which it is moulded into its various forms.[1] When therefore it is affirmed that ' the mere existence of the world does not prove a God,[2] the statement must be taken with limitations. The existence of inert matter certainly does not lead to the ideas of personality and intelligence as connected with a first cause; nor does this branch of the theistic argument profess to go so far. What it establishes is the reasonableness of the conception of a first cause, eternal and self-existent; and of the high probability, from analogy, that this cause is not matter, or any property of matter, but Mind.

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[1] We are not cognizant of the act of mental determination and of the act of corporeal movement in the same sense. The former is self-determined, or matter of direct consciousness ; the latter is secondary and empirical.

[2] Sir W. Hamilton, *Lect. on Metaphysics*, ii. Lect. xxxix. ; Mill, *Logic*, i. 389.

[3] Cudworth, *Syst.*, bk. i. ch. 4.

8. *An Intelligent First Cause. Final Causes*

Marks of order and design in an effect force upon us the conviction of a designer. But the world abounds with examples of orderly arrangement (whence the term κόσμος), and of adaptation of means to ends. This is visible not only in particular instances, *e.g.*, the structure of the eye as compared with its final cause, the power of seeing, but in the combination of these for still further ends; nature, however high we ascend in the scale, ever presenting the same aspect of harmonious co-operation among its various parts towards a designed end, or ends. This, as it is the oldest, is the most forcible argument for the Being of a God: the most forcible, inasmuch as it rests on the clearest analogies. As certainly as we infer from the known final cause of a watch, viz., to show the hour of the day, that intelligence presided over its construction, so we conclude from the subserviency of means to ends in creation that it must have had an intelligent Author. Nor would the argument be invalidated if, in some instances, we did not know, or could not discover, the final cause; for the mere collocation of parts, and their dependence upon and relation to each other, would be sufficient to convince us that some end must have been intended: as, in the instance of the watch, even were we ignorant of its object, the analogy between its construction and that of other productions of human art, of which we do know the design, would lead us to place the instrument under the same category. For is it to be supposed that the parts could have arranged themselves by chance? Even ancient philosophy, in its better schools, could not entertain the supposition. Or shall we say that the material world may ' contain the source or spring of order originally within itself, as well as mind does?' But abstract possibilities are one thing, inferences forced upon us by experience another ; and the only experience we have in the matter, and therefore to us the only analogy to reason from, is that adaptations of means to ends never occur apart from the agency of intelligent Personality, either our own or that of others. We are therefore entitled to infer this agency whenever we meet with a corresponding fact, in the productions of nature as well as those of art, notwithstanding circumstantial differences which may exist between them. Whether we had ever seen a watch made or not, or known of the existence of such an instrument or not, the mere inspection of its structure would be sufficient to raise a presumption of a designer who had some end in view, and framed this means accordingly.

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[1] *Ibid.*, ch. 3.

[2] Mill, *Essay on Theism.*

The advance of science not only furnishes continually fresh materials for this argument, but at the same time discloses a prevailing principle of uniformity, and adapted relations as well as parts, throughout nature, so that the hypothesis of discordant wills having been concerned in the cosmical arrangements may be considered as finally abandoned by philosophy itself. There are no notes of discord in the effect, and therefore not in the agency from which it has proceeded.

But it may be questioned whether this argument is really a distinct one from the former, and not rather a particular application of it—that is, of the axiom that every effect must have a cause. The difference seems to be that here it is not the effect as a whole, but the marks of design in it that is the object of thought, which, like everything else, must have had a cause. This cause, from the nature of the case, can be neither a blind necessity, nor even Mind merely as involving the idea of power, but mind as involving the idea of intelligence. And thus it supplements the inherent deficiency of the cosmological argument, which merely leads to the belief of a first cause. This might be conceived of as a blind force, a *natura naturans ;* but the idea of intelligence cannot be separated from the doctrine of *final* causes, they and a designing mind being correlative terms.

It has been objected by a great metaphysician that since the argument from final, like that from efficient, causes rests on experience, and we have never been present at the formation of a world, our own being to us a solitary instance, or ' singular effect,' we are not warranted in inferring from the marks of design in it the existence of a designing mind. But is there not a confusion here between the origin and the constitution of the world ? It is not to the creation of matter out of nothing, or to the *rudis indigestaque moles* of chaos, that the argument so much applies, as to the adaptation of means to ends in the existing frame of nature, with which we are personally acquainted. It may be difficult to establish the fact that the universe had a Creator, for certainly we have had no experience of creations ; and yet it may be easy to discover in the arrangements of our universe, or one part of it, such a multiplicity of contrivances as to convince us that mere matter could not have produced them. Moreover, the experience from which we derive the idea of final causes is, like that which gives us the idea of an efficient cause, in ourselves, and not in the physical operations of nature. When we see a watch in process of construction, all that sense tells us is that the work is proceeding from a curious arrangement of bones, muscles, sinews, etc. ; the intelligence which presides over it remains unseen. That intelligence is presiding over it we infer from the knowledge that such an instrument could not be produced by ourselves without the exercise of a designing mind ; and by analogy we transfer the same to the watchmaker.

It is only a more extended application of the reasoning when from the observation of the marvellous contrivances which the *whole* of nature, so far as it comes under our knowledge, exhibits, we ascend to the conception of a presiding Mind which framed them for ends, whether we can at present discern those ends or not. With respect to this last difficulty, it may be remarked that some of the greatest discoveries in science have been made in reasoning from means to unknown ends ; as, *e.g.*, the circulation of the blood, which Harvey arrived at by asking himself what could be the design of the valves which so plentifully occur in the veins of the body. Here the final cause was unknown ; being discovered, it threw light upon the contrivance.—As to the hypothesis that the complex structures of the world may be accounted for on the principle of 'the survival of the fittest' ; the animal, *e.g.*, in its efforts to see, throwing out at first the mere rudiments of an eye, and these, in the lapse of ages, improving themselves into the perfect organ ; it seems hardly necessary to dwell upon it. The ingenious author can hardly have seriously intended it as an argument against final causes.[1] Certainly it has nothing to recommend it, on the score of simplicity, in preference to that of an intelligent Creator.—Nor is the validity of the argument impaired by there being some things in nature of which perhaps we shall never discover the end intended, as, *e.g.*, the use of barren deserts, venomous reptiles, fierce wild beasts, or the existence of evil.[1] To such instances Paley's remark is applicable : 'These superfluous parts do not negative the reasoning which we instituted concerning those parts which are useful, and of which we know the use ; the indication of contrivance with respect to these remains the same as it was before.[2]

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[1] For even if we admit that the primitive germ, or protoplasm, was endowed with instinctive tendencies, we must still ask two questions : 1. Whence did these tendencies proceed ? Were they self-caused ? If so, the principle of causation itself, on which science rests, is annihilated. 2. How came the environments, the correlation of the instinctive tendencies, and the condition of their successful result, into existence ?

9. *The Ontological Argument*

The first to propound this argument distinctly was Anselm of Canterbury. His reasoning is as follows : We have a conception in our minds of an all-perfect Being ; but if this Being does not actually exist, we might add existence to our previous conception of Him, which, therefore, would be proved not to be the conception of an all-perfect Being ; for to such a conception nothing can be added. Such a conception, therefore, necessarily involves actual existence.[3] It afterwards became particularly associated with the name of Descartes, who devoted the fifth of his celebrated 'Meditations' to the discussion of it. 'Actual existence,' he argues, 'can no more be separated from the essence of God than the equality of its three angles to two right angles from the essence of a triangle ; or the idea of a valley from that of a mountain. It is as certain that I find in myself the idea of an all-perfect Being as I do that of any mathematical figure or number ; and I have no less clear a conception that an actual and eternal existence belongs to His nature than I have of the properties which I can demonstrate to belong to such a figure or number. For to such a Being no perfection can be wanting, which would be the case if He did not possess existence.'[4] Kant's refutation of the argument is, on purely logical grounds, unanswerable. As long as we entertain the conception of a triangle, he remarks, it would be a contradiction to suppose its angles not equal to two right angles ; but there is no contradiction in supposing such a figure not to exist at all. Remove the subject as well as the predicate, or predicates, and nothing at all remains. That a figure containing three angles should necessarily exist can never be proved ; on the *supposition* that a triangle exists, no doubt it must have three angles, but with the disappearance of the supposition the angles also disappear. So it is with the conception of an absolutely necessary Being. That God is almighty is a necessary judgment; and the predicate cannot be removed as long as the subject God, *i.e.*, an all-perfect Being, is in the mind; but that there is no God involves no contradiction. Moreover, existence is not a predicate which adds anything to our previous conception of a thing. A hundred actual dollars contain nothing more in the idea than a hundred imaginary dollars, though there is a great difference between them as regards a man's available resources. Whatever, then, our notion of an object may contain or involve, we must go out of it in order to predicate existence of the object.[1]

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[1] Jowett, *Essay on Nat. Rel.*

[2] *Nat. Theol.*, ch. 5.

[3] 'Convincitur etiam insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari potest : et certe id quo majus cogitari nequit non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re ; quod majus est. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu, et in re' (*Proslog.*, ch. ii).

[4] *Medit.* v.

There seems, in fact, to lurk an ambiguity in Descartes' use of the expression, necessary existence. It may mean either that the adequate conception of a thing involves necessary existence, or that the thing of necessity actually exists. In the former sense it is true that no adequate conception of God, *i.e.*, of an all-perfect Being, can be formed which does not contain, as part of the conception, existence *a se*, or necessary existence; but does this involve the necessity of such a Being actually existing? As long as I frame to myself the conception of a winged horse, the wings are an essential part of it; but I am not entitled thence to infer that such an animal actually exists. As an intuition, however, of the human mind, the argument may hold its place. If I, an imperfect being, exist, how can I conceive an all-perfect Being as non-existent? Every attempt to do so will prove abortive. If I exist, and am not God, and yet have an idea of God, which I have, I cannot think and therefore be convinced of my own existence (*cogito, ergo sum*) without believing that God exists; and if He exists, He must exist necessarily. The ontological argument is only a mode of stating the fact that belief in the existence of God is a necessity of the practical reason.[2]

It is obvious that if, as some modern philosophers have maintained,[3] we can form no true, albeit inadequate, conception of God, the very basis of the argument is cut away from under it. For it proceeds on the assumption that such a conception is innate, though it may be dormant; that it exists previously to the observation of material objects, and is not derived from the mere multiplication of created perfections; and that it is not, as an original intuition, affected by the logical contradictions which, no doubt, beset every attempt to reduce the ideas of the Absolute and the Infinite to consistency with the laws of the human understanding.[1]

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[1] *Kritik der R. V.* (Kirchmann's edit.) p. 476.

[2] Descartes, in *Medit.* iii., gives another turn to the argument; viz., that the idea of an all-perfect Being could not have originated with ourselves, but must have been implanted in us; and, on the principle 'nihil in effectu quod non prius in causa,' by an all-perfect Being.

[3] *E.g.*, Mansel, Bampton Lectures.

10. *The Moral Nature of Man*

The moral law within us seems to point to a Lawgiver. For this law is not merely a passive faculty of discriminating between right and wrong, but speaks with authority, commanding us to choose the right and avoid the wrong, and acquitting or condemning accordingly (Rom. i. 15). The voice of conscience is, in fact, the voice of God ; if not speaking directly[2] through it, yet indirectly, inasmuch as this wondrous faculty must have been implanted in the heart of man by the Creator. Nor is the inference invalidated by the erroneous judgments which an uncultivated conscience may deliver ; for still what it commands it conceives to be right ; it commands nothing *as wrong*, though it may err in the practical application. The evidence from the moral constitution of man bears rather on the character than on the mere existence of God ; and perhaps it is going too far to say that the 'categorical imperative'[3] of conscience *necessarily* implies a Lawgiver. The obligations of morality, we are reminded,[4] need no other support than themselves : they are eternal and immutable. But the question relates not to the nature or obligation, but to the *origin* of the moral sense. Whence comes it ? As the intuitions of the infinite and the eternal seem to imply an infinite Being from whom they proceed, so the existence of conscience seems to point to a righteous Lawgiver, the Author of the faculty.

11. *The Consent of Mankind*

This is a favourite topic with writers on the subject, and is useful, not so much in proving the existence of a God, as in proving that such a belief is the common inheritance of the race.[1] Hardly any nation, or tribe, however barbarous, but acknowledges a superior Power: the apparent exceptions are not such, when examined more closely. How is the fact to be accounted for? A primitive revelation presupposes a Revealer: an innate idea presupposes an Author. The universality of the belief guarantees the truth of it; not, indeed, in Descartes' sense, but as proving it to be a common intellectual judgment. A question arises, Has this common belief become impaired in the progress of civilization, so that we may describe it as the special characteristic of a rude age? The contrary is notoriously the fact. The nations of Western Europe are theistic no less than the savage tribes to whom Cicero appealed. Nay, their theism has become more concrete, more personal, than that of ancient philosophy itself. The *Gods* of heathenism were personal, not so its abstract Divinity, the τὸ θεῖον, or in a more concrete form the *Dii Deæque omnes*: but the manifest testimony of human belief, in modern times, has been toward investing this supreme object of worship with the attribute of intelligent Personality. And whereas the Deity of the Jewish Revelation is more anthropomorphous (not in an erroneous sense) than the corresponding conception of heathenism the Deity of Christianity exhibits an advance, in this point, upon the Jewish, for in the Gospel, 'the Word' Himself 'became flesh, and dwelt among us' (John i. 14). Against the atheistic argument that religion owes its origin to the policy of legislators availing themselves of a popular error to gain authority for their institutions,[2] this *consensus gentium* may be urged with great force; for, if the theory were true, the belief in a superior power would be found only in communities which enjoy the benefits of legislation, whereas it is found, in some form or another, in the most uncivilized tribes.

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[1] [It could have been wished that in the preceding pages Litton had stated in stronger terms the position so positively described by St. Paul in Rom. i. 18ff., from which it is plain that man's sin consists precisely in the suppression of the truth concerning the eternal power and godhead of the Creator, so inescapably manifest to him, both because of the ceaseless testimony of the whole order of creation that confronts him whichever way he turns, and of which he himself is a part, and also because, being himself a creature of God and in particular created in the image of God, it is a truth which is within him, constitutionally, as well as around him. That is why there is absolutely no excuse for the suppression or the denial or the plea of ignorance of this truth (Rom. i. 20). The fully Christian position is that the existence of God is not a matter of philosophical proof (or of Butlerian probability) but an inexorable fact known to all men. Editor.]

[2] See Delitzsch, *Psychology*, iii. s. 4 (Clark).

[3] Kant, *Kritik der R. V.*

[4] Mill, *Essay on Theism.*

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The following remarks may be made on these proofs in general. Neither singly nor collectively do they amount to a 'Demonstration *a priori*'[3] of the existence of God, much less of His attributes. No fact is capable of demonstration in the strict sense of the word, so that the denial of it shall involve a contradiction; and neither is this one. Mathematical deductions are demonstrations and necessary truths because they are concerned not with facts but with abstractions, or mental pictures of our own minds. What is the triangle the three angles of which can be demonstrated to be equal to two right angles? No such figure exists actually in nature. We cannot draw a line on paper which shall have length without breadth, or which shall lie evenly between its extreme points; that is, the demonstration is not true of any actually existing triangle. It is the ideal triangle, formed by abstraction from the actual, on which we reason. Euclid is obliged to *postulate*, or make a condition of his reasoning, that a straight line may be drawn from one point to another, which yet is practically impossible: but the postulate once granted, all the properties of a trilateral figure bounded by such mathematical lines are necessary truths.

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[1] 'Ut porro firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, cur Deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit deorum opinio. Multi de Diis prava sentiunt (id enim vitioso more effici solet), omnes tamen vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur; nec vero id collocatio hominum aut consensus efficit, non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus; omni autem in re consensio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est' (Cicero, *Tusc.*, lib. i.c. 13. Comp. *De Nat. Deor.*, i. 16, *De Leg.*, i. 8).

[2] Cudworth, *Int. Syst.*, v. 1.

[3] See Clarke's *Work*.

It will be seen that none of the proofs for the existence of God partake of this character. They root themselves in experience, and though they rest ultimately on certain intuitions of the mind, they never can free themselves from the imperfections of their origin. The first step in the argument is, that something must have existed from eternity, for an intuition of reason tells us that from nothing nothing can come, and so far it is of an *a priori* character; that is, the intuition is part of our mental constitution, and begins to operate directly we perceive that something exists. But whether this something is God or the world the intuition does not decide. There is no contradiction in supposing that the eternity of existence may belong to the world itself, and not to a Being independent of it; which accordingly was held by many philosophers. An intuition of reason tells us that *if* the world is an effect, it must have had a cause, but not whether it is an effect or not. That it is so can only be argued from observation of facts, and depends, therefore, on probable reasoning. Similarly it is evident that whatever has existed from eternity must have the reason of its existence in itself, or necessary existence; but that the world may not possess this property cannot be demonstrated *a priori*. There are strong reasons for thinking that the world is an effect, and therefore must have had a cause, and therefore is not self-existent; but the δός ποῦ στῶ is wanting for demonstrative or *a priori* reasoning on the subject. That the first Cause possesses intelligence, and that He is a righteous Lawgiver, are obviously conclusions founded on an observation of facts, in the external world, and in ourselves; and therefore are *a posteriori*. The argument therefore falls short of apodeictic cogency, which accounts for the degraded notions entertained of the Divine Being by large portions of mankind, and, as travellers affirm, even the absence of the idea of God in some particularly uncivilized tribes.

We may not 'like to retain God in our knowledge' (Rom. i. 28), and the natural result may be anticipated ; for we are not *compelled* by a necessity of reason to believe in Him, much less in the God of revelation. The evidence is only probable, but probable evidence is the usual, and the sufficient, guide of life.[1] It may be added, that to us Christians, faith, grounded on the revelation of God in the Scriptures furnishes the *δος ποῦ στῶ* which the natural argument fails to do. The natural argument is rather the confirmation than the foundation of our belief.

The proper light in which these proofs are to be regarded is that of furnishing materials from which the imperfect consciousness of a superior Power, whether or not derived from revelation, is developed into more adequate conceptions, and attains a definite shape.[2] 'The innate idea of God,' says Jacobi, 'resembles a mute consonant, which can only be sounded in combination with a vowel, viz., creation (*τὰ ποιήματα*, (Rom. i. 20), including man and his moral nature. The faculty is there, but it is only potential until the reflective powers are directed to it. Sometimes this process never takes place, and then generations remain sunk in Fetichism, or the lower forms of idolatry. In more happily endowed races a few superior minds emancipate themselves from the grosser conceptions of the popular superstition, and from them the improvement descends until, in a greater or less degree, it permeates the mass. The conjunction of the two factors, human reason and the visible creation, being thus effected, the result is, sooner or later, a *γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ* (Rom. i. 19), not merely the belief of a God, but this belief purged from the taint of idolatry, which the Apostle describes as *unnatural*, and as the penal consequence of inattention to the lessons to be derived from creation (Rom. i. 21).[3]

Further, the force of evidence lies not in any one branch of it singly, but in the combination of all the branches. Inert matter could hardly suggest the idea of an intelligent, and the contrivances of nature hardly that of a righteous, Creator; in conjunction with each other, and with the evidence from the moral nature of man, they produce their full effect. This, indeed, is a feature of the evidences of Christianity itself ; each of which singly possesses some force, but collectively a much greater one. It is to be observed, moreover, that these proofs, while rendering the existence of a God probable, at the same time, to some extent, make known *what* He is.

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[1] Butler, *Anal.*, Introd.

[We feel bound to object that the whole of St. Paul's argument in Rom i is *not* that " the evidence is only probable," but that it is inescapable and conclusive, with the consequence that we *are* "compelled by a necessity of reason to believe in Him." Sin, as the Apostle so clearly shows in this passage, is the perversion, the overturning, of reason ; it is the triumph of irrationality, as epitomized in the assertion that men who dishonour God, though professing themselves to be wise, in fact become fools (verse 22). See also Note on p 54 above. Editor.]

[2] See Martensen's remarks on these proofs, *Dog.* ss. 38-43.

[3] The book of Wisdom contains striking examples of this purifying process (see cc. 13–15), in which the philosophic minds of later Judaism had the prophets as forerunners (see the latter part of Isaiah throughout).

[Litton seems to have reversed the process described in the latter half of Rom. i., where idolatry and heathenism are defined, not as a primitive non-reflective state from which mankind advances progressively to more adequate conceptions of the truth, but as a state of degradation, of fallenness from that original state with its natural knowledge of God in which man was created. Editor.]

B—THE NATURE OF GOD.

12. *Infinity*

Although the conclusion of Simonides, when he was requested to give a definition of God,[1] must ever be substantially that of a finite understanding, it must not be supposed that His nature is absolutely incomprehensible ; otherwise it is difficult to see how He could be an object either of thought or worship. That no logical definition of God is possible, is evident : for such a definition would consist of a genus and a difference ; but neither is in this case conceivable : not the former, for there is no common notion or category between God and the creature, under which He can be brought ; not the latter, for in God no such distinction as genus and difference exists. Even the highest category, substance, is predicable of God in quite a different sense from that which it bears in ordinary language.

But can that inferior kind of definition called 'description' be applied to Him? Theologians usually hold that it can ; but only in a limited measure, corresponding to the imperfection of our ideas on the subject. They tell us, that whereas the natural knowledge of God, which is partly innate and partly acquired (from the works of creation), is extremely imperfect (*languida et pæne nulla*), and inadequate to meet the wants of fallen man ; and even under the light of Revelation we only know so much as our limited faculties can receive ; yet our knowledge is only inadequate, not untrue as far as it extends : we do not worship the 'unknown God' of the Athenians (Acts xvii. 23).[2] They appeal, in proof, to Holy Scripture, which teaches that while 'no man hath seen God ' (in His proper Being) ' at any time ' (not even Moses, the most favoured of His servants, Exod. xxxiii. 20), yet ' the only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father hath declared Him ' (John i. 18) ; that while we are far from seeing ' face to face,' or knowing as we are known, yet ' we see through a glass darkly,' and ' know in part ' (1 Cor. xiii. 12) : that while God dwells ' in the light which no man can approach to ' (1 Tim. vi. 16), and the Spirit of God alone ' knows the things of God ' fully and perfectly, yet we, having ' the mind of Christ,' are admitted to a measure of this knowledge (1 Cor. ii. 10–16). They remind us that if the only approach to a formal definition to be found in Scripture is the tautology ' I am what I am ' (Exod. iii. 14 ; Isa. xliii. 13), yet what is important for us to know is conveyed in the statements that ' God is Spirit ' (John iv. 24), and ' God is Love ' (1 John iv. 8).[1]

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[1] 'Roges me, quid aut quale sit Deus, auctore utar Simonide : de quo quum quæsiverit hoc idem tyrannus Hiero, deliberandi causâ sibi unum diem postulavit. Cum idem ex eo postridie quæreret, biduum petivit. Cum sæpius duplicaret numerum dierum, admiransque Hiero requireret, cur ita faceret, Quia quanto, inquit, diutius considero, tanto mihi res videtur obscurior' (Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, i. 22.

[2] Gerhard, *Loc.*, iii. c. 3. Comp. c. 1 : 'Ergo est aliquod nomen Dei absconditum, et occultum, quod scrutari non licet : est etiam aliquod nomen Dei patefactum, quod vult agnosci, narrari, celebrari, et invocari.'

We have now to ask, Does Philosophy teach us anything on the subject ? Reverting to the proofs of the existence of a God, we are met by a difficulty, viz., that none of them seems necessarily to lead to more than the conception of a limited Deity. That the Author of the universe must have been a Being of vast power, wisdom and goodness, may be admitted as at least highly probable ; the great difficulty of the existence of evil, moral and physical, being explained on the supposition either of the refractoriness of matter, or of an Evil Being counteracting the designs of his adversary. But since the effect is not infinite, why need we suppose an infinite cause ? Why assume a Deity of unlimited attributes to produce limited results ? Whence, in short, do we derive the ideas of the Infinite and the Absolute as connected with the idea of God, which yet we do spontaneously connect with Him? It must be confessed that here the argument *a posteriori* fails us.[2] Even the oneness, or rather ' Oneliness '[3] of God cannot be thus inferred. There can of course be but One infinite Being ; but there is nothing contradictory in the supposition of a number of limited deities having been concerned in the production of the world, provided we also suppose them to have been actuated by accordant wills.

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[1] Gerhard, *Loc.*, iii. c. 8. s. 70.

[2] A defect admitted by Clarke (*Ans. to seventh Letter*)—' The finite phenomena of nature prove indeed demonstrably *a posteriori* that there is a Being which has extent of power and wisdom sufficient to produce and preserve all these phenomena. But that this Author of nature is Himself absolutely immense or infinite cannot be proved from these finite phenomena, but must be demonstrated from the intrinsic nature of necessary existence.' Whatever may be thought of this latter ' demonstration,' the preceding remark holds good.

[3] ' *Μόνωσις*, unity, oneliness, or singularity, is essential to it '—the idea of God (Cudworth, c. iv. s. 10).

Attempts have been made, with various success, to supply this defect. A traditionary method, derived from the scholastic writers, of arriving at an idea of the Divine perfections consists in three processes of thought: *Via eminentiae*, by which we ascribe to God all the perfections which we discover in the creature, only in a superlative sense (*sensu eminentissimo*); *via remotionis*, or *negationis*, by which we separate from the idea of Him the imperfections that belong to the creature; *via causalitatis*, by which whatever perfections we observe in the works of God we ascribe to Him as their cause, on the principle that the cause must contain at least as much as the effect. But the objection still recurs, that by none of these methods do we gain the idea of absolute perfection; they are *a posteriori* methods, and the chasm between the Finite and the Infinite remains unbridged over. Others argue from necessity to perfection, that a self-existing Being must be Infinite, but hardly with success.[1] For, in truth, limitation of essence is not necessarily inconsistent with necessity of Being[2]; at least we cannot, on merely logical grounds, pronounce it to be so. Infinity may be a condition of self-existence, or rather the most suitable idea we can connect with it, and yet it does not follow that the thing conditioned may not exist without it; as, in the hypothetical judgment, if rain falls the grass will grow, the failure of the antecedent does not involve that of the consequent, for the grass may grow even if the rain does not fall.

It seems, then, that we must attempt another path; and perhaps it will be indicated if we consider that all discussions respecting the Absolute or the Infinite presuppose some idea thereof in our minds to which we tacitly refer, for we cannot be supposed to reason about a nonentity. Not an adequate conception, for the forms of logical thought are inapplicable to this subject, and we become involved in contradictions when we attempt definitions; but an idea, or immanent intuition of reason. We advance *via eminentiæ* to the utmost limits of analogical reasoning; but we are conscious of something beyond, fathomless and immeasurable, in the nature of God. 'We know,' says Pascal, 'that there is an Infinite, though we are ignorant of its nature.' And this something does not, in transcending the conceptions of the understanding, become to us a mere blank, a yawning chasm, 'without form and void'; the created perfections which have been our prompters and our guides all along, project their shadow on the boundless bosom of the Infinite. We still anthropomorphize, as we must do if we are to reason about Deity at all; and thus Infinity becomes identical with absolute perfection, and when we speak of a God of 'infinite,' we mean a God of perfect wisdom, power, and goodness.[1] Let us hear Cudworth on the subject: 'Since infinite is the same as absolutely perfect, we having a notion or idea of the latter, must needs have of the former. From whence we learn also that though the word "Infinite" be in the form negative, yet is the sense of it, in those things which are really capable of the same, positive, it being all one with "absolutely perfect"; as likewise the sense of the word "finite" is negative, it being the same with "imperfect."'[2]

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[1] See Clarke, Prop. 6.

[2] Kant, *Kritik der R. V.*, b. ii. c. 3, s. 3.

It is, in fact, through not giving sufficient prominence to the positive element in our idea of Infinity that some modern philosophers of great name have failed to assign its due force to the theistic argument.[3] Etymologically the word 'Infinite' expresses a negation, that which is not limited; but philosophically it expresses an affirmation, however indistinctly the object may be apprehended; and it is in the latter sense that it denotes that element in the Divine nature which no mere *a posteriori* argument can supply. The idea of it is something more than that which we have of perfections vastly transcending our own, and something less than the immediate knowledge of Deity to which the ancient Mystics pretended; it is one of those indistinct ideas which we accept as a whole (intuitively), but are baffled when we attempt to reconcile its conflicting elements. The conclusion of the whole is that while God Himself alone knows what God is (1 Cor. ii. 11), man, by a combination of the intuitional and reflective faculties, knows too, but only in part; that partial knowledge, however, not being a mere creation of the intellect, but having correspondent realities in the Divine essence. And with this accords the language of Scripture, which refers us, for such knowledge of God as we can attain to, not to the understanding, but to faith, the intuitional organ of spiritual apprehension (1 Cor. xiii. 12; Heb. xi. 3, 6.).

That there can be only one subject of these infinite perfections—one not merely in purpose but in essence—is evident; and further, that such a Being can have no 'parts'—divisibility into parts, which implies limitation, being inconsistent with the notion of infinity.

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[1] The late Dean Mansel may perhaps be thus reconciled with his opponents. It could hardly have been the learned writer's intention (in his Bampton Lectures) to maintain that the infinite and the absolute, as applied to Deity, in other words the infinite perfections of God, are to us mere nothings, or wholly incomprehensible. But he has given occasion to objections, not altogether unfounded, against his theory by insisting too exclusively on the negative as compared with the positive notion of infinity, and by omitting to explain why it is that, while unable to conceive it, we yet must believe that this notion exists. Moreover it is not 'the infinite' in the abstract, but the 'infinite God' that we are reasoning about.

[2] *Int. Syst.*, c. v.

[3] *E.g.*, Sir W. Hamilton, *Discussions*, etc.; McCosh, *Div. Gov.*, App. i.

The arguments from marks of design, and from the moral sense, particularly point to the personality of God ; but this has by modern philosophers been thought to involve great difficulties. How can the Absolute and the Infinite be conceived as a Person ? Personality, in the ordinary sense, involves relation and limitation : a person is related to another, as not being that other, and for the same reason is limited. That the word Person admits of modified senses is seen from its use in describing the relations of the three Persons of the Holy Trinity to each other, relations which are never supposed to be inconsistent with the infinity of each ; but on the immediate question before us, has not personality been confounded with individuality ? An individual must be limited, but God is never represented in Scripture as an Individual. 'God,' we read, 'is' not *a* Spirit, but 'Spirit,' *i.e.*, the most perfect embodiment of intelligence and freedom as He is 'Love,' the most perfect embodiment of goodness.[1] To have created other spirits, possessing a relative freedom and independence, is not to have abdicated His own essential qualities ; in Him we still live, move, and have our being (Acts xvii. 28) ; He is still the 'Father of spirits' (Heb. xii. 9) ; it is a self-limitation, not a necessary one, that He has clothed Himself in to come down to our apprehension ; and though we must conceive of Him as possessing Personality, it is neither necessary nor correct to conceive of Him as a Person, in the sense in which each of us is.

The difficulty arises, as it does also in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, from our attaching to Personality the only conception we can form of it, viz., that derived from our own consciousness, which is always that of a limited nature : the conception may be true, but it is imperfect, and must not, any more than in the doctrine of the Trinity, be pushed to its consequences if we would avoid error. When we can understand what is involved in the title I AM (Exod. ii. 14), we can also understand what is meant by the Personality of God.

C—Attributes of God

13. *Origin and Divisions*

The infinite nature of God does not in fact, present itself to the mind as a single idea, but as an assemblage of properties or qualities, to each of which the idea of infinity is attached. The different wants of which we are conscious, as limited, or sinful, beings ; the different circumstances in which we are placed ; the different points of view from which creation may be regarded; modify the aspects under which we represent to ourselves the one living and true God, and thus give rise to the doctrine of the Divine attributes. In conceiving God as the infinitely wise, good, powerful, etc., we confine our attention, in each case, to one aspect of the Divine essence, we take a partial view of it suggested by existing circumstances; and because a partial, necessarily an imperfect one; but such a view as alone is of any religious value. There is no food for faith in the abstract ideas of the Infinite and the Absolute. How this Infinite Being is affected, what the relations He sustains, towards us, are the points with which we are practically concerned; a God of attributes can alone be the object of worship. That this is the true origin of these conceptions, and that they are not logical deductions from one or more determinations of His essence, is evident as well from our own experience as from the representations of Scripture; of which those portions which most abound in references to the Divine attributes, *e.g.*, the Psalms, the Book of Job, and the latter part of Isaiah, are also those in which the varying phases of religious experience occupy a prominent place.

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[1] [The use of the term "embodiment" here is hardly appropriate ; but it will not be understood etymologically. Editor.]

But the question may be asked, How come we to connect definite ideas with these Scriptural designations of the Divine Being? The methods above mentioned (*via eminentiæ*, etc.) teach us how to use the materials once supplied, but do not supply them. The answer is, that it is from human qualities we take our departure in framing predicates of God. Since revelation is conveyed in human language, it must either be unintelligible or avail itself of the innate notions and moral perceptions of the human subject; it must speak to us in our own tongue where in we were born.[1] That is to say, in framing conceptions of God, we necessarily reason from the most perfect subject of which we are cognizant, the reasonable creature, and assign in an eminent, it may be inconceivable, sense to Him what we find in the creature.

In so doing, a twofold caution is to be observed: one that we do not suppose the Divine attributes to be *identical* with the corresponding qualities in the creature. It is an axiom of theology that the attributes of God are not separable from His essence, as in the case of a man his virtue, or his wisdom, is separable from his rational nature; and therefore they partake of the incomprehensibility of His nature. When we pass from our most perfect notions of human wisdom or justice to God, we exchange, in the language of mathematics, continuous motion for motion *per saltum*: we confess the inadequacy of human thought to understand, and human language to express, the corresponding realities in the Divine nature: these form a different *species* from the former.

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[1] Hampden, *Phil. Evid. of Christianity*, p. 23.

But the other caution is no less needed ; that we do not treat these predicates as arbitrary conceptions, which have no meaning when applied to God. For our flight over the chasm continues in the direction which it held when parting from the finite ; neither in a reverse nor a divergent one. As the schoolmen state it, these distinctions are not those *rationis ratiocinantis*, merely conceptions of our minds, but *rationis ratiocinatæ*, having a real basis of fact : there is something in the Divine nature actually corresponding to them : they are *analogically* true, however inadequate. God is not righteous merely because He acts as a righteous man would act ; nor, again, merely because He is the source of righteousness in us : but He acts righteously because it belongs to His nature to do so (*οὐσιωδῶς*). He cannot be supposed as misleading His creatures when, in the language of inspiration, He describes Himself as just or merciful ; His creatures, who have no means of understanding these terms, except such as their own minds furnish.

This is no point of merely speculative interest. A blind force, a mere *natura naturans*, a system of 'natural laws' working invariably and remorselessly, can never call forth the sentiments which Scripture encourages us to entertain towards God ; in such a rarefied atmosphere all that is vital in religion perishes ; love expires, prayer becomes a mockery. He who knows what is in man gives us better lessons when He authorizes us to reason from analogy to 'the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,' and tells us that if 'ye being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him ?' (Matt. vii. 11). 'If this', says Twesten, 'is Anthropomorphism, it is a natural and a necessary Anthropomorphism. For if we are formed in the image of God, why should we not from the image reason to the Original ? Was He not in our likeness who could say, 'He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father ?' (John xiv. 9).

Many divisions of the Divine attributes have been proposed which aim at an exhaustive analysis, but with indifferent success. Sometimes the distinction is not observed between the attributes and the nature of God, and sometimes the divisions run into each other. They have been classified under the heads of absolute and relative, negative and positive, proper and improper, abstract and concrete, quiescent and active ; the first and the last conveying the same idea, and furnishing the only generic division under which the others can be arranged.

The absolute attributes are those which we conceive as existing in God in and by Himself, the relative those which express the relations in which He stands to the creature; the former may be termed quiescent (*immanentia*), the latter active (*transeuntia*) ; in the former the distinction, in the latter the connection, between God and the world is more prominent. But if the origin of our conception of attributes has been correctly assigned, many of the so-called absolute attributes hardly come under the description ; they either belong to the Divine essence, or are immediate deductions from our idea of it. Such are 'living and true' ; infinity in its twin forms eternity and immensity; simplicity and unchangeableness, which follow from unconditioned existence ; blessedness (*beatitudo*), which is implied in absolute independence. Sometimes they reappear under the form of relative attributes ; as, *e.g.*, under a certain aspect immensity becomes omnipresence. To the relative attributes then we may confine our attention.

14. *Omnipresence*

The immensity of God, considered in relation to space as a condition of creation, assumes the name of Omnipresence. For there are two ideas involved in this attribute, not separable in fact, but mentally—the Divine immensity in virtue of which God never can be absent from any of His works (*Dei adessentia*) and the Divine causality in virtue of which He is actively operative in all His works. These ideas are not separable in fact, for the attributes and the essence of God are one : wherever He is, there He acts ; and wherever He acts, there He is : but under the former, Omnipresence is regarded as a quiescent and absolute attribute, involving no considerations of space (in fact out of it) ; under the latter as a relative one, having reference to existing things, and in immediate connection with them. For we can no more dissever God from the world, since 'in Him we live, move, and have our being' (Acts xvii. 28), than we can identify Him with it. But if we are not to think of Him merely as an omnipresent spectator, the connection can be no other than that of an omnipotent agent, sustaining, guiding, impelling the course of nature.

The rest of God from His works is a perpetual activity (John v. 17). And the dogmatical import of this attribute is to guard against the deistical notion that God, having once communicated to matter its forces and laws, has retired into a state of repose, leaving these laws to their regular and immutable operation ; as an engineer, having set his machine in motion, withdraws from personal interference with it. The language of Scripture, of religion, and even of true philosophy, is at variance with this notion. If in the thunder the Psalmist hears 'the voice of the Lord' (Ps. xxix. 3) ; if it is He that makes 'darkness and it is night' (Ps. civ. 20), and gives to all creatures 'their meat in due season' (*ibid.* verse 27), this language is sanctioned by the spontaneous utterance of piety ; as, *e.g.*, when a nation, grateful for deliverance from a threatened invasion, stops not, in commemorating the event, at the laws of nature established by God, but ascends to their Author—' *Deus afflavit et dissipati sunt.*' Nor does a sound philosophy lead to a different conclusion, for to an all-perfect Being we cannot ascribe a state of *otium cum dignitate.*

But do we not thus annihilate the relative independence of secondary causes, and give countenance to the theory of Descartes and his followers, that God is the Direct Agent in all that happens, the properties of matter only furnishing the occasions on which He exercises His power ? Not if we bear in mind that these secondary causes are themselves dependent on God, who at the first established them, and defined their mode of working. If in His wisdom He has chosen to limit Himself to work in and through the laws of nature, it is not the less He who does the work. It is, however, the fact that nature *appears* to have a life of its own, and to act independently ; and this difficulty especially meets us when under the term ' nature ' we comprise free intelligences ; the difficulty, viz., how finite beings, free to stand or fall, can co-exist with an infinite Spirit who created, and is ever present with them. Both as regards the material and the moral world, it arises from the inability of those whose conceptions are bounded by time and space to comprehend the nature of a Being who is unconfined by those limits.

Hence theology takes refuge in antinomies, or apparent contradictions ; God is everywhere, God is nowhere ; He is not so much everywhere as He is that very thing which we call everywhere ; He is in every place, and yet is not contained in any place (*illocalis praæsentia*). ' It is more proper,' says Augustine, ' to say that all things are in Him, than that He is anywhere, and yet they are not in Him as in a place ' ; all which statements amounts substantially to Chrysostom's confession, ' That God is everywhere we know and profess ; but how He is so we do not understand.'

Is God everywhere present in the same manner ? It can hardly be a matter of words when we distinguish between that presence of His which belongs to creation generally (*præsentia generalis*) ; that by which He dwells in the regenerate (John xiv. 23, *præsentia specialis*) ; and that on which the union of God and man in the person of Christ is founded (Col. ii. 9). Nor can we consider the distinctions as merely of degree, and not of kind, or specific ; as if, *e.g.*, the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the regenerate is nothing but the general presence in a certain stage of intensity. Schleiermacher's remark, however, deserves notice : ' Properly understood, there is no difference in the Almighty presence of God, but only in the receptivity of the creature, which is greater in man than in any other created being, and greatest of all in the pious.' The question whether the Divine essence, or the Divine operation, *i.e.*, whether God Himself, or merely the virtue that proceeds from Him, is to be considered in proximity to the creature—at one time much debated—can hardly be entertained by those who hold that wherever God works there He is, and must be, in all the fulness of His Being ; yet possesses a measure of importance in reference to the crude notions of the Socinians, who maintained that God, in His essential Being, is only in heaven, all of Him that is present in creation being his attributes of Wisdom and Power.

But if the Omnipresence of God is not quiescent, but active and co-operative—and we cannot think otherwise than thus of it—we must take care to confine its co-operation to its proper objects. We cannot, *e.g.*, conceive of God as actively co-operating with evil, the existence of which we feel too keenly, while we know that it could not exist without Divine permission. In what sense is God present (as in some sense He must be) to the minds and actions of evil men ? This question will be more suitably considered in a following section. Nor, as has been observed, does it dispense with the operation of secondary causes, which are *relatively* independent ; and if piety leads us to pray for the former, prudence forbids us to neglect the latter. We pray for recovery from sickness ,and if restored to health ascribe it to God's goodness ; but we also avail ourselves of the resources of medicine, and ascribe our recovery to the skill of the physician. It is in the actually constituted course of nature, with its laws and forces, that Divine co-operation properly finds its place ; according to the saying of Augustine, 'God so manages all things which he created that He also permits them to exert their own energies.' We must, therefore, exclude it from creation strictly so-called, *i.e.*, the beginning of all things, when no course of nature was in existence ; and from the evangelical miracles of the *creative* type, viz., those on which Christianity is founded, the incarnation, resurrection, and ascension of our Lord. In the former, nature was passive ; in the latter, her existing laws were suspended.[1]

15. *Omnipotence*

To whatever extent any notion, however debased, of a God exists, to the same extent power is found connected with it ; power to avert evil, and bestow benefits ; power to order and dispose, if not to create. But except in revealed religion this power appears limited and controlled ; the inferior gods by Jupiter, Jupiter himself by Fate. In strong contrast therewith, the God of revelation is omnipotent. To have called the existing frame of nature into being conveys to our minds the idea of wonderful power ; but Omnipotence comprises a further idea, that of power adequate to all *possible* or conceivable objects, *e.g.*, a new frame of nature, should such seem good to the Divine wisdom ; God has not exhausted all His resources in creating the existing universe. Hence the god of Pantheism is not, and cannot be omnipotent, as being identified with the sum-total of creation, and having his will fully embodied in its laws. ‘ In scholastic phrase, the Divine power is infinite,’ both *extensive* in respect to the range and scope, and *intensive* in respect to the mode and energy of its exercise ; so that God, had it pleased Him, could have created a more perfect universe than He did.

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[1] [It might better be said that they were interrupted by intervention from above.—Editor.]

It is understood, of course, that the power of God does not extend either to what is contradictory in itself, that is, a nothing (as, *e.g.*, to undo what has happened, or to make two and two five) ; or to what is contradictory to some other of His attributes, as to pardon sin without an atonement would be contrary to His justice ; to refuse pardon to those who repent and believe on Christ would be contrary to His mercy. But this is not to introduce limitations into His nature, but to avoid doing so ; for to suppose Him capable of undoing what has been done would be to suppose Him capable of rendering false what is true ; and to suppose Him capable of acting against any of His attributes would be to connect with Him the idea of ‘ passive power ’—*i.e.*, the power of being acted upon, whereas He is pure energy (*actus purissimus*)—and to introduce division into that nature which is absolutely simple.

Nor is Omnipotence inconsistent with God’s acting, sometimes independently of secondary causes (as in creation), and sometimes through them (as in healing a sick person) ; for in this latter case it is He Himself who has ordained the limiting condition : of His own will He has ordered it, that certain effects shall be produced, not by a direct exercise of His power, but instrumentally through other agents. But He could, at the first, have arranged it otherwise ; and He can (as in miracles) exchange His ordinary mode of operation for another, if reasons exist for the change. His power can only become active through His will ; and therefore if it is His will to act conditionally, His power can only act thus.

16. *Omniscience*

From the union of omnipresence and infinite intelligence we infer the attribute of Omniscience. Nothing can escape His knowledge, to whom all things are present, and who perfectly understands them in all their relations. He knows the thoughts of the heart (Ps. cxxxix.) ; every ‘ hidden thing of darkness ’ (1 Cor. iv. 5) ; every want before it is expressed in prayer (Matt. vi. 8) ; everything in the womb of the future (Acts xv. 18) ; and, finally, He, and He alone, knows Himself (1 Cor. ii. 11). As regards this attribute, we must, as with the others, separate from it (*viâ remotionis*) all imperfection, such as necessarily belongs to our knowledge : for example, the distinction of past, present, and future applies not to Him whose being is an eternal Now ; God’s knowledge is not, as in man, a property annexed to His nature, but is His nature ; it is not after the manner of deduction (*discursive*), nor succession (*successive*) ; not by means of ideas (*species intelligibiles*) but immediate (*uno actu, se ipso*) ; it is not partial, but complete.

In the attempt to analyse the idea of Omniscience distinctions have been invented, which however add little to our comprehension of it : such as *scientia simplicis intelligentiæ*, by which is meant the knowledge of everything possible, and *scientia visionis*, the knowledge of everything actual, God Himself included ; *scientia necessaria* and *scientia libera*, etc. The mode of speaking is analogical : what we can conceive (*intelligentia*) as contrasted with what we see (*visio*) ; what we call ‘ natural ’ as belonging to God’s nature (therefore *necessaria*), as contrasted with the effects which flow from His will, and which seem more arbitrary ;—these distinctions we, in whom nature and will are separable, transfer to God, in whom they are one. A distinction of some importance is attributed to the Jesuits, who made use of it in their contests with the Jansenists, viz., *scientia media*, or the knowledge of things which would have happened had certain conditions been fulfilled, which never were : as, *e.g.*, God knew that David would be delivered into the hands of Saul if he remained in Keilah, where he did not remain (1 Sam. xxiii. 12). So our Lord knew that had Tyre and Sidon seen His mighty works (which they did not see), they would have repented (Matt. xi. 21).

The knowledge of God in respect of contingent actions,[1] those of free agents, is supposed to present peculiar difficulties. Cicero pronounces it inconceivable. And undoubtedly, when by ‘ knowledge ’ we understand ‘ will ’ or ‘ decree ’, it is not easy to understand how such knowledge and contingency can co-exist. Under that aspect, however, it rather belongs to the topic of Divine providence (§ 21). But mere foreknowledge of an event is no more inconsistent with contingency than with necessity ; for the *nature* of the event is not altered by it : our knowing that a contingent event *has* happened does not affect its contingency ; neither, therefore, does our knowing (could we do so) that it will happen.

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[1] Usually called ‘ præscientia,’ foreknowledge : not accurately, since past, present, and future have no meaning as applied to God.

Notwithstanding God's foreknowledge, free agents act freely, and necessary agents necessarily ; *i.e.*, He has knowledge of free agents *as such*, and of necessary agents *as such* ; or knows that each will act according to the laws which Himself has imposed upon them. Wisdom stands in the same relation to Omniscience as Immensity to Omnipresence ; *i.e.*, it is a quiescent or absolute attribute, or at least does not necessarily presuppose an actual creation. To 'the only wise God' (1 Tim. i. 17) we ascribe especially the first planning of the universe, with its laws and forces, its adaptation of means to ends, its final attainment of the greatest good of which it is capable. Hence this attribute is closely connected with the theistic argument from final causes. But the 'manifold wisdom' of God is especially revealed in the work of redemption, and the Church, even in its present militant state, is its highest embodiment (Ephes. ii. 10).

17. *Goodness—Holiness—Righteousnes—Mercy*

These are what are called ethical, as distinguished from physical, attributes.

Goodness—The goodness of God may be understood in a twofold sense ; either the essential goodness of His nature ('There is none good but one,' Matt. xix. 17), or goodness in the sense of beneficence. As a relative attribute the latter is the sense which it bears. The earth teems with instances of God's goodness. 'It is a happy world after all.' The sportive movements of animals, the cheerful song of birds, the varied hues and fragrance of flowers (apparently serving no purpose but that of gratifying the senses), the pleasure attached to intellectual and even bodily exertion, all testify to the beneficence of the Creator. The existence of evil, it is true, lowers in the distance as a dark cloud, and is too important a subject not to demand special consideration. Meanwhile, thus much is evident : all the contrivances of nature have the well-being and happiness of the whole for their *natural* tendency : if the aim is not attained, it is in *spite* of natural arrangements, and because they are thwarted by some antagonist power. 'We never discover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil purpose.' If God had been indifferent to our happiness, He might have made, or permitted a rival Power to make, 'everything we tasted bitter, everything we saw loathsome, everything we touched a sting, every smell a stench, and every sound a discord.'

Holiness.—The proper idea of this attribute is separation from what is unclean. God, as He has no taint of sin in Himself, cannot tolerate it in the creature. The absolute holiness of God fences His love round; and without the constant recollection of it, worship degenerates either into pantheistic rapture, or impure mysticism. Hence the common title, 'The Holy One of Israel' (Isa. i. 4); hence the more closely man is permitted to approach the Divine Presence, the more is he reminded of his unfitness for it (*ibid.* vi. 5). In general, in proportion as God becomes the God of history and revelation, mingles in human affairs, and assumes 'a local habitation and a name' in the congregation of Israel, the assertions of His holiness become emphatic, so as to establish a strong line of demarcation between Him and the impure deities of heathenism. Nor is the lesson unneeded under the Gospel, as the prevalence of Anti-nomianism at some periods, and in some sects, too plainly proves.

Righteousness.—Righteousness, or justice, is in man the virtue which rewards according to merit, and which redresses the inequality produced by wrong-doing, *i.e.*, inflicts punishment on the transgressor. Analogically, God is conceived of as righteous when He acts towards individuals as men would act under the circumstances. This attribute, then, is distinct from that of goodness, which embraces the whole creation, whereas this stands in special relation to beings endowed with personality and free-will (angels and men), *i.e.*, to their behaviour. That God is righteous, rather is righteousness itself, is declared not only in Scripture, but by the moral law in man, and by the moral government of the world; the tendency of the latter, however occasionally thwarted, being plainly in favour of virtue. On the whole, virtue brings its own reward, while sin ends in, and is, misery.

It must be confessed, indeed, that the traces of this attribute are not so clearly visible in creation as those of some others—wisdom, for example, or power; in fact, what are called 'the inequalities of life,' have furnished matter of objection to the unbeliever, and of perplexity sometimes to the Christian. The frequent failure of merit to achieve the success due to it; the calamities which often overwhelm the righteous while the wicked enjoy prosperity (Ps. lxxiii.); the apparent abortiveness of elaborate preparations for usefulness through the premature stroke of death—these are some of the difficulties which meet the inquirer, and form, in fact, a strong argument for a future state, where such inequalities will be rectified, and the righteousness of God vindicated. At present we walk by faith, not by sight ; content with the assurance that however perplexing appearances may be, the Judge of all the earth will eventually justify His ways (Gen. xviii. 25).

But, it may be asked, has not this doctrine of retributory justice, especially under the aspect of reward (Heb. vi. 10), a tendency to impair the Christian sentiment of humility ? Not if we bear in mind that both the will and the power to do good are the gift of God (Phil. ii. 13), who, in rewarding, merely crowns His own work ; and that, as regards forgiveness of sin, if He is ' faithful and just ' to grant it (1 John i. 9), is not on account of our merits, but those of Christ, whose obedience, active and passive, becomes the property of those who believe upon Him. Inasmuch as no attribute of God is separable from His essence, and His essence is love, His righteousness can only be an efflux, and particular manifestation of His love ; for which reason to attempt to set the one against the other, or to construct systems from their presumed opposition, is unscriptural, and tends to introduce something like dualism into the Divine nature.

Mercy.—Although this attribute has been denied an independent existence, on the ground that it is identical with love, a distinction clearly exists between them. Mercy is love ; but it is love towards the fallen, the miserable. It has special relation, therefore, to the fact of sin in the world, and to the provisions of the Gospel for deliverance from the consequences of sin. Even towards the regenerate, who are reconciled to God through Christ, and have learned to cry, Abba, Father (Rom. viii. 15), there is room for its exercise ; for though they are no longer under the dominion of sin, they offend in many things (James iii. 2), and that continually ; and therefore are continually compelled to fall back upon the assurance that, like as a father pities his erring and repentant children, so the Lord is merciful to them that fear Him (Ps. ciii. 13 ; Luke xv).

D—The Works of God

18. *The Will of God*

Both the earlier Creeds connect creation with the existence of God : and in this they are followed by our Article, which speaks of Him as the ' Maker and Preserver of all things, both visible and invisible.' But between the attributes and the works of God there is an intermediate link by which we pass from one to the other, viz., *the Will of God*, or His free agency. This can hardly be called an attribute, and yet is the ground of all His works, and therefore claims a short notice. In attributing will to God, we invest Him with the essential property of a free agent, the power of choice ; we affirm that He was under no necessity, like a blind force, to do what He has actually done. And since there is no real distinction between the Will and the Being of God, the imperfections connected with human will must be removed from our conception of the Divine : thus there is no succession in it, as when we deliberate first, and then will ; no change involved, as when we pass from the power of willing to the act ; but deliberation, decree, choice of means, choice of end, are all one in God, and co-eternal with Himself.

That He is under no necessity of willing any particular effect, appears from the consideration that He is in Himself all-sufficient ; which He could not be, if anything outside of Himself were indispensable as a complement to His perfection. The object of God's will can only be absolute good, first in Himself, then in the creature : He cannot will otherwise ; but this is no limitation, but a perfection. Why His will should be described in one point of view as *absolute*, in another as *conditional* ; or as *antecedent* and *consequent* ; or as *efficacious* and the reverse ; *active* or merely *permissive* ; in other words, why an effect which He wills does not, and one which he does not will does, take place, are questions which more properly belong to other heads of discussion.

The works of God, when we consider Him as the efficient cause of the universe, are usually described as creation, conservation, and co-operation. The first applies to the commencement, the second to the continuance, the third to the active forces of the frame of nature. It is needless to remark, that in God Himself there is neither variety nor succession of acts : all His acts are one, but to our apprehension they are distinguishable. For clearly it seems one species of act to call things into being, another to preserve them in being, and a third to co-operate with their powers. So it seems, we say, for in reality it may be doubted whether these acts do not run into one another : *e.g.*, to give existence to a thing is to give it continuance, for however short a period ; to preserve a thing is to preserve all that makes it what it is, viz., its vital powers as well as its material form. The distinctions are more valuable as safeguards against imperfect views of the Divine agency than in a philosophical point of view. For instance, if we fix our attention too exclusively on the conservation of things, we may be tempted to forget either that they owe their very being to Almighty power, or that they cannot exert their inherent forces without the Divine co-operation ; if we have regard to creation alone, we may overlook the fact that, even when in existence, things could not continue so for a moment without God's sustaining presence. In this, as in other instances, it is the weakness of our faculties that compels us to consider under different aspects what is in reality one and the same operation.

19. *Creation*

The primary idea of creation is production out of nothing (*ex nihilo*) ; by which expression is to be understood not that ' nothing ' was a kind of material out of which God created the universe, but that there was no material at all antecedent to the creative act. It will be seen that this idea is necessary to obviate undue limitation of the Divine power. If an uncreated matter (ὕλη) existed independently of God, and co-eternally with Him, He would be a mere artificer, making the best use of the material to his hand, and possibly thwarted in his aim by its refractoriness, which, in fact, is one very ancient mode of accounting for the existence of evil.

The emanation theory, according to which the world is an external efflux of the Divine nature, involves the absurdity of supposing that an infinite Being could throw off from Himself a finite being, *i.e.*, undergo a change of nature. The world, while dependent upon God, both for its existence and continuance, is yet distinct from Him, and consequently has, in the proper sense of the word, been created ; and all the passages of Scripture which declare that there is but one God, and invest Him with infinite attributes, furnish indirect proofs of a proper creation. The Mosaic account (Gen. i) supplies, of course, the main materials for our knowledge and our reasoning on this subject. From it we learn, that ' by the Word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing in the water and out of the water ' (2 Pet. iii. 5) ; and this general fact remains unaffected by any particular interpretation of the passage. Whether verse 1 is to be considered as a summary of what follows, or as referring to the creation of the elementary principles of matter, on which the subsequent changes proceeded ; whether the ' days ' of creation are to be understood literally, or as signifying vast intervals of time ; the true principle of creation—' He spake, and it was done ; He commanded, and it stood fast ' (Ps. xxxiii. 9)—is equally asserted.

It is plain that by ascribing the successive acts by which the world was prepared to be the abode of man, to the word of God, the writer implies that each was, in a true sense, an act of creation, that is, that they did not pass one into the other in the way of natural antecedent and consequent. Lifeless matter did not breathe into itself the principle of vegetable life, nor did vegetable life advance by any known law into animal, nor animal into rational ; there was a chasm between each of these steps, which nature of itself could not bridge over. There must, no doubt, have been a groundwork in the earlier for the later manifestations of creative energy ; a point of affinity with which the latter could connect themselves. Man, *e.g.*, was not created *per saltum* ; there was a capacity in the irrational soul for the gift of reason. But the progression was not the less above nature ; and each step involved a repetition of creative agency. Yet since this agency made use of existing materials, and built upon them, it is distinguishable from the first Divine act of creation *ex nihilo* ; whence its name of secondary, or mediate creation.

Whether the world had a beginning or not, is a question which does not necessarily affect the idea of creation ; for a world, the commencement of which we can assign to no point of time, may be as much dependent on the Creator as one to which we can assign such a point ; hence it was held to be an open question. The controversy relates not to the secondary acts of creation, the works of the six days, for they are described as occurring *in* time, and therefore must have had a beginning, but to the primary creative act. When we attempt to conceive this either as having had a beginning or as having had none, we encounter metaphysical difficulties which Kant pronounces insoluble and which really are so if we grant his premiss that time, in the proper sense of the word, can exist apart from the succession of events by which it is measured. Augustine's formula seems nearest the truth : ' The world was made not *in* time, but *with* time ' ; *i.e.*, time was coeval with creation, and though in *thought* we can extend it backwards beyond that point (as Scripture itself speaks of what occurred, ' before the foundation of the world,' Ephes. i. 4), yet it is then no longer time *in fact*, and we plunge into the abyss of eternity. That the world had a beginning has, therefore, come to be the commonly received opinion.

Another difficulty, of very ancient date, is stated in the question of Velleius, the Epicurean, in Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, l. i. c. 9 : ' Why,' he asks, ' should artificers of the world have suddenly appeared ? and why should they have slept for innumerable ages previously ? ' In other words, how can we conceive God's willing that the world should exist without His will immediately taking effect ? Again, if He ever existed without the world, there was a time when He was not Creator ; when He became so, did not this involve a change ? to suppose which is not consistent with proper ideas of the perfection of the Divine nature. It was on this ground that Origen was led to argue against the world's having had a beginning ; and so far as it was an idea in the Divine mind he was in the right ; it must have been eternally present to the Divine intelligence. How this is to be reconciled with the apparent doctrine of Scripture, which is, that the actual world did not exist from eternity, but that time and it came into being together, is a question for metaphysicians to discuss, and is one which dogmatic theology has little to do with. Hence, though as a rule favouring the common opinion, theologians have never considered the other as inconsistent with Christian faith.[1]

The final end of creation can be no other than the glory of God and the communication of the highest good to the creature : things which in fact can never be separated. It would be improper, therefore, to say that God needed the world to complete His blessedness ; *i.e.*, that He *must* have created it. He is in Himself all-sufficient and all-blessed. Nor is it less improper to maintain that God created any part of the universe, especially of the reasonable creation, to show forth His glory in its eternal ruin : a tenet incompatible with the fundamental ethical truth, that God is love.

20. *Conservation*

By the schoolmen conservation was identified with creation, being described as a *creatio continua*, or a series of successive acts of the same energy which called things into existence. And, no doubt, all the works of God are, as far as He is concerned, one. To us, however, there is a distinction between the maintenance of the existing frame of nature and its first production ; and the idea can hardly be dispensed with in our conception of the Divine causality. It expresses the fact that the world, after its creation, does not continue to exist by any independent power of its own ; and that if God's maintaining presence were withdrawn, it would relapse into pristine nothingness. Yet as things must be supposed to possess, by the gift of creation, inherent faculties and powers which naturally propagate themselves, the Divine agency in conservation is not exclusive and God maintains the frame of nature by maintaining its faculties and powers. Thus certain plants were created with medicinal properties, which so far have an independent existence; but that they continue to exhibit these properties, and so minister to the art of the physician is from God's sustaining power.

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[1] [Origen's argument against the world's having had a beginning may with equal force be applied to any event whatsoever, so that, rather than say, for example, that there was a time when God was not incarnate in Christ or when He was not poured out on all flesh as the Holy Spirit, we should be required to affirm that God, being unchanging and unchangeable, must eternally have been incarnate, and the pentecostal Spirit poured forth from all eternity. Speculation of this kind, however, so far from preserving God from the human experience of time and change (which it is intended to do), has the precise effect of enslaving Him to the human concept, and of placing Him in a philosophical kind of static timelessness in which nothing ever happens. To conceive of the divine existence in these terms is, in fact, to do a disservice to the creative and unconditioned freedom, exuberance, and otherness of the Deity. Editor.]

How, then, does conservation differ from co-operation (*concursus*) ? Not specifically, for both are modes of the Divine omnipresence ; but the former represents rather the passive, the latter rather the active, side thereof ; the former is connected rather with the fundamental laws of nature (such as electricity, gravitation, generation, etc.), or with species as distinguished from individuals ; the latter rather with the manifestations of those laws, or the actions of individuals. We apply, *e.g.*, the idea of conservation to the human race, the idea of co-operation to the conquests of an Alexander or a Napoleon ; the former to the laws of storms, the latter to the particular tempest which destroyed the Spanish Armada. Yet it may be questioned whether the distinction can, philosophically, maintain its ground, whether it is not founded merely on the degree of prominence which the activity of secondary causes assumes in either case.

21. *Providence*

The Divine agency is here considered in relation not to efficient but to final causation. If God created the world for His own glory in the communication to it of the highest good, He must be conceived as providing for the attainment of the end, as well in the choice of means as in their combination ; disposing and directing every event, even every purpose of free agents, towards the accomplishment of His designs. He is a *negotiosus Deus* who never lets the reins of government fall from His hands. The mode of speaking is, as usual, analogical. When we propose an end to ourselves we are compelled to select and make use of other agencies as means ; but God needs not means to effect His purposes, and as regards Him the distinction vanishes : to Him everything is at once means and end.

The doctrine of Providence is opposed, in the first place, to that of blind necessity (the *fatum* of the ancients), which leaves no room for an intelligent will in the order of nature, and confronts us at every step with the iron rule of inexorable law ; and, in the next place, to the doctrine of chance, which does not, indeed, deny efficient causation, but treats the belief of a controlling Providence, disposing all events to an intended issue, as a pious illusion. It places us in the hands of Him who has told us that not even a sparrow falls to the ground without His permission, that the very hairs of our head are numbered, and that all things work together for good to them that love Him (Matt. x. 29, 30 ; Rom. viii. 28).

With respect to the objects of Divine Providence, nothing is excepted from it, however insignificant it may appear to us : for, in the first place, to God nothing is either great or small, this relation existing only for finite intelligences—as in mathematics the smallest and the greatest quantity are equally nothing when compared with infinity ; and, secondly, the (apparently) most trifling event may give rise to momentous and far-reaching consequences ; as the noise of geese is said to have preserved Rome from destruction—and had Rome been destroyed how different would the history of the world have been ! The sentiment, therefore, '*Magna Dii curant, parva negligunt*,' is as unphilosophical as it is irreligious.

But though everything is an object of Providence, it does not follow that everything is equally so : hence the distinctions that have been drawn between general and special Providence, the former being concerned with nature as a whole, the latter with the Church. And, no doubt, there must be some difference between the care which God has for all His creatures, in feeding the fowls of the air (Matt. vi. 26), in blessing the labours of the husbandman with rain and fruitful seasons (Acts xiv. 17), or in His providential government of the human race (Acts xvii. 26) ; and that which He exercises towards those whom He has chosen in Christ (Ephes. i. 4), redeemed with the precious blood of Christ (1 Pet. i. 19), sanctified by His Spirit, and made heirs of eternal life. The distinctions, however, not unfrequently overlap each other : *e.g.*, if the life and labours of St. Paul, after his conversion, were the subject of Providence in its most special sense, yet his mental endowments, his birth, his education, and other circumstances which fall under the head of general Providence, manifestly bore upon his special mission ; not to mention that if he was thus selected for a particular purpose, this again was for the sake of the heathen world which was his appointed field.

Perhaps it would be more correct to say that Divine Providence has ever had one grand aim, the establishment of the Kingdom of God upon earth under Christ ; and that all its subordinate agencies, whether in nature or in history have been intended to promote that final result. This is the great lesson of sacred history, from the call of Abraham to the impending consummation, when the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of His Christ (Rev. xi. 15) : for this the world was created, has been preserved, and is controlled, in all its complicated movements, by the Providence of God.

There is, however, a distinction of real importance, as regards the manner in which Providence operates, that, viz., between ordinary and extraordinary, or those cases in which it works in the usual manner through secondary causes, and those in which it arrests attention by some unusual combination. The latter have received the name of special Providences. Events occur in history, or in the lives of individuals, of the greatest moment in their consequences, which have been brought about by a concurrence of circumstances so remarkable as to force upon us the idea of special Divine agency : the junction of the man and the hour has been marvellously effected ; lines of historical progression have intersected each other at the exact time and place when and where it was needful.

Yet a special Providence can hardly be called a miracle : partly because in order to recognize it a retrospect is necessary, whereas a miracle addresses the senses directly ; partly because there is here no interference with the established order of nature, the miraculous element lying in the combination, not in the nature of the events ; and partly because it is not a question of authenticating a mission to introduce a new religion, and this it is that furnishes the appropriate place for miracles properly so called. True miracles come under the head rather of Creation than of Providence ; which latter is associated in our minds rather with the controlling and directing of the existing order of things, than with the originating of something new.

A main difficulty remains how to reconcile the doctrine of Providence, as explained above, with human freedom. If Providence were confined to mere foreknowledge, the difficulty (though not by any means removed, for God's foreknowledge cannot be conceived without a result in act) would be mitigated ; but if it involves, as it does, the idea of active government, how can this co-exist with liberty of human action ? That they must somehow co-exist, we know, on the testimony both of Scripture and of reason. We know that we are free to choose between contending motives, or, at any rate, actions ; and Scripture proceeds upon this fact in its promises and threatenings, its examples of reward and punishment. Yet the same Scripture asserts, as plainly, the entire dependence of created beings upon God, without whose permission and direction nothing happens that does happen. Without human liberty there could be no virtue nor religion ; without a recognition of Providence, no just views of the Divine nature.

The philosophical difficulty lies in this : that owing to the connection of cause and effect every event, according as it happens or does not happen, carries with it an interminable train of consequences, the issue of which no one can foresee ; the doctrine of free-will therefore seems to vest in man the power of permanently altering the course of nature ; and if so, the designs of God would seem to be dependent upon human choice, or caprice. The complete solution of the problem is probably beyond the reach of our faculties :[1] meanwhile it may be observed that if anything could occur unexpectedly, so to speak, as regards God, He whose power and wisdom are infinite, can never be at a loss for means to counteract or divert its consequences. But this supposition is inadmissible ; nothing can ever occur unexpectedly as regards God.

We are brought back, then, to the old tentative solution, that when God determined to create free agents, He imposed upon Himself limitations in His dealings with or through them : He must, unless He was to annihilate the freedom which He had created, allow it its proper scope ; He must permit voluntary causes to operate in their own way, as well as necessary ones in their way ; and the certainty of the event (which must be admitted) does not affect the nature of the causation which produces it, or transform freedom into necessity.

Yet free as the causes may be, if God is omnipresent, not as a mere spectator, but as an efficient agent in every change that takes place (things being considered merely under the aspect of contingency, not of their moral quality ; in what sense God co-operates with evil actions is a different question), He must be supposed as, in some way inscrutable to us, shaping the ultimate result. For freedom in the creature is not independence of God, who both created and upholds free agents not less than necessary, and apart from whom neither could exist for a moment.

The difficulty of explaining how God, without interfering with free causation, yet makes it subservient to His purposes, meets us also on the subject of Divine grace : *trahit volentem*, but He gives the will to be drawn, as well as draws. In the one case as in the other, the concurrence of Divine agency with human freedom is a mystery which baffles comprehension. Attempts to evade it, by reducing Divine agency to mere fore-knowledge,[2] only land us in other difficulties, and on more critical ground—the nature of the Divine perfections. The facts must be admitted, and the mystery acknowledged ; and with this we must be content until an enlargement of our faculties enables us to see things in their unity, which at present exist side by side as independent truths.

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[1] 'Where does the difficulty in this case originate ? Where is it situated ? It originates in a province of thought wherein our notions confessedly are inadequate and imperfect ; in an estimate of the Divine Nature, and the infinite perfections of God' (Davison on Proph., dis. vii). It should never be forgotten that in speaking of God's foreknowledge, or decrees, we anthropomorphize, and speak analogically.

[2] A great thinker confesses his inability to solve the problem : 'Si ad Dei naturam attendamus, clare et distincte perspicimus omnia ab ipso pendere, nihilque existere nisi quod ab æterno a Deo decretum est ut existat. Quomodo autem humana voluntas a Deo singulis momentis procreetur tali modo ut libera maneat, id ignoramus' (Spinoza, *Cog. Med.*, p. i, c. 3, s. 10). See also Hume in his *Essay on Human Understanding*, chap. 39, § 8 fin.

22. *Evil—Especially Moral Evil*

If a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness is the Creator of the world, the latter, it should seem, must be a perfect reflection of the Divine nature, *i.e.*, it must contain no admixture of evil. And so, in fact, we are told that when God surveyed the work of His hands He pronounced everything to be ' very good ' (Gen. i. 31). Yet the actual state of the world is quite the reverse : it abounds with evil, moral and physical, so much so that it has been subject of debate whether good or evil predominates in it. How are we to reconcile this fact with the infinite perfections of God? If it be said that creation, as it came from the hands of God, was perfect, but man, in the exercise of free-will, fell from his state of innocence, and with the fall sin and misery came into the world, it may be replied that God was under no necessity of creating the world, and if He foresaw (as He must have foreseen) that sin would find an entrance into it, why did He create it at all? or if He did choose to create it, why did He not adopt effectual safeguards against the intrusion of the foreign element?[1] Questions which have never yet been satisfactorily answered.

The attempts that have been made in this direction may be reduced to two principal heads : those which affect our conception of God, and those which affect our estimate of the Christian redemption. Since in either point of view they seem inimical to religious faith, it is worth while to examine how far they rest on a solid foundation.

Where the proper notion of evil was retained, as something positively antagonistic to good, it was natural, especially in the absence of revelation, to have recourse to the hypothesis of two independent principles—one the Author of good, the other the author of evil—who, after contending in vain for the mastery, came to a tacit agreement to retire each to his own province, and partition between them the empire of the world. The Manichees in the third and fourth centuries, and the Paulicians in the seventh, were the chief representatives of this theory, which, however, dates from a remote antiquity, and, in fact, readily suggests itself to a mind which has never entertained, or has lost, correct notions of God.[2] A dualism of this kind leads to the hypothesis of a *limited* beneficent Deity, which, of course, is inconsistent with any form of Christian faith.

Those who recoil from it—some within and some without the pale of faith in revelation—have resorted to modes of explanation which virtually consist in denying that what we call sin is sin. Far from being an intrusive principle, foreign to the intended constitution of the world, and actively opposing itself to the Creator and His beneficent purposes, it is described as a necessary factor in the order of things, which without it would be less perfect, and indeed incapable of advancing to its appointed goal; like a sour sauce, it adds piquancy to the banquet, or like a passing discord, it not only is passing (*i.e.*, has no substantial existence), but it enhances the perfection of the harmony. That this is not the idea of sin which Scripture conveys, is obvious; and not less obvious is it that the necessity and importance of the redemption which Scripture reveals are thereby disparaged; for why should man be redeemed from what is a necessary constituent in his moral progress, or an inseparable adjunct of his condition as man? It is by no means, however, so certain that the theories in question rest on a solid foundation.

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[1] See the imaginary dialogue between Melissus and Zoroaster in Bayle's *Dict.*, art. Manichees.

[2] See Plutarch's confession of his own belief in his 'Isis and Osiris,' quoted by Bayle, Manichees.

One great writer, who has paid special attention to the subject, maintains that sin is a necessary consequence of the imperfection of the creature as compared with the Creator.[1] If the creature could be absolutely perfect, it would be as God Himself. God can bestow His gifts only in proportion to the capacity of the receiver; and even He could not create a finite being without the limitations and defects to which all such are subject. Hence the possibility of imperfection in knowledge, error in judgment, and perversion, or at least, instability, in the will. It does not follow that these imperfections will acquire actual existence; but they were contained in the Divine understanding, the 'Region of eternal truths,' as possibilities; which Region of eternal truths may therefore be called the 'Ideal cause' of evil as well as of good, and is what the ancient philosophers had in their mind when they made matter as such the source of evil.[2] God therefore is the Author of sin in the same sense in which He is the Author of His own understanding; *i.e.*, He is not the Author of it at all. But further, the source of sin being the imperfection of the creature, it is in its nature nothing positive, but merely a privation, as cold is the absence of heat, darkness the absence of light, or as the *vis inertiæ* of bodies retards their velocity.[1] It is a nothing apart from the substance of quality which forms its opposite pole : it has no independent existence, but cleaves, like a parasite, to what is good ; as such, therefore, it needs no efficient but only a ' deficient ' cause, *i.e.*, abstinence from perpetual miracles to counteract its natural tendency—which is exactly God's attitude with respect to evil. If the question be asked, Why should God have created a world with such beings in it, in their own nature limited and imperfect ? the answer is, that an infinite number of possible worlds having presented itself to the Divine mind, God was bound by a moral necessity to choose that one which, on the whole, should contain the greatest amount of good ; and that one is our present world, notwithstanding its admixture of imperfection.[2]

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[1] 'Il faut considérer qu'il y a une imperfection originale dans la créature, avant le péché, parceque la créature est limitée essentiellement : d'où vient qu'elle ne sauroit tout savoir, et qu'elle se peut tromper, et faire d'autres fautes' (Leibnitz, *Théodicée*, i. s. 20). 'Dieu est la cause de la perfection dans la nature et dans les actions de la créature, mais la limitation de la réceptivité de la créature est la cause des défauts qu'il y a dans son action' (*ibid.* s. 30). 'Dieu ne pourroit pas lui donner tout sans en faire un Dieu : il falloit donc qu'il y eût des différents dégrés dans la perfection des choses, et qu'il y eût aussi des limitations de toute sorte' (*ibid.* s. 31).

[2] *Théod.*, i. s. 20. It is difficult to see how Leibnitz's theory escapes making sin a necessary adjunct of human nature; but he seems to disavow the inference: 'Le mal métaphysique consiste dans la simple imperfection, le mal physique dans la souffrance, et le mal moral dans le péché. Or quoique le mal physique et le mal moral ne soient point nécessaire, if suffit qu'en vertu des vérités éternelles ils soient possibles' (i. s. 21).

The weak point in this theory does not lie in its Theodicy properly so called, for every Theodicy must aim at the same conclusion, viz., that the world would be less perfect without evil than with it, but in its views of the nature of moral evil, or sin. If the source of sin is the inherent imperfection of the creature as such, then the highest archangel is not free from it, being a creature ; nor can sin ever be wholly extirpated from the Kingdom of God : whatever change may await the redeemed hereafter, they must still be creatures, and Leibnitz's reasoning will apply to them.[3]

But especially, the notion of sin's being a mere privation is opposed both to Scripture and experience. Scripture speaks of sin not merely as an impediment to the Christian's progress, but as a principle of hostility against God (Rom. viii. 7) : Christ and Satan, the kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness, are engaged in irreconcilable conflict, which can only end in the destruction of the latter (Matt. xii. 26, 27 ; Ephes. vi. 12 ; 1 Cor. xv. 25). And such, in fact, does sin show itself when the restraints of law or of society are removed, and it has free scope to display its nature. The tragic page of history, individual and national, conveys far less frequently the idea of misfortune to be lamented than of wickedness to be hated and punished ; and the State, as a Divine ordinance, is compelled to deal with crime under this aspect (Rom. xiii. 4).

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[1] This is a favourite illustration with Leibnitz. ' Suppose,' he says, ' two barges on the same river, but one more heavily laden than the other : this one will proceed the more slowly, not because the current is less strong, but because the *vis inertiæ* of the heavier load opposes a greater resistance to it. The force of the current may be compared with the action of God on the creature ; the *vis inertiæ* with the natural imperfection of the creature ; the slowness of the barge with the defects which meet the eye in the action of the creature. The current is the cause of the movement, but not of the retardation ; and so God is the cause of perfection in the creature, but the limited receptivity of the creature is the cause of its deficiencies. God is as little the cause of sin, as the current is the cause of the retardation.' (*Théod.*, i. s. 30).

[2] See the remarkable allegory at the end of part ii of the *Théodicée*. Leibnitz's reasoning on this point does not seem conclusive. His task is to prove that the existence of evil is a *sine quâ non* of the greatest amount of good ; but the proof seems to consist in the assertion that because *God* permitted evil, the world must be the best possible ; which is the very thing to be proved. ' Il est permis de dire que Dieu peut faire que la vertu soit dans le monde sans aucun mélange du vice, et même qu'il le peut faire aisément. Mais puisqu'il a permis le vice, il faut que l'ordre de l'univers trouvé préférable a tout autre plan l'ait demandé. Il faut juger qu'il n'est pas permis de faire autrement, puisqu'il n'est pas possible de faire mieux.' (*Théod*, ii. s. 124).

[3] Hence his well-known description of the creature as an ' asymptote ' of Deity. See J. Müller, *Lehre der Sünde*, b. ii. c. 1.

The theory, in fact, confounds metaphysical with ethical and good and evil.[1] Metaphysical good consists in the perfection of a thing as a mere production, so that no essential constituent is wanting to it ; and hence it may be predicated of the inanimate and the irrational creation, to which the idea of moral goodness is inapplicable, or applicable only in a very inferior degree. Moral goodness implies reason and free-will, and consists in their right direction—moral evil in the reverse. According to the *Théodicée*, the difference is one of quantity, not of quality : evil is the less, good the more, perfect metaphysically ; a view with which the fact that the greatest wickedness if often found combined with the greatest energy of will is irreconcilable. It is here overlooked that privation, in a moral sense, involves or presupposes a positive perversion of will : man fails of reaching the standard set before him because he does not will to reach it : his failure is criminal, and is treated as such in Scripture. This celebrated essay, then, notwithstanding the just reputation which it enjoys, solves the problem by essentially altering one of its conditions, *i.e.*, it fails to solve it.[2]

Another explanation is that the animal nature of man, as contrasted with his higher one, is the source of sin. Man is connected with the outer world by means of the senses, which not only convey impressions, but are the avenues through which, as in the case of our first parents, temptations find an entrance to the soul. 'The flesh lusteth against the spirit' (Gal. v. 17), and since in infancy and childhood the animal nature gets the start of the spiritual, the latter is placed at a disadvantage, its orderly development is checked, it advances by fits and starts, experiences frequent reverses, and sometimes never gains the ascendency ; and the result is—sin.[1] The *possibility* of sin is here sufficiently accounted for, but as an explanation of its *origin* the theory is a failure. The animal nature itself cannot be sinful, otherwise sin might be predicted of the brute creation ; and moreover such a doctrine tends directly to Manicheism.

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[1] J. Müller, *Lehre der Sünde*, b. ii. c. 1.

[2] The rudiment of the theory that sin is a mere privation, a nothing in short, appears in Augustine, *e.g.*, *De Civ. Dei*, lib. xii, c. 7 : 'Nemo quærat efficientem causam malæ voluntatis : non enim est efficiens sed deficiens : quia nec illa effectio est sed defectio. Deficere namque ab eo quod summe est ad id quod minus est, hoc est incipere habere voluntatem malam. Causas porro defectionum istarum, cum efficientes non sint, ut dixi, sed deficientes, velle invenire tale est ac si quisquam velit videre tenebras, vel audire silentium : quod tamen utrumque nobis notum est : neque illud nisi per oculos, neque hoc nisi per aures, non sane in specie sed in speciei privatione.' From Augustine it passed into the systems of the great Roman Catholic theologians. See Bellarmine, *De Stat. Pec.*, 1, ii, c. 18.

How comes it, too, that the superior factor in human nature should, as experience shows, be so universally and permanently overcome by the inferior ? Whence the feeling of *guilt*, if after all not the man, not his true self, *i.e.* his 'spirit,' but something which is not so, is the source of sin ? Are there not special sins of the spirit which have no apparent connection with the flesh, such as those mentioned in Gal. v. 20 ? In Scripture the Pharisees, to whose charge sins of the flesh are not laid, are described as farther from the Kingdom of Heaven than the publicans and harlots. Above all, our Lord Himself cannot, on this hypothesis, be pronounced free from sin ; for the Eternal Son in becoming flesh became subject to temptations as we are (Heb. iv. 15), and experienced the shrinking of nature from suffering (Matt. xxvi. 39 ; Heb. v. 7), or, in other words, its resistance to the higher law of the spirit ; if, notwithstanding this, He was 'without sin' (Heb. iv. 15), the seat of the latter cannot be merely in the animal part of man. We have still then to ask, What is the intermediate factor between the flesh and the spirit, *i.e.* the lower and the higher parts of man's nature, whereby the latter is compelled to abdicate its natural supremacy, and make itself the servant of the former ? (Rom. vi. 17). In this factor lies the true source of sin. But the theory in question supplies no answer. It is to be remarked, too, that it leaves the fall of the angels, purely spiritual beings, quite unaccounted for.[2]

But admitting that sin is more than a mere privation, or a necessary consequence of an animal nature—that, in fact, it is nothing less than a principle of active opposition to the law of God—do we not see that opposition and contrast pervade the whole of human life, and are the indispensable conditions of improvement, whether in the individual or the community ? Action and re-action is a law of matter ; in the human body every muscle has its antagonist ; light and darkness are correlatives ; every resultant is composed of diverging forces. In the domain of art, a picture without shadows would be without lights, and a piece of music without occasional discords would sound flat and insipid. What health means is known by sickness, and rest presupposes labour. In communities, especially free ones, opposite tendencies, opposite parties, supplementing and correcting each other, are the very materials of national progress ; and the foremost of civilized nations have only won their position through protracted, and sometimes sanguinary, struggles. Thus the clashing of opposite elements is everywhere the condition of a higher unity ; and why should we be surprised if we find the same law prevailing in the spiritual progress of the race ? To be known as such, goodness must have its contrast and foil in evil, which therefore has a necessary, though transient, existence ; and moreover, when felt, acts as a stimulus to improvement. Such is another rationale of evil, which can number among its supporters names of great authority.[1]

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[1] Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre*, ss. 66–7.

[2] That the word σὰρξ, so common in St. Paul's Epistles, means much more than the mere natural affections and impulses of which the body is the organ, is abundantly proved by J. Müller, *Lehre*, etc., b. ii. c. 2. See also Tholuck on Rom. i. 3 ; Harless on Ephes. ii. 3 ; Neander, *Geschichte der Pflanzung*, etc., p. 572, 3rd edit.

That it is inconsistent with the teaching of Scripture needs hardly to be observed, particularly with the doctrines of the sinlessness of Christ and the future sinlessness of His Church : for according to it, moral perfection is only attainable through the knowledge and antagonism of sin. But, in fact, it rests upon erroneous premises. It is assumed that goodness, apart from its foil of evil, is a mere passive quality, without activity or progress ; than which nothing can be further from the truth. The Source of all goodness is perpetually active (John v. 17) ; it was our Lord's meat and drink to do the will of Him that sent Him ; the introduction of Christianity into the world is compared to leaven which never ceases to work until it has permeated the mass (Matt. xiii. 33). Goodness has its spring of energy within itself, and needs no foreign force to impel it on its path. Besides this, so far from being a necessary condition of moral or spiritual progress, evil impedes, corrupts, perverts every step of advance towards that perfection. In the individual, sin wars against the better law of his mind[2] ; in the community it is an active principle of disintegration and ruin. Avowed enmity, not friendly co-operation, is its real character.

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[1] This theory reaches its culminating point in Hegel and his school. Scripture tells us that man was created in the image of God (Gen. i. 27), but the philosopher's doctrine is that ' Man must eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, otherwise he is not a man, but a beast ' (Hegel, quoted by Müller, *Lehre*, etc., b. ii. c. 4) ; on which Martensen pertinently remarks that Hegel's paradise is a ' zoological garden ' (*Dog*., s. 82). Novalis describes sin as the poignant relish which makes religion palatable (*ibid.* s. 85).

[2] ' Sed trahit invitum nova vis, aliudque cupido Mens aliud suadet ; video meliora proboque Deteriora sequor.'

It is true that the higher we ascend in the scale of organization the greater the number and variety of constituent elements which, in a certain sense, present contrasts ; as in man, the summit of terrestrial creation, body and soul, sensation and reflection, understanding, affections, will : but, according to the ordinance of God, these divers faculties are intended not to counteract but to aid and supplement each other, so that no jarring discords shall mar the result. It is the same in communities ; the beneficial effect of different ranks, pursuits, and opposite parties, depends on the degree in which all are actuated with a zeal for the common welfare, and are prepared to unite if it be endangered. So too in the Church : there are 'diversities,' and 'differences of administrations,' but they all proceed from the same Spirit, and all tend to the edification of the body (1 Cor. xii).

No such tendency can be perceived in sin ; it is an enemy to be expelled, not an ally to be admitted. According to this theory, the first man could not have had a sinless development, or arrived at the knowledge of good and evil by a decision in favour of obedience ; to emerge from an immature state of innocence he needed a fall ; which is a gratuitous assumption. Man may have needed to be *tempted* in order to spiritual progress, but had he, like the second Adam, withstood the temptation, he would, in a manner analogous to that in which God does,[1] have arrived at the knowledge of good and evil ; he would have attained it in the right way, whereas he took the wrong one.

It appears then that, for all the light that philosophical theories have thrown upon the matter, the origin of evil is as much a mystery as ever. Nor does Scripture profess to explain it. It assumes the fact ; it describes sin as positive depravity ; and it tells us how it found an entrance into *this* our world ; but how angelic beings came to fall it leaves in darkness. That philosophy has not superseded the Scriptural statements on the nature of sin, and therefore the need of a Redeemer is evident ; and this is all that we are concerned with.

We can perceive, however, that the gift of free-will, and therefore the *possibility* of sin, is the condition of some advantages which, apparently, could not otherwise have been secured. If there had been no free-will, there would have been no sin ; but, on the other hand, no moral virtue, no superiority to the brute creation. The prerogative was a perilous one, and must be accepted with its hazards. Nor should we forget that though God is not the Author of evil, He can make it the occasion of far greater good. Thus the crime of Joseph's brethren was overruled to the preservation of the chosen family from whom Christ was to come (Gen. xlv. 5); and thus Adam's fall itself was the occasion of a greater restoration.[1]

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[1] 'The Lord God said, Behold the man is become like one of us to know good and evil' (Gen. iii. 22). In whatever way God possesses this knowledge, it cannot be through the intermediate step of sin.

This last remark leads us to consider the relation in which evil actions stand to the Divine causality, which, as we know, embraces all things, or at least is never wholly inactive in respect of them. God cannot be the Author of a sinful action; and yet nothing can be conceived of as wholly independent of God—this is the difficulty. The scholastic distinction is *Deus concurrit ad materiale, non ad formale actionis malæ;* the Divine co-operation is confined to what in an action cannot be called evil, viz. the natural powers and faculties of the agent, and does not extend to the perversion of those powers, which is solely owing to a corrupt will.[2]

In fact, if God were to withdraw His sustaining power for a moment, the whole frame of creation, including evil men, would collapse; to this extent, then, He must be considered as co-operating with such men, but only in the sense in which He co-operates with the motion of the planets. Hence the importance of the distinction between creation and conservation. Had God *created* man with a taint of sin, it would have been impossible to disconnect sin from the Divine causality; not so if He merely does not, because some reasonable beings in the universe misuse their faculties, withdraw the sustaining power by which all things consist (Heb. i. 3); in such a case, the misuse may, and in fact does, proceed not from God but from themselves.

This distinction sometimes appears under another form, viz., that God neither wills nor produces sinful acts, but only permits them. But how can God permit what He abhors, when He has power to prevent it? The answer is that the Divine permission applies not to the sin directly, but to the free agency from which it proceeds. It pleased Him to create beings who possess an independent spring of action within themselves, who can originate and carry on a moral development in the direction either of good or evil. By so doing He has limited, not under necessity, but freely, the exercise of His omnipotent power, and acts accordingly even when evil rather than good is chosen by the creature. He permits the continued existence of free agency, with the full foreknowledge of the possibility, and even of the fact, of its choosing the wrong ; and He does this because, though He hates the sin, He could not forcibly prevent it without destroying that in which Personality, *i.e.* a capacity for re-union with Himself, consists.

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[1] 'O felix culpa, quæ talem et tantum meruit habere redemptorem!'

[2] Concurrit in malis actionibus divina providentia naturam sustentando, in ipso enim movemur' (Acts xvii. 28). 'Est autem stupenda Dei longanimitas, quod sustentat membra, conservat vires ac motus in illis etiam actionibus, in quibus summa afficitur contumelia' (J. Gerhard, *Loc.* vii. c. 8). 'Cum actus quâ talis semper bonus sit quoad entitatem suam, Deus ad illum concurrit *effective* et *physice*, non modo naturam conservando sed motus etiam ejus et actiones ciendo motione physicâ utpote quæ sunt bona naturalia, quo sensu dicimur in Deo vivere, moveri, et esse . (Turretine, lib. vi, q. 7). Compare Chemnitz, *Examen*, p. i, lib. 7, s. 1.

It is thus that the language of the Old Testament is to be understood in passages which seem to refer evil directly to God. God is said to have ' raised up ' Pharaoh to show in him His power (Exod. ix. 16), because, Pharaoh's will being already perverse, God did not interfere with its exercise, and could not have done so without destroying Pharaoh's responsibility. He is said to have ' hardened ' the heart of Pharaoh, or of the children of Israel (Exod. vii. 13 ; Isa. lxiii. 17) ; because having hardened their own hearts they were not forcibly restrained from the choice they had made, and because the commandment which came to them, in itself ' holy, just, and good,' became the innocent occasion of increasing their rebellion and their guilt. Yet, in thus permitting the free-will of man to work out its own results, God is by no means an indifferent spectator of the process. For not only does the Divine law from without, and the voice of conscience from within, testify against the sinner, but the sin itself, once committed, does not escape from the control of Divine providence. God can place limits to its natural tendency ; He can check one sin by another ; He can make the sinful agent a means of executing His righteous judgments (Isa. x. 7) ; and we may rest assured He will overrule it to promote the interests of His kingdom. The greatest of sins was thus made the means of conveying the greatest of blessings to mankind (Acts ii. 23).

But besides moral evil, or sin, the world abounds with suffering, mental and bodily ; and this too seems inconsistent with its having proceeded from a Creator of infinite goodness. The difficulty here, however, is less than in the former case, for, the fact of sin once admitted, suffering is only its natural consequence, under the government of a righteous Creator, and indeed can, in most instances, be directly traced to it ; the amount of suffering which we could not avoid being insignificant as compared with that of which our own sins, or those of others, are the direct cause. ' By one man sin entered into the world, and death ' (the comprehensive term for all kinds of woe) ' by sin ' (Rom. v. 12) ; it could not be otherwise, consistently with the moral order of the universe. God permits this order to be violated by free agents, but He does not permit the transgression to pass unvisited: there is a recoil of the eternal law upon the sinner, which, as far as is possible, annihilates his sin, and restores the supremacy of right.

This is the true idea of punishment, natural or positive—a point forgotten by those who limit its object merely to be a warning to transgressors, or to improve them. The extreme penalty of the law is an instance in point; there is here no question of improvement; a crime has been committed which, if the community is to be purged from the taint of complicity, must be expiated by death. And since the State no less than the Church is God's ordinance (Rom. xiii), and a revelation of His will, there is here a clear manifestation of His displeasure against sin. It is quite another aspect of suffering when we view it as *chastisement*, intended to promote the good of the sufferers (Heb. xii), and meted out by infinite wisdom; here it is no longer punishment, *i.e.* retribution, but fatherly discipline. To be subjected to this discipline is the privilege of the Church; and her light affliction, which is but for a moment, is working for her a far more exceeding weight of glory (2 Cor. iv. 17), to be manifested on that day when suffering, as well as its parent, sin, shall for ever disappear from the kingdom of God (Rev. xxi. 4).

PART II

THE HOLY TRINITY

23. *One God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*

THE attributes and works of God, as we have seen, present to us the one Divine agency under various aspects and in different relations ; and thus far Christian Theism coincides with that of other monotheistic religions, at any rate with the Jewish, which leaves nothing to be supplied as regards the purity and loftiness of its conceptions of the Divine being. Does the later revelation add anything to our knowledge of the nature of God ? The answer to the question is contained in the Confession of the Catholic Church at all times and in all places, that ' in the Unity of the Godhead there be three Persons, of one substance, power, and eternity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost ' ; in other words, that in the one Godhead there are three, and no more, Subjects of whom Divine attributes are predicated, and to whom Divine works are ascribed.

The usual arrangement, which our Article follows, of placing the doctrine of the Trinity under the general head of Theism is open to objection. For the interest which the Christian feels in this doctrine is of a practical rather than of a speculative character ; that is to say, he is not so much concerned with the fact that in the Godhead there is a Trinity of Persons, as with the offices which the three Persons discharge in the work of redemption. The inner constitution of the Divine nature may be, and must be if Scripture reveals it, a subject of hallowed contemplation ; but if it terminates in itself as a question of philosophy, or even if it occupies the foreground in our discussions, to the forgetfulness of its practical import in the Divine plan of salvation, it proportionably loses its Christian character. The immediate object of the Christian's faith is not the ontological Trinity, or the relations of the first, second, and third Persons to each other, but the Trinity of redemption, the Father who created, the Son who redeemed, and the Holy Ghost who sanctifies us.

It is a disadvantage then to approach the subject, in the first instance, from the ontological side, or to introduce the terms of the Athanasian Creed before showing the practical foundation on which they rest ; which, however, is a very common method of proceeding. It is hardly necessary to observe, that it is not the method of Scripture.

The New Testament, as we shall see, is not silent on this mysterious topic, but the hints which it furnishes are comparatively few and obscure, and the prominent aspect is ever the love of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, in devising, accomplishing, and applying the means of our restoration from the effects of the fall. In following this method it is difficult not to anticipate, to some extent, what properly belongs to other topics, viz., the Person of Christ, and the work of the Holy Spirit ; but we thus avoid the abrupt introduction of formulas and modes of expression which cannot be understood except in connection with the history of the Trinitarian controversy.

The central figure of the New Testament is Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin, crucified under Pontius Pilate. He announces Himself not merely as a teacher sent from God, approved by miracles which no one, unless in intimate connection with God, could perform (John iii. 2), but, as His name imports, the anointed Saviour, foretold by the prophets, and now appearing in the fulness of time (Luke xxiv. 27) ; as come to seek and to save the lost (Matt. xviii. 11) ; as having power on earth to forgive sins (Matt. ix. 6) ; as hearing and granting prayer (John xiv. 13) ; as the bread of God which gives life unto the world (John vi. 33) ; as the resurrection and the life (John xi. 25) ; and as the future Judge of quick and dead (Matt. xxv. 31).

Unless Jesus was either a deceiver or self-deceived in appropriating to Himself such exalted functions, which not even the greatest of the prophets of the Old Testament venture to do, we must at least, with Arius, grant Him a rank in the scale of existence second only to that of the supreme Deity ; He must be, if not eternal and self-existent (ἦν πότε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν), a kind of δεύτερος θεὸς, or the highest of created things. But Scripture goes beyond this, and uses language which cannot be understood otherwise than as asserting His absolute Godhead. Let us take, for example, the title ‘ Son of God,’ which, though not the one chosen by Himself to designate His person, is of frequent use, and is never disclaimed by Him as unsuitable or improper (Mark i. 1 ; Luke viii. 28 ; Rom. v. 10 ; and above all, John vi. 69). In what sense is it used ? There is no doubt that in Scripture the title is of wide application. Israel collectively, or as a nation, is called the Son of God (Exod. iv. 22 ; Hosea xi. 1) ; Christians are sons of God (Rom. viii. 14) ; all men are so in a certain sense (Acts xvii. 29). It may mean, also merely *ethical* resemblance to God (Matt. v. 45). But in some of the passages alluded to the connection in which it occurs leaves no doubt as to its meaning. On two occasions (John v. 18 ; x. 33) the Jews sought to put Jesus to death because they understood Him, in saying that God is His Father, to assert His equality with God ; and this in their eyes was blasphemy. If they misunderstood Him, why did He not remove the impression by disavowing the imputation ? Still more to the point, when the High Priest adjured Him in the most solemn manner to declare whether He were the Son of God, He replied in the affirmative (Matt. xxvi. 63) ; and in what sense the question was put is plain from the exclamation of the proposer, ' He hath spoken blasphemy ' (verse 65).

Nor must the distinguishing epithet, ' only begotten ' (μονογενής) be overlooked which St. John (i. 18) introduces in connection with the title, and which, without entering at present further into its meaning, is evidently intended to establish an essential difference between the Sonship of Jesus and that of any other being. But passages are not wanting in which He is directly spoken of as God. As for instance, the exclamation of Thomas, when convinced of His resurrection, ' My Lord and my God ' (John xx. 28), which elicits no reproof from the risen Saviour ; St. Paul's statements that His second coming will be that of ' our great God and Saviour ' (Titus ii. 13), that ' in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily ' (Col. ii. 9), that He ' is over all, God blessed for ever ' (Rom. ix. 5) ; and St. John's, that He is ' the true God and eternal life ' (1 John v. 20). To which we may add that worship is represented as offered to Him (Rev. v. 12), and that by Jews to whom ' the gods many and lords many ' of heathenism were an abomination.

But the title ' Son of God,' which, taken in connection with other statements of Scripture, establishes the Deity of the man Christ Jesus, involves another conception of God, viz., as the ' Father of our Lord Jesus Christ ' ; which, accordingly, repeatedly occurs in Scripture, and nowhere more emphatically than in our Lord's own discourses (see John xvii ; 2 Cor. i. 3 ; Ephes. iii. 14). The Deity and Personality of the Father are not matter of dispute ; but His distinction from the Son is equally marked. The Father did not come into the world, but sent His Son to redeem it (John iii. 16 ; Gal. iv. 4, 5) : nor does Christ say that He is the same, but that He is one with the Father ; that He is in the Father and the Father in Him (John x. 30 ; xiv. 11) ; that He works as the Father works (John v. 17) ; and that He came not to do His own will, but the will of the Father which sent Him (*ibid.* 30). The Father is said to love the Son (John iii. 35), and to bear witness to the Son (John v. 37) ; and on two solemn occasions this witness is recorded when a voice from heaven was heard saying, ' This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased ; hear ye Him ' (Matt. iii. 17 ; xvii. 5). The language employed suggests an analogy to the human relation, and it is plain that the titles cannot be indiscriminately applied to the same Subject ; that is, that the Father cannot directly be said to be the Son, nor the Son the Father.

But before His departure from the world the Saviour promised His disciples that He would pray the Father to send them another 'Comforter,' or Advocate, to take His place (John xiv. 16), and again that He Himself would send this Comforter (*ibid.* xvi. 7), whom He calls the ' Spirit of Truth,' and the Holy Spirit. We learn that shortly after His Ascension this promise was fulfilled, and thenceforward the Holy Spirit appears so prominently as the Divine Administrator of the Church that the Gospel dispensation is fitly described as the ' ministration of the Spirit ' (2 Cor. iii. 8). The Holy Spirit is spoken of in terms which imply a Divine nature. He is said to ' search the deep things of God,' which reason tells us no created being can do (1 Cor. ii. 10, 11) ; spiritual blessings are invoked from Him conjointly with the Father and the Son (2 Cor. xiii. 14) ; to Him, and also to God, spiritual operations such as the New Birth (John iii. 5), the dispensing of gifts (1 Cor. xii. 11), the inspiring of prophets (1 Pet. i. 11), are ascribed. And lest we should suppose that nothing more is meant than an emanation, or influence, from God, He is invested, equally with the Father and the Son, with a personal character : the Holy Spirit teaches (John xiv. 26) ; appoints ministers (Acts xiii. 2) ; sends an apostle on a mission (Acts x. 19) ; bestows gifts as He wills (1 Cor. xii. 11) ; can be ' grieved ' (Ephes. iv. 30) ; makes intercession for the saints (Rom. viii. 26). And He must be distinguished from the Father and the Son in the same way and to the same extent as they are distinguished from each other. He who is sent by the Father and the Son cannot be either of them *as such* ; if He receives of Christ (John xvi. 14) He cannot, *so* far, be Christ ; if He descended upon the Saviour at His baptism, while a voice from heaven proclaimed, ' This is My beloved Son ' (therefore the Father's voice), His could not be the voice.

Finally, in appointing the initiatory rite of the Christian Church, our Lord formally associates the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as the sacred Name into which converts are to be baptized (Matt. xxviii. 19).

The above statement, which contains little more than an enumeration and collation of passages of the New Testament, presents to us the *facts* on which we are to reason ; and the problem is, as in the analogous case of natural philosophy, to frame an hypothesis which, though it may not be without difficulties, shall best comprise the whole of the facts, without omission or distortion. Our starting-point is the fundamental truth of revealed religion, viz., the unity of the Godhead, which is as strongly implied in the New Testament as it was expressed in the Old (Mark xii. 29 ; 1 Cor. viii. 4 ; 1 Tim. ii. 5). Where the Father is, there is the Son, and there is the Holy Ghost. The Holy Spirit, *e.g.*, was promised to abide with Christ's disciples, but immediately afterwards it is the Father and the Son in reference to whom the same promise is made (John xiv. 23) ; and so St. Paul prays that ' Christ may dwell ' in the Christian's heart by faith (Ephes. iii. 17), which heart is also described as the habitation of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. iii. 16).

Yet, unless the language of Scripture was framed to mislead, in the unity of the Godhead there are three Divine Subjects, or what, for want of a better term, we call Persons, to whom distinct offices in the work of redemption are assigned : to the Father election (Ephes. i. 4), to the Son atonement (*ibid.* 7), and to the Holy Spirit sanctification (2 Thess. ii. 13). And under this, its practical aspect, the doctrine reposes in many minds, which accept it, as thus stated, without difficulty, and are only conscious, in a general way, of a threefold causality in the work of salvation, which commends itself to the felt necessities of the Christian life.

To what extent the doctrine of the Holy Trinity formed part of the Jewish revelation is to Christians rather a matter of interest than importance. It could not be expected that as long as redemption itself was subject of prophecy or type, and not a fact, a doctrine so intimately connected with it should have been revealed as it is under the Christian dispensation : the revelation of the Godhead naturally kept pace with the unfolding of His purposes towards fallen man. The facts may be thus summed up : there are preparations in the Old Testament for the doctrine, but no explicit statement of it. If we cannot argue from the plural Elohim, nor from the Theophanies of the Old Testament, no more can the fact be overlooked that this Elohim, the abstract Deity whom the heathen ignorantly worshipped (Acts xvii. 23), manifests Himself in Israel under the name Jehovah, the God of history and revelation, entering into mundane relations with the chosen people.

That the ' Angel of the Lord,' of whom mention is so often made in the earlier Books of Moses, was no created being appears from his being identified with Jehovah Himself ; and yet a distinction is made between Jehovah and the angel ; the angel is sent by Jehovah, though Himself bearing the sacred name, *i.e.*, being partaker of the Divine nature (Exod. xxiii. 20, 21). Moses cannot see God as He is in Himself, but a shaded ray of the Divine Glory passes before him (Exod. xxxiii. 22). In the prophets, especially Isaiah, another phase appears : The

‘ Spirit of the Lord ’ confers on the prophet his mission (Isa. xlviii. 16) ; is to abide in all His fulness on the predicted Branch of David (Isa. xi. 1, 2) ; and to display Himself, at a future time, in a manifold variety of gifts (Isa. xliv. 3 ; Joel. ii. 28). In the Book of Proverbs the ‘ Wisdom of God ’ assumes a hypostatical character : it was ‘ set up ’ (anointed) ‘ from everlasting, or ever the earth was ’ ; ‘ brought forth when there were no depths’ ; was with God ‘ daily His delight, rejoicing always before Him,’ yet also ‘ rejoicing in the habitable parts of the earth, with the sons of men ’ (Prov. viii. 23–31). With the light of the New Testament reflected on them, these notices of the Old seem to acquire significance, and stand in the same relation to the later revelation as the Law itself did to the Gospel—as a prefigurement and anticipation ; but more than this can hardly be found in them.

24. *The Immanent Trinity*

The two principal heresies on the subject of the Holy Trinity were Sabellianism and Arianism, for information on which the reader is referred to the works which treat of the history of dogma. Sabellius, a presbyter of Ptolemais in the middle of the third century, in order to avoid the semblance of Tritheism in the doctrine of the Church, taught that in the Godhead itself there is no distinction of Persons, but that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are only different manifestations of the One Supreme Deity, who assumed these names and corresponding functions for the purposes of redemption only (πρὸς τὰς ἑκάστοτε χρείας), revealing Himself under a different character (*Persona*) as occasion required. Arianism, on the contrary, so strongly distinguished the Persons as to ‘ divide the substance,’ subordinating the Son to the Father as the creature to the Creator, and the Holy Ghost to the Son. Both, it will be seen, tended ultimately to the same result, viz., such a unity of the Divine Being as excluded any essential and eternal distinction of the Persons ; but in Sabellianism this was attained by making the Persons merely dramatic parts which could be put on and off, in Arianism by robbing the Second and Third Persons of the proper attributes of Deity.

The Arian heresy, after a long struggle, was expelled from the Church, and under the name of Unitarianism exists only in bodies external to it. It laboured, from the first, under the twofold absurdity of introducing a species of being intermediate between the Creator and the creature, and of teaching the union of two created beings in the one Person of Christ. But Sabellian tendencies, under various names, such as Modalism, etc., occasionally reappear within the sacred precincts ;

and indeed this mode of explaining the statements of Scripture is not unlikely to be the first to suggest itself to a mind impressed with the difficulties of the subject, and anxious to save the great truths of the unity of the Godhead, and of what seems connected therewith, His proper personality. For how, it may be urged, can such a personality be conceived as divided among three Subjects ? That the orthodox doctrine is not chargeable with this error will be explained hereafter. The question now before us is, What does Scripture teach on the subject ? Does it represent the distinction between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as meaning merely that to us, and in time, God exhibits Himself in a threefold aspect, or as belonging to the Divine nature itself, and immanent therein ? Are the *operationes ad extra* founded on *operations ad intra*, *i.e.* upon relations in the Godhead itself, and therefore eternal ? Or, to put it in another way, Does the τρόπος ἀποκαλύψεως (the mode of revelation) imply a τρόπος ὑπάρξεως (a mode of existence) ? This is the question with which our first Article ' of faith in the Holy Trinity ' is properly concerned.

The first remark to be made is, that as God reveals Himself, so He must be presumed to be ; otherwise the revelation would convey inaccurate notions of His nature. If in Scripture the salvation of man is derived from a threefold causality, or from God as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and *never from more*, *e.g.* a fourth, this raises a strong presumption that the terms signify more than mere aspects under which the one God may be regarded, mere characters which He assumed as need requires. For, on the Sabellian hypothesis, what reason can be assigned why He should reveal Himeslf under precisely three, and not any number that may be imagined, seeing He stands towards the creature in manifold relations ? Apart from an immanent, or ontological Trinity, the Trinity of redemption seems to have no proper foundation, and to become an arbitrary assumption.

But to the Scripture testimony. Let us note, then, the language of St. John respecting that Word of Life, which he had seen with his eyes and his hands handled : had seen as the Christ of history, the Word become flesh. In the first chapter of his Gospel he tells us that ' in the beginning ' (ἐν ἀρχῇ=בְּרֵאשִׁית, Gen. i. 1), that is, at the commencement of creation, this Word did not then first come into existence, but was actually in being (ἦν not ἐγένετο) ; thus disconnecting His existence altogether from the idea of time, which is coincident with creation. Further, that the Word was with God (πρὸς τὸν Θεόν in closest fellowship with God, yet in some sense distinct from God. And then, apparently to obviate Philo's doctrine of a δεύτερος Θεὸς, he adds, ' and the Word was God ' (Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος). If the first clause hardly by itself establishes the *eternal* existence of the Word, the third supplies the defect ; for if He is God He must be eternal. Here then, the Deity of the Word, and a distinction in the Godhead, are both intimated, and this without reference to creation or redemption ; for it is not until the third verse that we are told that ‘ through Him all things were made,’ in accordance with the usage of Scripture, which ascribes creation to the Father, but through the Son (Col. i. 16 ; Heb. i. 2).[1] In the eighteenth verse we again find the Word described as in closest connection with, and yet distinct from, God (εἰς τὸν κόλπον = πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν), but under another name, viz., ‘ the only-begotten Son,’ a relation which necessarily implies the corresponding one of Father. This use of the word ‘ Son,’ in an absolute sense, and abstractedly from the Incarnation, is common with St. John (*e.g.* v. 19 ; viii. 36), but occurs also in the other Gospels (Matt. xi. 27).

Another class of passages which deserves notice is composed of those in which the Son is described as the ‘ Image ’ or counterpart, of the invisible God. Thus Heb. i. 1–3, the writer, after referring to the revelation of God in and through His Son, *i.e.* the incarnate Word, proceeds to speak of that Son’s pre-existence, as the Maker and Upholder of all things, and describes the Son as the ‘ brightness of God’s glory, and the express image of His person ’ ; which latter words, according to the best commentators, describe not the revelation of God’s glory in the incarnate Son, but the identity of the Son with the Father as regards His Divine nature[2] ; and yet seem to establish a distinction between them analogous to that between the splendour of light and its source, or between a seal and its impression ; and this without reference to creation or redemption. With this may be compared Col. i. 15, in which Christ is described not only as πρωτότοκος, *i.e.*, in existence before the birth of creation, but as the ‘image’ (εἰκὼν) ‘ of the invisible God,’ God as the Father contemplating Himself in the Person of the Son, and therefore not formally the same with the Son.[3] And in a corresponding passage, Phil. ii. 6, the expression ‘ in the form of God,’ which, from its opposition to the ‘ form of a servant,’ is now usually held to relate to the pre-existence of the Logos, implies, like the word ‘ image ’ above, a certain distinction from God, when

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[1] This seems to imply a *personal* distinction, and not merely that between the λόγος ἐνιάθετος and the λόγος προφορικός of Philo and Theophilus. Compare 1 Cor. viii. 6 : Θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ, ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα . . . Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς δι’ οὗ τὰ πάντα.

[2] ὤν, as in John i. 1 ; not γενόμενος. On the whole passage see Bleek’s Commentary.

[3] As Olshausen (Com.) remarks, the whole passage speaks of Christ under a twofold aspect ; verses 15–17, as He is the Logos, antecedently to time ; verses 18–20, as He is incarnate, and the Head of the Church.

God is considered under another aspect, viz., as the ground or fountain of Deity.[1]

As regards the Holy Spirit, if He searches the ‘ deep things of God,’ in a manner analogous to that in which the ‘ spirit of man ’ knows ‘ the things of a man ’ (1 Cor. ii. 11)—and this Divine energy cannot be understood to apply merely to creation or redemption—not only is the personality of the Holy Spirit indicated, but He appears as a distinct subject in the Godhead, a third relation of God to Himself not to be confounded with the other two.

The result seems to be that the New Testament, besides revealing the economical Trinity, or the Trinity as related to the Church and operative *ad extra*, furnishes a revelation of the same Trinity as it exists intrinsically and is operative *ad intra*, and teaches that apart from all manifestations of God in creation or in redemption, He is in Himself not an abstract Monas, but a Trinity of immanent relations, expressed under the terms Father, Son, and Holy Spirit ; that is, that in the Godhead there exist energies which terminate in itself. To defend and illustrate this doctrine was the main object of the great writers, and of the councils, of the Church for several centuries after the Apostolic age ; and the result is seen in the statements of the Ecumenical Creeds.

25. *Ecclesiastical Definitions*

The doctrine of the Church, as laid down at the second Constantinopolitan Council (A.D. 381), may be summed up in the words of the Athanasian Creed : ‘ We worship one God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity, neither confounding the Persons nor dividing the substance. For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost ; but the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one, the glory equal, the majesty co-eternal.’ ‘ The Father is made of none, neither created nor begotten ; the Son is of the Father alone, not made, nor created, but begotten ; the Holy

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[1] This passage, as is well known, admits of two leading interpretations, one applying the whole to Christ in His human nature, the other applying verse 6 to Him as the Logos, and verses 7–11 to Him as incarnate. The former was generally adopted by the Lutheran theologians, as furnishing ground for their doctrine of the communication of Divine properties to the manhood of Christ ; the latter by the Reformed.

[With respect to the use of the word μορφή (“form”) in Phil. ii. 6, Bishop Lightfoot observes that “ the possession of the μορφή involves participation in the οὐσία also : for μορφή implies not the external accidents but the essential attributes.” Cf. also R. P. Martin’s comments in *Expository Times*, March, 1959, pp. 183f., and A. M. Ramsey, *The Glory of God and the Transfiguration of Christ* (London, 1949), p. 54. Editor.]

Ghost is of the Father and of the Son, neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.'

Let us first ask, What does the word Person here mean ? The idea we commonly attach to it is that of an individual ; and a Trinity of persons in one Godhead might be supposed to resemble the classification of three individuals, John, Peter, Thomas, under the one species, man. But this would be an erroneous conception of its meaning in the Creed. It would be equivalent to denying the numerical existence of the Godhead, for the species ' man ' is but an abstraction, having no existence outside the mind that frames it ; that is it would ' divide the substance,' and lead to Tritheism. It must not be forgotten that what we mean by personality belongs to the Divine *essence* as it is distinguished from the Trinitarian relations ; just as the personality of a human father resides not in his paternity as a mere relation, but in his individuality as a man. The word *persona*, of which Person is the translation, properly signifies a dramatic part, or character ; and was adopted, as Augustine tells us,[1] by the Latins on account of the poverty of their language, which has no word exactly corresponding to the ὑπόστασις[2] of the Greeks, the term employed by the latter to denote each of the three Subjects of the Holy Trinity.

The meaning of *persona*, then, must be determined by that of hypostasis. Now this term, as distinguished from essence (οὐσία), signifies the Divine being when viewed in connection with a particular ' Personal property ' (*Proprietas personalis*),[3] that is, the property which compels us to make a distinction between the Persons ; which in the first Person is paternity, in the Second filiation, and in the Third procession ; so that the Father means God considered as begetting, the Son God considered as begotten, and the Holy Spirit God considered as proceeding (*essentia divina cum proprietatibus personalibus*). The personal properties flow from acts immanent in the Divine Being (*opera ad intra*), viz., generation (active) the act of the Father, generation (passive) the act of the Son, and spiration (procession, passive) the act of the Holy Spirit[1] ; and as these acts cannot be ascribed indiscriminately to the three Persons, so far forth as they are Persons, we have the well-known canon, '*Opera ad intra divisa sunt*'—the immanent acts of the Trinity belong respectively to only one Person.[2]

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[1] ' Sed quia nostra loquendi consuetudo jam obtinuit ut hoc intelligatur cum dicimus essentiam (οὐσία) quod intelligitur cum dicimus substantiam (υπόστασις), non audemus dicere unam essentiam, tres substantias, sed unam essentiam vel substantiam, tres autem personas : quemadmodum multi Latini ista tractantes et digni auctoritate dixerunt *cum alium modum aptiorem non invenirent quo enuntiarent quod sine verbis intelligerent* ' (*De Trin.*, lib. v. c. 10).

[2] The word πρόσωπον would have exactly corresponded to the Latin ' persona,' and it is actually used by John of Damascus as equivalent to ὑπόστασις (Χρὴ δὲ γινώσκειν ὧς οἱ ἅγιοι πατέρες ὑπόστασιν καὶ πρόσωπον τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάλεσαν—*Dial.*, c. 43) ; but it fell into disuse, lest it might lead to Sabellianism.

[3] In Greek, ὑποστατίκη ἰδιότης. See John of Damascus, *De Fid. Orth.*, lib. i. 138. ' Character hypostaticus, sive proprietas personalis, est relatio in actu personali fundata, personam in esse certæ personæ constituens, et per oppositionem relativam realem ab alia persona distinctionem inferens ' (Hollaz, p. 1. c. 2, q. 8).

Thus the three Persons are not three Gods, but God under three inner relations, or modes of subsistence (*τρόποι ὑπάρξεως*, *modi subsistendi*). These relations, however, are not merely creations of our minds, not merely relations of God to the world which may be supposed as ceasing when the occasion ceases : they have an eternal ground of subsistence in the Divine nature itself or, in the language of the schools, they depend not upon *ratio ratiocinans*, but upon *ratio ratiocinata.*

There is no actual distinction between the 'substance' and the hypostatical character of each Person taken *singly* : God the Father is very God, with all the fulness of the Divine attributes and perfections, and so is God the Son, and so is God the Holy Spirit[3] ; paternity, filiation, and, procession, adding nothing in each case to the Divine essence. But when the Persons are considered *collectively*, these distinctions become in some sense real, for otherwise there would be no distinction, except in our minds, between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit[4] : God is not ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, but certainly ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλος: the Divine essence (or 'substance') is in the Father ἀγεννήτως, in the Son γεννήτως, and in the Holy Ghost ἐκπορεύτως ; yet this does not affect the simplicity of the Divine nature, for according to the ancient Canon, 'Relations do not compound' (are not constituent parts of a thing), but merely ‘ distinguish ’ ; *e.g.* if John is the father of Thomas, the relation distinguishes John from Thomas, but does not *divide* John into two parts, himself and his paternity. There is a distinction (as Keckermann illustrates it), and in some sense a real one, between the *degree* of light at noonday and that at twilight ; and yet degrees of this kind do not affect the composition of light. In fact, distinct relations in the Godhead no more introduce into it the idea of composition than do the distinct quiescent attributes (infinite, eternal, immense, unchangeable, etc.)

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[1] It may be asked, How can the *generatio passiva*, the being begotten of the Son ; and the *spiratio passiva*, the being breathed, or proceeding, of the Holy Ghost, be described as *acts*, when they seem more like *passivities* (if such a word may be used) ? And we know that God, as *actus purissimus*, is incapable of being acted upon. But when, as in this case, the subject and the object are the same, the passive form is merely grammatical ; *e.g.* I think of myself, and I am thought of by myself, are identical in meaning. Therefore the procession of the Holy Ghost is really an act of God considered as proceeding ; and in like manner the *generatio passiva* of the Son is an act of God considered as begotten, though the corresponding active term cannot here be used, on account of the special relation between Father and Son (Twesten, ii. 246, to whom the author is indebted for this remark).

[2] Thus 'active generation,' an *opus ad intra*, belongs only to the Father ; but 'creation,' an *opus ad extra*, is the work of the whole Trinity.

[3] This is what is meant by the περιχώρησις, 'circumincessio, immanentia,' of old writers ; viz., that the Father is in the Son, the Son in the Father, and the Holy Ghost in both : and it hardly deserves the censure bestowed upon it, and kindred scholastic terms, by Abp. Whately (*Logic*, App. Person). These terms are attempts, more or less successful, to translate Divine mysteries into human language. 'Singula sunt in singulis, et omnia in singulis, et singula in omnibus, et omnia in omnibus, et unum omnia' (Augustine, *De Trin.*, vi. 12).

[4] 'Relatio ad essentiam comparata non differt re sed ratione tantum ; comparata autem ad *oppositam relationem* habet *virtute oppositionis* reale discrimen' (T. Aquinas, p. i. q. 39, art. 1).

It will be seen, then, that the word Person in the Creeds must mean something very different from what it does in common speech ; and in fact, as John of Damascus remarks, while in created things the distinction of individuals or persons exists in *fact* and their common nature only in conception (John, Thomas, etc., are actually existing persons, their common nature man is a logical entity), the opposite holds good in the doctrine of the Trinity ;—the common nature, or essence, of the Godhead exists in fact, and possesses real personality, and the personal distinctions, though not indeed logical abstractions, yet have no distinct will or intelligence apart from the nature in which they inhere as relations. Yet they are so far real that they constitute subjects which cannot be used as predicates : *e.g.* as Thomas is a subject which cannot be the predicate of any one but Thomas (not like ‘ man,’ which may be predicated of any number of individuals), so the Father cannot be a predicate of the Son, nor the Son of the Father, nor the Holy Spirit of either. And with this imperfect notion of a Trinitarian ‘ Person ’ we must rest content : and with a not less imperfect one of the difference between ‘ generation ’ and ‘ procession ’ as applied to God. In truth, these are points which, pushed beyond a certain limit, bring us too near ‘ the light which no man can approach unto ’ (1 Tim. vi. 16), and in reflecting on which we shall do well, with Augustine, never to forget the inherent limitations of human reason.

But if the Father alone is God ἀγεννήτως, while the Son is so γεννήτως, and the Holy Ghost ἐκπορεύτως, does not this introduce something like subordination among the three Persons, so that Arius may seem to have been unjustly accused of heresy ? If the subsistence of the Son is grounded in that of the Father and the subsistence of the Holy Ghost in that of the Father and the Son (as in fact the Father is sometimes called by orthodox writers πηγὴ Θεότητος, *fons et origo Trinitatis*), how is the statement of the Creed to be understood, ‘ And in this Trinity none is afore or after other, none is greater or less than another ’ ?

Unquestionably there is a difference, but one that does not necessarily imply a gradation of dignity, or at any rate inferiority of nature. The difference consists not in reference to *time*, for all three Persons are co-eternal ; nor in reference to *essence*, for all three are God ; but in reference to the *order* of subsistence (*ordo subsistendi*), according to which the Father is the first, the Son the second, and the Holy Ghost the third Person. The ideas of finite and infinite, and generally the category of quality, belong to a thing itself, not to the modes of its subsistence : as *e.g.*, the human relation of father and son does not imply that the son is inferior in *nature*, but merely that he owes his existence to his father, who in this case must be antecedent in time. If we remove the element of priority of time, which necessarily inheres in the human relation, and conceive an eternal generation, we arrive at the Catholic doctrine, that while a certain inequality must be admitted, the three Persons are, as regards their Deity, co-equal. So that the Son *as God* is not inferior to the Father *as God*, but the former as a Person of the Holy Trinity stands to the latter as a Person of the same Trinity in the relation of begotten to begetting. Nor should it be forgotten that when we say the Son has His subsistence in the Father, we cannot, indeed, affirm the direct converse, that the Father has His subsistence in the Son ; but we can say that paternity, the ‘ personal property ’ of the Father, could not be conceived without the ‘ filiation ’ of the Son, and that to this extent the Father is not without the Son ; and the same remark applies to the relation (‘ spiration ’) between them and the Holy Ghost.

In contrast with the *opera ad intra*, acts which terminate in the Deity itself, are the *opera ad extra*, acts in which God enters into relations with the creature : and to the Father is especially assigned the work of creation, to the Son that of redemption, and to the Holy Ghost that of sanctification. With respect to these the rule is, *Opera ad extra sunt indivisa ; i.e.*, in them the three Persons co-operate to the result. When, therefore, a work *ad extra* is ascribed to any one Person by himself, the others have a share in it ; in other words, when one Person only is named, the name is to be taken not ὑποστατικῶς but οὐσιουδῶς, not as referring to the Person but to the substance. Thus, when one person is addressed in prayer, the other two are simultaneously invoked. The incarnation especially belongs to the second Person, but Christ is also said to have been conceived of the Holy Ghost (Matt. i. 20) : and we have seen above that to the Son, to the Holy Spirit, and to the Father, is indifferently ascribed indwelling in the Church : and in general, ‘ Whatsoever things the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise ’ (John v. 19).

What reason then, it may be asked, is there for ascribing a special work to each Person ? In attempting to answer this question, theologians experienced great difficulty. They remark, in general, that an order in working (*ordo et modus agendi*) may be expected to correspond to the order of subsistence (*ordo subsistendi*) ; and since, according to this latter, ' the Father is made of none, neither created, nor begotten ; the Son is of the Father; and the Holy Ghost of the Father and the Son ' ; therefore such works as election and creation, which seem to be especially *ex nihilo*, are appropriated to the Father, while others, as redemption and sanctification, which are not of so absolute a character, as being performed in time, are more properly connected with the second and third Persons. And this is the meaning of the rule, *Opera ad extra tribus Personis communia sunt, salvo tamen earum ordine et discrimine ;* or, as it is otherwise expressed, special works are attributed to each Person *terminativè* : *e.g.* the atonement is the work of the whole Trinity, but it ' terminates,' or finds its completion, in the second Person ; and the special Divine presence in the Church is the work of the whole Trinity, but it terminates in the third Person.

The procession of the Holy Spirit was, as is well known, the occasion of a schism between the Greek and the Latin Churches which exists to this day. The original Constantinopolitan Creed, while affirming the Deity of the Holy Spirit, had simply declared that He proceeds from the Father ; which appeared insufficient to some of the Western Churches. By Augustine the procession from both Father and Son was taught ; and under the influence of his great name the word *Filioque* came to be introduced into the Creed, and received formal sanction in the third Council of Toledo, A.D. 589. This gave umbrage to the Greeks, who refused to admit the addition, partly on exegetical grounds, but principally because they objected to any change being made in the Creed without the consent of the whole Church. As regards the usage of Scripture, the Greeks urged that the Holy Spirit is not said to proceed from the Son, but only from the Father (John xv. 26) ; but the Latins replied that, though the term ' proceeding ' may not be used, others equivalent to it are, as, *e.g.*, ' the Spirit of Christ ' (Rom. viii. 9), ' the Spirit of His Son ' (Gal. iv. 6), compared with the ' Spirit of your Father ' (Matt. x. 20) ; if this last means ' proceeding,' why should not the former ? They referred also to the symbolical action of our Lord, when, after His resurrection, He breathed on the Apostles, using the words ' Receive ye the Holy Spirit ' (John xx. 22) ; and to such passages as, ' All things that the Father hath are Mine ' (John xvi. 15) ; inferring from the latter, that since Procession from the Father is the Father's, it must also belong to the Son. But especially they insisted, with reason, on the fact that the *sending* of the Holy Spirit is, in express words, attributed both to the Father and the Son (John xiv. 26 ; xv. 26) ; with reason, because mission in time corresponds to procession in eternity.

Some of the Greeks were willing to use the formula that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father *through* the Son ; but this was objected to by the Latins on the ground that it savoured of Arianism, while the double procession seemed to the other party to affect their favourite tenet of the Father's being *πηγὴ Θεότητος*. But, as Anselm observes, the ground of subsistence of Father, Son and Spirit is not that in which they are distinct (the *relationes oppositæ*), but that in which they are one (the *essentia*, or ' substance ') ; therefore, if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father (in His Divine essence), He must also proceed from the Son. But why may it not, by parity of reasoning, be inferred from the generation of the Son from the Father, that He is also generated from the Holy Spirit ? Because the necessity of an ' opposed relation ' stands in the way. Filiation is opposed to paternity, but spiration is not opposed to generation ; and so it might happen that the Son would be conceived as both generated and proceeding, and the Holy Spirit as both proceeding and generated ; and thus the Son and the Holy Spirit would constitute but one Person, for want of an ' opposition of relation ' between themselves. This is supplied by the relation of *spirans* and *spiratus* : the necessary caution being added that Father and Son are to be conceived, not as a twofold, but as a single Principle of spiration. The dispute culminated with mutual excommunications in the eleventh century, and has never since been adjusted.

26. *Natural Analogies*

At an early period attempts were made not indeed to establish, but to illustrate, the doctrine from various sources : some of which are proofs of the pious zeal rather than of the judgment of their authors. But that derived from the human consciousness is of a more solid character. Augustine here led the way and is followed by the schoolmen. If a man, he observes, is created in the image of God, it may be expected that in the mind, or its faculties, some resemblance will be found to the Archetype. Now if we consider the Mind itself in the act of knowing and loving, we find three aspects under which it presents itself : the Mind as subject, a knowledge of itself, and the love which springs from that knowledge ; and yet these are really one : or if we consider the principal faculties of the Mind, we again find them to be three, viz., Memory, Intelligence, and Will ; and these three also inhere in one subject. Apart from Augustine's particular theory, it is a fact that in our mental operations *ad intra*, *i.e.* abstractedly from external things, we can distinguish between the Mind which makes itself an object of contemplation (the subject), the Mind which is thus contemplated (the object), and the Mind which, by the union of the two, attains its full consciousness : yet it is the same Mind, or Ego, which is thus conceived under a threefold aspect. The analogy must be transferred with due caution to the Divine essence ; yet it may serve to explain how neither the unity nor the simplicity of that essence is affected by energies which terminate within itself.

The orthodox doctrine is, in fact, opposed not to the unity of the Divine Being, but to the notion of an abstract, impersonal Monas, without will, or affection, the Monotheism of Judaism and Deism. If the fulness of life, the plenary consciousness of blessedness, is to be ascribed, as it surely is, to the Godhead, the Trinitarian hypothesis of God generating from eternity a counterpart or image of Himself, and dwelling with ineffable complacency upon that image, is the only one which supplies such an idea, and effectually secures the αὐτάρκεια, or self-sufficiency, of the Divine Being. Hence, where the Trinitarian doctrine is rejected, the remedy is sought in Pantheistic theories ; as in modern sceptical philosophy. The Divine Monas, deprived of living movement in *Himself*, comes first to a consciousness of Himself in the act of creation, and maintains that consciousness only in and through the ceaseless evolutions, the manifold movements, of the universe ; that is, God and nature are practically identified.

27. *Concluding Remarks*

The question may be asked, Of what value, at the present day, are these abstruse distinctions and the technical phraseology in which they are clothed ? Do they not seem invented only to perplex plain minds, and furnish matter of disparaging comment to the sceptic ? What bearing have they on practical piety ? Why should we not relegate them to the lumber-room of antiquity, and fall back upon the simplicity of Scripture, distinguishing between the revealed facts and the theories which have been raised upon them ? As regards the former demand, it may be replied that it is as impossible for us to fall back on the simplicity of Scripture as to put back the dial of time and live in the second or third century. It is with the (legitimate) development of doctrine as it is with the progress of constitutional polity ; in either case, to revert to earlier forms is impossible, because it is impossible to obliterate the traces of the past. For good or for evil, controversies arose respecting the Person of Christ, and the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, even within the pale of the Church ; controversies which were vitally important. It was to meet the ever-shifting forms of error that Creeds were framed, and from time to time enlarged ; and as long as there is danger of the revival of these, or similar forms of error, the Creeds must be retained, at least in substance. And such a danger never can be pronounced imaginary, for human nature remains the same from age to age, and phases of thought which seemed to have lived their day, may at any time reappear under new forms and in unexpected quarters.

A composition like the Athanasian Creed, with its laboured and nicely balanced statements, every one of them bristling with controversy, may not be a very edifying study ; but the question is, Could the Church have guarded the true *Scriptural* doctrine against heretical subtleties without resorting to similar subtleties on her side ? It does not appear that she could have done so ; and it may be affirmed that if the ancient controversies were again to come up, they would have to be met by the same weapons, and in the main determined in the same sense, if the substance of revealed doctrine was to be preserved. Particular expressions may be open to doubt whether they are happily chosen ; but if the Creeds, as a whole, were expunged from the literature of the Church, it seems we should be compelled before long to draw up formularies substantially the same, as terms of communion. They may not be the truth in its Scriptural *form*, but they are the casket that contains it, and preserves it from essential depravation. In short, like our first parents we have come to the knowledge of good and evil, and it were a mere fiction of the imagination to suppose we can revert to a state of paradisaical innocence. Moreover, it is not the province of Scripture to supply summaries of doctrine, or defensive statements against heresy ; Scripture furnishes the materials which it is the office of the Church, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, to explain and to harmonize in such a manner as to be an adequate expression of her faith.

With respect to the other point, that we should distinguish between the revealed facts and theories based upon them, we ask, What *are* the facts ? If it be replied, The facts of the Gospel *history*, *e.g.*, that Jesus of Nazareth was born of the Virgin, died on the Cross, rose again, and ascended to heaven, and that the Holy Ghost came down, with visible signs, on the day of Pentecost, we must remind the objector that the *doctrines* of revelation which connect themselves with these facts are themselves facts as much as the visible events, but facts for our knowledge of which we depend upon Divine revelation. Who, *e.g.*, or what, was the Jesus who died on the Cross ? Who, or what, is the Holy Spirit who came according to Christ's promise ? What relation, or connection, exists between Christ, the Holy Spirit, and the Father ? What was the import, and the effect, of Christ's death ? What the offices He discharges now that He has ascended to heaven ? The answers to these questions, if Scripture furnishes them, are as really *facts* as the events that met the eye. An atonement has been made for the sins of the world : this, if true, is not a mere doctrine in the sense of an opinion or theory ; it is a fact just as much as the visible death of Christ, of which it forms the invisible side, or aspect.

In this enlarged sense of the word the facts, so far from being independent of the theories, are the ' theories ' themselves, only not formally arranged or clothed in the current language of the age. They are independent of the theories so far as this, that they might be translated into other language than that of our present Creeds, provided the substance were retained ; but somehow or other, the substance must be retained if the revelation of God is to be preserved in its integrity. Thus, as regards the present subject, the nature of the Divine being in Himself is not a mere hypothesis, but a fact—most mysterious and incomprehensible—but still a fact of revelation ; and no creed which did not declare it more or less explicity could lay claim to be an adequate representation of the teaching of Scripture on the subject, and therefore of the appointed measure of our faith.

MAN BEFORE AND AFTER THE FALL

'Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk), but it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam ; whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit ; and therefore in every person born into the world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation. And this infection of nature doth remain, yea even in them that are regenerated : whereby the lust of the flesh, called in Greek "phronema sarkos," which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God. And although there is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptized, yet the apostle doth confess that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin' (Art. ix).

'The condition of man after the fall is such that he cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural strength and good works, to faith and calling upon God. Wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will' (Art. x).

'Item docent quod post lapsum Adæ omnes homines secundum naturam propagati nascantur cum peccato, hoc est, sine metu Dei, sine fiducia erga Deum, et cum concupiscentia ; quodque hic morbus seu vitium originis vere sit peccatum, damnans et afferens nunc quoque æternam mortem his qui non renascuntur per baptismum et Spiritum Sanctum' (Conf. Aug. p. i. 2).

'De libero arbitrio docent quod humana voluntas habeat aliquam libertatem ad efficiendam civilem justitiam et deligendas res rationi subjectas. Sed non habet vim sine Spiritu Sanctu efficiendæ justitiæ Dei seu justitiæ spiritualis, quia animalis homo non precipit ea quæ sunt Spiritus Dei (1 Cor. ii. 14) ; sed hæc fit in cordibus quum per verbum Spiritus Sanctus concipitur (*ibid.* 18).

De causa peccati docent quod tametsi Deus creat et conservat naturam, tamen causa peccati est voluntas malorum, videlicet diaboli et impiorum, quæ, non adjuvante Deo, avertit se a Deo' (*ibid.* 19).

'Assunt (Pontificii) et alias sententias, naturam non esse malam. Id in loco dictum non reprehendimus ; sed non recte detorquetur ad extenuandum peccatum originis' (Apol. Conf. 43).

'Damnamus Manichæos qui negant homini bono ex libero arbitrio fuisse initium mali. Damnamus etiam Pelagianos qui dicunt hominem malum sufficienter habere liberum arbitrium ad faciendum præceptum bonum' (Conf. Helv. 1566, c. 9).

'Homo perfectissima Dei in terris imago, primasque creaturarum visibilium habens, ex anima et corpore constans : quorum hoc mortale, illud immortale est : cum esset sancte a Deo conditus, sua culpa in vitium prolapsus, in eandem secum ruinam genus humanum totum traxit, ac eidem calamitati obnoxium reddidit. Atique hæc lues, quam originalem vocant, genus totum sic pervasit ut nulla ope iræ filius inimiscusque Dei curari potuerit.... Unde sic homini liberum arbitrium tribuimus ut, qui scientes et volentes agere nos bona et mala experimur, mala quidem agere sponte nostra queamus, bona vero amplecti et persequi nisi gratia Christi illustrati, excitati atque impulsi non queamus' (Conf. Helv. 1581).

'Deus nequaquam est auctor ullius peccati, sed fons et auctor omnis boni, osor vero et ultor mali. Peccatum originis non tantum justitiæ nuda carentia, sed etiam in pravitate, seu pronitate ad malum ex Adamo in omnes propagata consistit' (Decl. Thor. iii).

'Etsi in renatis peccatum originis quoad culpam et reatum gratuita remissione deletur, et quoad privitatem magis magisque per Christi gratiam mortificatur, manent tamen in ipsis, quamdiu in carne vivunt, ejus privitatis reliquiæ, vid. pravæ inclinationes et motus concupiscentiæ, quæ proinde vere et proprie peccatum dicitur, non tantum quatenus est pœna et causa peccati, set etiam quatenus et ipsa cum legi Dei tum Spiritui gratiæ repugnat' (*ibid.*).

28. *Creation of Man*

With the various interpretations of which the first chapter of the Book of Genesis has been the subject, dogmatic theology has little concern. Its sole interest is to secure the idea of a proper creation, an original act in the first instance whereby matter was created *ex nihilo*, and subsequent successive acts whereby the various species which exist were called into being.[1] The first verse of the chapter may refer to the former, or it may be understood of cosmical arrangements of unknown antiquity, fitting our world for a race of happy beings, amongst whom sin found an entrance and reduced their abode to the condition described in verse 2, when the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep. On the latter supposition, the earth was restored by a succession of creative acts to be again a paradise of happy beings, no longer, however, of angelic nature, but of a nature ' a little lower ' in itself ' than that of the angels ' (Ps. viii. 5), though immeasurably superior to them in that it was to be eventually taken into union with the Divine.

When five days of creation (whatever the duration of a creative ' day ' may have been) had thus restored the earth from the ruin in which it had become involved, man was formed on the last day to occupy the habitation prepared for him. There is a marked distinction between the language used in reference to his creation and that of the inferior species. A simple fiat of the Almighty gave them being, but man is the subject of a consultative or deliberative process (Gen. i. 26), whether with the older divines we are to conceive the three Persons of the Holy Trinity as uniting in the work, or, with later ones,[2] the elect angels, already bearing the image of God, as taken into the Divine counsels. In chapter i. man is described in his ethical and cosmical aspects ; he is the head and lord of creation, and bears the image of God. In chapter ii. the subject is resumed, and material details are supplied. His body was formed of the dust of the ground (verse 7), thus connecting him with the visible universe, and especially that portion of it which was to be the theatre of his fall and his redemption ; formed not as the clay, or the marble, is fashioned into the likeness of a man, but organized from within by the assimilation of the earthly elements, which, under the plastic hand of God, lost their original forms and grew into that wonderful piece of mechanism which constitutes the human frame. Thus on its first page the Bible contradicts the Manichæan or Platonic theories, which consider the body either as like all matter, the production of an inferior deity, or as a clog and impediment to the aspirations of the soul. Man's material nature proceeded directly from God ; formed of dust and therefore capable of resolution into dust (Gen. iii. 19), but also capable of a future renovation (1 Cor. xv. 44) ; the first element of his being in order of creation, the last in order of restitution (Rom. viii. 23). Into this body God Himself breathed 'the breath of life,' the symbolical action representing, not as in a somewhat parallel instance (John xx. 22), the communication of the Holy Spirit in His hypostatical character, but the gift of a created spirit, the source and seat of all that distinguishes the human soul from that of the brutes, but which as yet was destitute of the principle of individuality. The spirit thus infused proceeded to ally itself with a distinct form of animal life, vegetative and sensitive, not essentially differing from that of the lower animals, and man became 'a living soul' ;[1] but a self-conscious soul, possessing all that is comprised in the term personality. Adam being thus created, the process was not repeated in the case of the helpmeet provided for him : from man woman was formed, in the way of derivation, the spirit-soul passing with the material element ; and thus as the man is the image and glory of God, the woman is the glory of the man, and through him, or mediately, the image of God (1 Cor. xi. 7).

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[1] See § 19.

[2] As Delitzsch, *Psychology*, Creation, s. ii. Comp. Job. xxxviii. 7.

But this Scriptural account of the creation of man has been pronounced by high authorities incompatible with the discoveries of modern science. The antiquity of man, it is said, extends backwards far beyond the received chronology of 6,000 years ; the plurality of races contradicts the notion of the descent of mankind from a single pair ; and a special act of creation is rendered unnecessary by the theory of the transmutation of species. With respect to the first of these objections, it may be observed that the precise period of man's creation is a matter of little moment to the Christian faith. The received chronology may, or may not, be erroneous ; man may have existed 20,000 years ago instead of 6,000 ; the difference would in nowise affect the religious aspect of the question. It might throw some doubt upon the accuracy of the Biblical narrative as regards matters of chronology, or rather perhaps of current interpretations of the narrative, but this is all. It is therefore unnecessary to inquire how far geological or other evidence tends to invalidate, or to establish, the apparent meaning of Scripture on this point.

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[1] נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה. This term is applied in the Old Testament to the life of brutes, and does not of itself denote anything peculiar to man (Gen. ix. 4). It is otherwise with the expression 'נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים breath of lives,' which is not interchangeable with the former. The soul of man, as distinguished from that of brutes, has a spiritual element which connects it with the Divine nature.

It is otherwise with the objections last named. If mankind did not spring from a single pair, the truth of the narrative is substantially affected ; the subsequent statements of the Old Testament (Gen. ix. 19 ; x. 32 ; Deut. xxxii. 8 ; Mal. ii. 10) are convicted of error ; St. Paul was mistaken when he declared that God 'made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on the face of the earth' (Acts xvii. 26) ; the doctrine of original sin becomes involved in difficulties ; and the corresponding doctrine of restitution by One man, the Head of redeemed humanity, redeemed out of all nations and tongues (Rev. vii. 9), loses its significance. But when we examine the proofs alleged, they seem of no great stringency. It is chiefly the colour of the skin, or diversities in the shape or size of the skull, in the protuberance or depression of certain parts of the body, or in the degrees of mental and moral culture which different races of men exhibit, on which the stress is laid. There is, no doubt, a marked difference between the physical and mental characteristics of the negro or the bushman and the European ; but are they specific ? Are they such as it is impossible to account for by the gradual influence of climate or modes of living ; by variations in the type at first slight but afterwards more marked, as two diverging lines, however small the initial angle, soon place a great distance between each other ? Until ethnology is able to frame a positive answer to these questions, we must hesitate to accept its surmises as subversive of the express statements of Scripture.

Amidst all the varieties of race the essential organs of the body are found the same, and so is the moral nature, though its voice may be silenced, or utter a perverted verdict. Everywhere men think, reason, feel alike. Under auspicious circumstances, the intellect of the negro has proved itself equal to that of the European. Everywhere, too, where the light of the Gospel has not penetrated, the moral state of man resembles the picture drawn in such sombre colours by the Apostle in Romans i. The objector may fairly be asked whether his hypothesis of several centres of creation, independent of each other, does not greatly augment the difficulty of accounting for this universal moral degradation of humanity. The entrance of sin into the world must always remain a mystery ; but whereas Scripture deduces its prevalence from one act of disobedience on the part of the primeval pair, this theory has to admit a fall at every centre, the results of which unite all men in a common ruin. For distinct acts of creation are not denied ; the different races are not supposed, as of old, to have sprung out of the ground : and as each pair must be supposed to have been created, like Adam and Eve, in the image of God, each must have fallen from this original righteousness in order to account for the existing state of man.

To say the least, the Scriptural account has the advantage in point of simplicity.

Still more opposed to revelation is the theory which has received the name of Evolutionism. According to it there is no need for the interposition of a creative fiat to account for the variety of existing species, with man at their head : all has proceeded by a natural law of development. From a dark abyss of life, a Miltonic chaos without form, gradually emerged, through vast periods of time, a few primitive types ; and these, through the instinct of self-preservation and the survival of the fittest, in the lapse of further vast periods, separated themselves into the species of plants and animals which we now see ; each ascending in the scale of complex organization until we reach the summit, the human race. We behold, therefore, in the ape, or the gorilla, our ancestors of a remote generation.

The scientific merits, or validity, of this theory must be left to natural philosophers to estimate ; it cannot be said, in its grosser form at least, to have gained universal acceptance even amongst these. We may ask, How did life first come to be breathed at all into a germ of lifeless matter ? and we may remark that, as far as observation extends, while species have become extinct, no instance occurs of the transmutation of one into another.[1] The attempts to combine species have resulted, as is well known, in sterility. Its inconsistency with Scripture is our immediate concern. Scripture tells us, with marked emphasis, that God made everything on the earth after its kind (Gen. i. 24–5), but this theory leaves no room for the agency of a personal Creator after the first production of matter ; Scripture establishes a specific distinction between man and the inferior animals in that he was created in the image of God, and endowed with the capacity of knowing, loving, and serving God, but this theory makes the difference one only of degree, and the religious faculty an accident of human nature, not its distinguishing characteristic.

29. *Dichotomy or Trichotomy* ?

From an early period it has been a subject of debate whether Scripture ascribes a dipartite or a tripartite nature to man. Plato, it is well known, considered the soul as consisting of three parts (*τὸ λογιστοκὸν* the undying, *τὸ θυμοειδὲς* and *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν* the mortal) ; but as he did not consider the body an essential part of man, his division is a mere logical one, and has little bearing on the present subject.

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[1] Whatever diversity there may be, and there sometimes is great diversity, among the individuals of a species, this does not constitute a *new species.*

A nearer approach to Scripture appears in Plotinus, who made man to consist of *σῶμα*, *ψυχή*, and *νοῦς*. Probably the earlier Greek Fathers, especially those of Alexandria, were influenced by these philosophic speculations, and Clement, Justin Martyr, and others, drew a distinction between the soul and the spirit of man ; and for some time Trichotomy was the prevailing doctrine of the Eastern Church. But the use made of it by Apollinaris, who substituted the Logos for the human spirit in Christ, led to a suspicion of its tendency, and the simpler view of a dipartite nature, body and soul, began to take its place. In the West this latter from the first prevailed. Tertullian rejected the tripartite division, and was followed by Augustine, whose authority in this, as in other points, became decisive.

According to the *usus loquendi* of Scripture, both in the Old and in the New Testament, the word ‘ soul ’ (*ψυχὴ*) signifies not merely the animal life, but the whole man, no doubt however, with an especial reference to his inward nature. ‘ Let every soul,’ St. Paul writes, ‘ be subject to the higher powers ’ (Rom. xiii. 1). It is also used of the immaterial part of man as distinguished from his corporeal, as when our Lord contrasts soul with body (Matt. x. 28), and speaks of His own soul as sorrowful even unto death (*ibid.* xxvi. 38). Soul and body is the usual division of man’s nature in Scripture, which thus appears to favour dichotomy. But there are passages in which not only is the word ‘ spirit ’ (*πνεῦμα*) used for soul, but in which a trichotomy seems distinctly intimated. The former are easily explicable. When the dying Stephen commends his spirit (*πνεῦμα*) to Christ (Acts. vii. 59), or when we read of the spirits (*πνεύμασι*) of just men made perfect (Heb. xii. 23), or of the spirits in prison (1 Pet. iii. 19), it is obvious that ‘ spirit ’ means in such passages the same as the more ordinary term ‘ soul,’ viz., the immaterial part of man when separate from the body: the distinction, if any, seems to be that soul is spirit in union with the body, spirit is soul in a separate state of existence. Spirit expresses the essential nature of the soul, which it has in common with the angels and with God Himself who is described as spirit (John iv. 24) ; its immateriality therefore, and its power to survive the stroke of death. Soul is spirit embodied. But from the interchange of the terms it is plain that no essential distinction is intended.

The other passages present more difficulty. St. Paul prays for the Thessalonians that their ‘ whole body, soul, and spirit may be preserved blameless ’ unto the coming of Christ (1 Thess. v. 23) ; and by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews the Word of God is described as ‘ piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, joints and marrow' (Heb. iv. 12): in either case a trichotomy seems to be implied. But if, as even the advocates of this view admit, soul and spirit do not form distinct elements of man's immaterial nature—that is, are separable only in thought, so that we never can conceive of man's soul without spirit, or his spirit without soul—what after all do these Biblical expressions describe but the same essence under different aspects, and in different relations?

It is to be noted that in the New Testament whenever the word 'spirit,' or 'spiritual,' is used in reference to Christians, there is an implied reference also to the Holy Spirit who dwells in them; as appears most plainly in the distinction which the Apostle draws between the mere 'natural' (unregenerate) man (ψυχικὸς) and the regenerate man (πνευματικὸς) (1 Cor. ii. 14, 15). The natural man has a soul with all its essential faculties; but inasmuch as it is only active towards the world and self, while it is inactive towards God and spiritual things, the man himself takes his position accordingly. In this state the faculty of the soul which distinguishes it from that of the brutes, viz., of knowing and loving God, is not indeed lost or extinct, but it is dormant, and cannot be roused into activity without a special influence from above. As soon as this takes place, and the soul's relation to God becomes its governing one, the man assumes another name, and becomes a πνευματικὸς. But the name appears given him not to denote philosophical distinctions, or because there was originally implanted in him a πνεῦμα as well as a ψυχὴ, but because the author of the new spiritual life is no other than the Holy Spirit Himself.

There is no objection to this faculty of the one indivisible soul, when thus quickened from above, being called the πνεῦμα; and in fact the inspired writers do so call it, and so far are trichotomic; but it may be doubted whether they mean to establish an essential tripartite nature of man. They write theologically, not as natural philosophers. When St. Jude describes certain persons as 'sensual' (ψυχικοὶ), 'having not the spirit' (πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες) (verse 19), he can hardly have meant that they were lacking in an essential constituent of human nature, but rather (as our translators rightly perceived) that they had not the Spirit of God. St. Paul therefore in 1 Thess. v. 23, prays that the whole Christian may be sanctified; his body in the connection of its members with the world, his soul in its twofold relation, as related to the same world sensitively, morally, intellectually, and as related towards God spiritually (σῶμα, ψυχή, πνεῦμα); and more seems hardly capable of being drawn from the passage. The Word of God (Heb. iv. 12), like a sharp sword, pierces to the discovering of sin in the inner man, not only as the latter is related to the world (ψυχή), but as it is related to

God (πνεῦμα) ; dissects and judges the very new nature itself : both so keenly that it is as if a sword penetrated not merely up to the bone, but through it to the marrow. On the whole, it seems that the word 'soul' in Scripture means one spiritual essence, but endowed with diverse faculties, and capable of being viewed in different relations : technically (if we may so speak) this essence, so long as it is unrenewed, is called ψυχή ; when born again of the Spirit it is called πνεῦμα ; but the essence itself, or substratum, remains one and the same.

30. *Image of God—Original Righteousness*

According to the inspired writer, man was created in the image and after the likeness of God (Gen. i. 26) ; what are we to understand by these expressions ? Was the body, or the soul of man, or both together, the seat of this likeness ? Those who, like Tertullian, invested God Himself with a certain corporeity, supposed that the body was framed thereafter ; but this conception was too gross to hold its ground in the Church, though it was revived in the tenth century by the obscure sect of the Anthropomorphites. Others, with more reason, saw in the words a prophetic allusion to the Incarnation ; Christ's body being the prototype after which man's was formed. But there are difficulties connected with this view. Our Lord's body while He was upon earth can hardly be called the pattern after which Adam's was created ; and as regards His *glorified* body, the true ideal of humanity, St. Paul draws a distinction in this point between the first and the second Adam : the former, he tells us, was made 'a living soul,' the latter 'a quickening spirit' ; the first man 'was of the earth, earthy,' the second man 'the Lord from heaven' (1 Cor. xv. 45–7). Even if this description be held to refer to Adam fallen, not to Adam as he came from the hand of the Creator, it seems to imply that the glorified body of Christ is something specifically different from that in which Adam was created, and that even if Adam had never fallen, some change must have taken place in his bodily organization in order to its becoming 'a spiritual body' ; which, no doubt, may have been his final destination. Although, therefore, the body may have to some extent represented (as the heathen poets observed), or shared in (as *e.g.*, in the matter of immortality), this dignity, yet primarily the image of God must be supposed to have belonged to the soul, and to have consisted in those features in which the soul bore a resemblance to its Creator.

The first of these, and the foundation of all the rest, was the gift of personality, or self-consciousness—the consciousness of what we call ourselves, and of its unbroken continuity, amidst the various changes, mental and bodily, which we undergo, and the power of making it a subject of reflection. The lower animals appear either to be wanting in this faculty, or to possess it only in a very limited measure. God is a Spirit—absolute Personality; man possesses derived and relative personality. But this cannot be supposed to exhaust the notion of the image of God, for the fallen angels have not lost the gift of personality though they have lost the image. The Protestant Confessions therefore, as we have seen, on the neutral basis of personality, build the further conclusion that the first man was created in a state of moral perfection, and, as this could not exist without fellowship with God, in a state in which the knowledge, fear, and love of God existed without any intervening cloud of sin. This doctrine was worked out in detail. The natural appetites were perfectly subject to the law of reason, so that no conflict could arise between them. Adam's knowledge of God was not like ours, partial and obscure (1 Cor. xiii. 12), but direct and full; his holiness had no stain; his will was coincident with the Divine. Secondary prerogatives were immortality, and dominion over the other creatures; to the latter of which exclusively the Socinians reduce the idea of the image of God.

Substantially the theologians were in the right; for it is impossible to conceive any positive imperfection in that which a God of infinite holiness pronounced, when He beheld it, very good (Gen. i. 31). But it may be a question whether they sufficiently distinguished between the perfection of an initial state and that of a final one: between virtue, as it were, in the crude material, and virtue confirmed through trial and victory over evil; between the natural impulse and the habit, the latter being usually formed by repeated acts of will. That Adam's original righteousness needed such a confirmation may be inferred from the trial to which he was actually subjected; and that it was not guaranteed from diminution or loss, is equally evident from the result of the trial. It was an inchoate righteousness, yet perfect of its kind; and had he withstood the temptation, it would have proceeded to a higher quality, until at length the probation being complete, the possibility of not sinning would have been exchanged for the impossibility of sinning. This relative imperfection of his original state no more implies a positive defect than the essential sinlessness of Christ excluded the possibility of His being tempted, and not only so, but the necessity of it in order to His being 'perfected' in His capacity of Redeemer (Heb. ii. 10; v. 9).

All the Protestant Confessions agree in describing the original state of man as not one of indifference between good and evil, still less of actual sin and its concomitant death; they agree too in denying the necessity of a fall, whether through the weakness of the nature thus created, or as a step towards the realizing its idea. And in the former point they dissent from the doctrine of the Romish Church, that original righteousness was not natural to Adam, but a super added gift, *gradia gratum faciens*, which might be and was withdrawn at the fall, and yet leave man in no worse a position than Adam was in before he received the gift.

The source of this doctrine is to be sought in the Pelagian tendencies which prevailed in the Western Church in the Middle Ages, and which naturally aimed at extenuating the effects of the fall. It found a congenial home in the scholastic theology, and appears therein under a twofold form : some, as Duns Scotus and his followers, holding that the gift was conferred subsequently to man's creation ; others, as Aquinas and his school, making it coincident therewith. But both agreed in considering it a matter of ' grace,' *i.e.* not of nature, something added over and above to the nature considered in and by itself. The Council of Trent, having regard to this difference of view, avoided in its decree on the subject the use of the word ' created,' substituting for it constituted ; and indeed the real point in controversy can hardly be gathered from its decisions. The Catechism of the Council is more explicit : ' As for the soul of man, God formed it after His image and likeness, and conferred upon it the power of free-will ; the appetites and impulses of the soul He so attempered that they should always obey the dictates of reason. *Then* He added the excellent gift of original righteousness, etc.'

The image of God in Adam is here described as something separable from his original righteousness ; and if so, it may remain in man after, through the fall, he has lost the latter gift. Bellarmine, as is his wont, expounds without reserve the doctrine of his Church, and pushes it to its consequences. Man, he observes, consists of flesh as well as spirit, and these are naturally opposed the one to the other ; consequently, from the very nature of matter, a strife must have arisen between the opposite inclinations, which could only be kept under by the ' golden rein ' of the superadded gift of original righteousness. This lost by the fall, the strife which had been forcibly repressed immediately recommenced ; and this is now our present condition. But as it could not have been called sin in Adam, but only the inevitable result of his compound nature, so it cannot be called sin in us ; and the Creator is no more accountable for it than the smith is accountable for the rust which accumulates on the sword he has made ; not he, but the material is in fault. (Bellarmine overlooks the fact that the smith does not create his material ; could he do so, he would make it proof against rust). The conclusion is, that Adam, apart from the superadded gift, was precisely what fallen man now is, and fallen man what Adam would have been but for that gift ; if the image of God and free-will belonged to Adam *in puris naturalibus*, they equally belong now to his posterity.

Apart from the ulterior object of this doctrine, viz., to exalt unduly the spiritual powers of *fallen* man, it may seem to be more a question of words than anything else. For, on the one side, it is admitted that, though Adam may be conceived as created *in puris naturalibus*, his condition never was actually such ; the gift of original righteousness having been added at once to the morally indifferent substratum of nature. And on the other side, the Protestant, it is admitted that an image of God still in some respects, and partially, exists in man; it is blurred, and in its chief characteristic obliterated, but there remain vestiges (*reliquiæ*) of it ; thus much must be conceded from Scripture itself, which, in Gen. ix. 6 and James iii. 9, presupposes even in fallen man an image, or remains of an image, of God. Personality and conscience have not been extinguished by the fall.

Nevertheless, the doctrine must be pronounced both exegetically and dogmatically erroneous. Exegetically, for it is founded on a distinction between the words ‘ image ’ and ‘likeness ’ ; the former, it is argued, signifying the abstract nature, the latter the more positive idea of resemblance ; which distinction is not borne out by the usage of Scripture. Dogmatically, for it represents God as creating an intelligent nature which needed a remedy for inherent defects, defects which *now*, when the remedy is removed, lead inevitably to sin ; which seems, not indirectly, to make God the author of sin. This difficulty cannot be evaded by alleging ‘ the condition of matter ’ ; unless, indeed, it is held that matter existed independently of God, and He had to make the best of a bad material. If matter was created, on whom is the fault of its being able to resist and overcome the spirit to be laid ? But further, it seems an error at all to introduce the idea of ‘ grace,’ or supernatural aid, into that of the original state of man, except in the sense in which all gifts of God, therefore creation itself, are of grace. This is an error from which Protestant divines themselves are not free, as, *e.g.*, when they speak of ‘ sacraments ’ in paradise. Grace, in Scripture, means free favour, or free aid, to the fallen ; the term is inapplicable to Adam’s state before the fall. To apply it to Adam unfallen, is to transfer the religion of redemption into Paradise, a state with which it has nothing to do.

Nor does there seem occasion to admit that, though the notion of a superadded gift is to be rejected, Adam may have been favoured with special gracious influences of the Holy Spirit ; nor does it seem safe to argue to Adam's original state from such passages as Ephes. iv. 24 and Col. iii. 10, in which the ' new man ' of the regenerate is said to be formed after the image of God. The work and the result of regenerating grace must be considered as of another and a higher quality than that of original righteousness : it is more than a mere restitution. The error of the Romish Church consists in transferring the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church, which is strictly supernatural, to the natural creation of man, where it could have no place and must necessarily give rise to unfounded theories.

According to the Protestant view, original righteousness, in the sense of perfect conformity to the will and law of God, was natural to the first man before his fall ; natural, not as constituting the essence of his nature, for this remains in fallen man, but as belonging to the conception of it, which the Creator framed to Himself in intending to create it. Hence it is described as ' a debt to the nature ' ; it was due to it, regard being had to the archetype in the Divine mind, and to the end proposed, eternal felicity, which could not be attained without it. How otherwise, indeed, could it have been transmitted to Adam's posterity, as no doubt it would have been, had he not sinned ? Supernatural grace cannot be tied to such a law. The distinction, therefore, which Protestant theologians draw between the ' essential ' and the ' accidental ' image of God in man, must not be misunderstood as a concession to the Romish doctrine ; it is merely another mode of saying that man has not ceased to be man because he has lost original righteousness ; that this latter was not so much a right nature, as rectitude of nature. It was a quality, and so far accidental as all qualities must be ; but the same Word of power which said, ' Let us make man ' (Gen. i. 26), made him also in the moral image of God. Since the impossibility of sinning now comes to man first through Christ, to this extent Adam's original state may be admitted to have been an imperfect one.

31. *Freedom—Immortality*

With personality, or the faculty of self-consciousness, free-will, or the power of self-determination, is necessarily connected ; and accordingly Adam must be supposed to have had this endowment conferred upon him. His obedience was neither that of external compulsion, nor did it proceed from blind instinct as in the lower animals ; it was the result of choice. But, his nature being supposed to have remained in its integrity, the choice was a matter of moral necessity ; just as there is a moral necessity of the elect angels acting according to the will of God, while acting with perfect freedom. His freedom was a real, and not merely a formal, one ; not the equilibrium of a moral neutrality, but the freedom of the will from the bondage under which it now labours. Man still has will, but it is biassed by tendencies which he had no natural power to overcome ; in Adam's original condition there was no such impediment. Yet he was capable of temptation as Christ Himself was ; and as his righteousness was merely that of the first creation, it did not include the impossibility of his being overcome by the temptation ; it was a *posse non peccare*, not a *non posse peccare*. The former denotes his advantage over his posterity, the latter the prerogative of the future glorified Church.

Was Adam created free from the law of mortality ? It seems so. He was not created immortal, as the event proved ; immortality, in its absolute sense, belongs to God alone (1 Tim. vi. 16) ; but he was created with the possibility of not dying. To suppose that he was subject to death in the course of nature would be inconsistent with the whole spirit of the Mosaic narrative, and not less so with the Apostolic doctrine that death is the consequence and the penalty of sin (Rom. v. 12). Geology proves that death reigned over the inferior creation long before the appearance of man, but the extension of this reign to the human race must be considered as something abnormal.

On the other hand, a so-called ' natural immortality ' can hardly be maintained, even when the phrase is applied, as it usually is, to the soul alone. Scripture supposes that the soul survives its separation from the body, but on the question of its inherent immortality it is silent ; the body too, in one sense, survives its separation from the soul, for no particle of matter is ever annihilated. Butler has done his best for the philosophical argument, but probably most readers of the *Analogy* have felt that the first chapter is the least satisfactory of that celebrated treatise. An uncompounded substance cannot indeed perish by dissolution, but this does not prove that it may not perish in some other way ; *e.g.* by the exhaustion of its vital forces. Surmises and probabilities on this subject are one thing, assurance is another ; and from no quarter does assurance come of immortality in the true sense but from the Gospel of Christ, and this includes that of the body as well as that of the soul.

Adam was capable of death, but it was his destination not to die, as is clearly intimated by the appointment of the tree of life in Paradise. Whatever we are to understand by it, it was plainly the symbol and means of immortality ; and from the prohibition to partake of it after the fall, it must be inferred that previously thereto it would have been a prophylactic against disease and death. On the future that awaited Adam and his posterity, if sin had not entered, Scripture throws a veil. The common opinion is that the paradisaical state would in due time have been exchanged for a heavenly ; that men would have put on, by a painless process, the spiritual body in which Adam was certainly not created (1 Cor. xv. 47), but which was intended for him ; and that successive generations would have been thus translated after their appointed sojourn on earth. It may, however, be doubted whether this is not an instance of the common tendency to confound creation with redemption, by adapting what the Apostle teaches respecting the change which those who shall be alive at Christ's coming must undergo (1 Cor. xv. 51), to the state of man before the fall.

32. *Traducianism or Creationism?*

An essential distinction between the original state of man and that of the redeemed in Christ is that in the former the bodily life was sustained by natural means, and the race propagated by natural descent (Gen. i. 28) ; while, ' in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven ' (Matt. xxii. 30). In connection with the doctrine of original sin, which, as our Article declares, is an inherited defect, and not a mere imitation of Adam, and which has its primary seat in the soul, it became in early times a debated question whether the soul, like the body, is propagated from parent to child, or whether a special act of creation implants it in each individual. The former is Traducianist, the latter the Creationist theory.

Origen's theory of the pre-existence of souls, which he considered were created simultaneously with the angels, is well known ; it has been revived in modern times by such philosophers as Kant and Schelling, and such theologians as J. Müller, who applies it to explain the doctrine of original sin. But, on account of its foreign origin (the Platonic philosophy), and its lack of Scriptural foundation, it never obtained general recognition in the Church.

Traducianism found a strong defender in Tertullian, as might have been expected, from his inability to conceive spiritual substance, not excluding God Himself, without corporeity of some sort ; and according to Jerome, it was the prevailing tenet of the Western Church, though he himself inclined to the other view. Augustine confesses that he could arrive at no certain conclusion on the subject ; and contents himself with pointing out the difficulty of explaining the inherited taint of sin on the Creationist hypothesis. Thomas Aquinas makes a distinction between the 'sensitive' soul and the 'intellectual' the former he holds to be propagated, the latter to be created. After the Reformation the Lutheran Church became almost exclusively Traducianist, while the Reformed, for the most part, adopted the Creationist theory.

The question must be cleared from the ambiguity which attaches to the word 'creation,' accordingly as it is used in its strict, or in a looser sense. In its strict sense it denotes production out of nothing (*creatio prima*), secondary causes being excluded ; and this is what is intended in Creationism. But it is sometimes applied to the Divine co-operation with secondary causes in the propagation of existing species (*creatio mediata*), and in this lower sense it is not denied by the Traducianists. The Divine co-operation, they admit, is necessary to the act of propagation ; but it exercises itself through that act, just as in other species of animals ; the soul does not come into existence through a simple fiat of the Almighty. The Creationists, on the other hand, dispense in the matter with secondary agency.

Both parties appeal to Scripture, but with no very certain result. On the Creationist side reference is made to Gen. ii. 7 ; which proves, indeed, that of the *first* man the soul was created *ex nihilo* ; but, as one of the ablest defenders of the theory himself admits, decides nothing as to the souls of his descendants ; for in like manner the body of Adam was formed directly by God out of the dust, and yet it is admitted on both sides that our present bodies come into existence by propagation. Also to Eccles. xii. 7 (' and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it '), which does not define *how* God gives it ; and, above all, to Heb. xii. 9, which describes God as the ' Father of spirits,' as distinguished from the ' fathers of our flesh.' But it is doubtful whether this latter passage will bear such an interpretation. The fathers of our flesh are our earthly fathers, and by flesh is meant not the body alone, but the whole man : the ' Father of spirits ' is God, so called because He is the Creator of purely spiritual beings (the angels) as well as of men, and especially because the regenerate man (πνευματικὸς) stands through Christ in a filial relation to God. It is very improbable that by the word ' spirits ' should be meant souls as distinguished from bodies. Yet in a modified sense Creationism may find a support in the passage. Whatever is spiritual, whether in essence (as that of angels), or by the new birth (as in the regenerate), bears a special relation to God as its Author ; who, therefore, in the case of the human soul, may be supposed as specially co-operating with the secondary instruments. But more than this does not seem to be contained in it.

To supply the place of Scripture-evidence recourse is had to philosophical considerations. If the soul is propagated, it must be from both parents or from one ; and again, in its totality or in part only. If from both, two souls would coalesce into one, which is absurd ; if from one, the other would be excluded from the process. If the soul is propagated in its totality, the parents would be left without one ; if in part, then it is divisible. It must be propagated either from the body or the soul (of the parents) ; if the former, it is material, if the latter, the difficulty just mentioned recurs. The soul is not immortal if it does not exist independently (*per se*) ; but it cannot thus exist if it is propagated.

The Traducianists found little difficulty in replying to these arguments. Both parents, they said, are here considered as but one cause, for propagation cannot take place without both. Not the soul alone, or the body is propagated, but the whole man : it is a maxim in the schools of philosophy, *generationem esse totius compositi.* Neither does the soul of the parent, nor any part of it, pass into the child ; it is endowed with a prolific power by force of the Divine Command and blessing, ' Be fruitful and multiply,' etc. The posterity of Adam, if he had stood, would have been immortal, even as regards their bodies, though there is no doubt these would have come into being by propagation ; immortality, therefore, and being propagated are not incompatible. But they were less successful in explaining their own view; and were compelled to fall back upon negations, or upon the incomprehensibility of the process, or, after all, upon physical conceptions. A favourite illustration was that of a torch communicating light to a torch ; but this involves physical separation.

Traducianism is most in accordance with the language of Scripture, as when Adam is said to have begotten a son in his own likeness, after his image (Gen. v. 3) ; which can hardly refer to the body merely. It seems also to agree better with St. Paul's doctrine of the first and second Adam, as the respective heads of fallen and regenerate humanity. It may appeal to the creation of Eve, which was not like Adam's, *ex nihilo*, but by a derivative process ; and to the statement of Scripture that God rested on the seventh day from works of creation (Gen. ii. 2), which though it does not exclude the idea of *creatio mediata*, does seem to imply that creation in the strict sense then ceased ; not indeed as a power or idea inherent in the Godhead, but in reference to this world of ours. The reply that the creation of souls is not a *new* thing, because Adam's was created, seems hardly to deserve notice.

But above all, the Traducianist may ask, as Augustine of old, how the transmission of a sinful nature is to be explained on the other hypothesis ? If God creates each soul directly, it must be supposed pure as it comes from the Creator ; is it consistent with His goodness to allow it to become subsequently contaminated by union with an infected body, as pure water suffers defilement by being poured into a filthy vase ? Can we suppose that an immaterial substance is capable of being contaminated by a material ? If, as Romanists hold, original sin is merely a defect, the loss of original righteousness, the difficulty may be lessened, but is by no means removed ; for why should God implant a pure soul in a defective organization ? In short, it is difficult to see how a rigid Creationist theory can avoid making God the Author of sin. It may be added that the principal seat of sin surely is the soul, not the body ; but if, as all admit, sin is transmitted from the parents, it seems as if the subject in which sin inheres must, in some inexplicable manner, share in the transmission.

Neither hypothesis can claim either sure warranty of Scripture or ecclesiastical consent ; but as pious opinions they are an expression of facts which must in some way be combined, if we are to gain an adequate view of the subject. Creationism is opposed to the tendency to consider each individual as he comes into the world a mere repetition of the type of the species, without individual characteristics or a distinct personality ; or to merge the individual in the race. Our own consciousness, and the varieties of mental and moral endowment which men exhibit, testify against this notion. It is not without a ground of reason that popular language ascribes the genius of a Newton or a Shakespeare to a direct gift of heaven. Traducianism, on the other hand, represents the principle of organic connection of the whole race under one head, the first Adam, as the leaves of a tree proceed from one stem ; it refuses to consider mankind as a collection of atoms, without a common root: and it can claim not only its relative share of philosophical truth, but its agreement with the general tenor of Scripture. A modified hypothesis on either side may lead to a combination of both ; which perhaps is as near an approach to truth as the subject admits of.

33. *The Angels*

From Scripture we learn that the fall of man was occasioned by a temptation proceeding from a being not of his own rank in creation ; and this seems naturally to lead to the question, What does Scripture teach respecting the order of intelligent beings thus for the first time presented to our notice ? This topic is usually treated of under the head of Creation, or that of Divine Providence, inasmuch as the angels, not less than man, declare the glory of the Creator, and are represented as His ministers in the providential administration of the world ; but as connected with the history of redemption it seems not inappropriately to claim a place between the original state of man and his fall.

In considering the nature and offices of angels, we may put aside the ethical distinction between them, as good and bad, as beneficent or malignant ; for this distinction was not an original one, but superinduced by events subsequent to their creation. As distinguished on the one hand from God, and on the other from man, both the good and the bad possess common characteristics. And it is important thus to consider them collectively, or as they were intended to be, in order to avoid the appearance of an original dualism in any department of the universe ; if there are evil angels they became such—whereas all were at first good. Moreover, the unfallen angels themselves are not in the same state as they were when created ; a change has passed over them for the better, as over the others for the worse. The question now before us is, What is an angelic nature, as such ?

We have first to ask whether a real personality is to be ascribed to the angels, or whether they are merely personifications of natural forces or phenomena, such as a rude or poetical age might invent. Our Lord and His Apostles, it is said, accommodated themselves to popular notions, but their language is not to be interpreted literally, any more than ours is when we speak of elves or fairies. Now, it is true that the creation of the angels is rather presupposed in Scripture than expressly mentioned ; and it is also true, that in some instances they seem to be merely personifications of the power of nature, as when the Psalmist describes them as ‘ spirits ’ (*i.e.*, winds) and as ‘ flames of fire ’ (Ps. civ. 4) ; or when an angel is said to have endued the pool of Bethesda, at certain times, with healing powers (John v. 4). But to the majority of passages no such explanation applies, for they consist chiefly of plain historical narration. Angels appear on special errands : to the Virgin (Luke i. 26), to Joseph (Matt. i. 20), to Zacharias (Luke i. 11), to the shepherds (Luke ii. 9), to the keepers of the Lord’s sepulchre (Matt. xxviii. 4), to the women at the same place (Luke xxiv. 4), to Cornelius (Acts x. 3). They are mentioned as ministering to our Lord (Matt. iv. 11), and as strengthening Him in His last temptation (Luke xxii. 43). They announce to the gazing disciples their Master’s ascension (Acts i. 10) ; they release Peter from prison (*ibid.* xii. 7); they assure Paul of safety when in danger of shipwreck (*ibid.* xxvii. 23). In the Old Testament they appear more sparingly, and not so often under their proper denomination, but still very distinctly. They guard the way of the tree of life in Paradise (Gen. iii. 24) ; they conduct Lot out of Sodom (*ibid.* xix. 15) ; they appear to Jacob on his journey (*ibid.* xxviii. 12). It is impossible to understand all this of mere poetical imagery, and the plain sense of Scripture is that they exist as a distinct order of intelligent beings. That Christ and the Apostles could have sanctioned a popular error without dropping a word of caution that they were not to be understood literally, is incredible.

The titles which these superior beings bear in Scripture are descriptive rather of their offices and qualities than of their nature. The word angel (מַלְאָךְ) signifies a messenger, or one who executes the Divine behests : poetically, they are called ‘ sons of God ’ (Job i. 6 ; xxxviii. 7), as, in the writer’s view, specially related to God, and ‘ sons of the mighty ’ (Ps. lxxxix. 6), as excelling in strength. Cherubim and Seraphim are of the nature of proper names ; the meaning and etymology are doubtful ; but to judge from the material symbols under which they are represented (Ezek. x, Isa. vi), they seem to signify dignity and might.

Angels are represented as assessors in the court of heaven (1 Kings xxii. 19), and as being very numerous (Ps. lxviii. 17 ; Rev. v. 11). Gradations of rank appear to exist among them (Ephes. 1. 21 ; Col. i. 16), though not worked out after the fanciful manner of Dionysius the Areopagite, who arrays them in nine orders, subdivided into three classes, with different functions. It is an archangel that rebuked Satan (Jude 9), and who is represented as with a host of subordinate angels waging a successful war with him (Apoc. xii. 7). In the later books of the Old Testament traces are found of the notion that nations have their respective tutelary archangels : thus Michael appears as the guardian angel of Israel (Dan. xii. 1).

On these notices of Scripture the statements of the theologians are founded, which it must be confessed in some instances exceed the limits of what is written. An angel is defined to be a spiritual substance, *i.e.* without body, finite, complete, and endowed with true personality. They are finite as created beings, and complete as distinguished from the soul of man, which, though a spiritual substance, is, if separate from the body, incomplete, *i.e.* needs the body as its complement. Opinions in the Early Church varied as to the incorporeity of angels ; many taught that they had bodies, but of an ethereal nature ; but it was generally held that they are incorporeal. When therefore they assumed a visible form, as in Gen. xviii, this was an accidental union, for a certain time and purpose, not part of their proper hypostasis, as the body of a man is an essential part of his nature.

The properties common to both good and bad angels are partly negative, such as indivisibility, invisibility, immutability, immortality, and illocality: as simple spiritual substances they are, like the human soul, indivisible, as such too they are invisible; they are not liable to changes which we undergo, *e.g.* they do not increase in size, nor do they grow old; they are not liable to death, nor are they confined in space like a material body. The positive properties are knowledge, freedom of will, power, endless duration, a definite whereabouts (*ποῦ*, ubi), and rapidity of movement.

These definitions seem framed to give us the conception of a being inferior to God, as every creature must be, and yet superior to man. Their knowledge and power far exceed ours, yet they are neither omniscient nor omnipotent; they are not eternal, but æviternal, *i.e.* though they had a beginning they have no ending; they are not circumscribed in space as our bodies are, and yet they are not omnipresent, they must be spoken of as in a certain place and not elsewhere at the same time; their agility is inconceivable, and yet they cannot pass from one point of space to another except in an interval of time, however small. As spirits, that is persons in the highest sense of the word, they possess knowledge and free-will; the latter in common with man; the former of a kind and measure far transcending human. And as their faculties, compared with the Divine, are limited, so are the effects which they can produce; they cannot, *e.g.*, create or generate anything; nor can they change the essential nature of things; nor can they perform true miracles.

In what manner, and to what extent they can operate on the minds of men—to us the most important point—cannot be certainly gathered from Scripture, and is not satisfactorily explained by writers on the subject. It is agreed that they have no immediate access to the rational soul, a prerogative which belongs to God, and can act upon it only mediately, by raising impressions or fomenting evil passions; nor can they exercise constraint on the will (Jas. iv. 7); but how they can operate through impressions (*phantasmata*), or by presenting objects of unlawful desire, is not explained, and perhaps is inexplicable. In our Lord's temptation the evil spirit is represented as appealing to sense, and in the way of direct colloquy.

Many subtle questions have been raised by the schoolmen on this subject, as, *e.g.*, At what particular time the angels were created? Whether more than one angel can be in the same place? Of what kind is their knowledge? How they communicate with each other? etc.: respecting which J. Gerhard well remarks, 'De his omnibus ita disserunt ut merito quis quærat quam nuper sint de cœlo delapsi' (*Loc.*, vi. *sq.*).

> Nescire velle quæ Magister maximus
> Docere non vult, erudita inscitia est.

34. *Continuation. Good and Bad Angels. Satan*

The angels collectively were created in the image of God, and perhaps in a higher sense than that in which Adam was ; not merely with an abstract power of will to choose and follow the good, but with a will directed towards the good, and furnished with all the moral and intellectual gifts which were sufficient in themselves to ensure their continuance in the favour of their Creator. Yet they were not, as the event proved in respect to some of their number, without the possibility of sinning ; not a proximate, but a remote possibility—one, that is, which might never have become fact. In short, all that goes to form our conception of Adam's original state equally applies to that of the angels. Scripture declares that God, on a survey of creation, which must have included the angels, pronounced everything good ; and that the angels who fell did so by wilfully abandoning their first estate and own habitation (Jude 6).

From this presumed analogy between the original state of man and that of the angels the question arose whether as in the former a superadded gift of righteousness, so in the latter a special act of 'grace,' was necessary to its perfection. By the schoolmen this was generally affirmed, but the grace was supposed to be coincident with the act of creation, so that the angels were never actually in a state of moral indifference. Thomas Aquinas draws a distinction between the 'natural blessedness' of the angels, and the supernatural, which consists in the vision of God ; and confines the necessity of an act of grace to the latter. An angel, he argues, could not, any more than ourselves, attain to this vision, *i.e.* eternal life, without Divine grace ; according to the Apostle's statement (Rom. vi. 23), 'Gratia Dei, vita æterna.' Hence, he continues, the more probable opinion is that they were created 'in grace.' Being so created, they determined, by an act of choice, their future position ; and by this act in the right direction the good angels merited their ultimate blessedness. When did this act in either direction take place? Directly after their creation; that is, the good angels and the bad became so instantaneously, and remain for ever so ; so that, properly speaking, no state or condition of angels as such, and without reference to their choice and its consequent separation, actually existed.

The whole of this theory, which was adopted by the Romish theologians, is open to the objections which lie against the corresponding one in reference to the creation of man : it has no foundation in Scripture, and it introduces the term 'grace' in a connection foreign from the proper idea thereof. Only so much of it is retained by the

Protestant writers as seems to have some Scriptural basis. The angels, like man, were created in positive righteousness ; but by an act of choice, when and how exercised we know not, a separation between them took place. By that act of choice, those whom the Scripture calls the ‘ elect ’ angels (1 Tim. v. 21), or ‘ angels of light ’ (2 Cor. xi. 14), were confirmed in their goodness : they were admitted to ‘ the vision of God,’ which precludes the possibility of their falling away : their service is perfect freedom, but the highest kind of freedom, which consists in a moral impossibility of their choosing otherwise : nor can we say that other gifts and rewards were not, in the exuberance of the Divine goodness, conferred upon them. By a corresponding act, the rest excluded themselves for ever from participation in this blessedness. For when they chose evil, evil became their nature in a sense in which this cannot be predicated of man when he fell. Hence the common opinion is that they are beyond recovery. Not merely on account of the heinousness of their sin, whatever it may have been, in itself or from the circumstances accompanying it, such as that it was committed by a nature superior to that of man, and not at the prompting of another ; but because the depravation of nature which ensued was complete. If they could repent, they would no doubt find mercy ; but their state can only be paralleled by that described by our Lord in Matt. xii. 31, 32, which perhaps, as regards any man in this life, is to be considered rather as an hypothesis than as a fact. All their faculties have suffered correspondingly ; their intellect, *e.g.*, has become darkened, proofs of which are thought to be found in Satan’s ignorance that Jesus was the Son of God, or, if he knew it, in his supposing that the Son of God could be tempted to commit sin (Matt. iv. 3–10) ; and his prompting Judas to betray Christ to death (John xiii. 2), which in fact, proved the destruction of his own kingdom.

The employments of the good angels are described as partly contemplative and partly active. They are represented as surrounding the throne of God, and singing His praises (Ps. ciii. 20 ; Isa. vi. 3 ; Rev. v. 11) ; and also as ministering spirits (in what manner is not declared) to the heirs of salvation (Heb. i. 14). On all important occasions in the history of redemption, angels appear on the scene ; at the giving of the Mosaic law (Acts vii. 53), at the birth of Christ (Luke ii. 13), at His second coming (Matt. xxv. 31), and at the gathering in of His elect (*ibid.* xiii. 41). They share in the joy of the Redeemer over repentant sinners (Luke xv. 10) ; they are present in the assemblies of Christians (1 Cor. xi. 10) ; they convey the souls of the pious departed to their rest (Luke xvi. 21). Though not interested in them as man is, they make the mysteries of redemption their earnest study (1 Pet. i.

12). That a guardian angel is assigned to each believer is a pious opinion which may derive some support from our Lord's words (Matt. xviii. 10) ; but whatever hints Scripture may furnish on this subject, it gives no prominence thereto, nor does it ever encourage us to look to angels for guidance or help in the emergencies of life. Why should it, when the Christian has a right to rely upon His over-ruling providence and ever-present succour, whom the angels themselves worship as their Creator ? That the subject of angelic agency is wholly without dogmatical import for us is too much to say ; but that it may be abused to superstitious practices Scripture itself intimates (Col ii. 18), and experience proved.

The error of the Colossians has, in fact, often reappeared in the Church. St. Paul warns them, among other things, against 'angel-worship,' which he traces to the tendency of human nature to add to what is revealed, and to pry into mysteries placed beyond our ken. After the return of the Jews from Babylon, the doctrine of angels became more prominent in the popular belief, and the sect of the Essenes is particularly mentioned in connection with it. From Jewish converts it probably passed into the early Christian Churches, and in the Colossian Church, at least, in such a form as to imperil the simplicity of the Christian faith. But though many speculations on the subject are met with in the early Fathers, no further trace, if we except one ambiguous passage in Justin Martyr, occurs of the existence of angel-worship, or invocation, in the Church. It was on the favourable soil of Gnosticism that these illicit doctrines chiefly flourished. The Church of Rome, therefore, can allege no patristic tradition for her decisions on this point : still less can she allege Scriptural authority. The angel whom Jacob invoked (Gen. xlviii. 16), and with whom he wrestled (*ibid.* xxxii. 26), was not a created angel ; nor can any conclusions be founded on such ambiguous passages as Job. v 1, or Rev. i. 4. Rev. xix. 10 is not ambiguous, nor the corresponding passage, xxii. 8, 9, and in them the Apostle himself records the Divine warning which he received not to render worship save to God only. Nor will the distinction between Latreia and Dulia avail to justify the practice ; the distinction is not in itself a Scriptural one, nor can there be an intermediate worship between that due to God (*cultus religiosus*), and the respect due to eminent, but created, dignity or virtue. All created distinctions vanish in presence of Deity ; and as worship is the prerogative of Deity, there can be, if the word is used in its proper sense, no degrees in it.

The evil angels are represented in Scripture (*i.e.*, the New Testament) as endeavouring to the utmost of their power (which, however, is limited) to thwart the gracious purposes of God in the redemption of mankind; and it contains not a few indistinct notices of their forming a kind of community under a supreme head, who bears the name of Satan. It is he who is said to have tempted Christ (Matt. iv. 10), to have prompted Judas in his sin (John xiii. 2), to have filled the heart of Ananias (Acts v. 3), to have hindered the Apostle in a proposed journey (1 Thess. ii. 18), to have 'buffeted' him with some unknown bodily ailment (2 Cor. xii. 7). He is described as tempting the saints (1 Thess. iii. 5), as going about like a roaring lion (1 Pet. v. 8), as counteracting the effect of the Word of God (Luke viii. 12), as sowing tares among the wheat (Matt. xiii. 39), as the instigator of persecution against the Church (Rev. ii. 10). To destroy his power was the special object of Christ's coming (Heb. ii. 14). He is the spirit who works in the disobedient (Ephes. ii. 2), and who blinds the minds of them that believe not (2 Cor. iv. 4). To the unbelieving world he stands in a special relation as its patron and prince (John xii. 31, xiv. 30). For him and his angels there is reserved the lake of fire and brimstone (Rev. xx. 10; Matt. xxv. 41). A description of better defined outline it is difficult to imagine. But, as we have said, Satan does not stand alone in his opposition to Christ: he is Beelzebub, 'the prince of the devils' (Matt. xii. 24); he is ruler over 'a kingdom' (*ibid.* 26); his angels are mentioned as well as himself; Christians are warned against the wiles of the devil (Ephes. vi. 11), and also are enjoined to put on the armour of God if they would wage a successful war against 'principalities and powers, the rulers of the darkness of this world' (*ibid.* 12, 13). In short, over against the Kingdom of God, of which Christ is the Head, and for the coming of which we are taught to pray (Matt. vi. 10), stands a kingdom of darkness, of which Satan is the head, and from which it is our privilege as Christians to be delivered.

And yet modern thought has very generally arrived at the conclusion that this whole doctrine of Satan, which, it is allowed, the *letter* of the New Testament seems to favour, has no foundation in fact; that the Satan of Christ and the Apostles is a mythical personage, the offspring of Jewish superstition; or a mere personification of the abstract principle of evil; or the poetry of symbol, suitable for liturgical use, but not of any moment as a doctrine. It is urged that the Old Testament contains few traces of the doctrine; that in the New Testament it is indeed presupposed, but not distinctly propounded; that it is difficult to conceive the fall of a being created in righteousness; equally so to conceive how a being of supernatural powers of intellect can maintain a warfare against the Most High, in which he must know he will be defeated; but if he does not know this, so foolish an antagonist is not to be dreaded by us ; that why some angels should have fallen and others not is inexplicable ; that inasmuch as Satan can do nothing without the Divine permission, and, in the event, without furthering the Divine designs, his enmity against God would be better gratified by his remaining inactive ; and that a kingdom, or community, of evil spirits cannot exist, for Satan must ever be divided against himself.

As regards the Old Testament, it must be admitted that it is not so explicit as the New on this subject. The doctrine of Satanic agency, in fact, passes through several stages in the inspired volume ; and so far from this being otherwise than natural, it is only what we should expect. As long as redemption was a matter of promise it was not proper that the power and malignity of him whose head the Saviour was to bruise (Gen. iii. 15) should be revealed ; there would be no use, and there might be harm, in inducing men to brood upon the spiritual dangers that surrounded them, while at the same time no clear revelation was given of the Almighty Redeemer in whom and by whom they were to be delivered. A veil, therefore, is drawn over this sombre subject until at the actual coming of the Seed of the woman it might be safely lifted. The Satan of the Old Testament does not appear as the irreconcilable enemy of the Most High, but rather as His instrument, in inflicting not undeserved chastisement on the people of God ; he is represented as in consultation with Jehovah respecting certain persons whom he is permitted to try, and as having limits assigned to his agency by a kind of pact or agreement (1 Kings xxii. 20, 21 ; Job i. 6–12). In Zech iii. 1 he arraigns before the throne of Divine justice the sinful nation in the person of its High Priest Joshua ; and is silenced, not as having brought a false accusation, but as having overlooked the abounding grace of God (vers. 1–4). Notwithstanding this, his true nature is sufficiently disclosed to prevent us from ever confounding him with an angel of light. If such an angels inflicts, at the command of God, temporal chastisement (2 Sam. xxiv. 16 ; 2 Kings xix. 35), yet he never appears as tempting men to commit sin in order to have matter of accusation against them, or as taking a malignant satisfaction in proving, as in Job's case, how infirmity cleaves to the best of men ; which is the aspect under which Satan appears in the Old Testament narratives. In the New Testament this disposition deepens into a positive enmity towards God and man.

Is this reserve in the Old Testament merely of an economical character, or does it represent a fact, viz., that the state of the fallen angels admitted, as that of fallen man does, of a progression from bad to worse, until a climax was reached, at which the possessed of devils, speaking in their name, could exclaim : ‘ What have we to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of God ?' (Matt. viii. 29). It seems to be too hastily assumed that this law of progression (*nemo repente fuit turpissimus*) applies only to a being like man, composed of body and soul, and not to a pure spirit; so that from the first the fallen angels, with Satan at their head, were as deeply imbued with evil as ever they could be. But they were, like man, *creatures*, and, like man, created in righteousness ; does the difference of their nature preclude the supposition of a growth in obliquity similar to that which Scripture supposes, and experience proves, to end, in the case of man, in a state in which the unhappy subject exclaims : 'Evil, be thou my good ?' However this may be, the Satan of the New Testament is a different being from that of the Old ; though it is possible that not the nature, but the *revelation* of the nature has advanced *pari passu* with the revelation of Christ and His salvation.

There is no doubt a real difficulty in conceiving how a created being can embody in himself the abstract principle of evil, that is, be absolutely evil. As Augustine frequently reminds us, evil in a created nature is something rather privative than positive : the nature is in itself good, and never can be absolutely transformed into its opposite. Hence, when Satan is introduced on the scene by poets, when he appears as an actual creation, the impression conveyed is that of a vicious and mocking man, as in the Mephistopheles of Goethe ; an exaggerated Voltaire. The Satan of Milton is not without qualities which, in their way, command respect ; or at all events do not occasion loathing. It seems that if the abstract principle of evil were to become actually existent, it would not be easy to avoid the dualism of the Manichees. Relatively to his agents, viz. evil men, Satan may be considered as absolutely evil; but we cannot say that he is so relatively to God.

The other objections seem of less weight. The fall of a righteous being presupposes, it is argued, that he was already fallen, for how otherwise could sin gain an admittance ? The objection equally applies to man's fall ; and in both cases it may be replied, that the character did not produce the act, but the free volition in the wrong direction produced the character—according to the law that the first sinful act draws after it an endless series of consequences. How can we reconcile Satan's intellectual perspicacity with his continued resistance to God ? In the same way in which we reconcile, in the case of evil men, vast abilities with moral blindness and what Scripture calls folly. These men display wonderful sagacity in the pursuit of their own selfish ends ; but of wisdom, in the true sense of the word, a comprehensive view of what is best for themselves and others, they show themselves destitute. If Satan possessed such wisdom, he would undoubtedly abandon his active resistance, and prefer inactivity ; he would repent if repentance is possible to him. If he perseveres in his antagonism, it is simply because of his lack of true perspicacity. But a kingdom of evil spirits, it is urged, could not hold together ; unless, we reply, there exists a bond of union which for a time at least is powerful enough to suppress individual obliquity. But such a bond does exist, viz., a common enmity towards God and His people, and it is sufficient to produce union as long as the conflict goes on. History supplies many such instances of a temporary combination amongst men, who but for the sinister tie that unites them would exterminate each other, or attempt to do so. What the state of Satan's kingdom may become, when at the consummation of all things there will remain no place for his opposition to Christ, and therefore no object superior to the gratification of individual licence, is another question.

The sacred history, as has been observed, discloses at the coming of Christ a greatly increased activity of Satan and his angels ; as is particularly to be seen in the instances of demoniacal possession in the Gospels, of which the Old Testament furnishes few or no examples. Demoniacal possession is divided into spiritual and corporeal ; the former consisting in a moral obliquity so great and so universal as to suggest the idea of an actual indwelling of Satan in the soul. Thus Satan is said to have entered into Judas (John xiii. 27), and to dwell in the swept and garnished chambers (Luke xi. 26), But in the absence of more direct Scripture evidence, it is hardly safe to press such passages to a more definite meaning than that—not without their own consent—some men seem to be specially under the influence of the evil one, and special instruments of his designs. Bodily possession stands on firmer ground ; it seems to have the letter of Scripture in its favour, and to be clearly recognized not only by the Apostles, but by Christ Himself (Matt. x. 8 ; xii. 28), and by Christ when explaining the matter to the inner circle of His followers (*ibid.* xvii. 19–21). The cases in the Gospels have peculiar features : on the one side they are allied to the forms of ordinary disease (epilepsy, dumbness and deafness, madness, even bodily weakness) (Luke xiii. 11), and the beneficent action of Christ is described as a 'cure,' and 'healing' (Matt. xii. 22 ; Acts x. 38). On the other, they are ascribed to a supernatural origin, either to Satan, or more frequently to one or more of his subordinate angels (*δαιμόνια*) ; and the cure consists in these being 'cast out.'

Shall we say that they were really nothing but ordinary diseases, and that our Lord spoke in the language of the time without intending to endorse its accuracy ? The subject is too serious, too closely connected with religion, to warrant such a supposition ; and when we recollect the crimes which the perversion of the doctrine gave rise to in after ages, when it was believed that men and women could hold commerce with Satan for illicit purposes, it becomes impossible to believe that He to whom the future must have been known could have sanctioned an error so fruitful in evil consequences, if it had no foundation in fact. It is commonly held that the unhappy subjects of this possession brought the calamity on themselves by indulgence in sin, especially sins of the flesh ; this is possible, but the only instance of healing in which our Lord insinuates that the sufferer's sin had been the cause of his malady does not belong to this class (John v. 14). And in another instance He warns His disciples against hasty judgments of this kind (John ix. 3). The opinion, however, may find some support from 1 Cor. v. 5, in which the Apostle speaks of delivering certain offenders 'unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh' ; which seems something quite different from ordinary excommunication.

The demoniacs of the New Testament were sinners, no doubt, but rather objects of pity than specimens of matured impiety ; they were not possessed of Satan in the same sense in which Judas was, and therefore were not beyond the reach of the Saviour's healing power. They were fearful examples of the power of Satan, not only over the souls but the bodies of men ; but great caution is needed in every age of the Church, lest the revealed fact be confounded with semblances of it, which may belong to the sphere of nature ; as appears from some chapters of early Church history, and from the curious catalogues of the signs of possession to be found in some of the older theologians. We have reason to believe that since the coming of Christ this terrible malady has entirely or almost disappeared—at all events from within the pale of the Christian Church.[1]

35. *The Fall of Man*

Sin, according to Scripture, is no necessary factor in the education of the human race, for it came into the world through a hostile agency. How this happened is described in the third chapter of the Book of Genesis.

The narrative opens with the temptation of man, or, as perhaps it should rather be called, his trial. It is not necessary to enter at length into the questions that have been raised respecting its details. Whether they are to be understood literally, or, as even orthodox theologians have held, they are merely the symbolical clothing of a real fact, is of no more moment to the Christian than the issue of the geological speculations which have clustered round the account of creation. It is enough for us to learn that though there was something in unfallen man which rendered it possible for him to sin, this was roused into activity by an appeal from without ; nor does Scripture leave it doubtful from whom the solicitation proceeded. If the original narrative does not expressly say that it was Satan, this omission is supplied in the New Testament. Apoc. xii. 9 is express to the point. 2 Cor. xi. 3, compared with ver. 14 of the same chapter, makes it clear whom St. Paul understood by the serpent. By the majority of commentators our Lord's words in John viii. 44 are referred to the temptation of Adam. The tempter was a spirit already fallen, and the mystery of the origin of sin dates from a period anterior to the creation of man.

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[1] [Many missionaries would confirm that demon-possession is by no means an uncommon phenomenon amongst so-called primitive peoples ; and there are medical authorities who are not indisposed to attribute certain maladies and derangements found in the civilized but largely pagan society of our day to demonic influences. Editor.]

It seems to have been formerly a question of some interest, what the sinful affection was in our first parents which led to the actual transgression. Bellarmine, after Augustine, devotes two long chapters to prove that it was pride, in the prospect of becoming as gods, knowing good and evil ; the Protestant theologians (Calvin, Luther, etc.) prefer to think it was unbelief (of the Divine warning, 'In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt die') ; apparently because this supposition better corresponds to what may be called the opposite pole, the doctrine of justification by faith. The question is immaterial. The real source of the primal transgression must be sought deeper ; in the usurpation by the selfish principle of that place which supreme love to God was intended to, and did actually hitherto, occupy. Once the true centre of man's being was displaced, the whole periphery shifted itself ; and both pride and unbelief were only symptoms of the inner disorganization that had taken place. The senses became avenues of illicit desire ('when the woman saw that the tree was pleasant to the eye,' etc.) ; doubts of God's goodness entered the heart ; impatience to snatch an advantage which would doubtless have come in its due time prevailed ; and—the sin was consummated.

> 'Earth felt the wound ; and Nature from her seat
> Sighing, through all her works gave signs of woe,
> That all was lost——'

The consequences of the first transgression are described in the narrative with sufficient distinctness. Shame and fear took possession of breasts which had hitherto been strangers to these emotions. 'They knew that they were naked' ; they became conscious of the loss of the original righteousness in which they had been created, and conscious of the result, in the emancipation of sensual desire from the control of reason and of the will ; which led them to place a covering over bodily organs now no longer obedient to these higher faculties. The Divine beneficence, recognizing the propriety of the sentiment, exchanged the poor original contrivance for a more complete and enduring investiture. And with shame was conjoined fear ; fear of the gracious Being whose approach had hitherto been the harbinger of holy and happy fellowship: ' Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the Lord God amongst the trees of the garden.' In other words, the slumbering faculty of conscience, in this case accusing, awoke into energy ; that Divine faculty which assents to the law of God while protesting against the law of sin in the members (Rom. vii. 22, 23), and is the last to resign its authority, until finally stifled by continuance in sin. And so Adam came to the knowledge of good and evil by the bitter experience of an irreconcilable strife between the two in his inner man. And then followed the sentence. It has been subject of comment that there is no express allusion in it either to the corruption of our nature through the Fall, or to the eternal penalty of sin ; but as regards the former, our first parents were already conscious of it, and as regards the latter the poison and the antidote (Gen. iii. 15) are in such close juxtaposition that the latter already seems to efface the former by its superior efficacy. It is temporal penalties which appear on the surface ; on the woman the pains of childbearing, on the man incessant toil for his living, on both temporal death. The full meaning of this last penalty of sin was reserved for future revelations to disclose : here it is merely the dissolution of the body into its original dust that is specified.

The penalty was not inflicted at once ; and therefore the commination in ch. ii. 17 must be understood to mean an inevitable subjection to death. The frame of man, sharing in the disorganization of his superior part, began to cherish in itself the seeds of his dissolution, and, however in those early ages postponed, the event came at last to all. From this law of a sinful nature, which he inherits, even the believer in Christ is not exempt, unless he be one of those who shall be alive when Christ comes again : ' the body is dead ' (or subject to death) ' because of sin ' (Rom. viii. 10) ; but since, in his case, death in its other and deeper significations has no existence, the dissolution of the body is but the mode of transition to a higher condition of humanity than Adam, even had he stood, would have enjoyed.

Speculation, as might be expected, has been busy with the question why, if its fearful consequences were foreseen as they must have been, the fall of man was permitted ? If it was foreseen that he would fall, why was the tempter allowed to assail him ? or why was not strength given to resist the temptation ? But these difficulties equally apply to the earlier entrance of sin into creation ; and they have been met, as far as they can be, in a previous section (22). The origin of evil is inexplicable ; but considered as *sin*, Scripture is express that God neither willed it nor needed it for the manifestation of His glory, If He elicited good out of evil, that does not diminish the guilt of the evil. Prevent it by an exercise of Almighty power perhaps He could not, without annihilating the free-will with which it pleased Him to endow the reasonable creature. And there was such ' a facility of standing ' in our first parents, as compared with us, that the blame of the catastrophe must be laid exclusively at their door.

36. *Prevalence of Actual Sin*

The history of mankind, from the fall of Adam, is, as it is given in Scripture, emphatically the history of a sinful race. So prominent is this characteristic that it almost seems as if it was the main object of the writers to inculcate the lesson. Commencing with the fratricide of Cain, the antediluvian narrative terminates with such an excess of wickedness as could only be purged by the destruction, with a few exceptions, of the existing population of the world (Gen. vi). Restored under a covenant of temporal mercies (Gen. ix), mankind again commenced its downward career, and only the confusion of languages put a stop to a presumptuous attempt, like that of the Titans of profane mythology, to wrest the sceptre of supremacy from the Creator (Gen. xi). Idolatry began to prevail to such an extent that the first actual step towards the accomplishment of the primeval prophecy was to sever the progenitor of the chosen people from the associations of home and kindred with which he was surrounded (Gen. xii). Whole communities became notorious for hideous vices (Gen. xix). The passage of the Israelites to the land of Canaan was marked at every stage by transgression. The moral state of the peoples then occupying Canaan was such that a sentence of extirpation, never, however, fully carried out, was necessary to prevent, as far as might be, their contaminating the new settlers, far removed as the latter were from perfection. The history of the chosen people for centuries is a record of anarchy and crime, together with repeated lapses into the impure and idolatrous worship of the surrounding nations. The constant theme of the prophets is the sin of their own people. The sins which the prophets denounced were exchanged, in our Lord's time, for others less gross in appearance, but not less dangerous in their spiritual effect. The picture which St. Paul presents of the heathen world as it then existed is drawn in the darkest colours (Rom. i) ; and his statements are confirmed by contemporary evidence of profane authors. No topic is more frequent in classical poetry than the corruption of later ages as compared with the (supposed) pristine sanctity of manners. Ancient philosophers deplore the untractableness of the material on which they had to work. Such is the account of Scripture, and such the confession of heathendom, as regards the moral condition of humanity.

The same lesson is taught us in Scripture in a more indirect manner. Hardly one even of the eminent characters whose biographies it contains—Abraham, Jacob, Moses, David, Peter, etc.—but breaks down in some point or other; and although in a few instances, such as those of Joseph and Daniel, no failure is expressly mentioned, it can hardly be doubted that they came under the same law of imperfection. The Christian expiation for sin is declared to have been for the whole of mankind, who therefore must be supposed, without exception, to be implicated in transgression. The change from the natural to the Christian state is never represented otherwise than as a change from darkness to light, from the power of Satan unto God (Acts xxvi. 18) ; with the Christian old things have passed away, and all things have become new (2 Cor. v. 17) ; he has emerged from a state of death in (actual) trespasses and sins to one in which the spiritual life is predominant (Ephes. ii. 1–3). In short, the sombre background of the edifice of redemption is nothing short of this : ' There is none righteous, no, not one : there is none that understandeth, there is none that seeketh after God : they are all gone out of the way, they are together become unprofitable, there is none that doeth good, no not one ' (Rom. iii. 10–12).

Does experience confirm these statements ? or has the condition of humanity changed since the Scriptures were written ? The history of the world, ever since the introduction of Christianity, is its condemnation. No one sees Christian nations fully leavened with the influence of Christianity ; no one finds in modern heathenism other than a transcript of St. Paul's experience. What is more, no one of mature age *expects* of human nature more than the most moderate attainments of virtue : the child confides implicitly, the youth is more wary, the man of experience, in his dealings with others, fences himself round with every expedient of precaution. The Christian himself is the first to disclaim perfection, and to set it down to blind self-ignorance of Pharisaical pride if any one, even the holiest of men, should venture to say that he has no sin (1 John i. 8). Nor can this verdict be retracted in favour of the unconscious age of infancy. Relatively to us the babe is called innocent ; but this amounts merely to the negative assertion that we do not know what is passing in its mind, there being a physical incapability of such manifestation. The moment this incapacity begins to disappear the alleged innocence also disappears ; sinful passions make their appearance, which too clearly point to an ominous development should circumstances favour it ; the child, according to his faculties and opportunities, is a reproduction of what his parents are. But it is not necessary to dwell further on a fact which is not denied, however it may be explained away or extenuated. The Pantheist, while divesting sin of its proper character, and making it an essential factor in the constitution of the universe, does not contest its existence under the notion of a temporary discord in the great harmony into which he resolves it. The Pelagian still less denies the fact, and only differs from the Church as regards the source to which he traces it. What this source is forms the subject of the following section.

37. *Original Sin as the Root of Actual*

As every effect is supposed to have a cause, the actual sinfulness of man leads the mind beyond the outward phenomenon, and suggests the inquiry, ' Whence can it proceed ? ' The most elementary lessons of moral philosophy teach us that the essence of virtue or vice is to be sought, not in the mere act, but in what lies underneath it. If the tree is known by its fruits, the fruits also presuppose a tree. If it be replied, then, that it arises ' from the imitation of Adam ' (the Pelagian theory), several difficulties at once occur. How can it arise from the imitation of Adam in the case of those who never heard of Adam, or read the story of the Fall ; that is, the vast majority of mankind ? who yet, as we have seen, are in no way superior to those who possess this knowledge. If it be ascribed to the bad example of parents or of society, how did this bad example itself come into existence ? In the case of those who enjoy the light of revelation, and believe that sin marred the perfection of the universe before Adam was created, why should not the imitation ascend higher, until it reaches Satan himself ? Moreover, these latter possess another standard to frame themselves by, one of absolute sinlessness, and exhibited too in our nature ; why should not the imitation frame itself on this model as well as on that of Adam ? Why should it be uniformly of one character ?

If it be replied again that every man is endowed with free-will, and that it is of the essence of free-will to be able to choose, and that the first step determines the future path, this no doubt is in a certain sense true. To fix the moment when the first deliberate act of sin takes place may be impossible ; the child himself is probably never aware of it : but whenever it does occur, it is a momentous epoch in the moral history of the individual. The will has consented, and the moral state can never again be as if this act had not taken place. It may truly be said that in every depraved life a subordinate and relative fall of the man has preceded the formation of the habit. But if the will is really free, or in a state of equilibrium, how comes it that the choice is invariable ? Why does not the will assert its freedom, in some instances at least, so as to resist temptation, and commence a career of holy obedience, which might issue in complete confirmation in holiness ; as would have been the case with Adam had he stood ? If, further, it be urged, with Schleiermacher,[1] that the explanation lies in the fact that, by the very conditions of infancy, our sensual nature steals a march upon our spiritual, which advantage is always afterwards maintained ; we may ask how it is that when our spiritual nature comes to its maturity, it does not, as the stronger, assert its supremacy, and subjugate its weaker companion in turn ?

We are thus led to the conclusion that the actual sinfulness of mankind is but the visible symptom of a defect or depravation of nature, which is not any one sin, but the root of all sin ; a constant quantity to be taken account of amidst the varieties of outward transgression ; a preponderating inclination in one direction, impeding all effort in the other ; not belonging to the original nature of man, but another nature in the sense in which we call habit a second nature ; attaching itself to what is in itself good, but so interwoven with it as not to admit of perfect separation ; and this is that ' corruption of the nature of every man ' (Art. ix.) to which the Church has given the name of original sin.[2]

Such a depravation of nature is clearly recognized in Scripture. When it is said in Gen. viii. 21, that ' the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth,' it is implied that the existence of the evil is coeval with the existence of ' the heart ' ; *i.e.*, man's nature. David in Ps. li. 5 professes, not that his mother contracted sinfulness in the act of conception and birth (an idea, as J. Müller remarks, wholly foreign to Jewish ideas[3]), but that he himself from that moment of his conception was affected with sin. The new birth which our Lord pronounces necessary to entrance into the kingdom of heaven (John iii. 3) seems to involve far more than merely renunciation of actual sins. St. Paul alludes to a kind of sin which was latent in him, and was only roused into activity, so that he became conscious of it, by being confronted with an external command (Rom. vii. 8). To the same effect are his statements respecting the opposition between the ‘ flesh ’ and the ‘ Spirit ’ (Gal. v. 17 ; Rom. viii. 9) ; for by ‘ the flesh ’ is meant not the material part of man as distinguished from the immaterial, but human nature in its unregenerate state, ‘ the *phronema sarkos*, which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh, which is not subject to the law of God ’ (Art. ix). The children of Christian parents, apart from the privileges which, as having been born within the pale of the Church, they enjoy, are pronounced by St. Paul to be of themselves unclean (ἀκάθαρτα), nor is there any point of time specified at which this disqualification commences (1 Cor. vii. 14)[1]. Of himself and his fellow-converts from Judaism the same Apostle declares that, whatever advantages they may have enjoyed as Israelites (Rom. ix. 4), they were ‘ by nature children of wrath,’ equally with Gentile believers (Ephes. ii. 3) ; of which the plain meaning is that by nature, and before the outbreaks of actual sin, there was something in them which God could not look upon without displeasure.

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[1] *Glaubenslehre*, § 67.

[2] Original sin may bear a twofold sense ; either as distinguished from ' actual sins of men ' (Art. ii), or as connected with Adam's sin. In this part of the present section it is used in the former, in the latter part in the other sense. ' Dicitur originale (peccatum), et quidem non ratione originis mundi aut hominis, sed (1) quia ab Adamo, radice et principio generis humani derivatum ; (2) quia cum origine Adamigenarum conjunctum ; (3) quia origo et fons est peccatorum actualium ' (Hollaz, p. ii. c. 3, q. 12).

[3] *Lehre von der Sünde*, ii. 378.

The testimony of Scripture confirms the conclusion to which we are led on grounds of reason, that, underneath the variety of sins which meet the eye, there exists in all men a natural propensity to sin, which is sure to bear its fruit—to some extent even where its power is broken by the operation of Divine grace. It is impossible otherwise to explain the fact that in no recorded instance, save that of Him whose birth was supernatural, is a human life found to have been exempt from actual sin.

Another exception is indeed claimed by the Church of Rome—that of the Virgin Mary. The history of the doctrine of the immaculate conception is soon told. At an early period vague notions prevailed respecting the prerogatives of the mother of our Lord, whom no Christian, any more than Scripture itself, hesitates to call ‘ blessed among women ’ (Luke i. 42) ; and an impulse was given in this direction by the ecclesiastical sanction of the epithet θεοτόκος, (‘ mother of God ’) as against the Nestorians. But if the Virgin was ‘ the mother of God,’ can she be conceived of as affected with original sin ? If so, might not the taint be derived from the mother, as it would have been from an earthly father ? or, in other words, to ensure our Lord's perfect sinlessness, was it not necessary to maintain, in the case of the Virgin, an antecedent exemption from this taint ?

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[1] It is doubtful whether it is the children of Christian parents in general, or those of the mixed marriages specially mentioned in the passage, of whom the Apostle speaks. But either way, the argument stands. See Olshausen *in loc.*

The reasoning had an air of plausibility, and fell in with the general tendency of the age ; but it remained for a long time unsanctioned by the ecclesiastical authorities. When, about the year 1140, the canons of Lyons instituted a festival in honour of the immaculate conception, they drew upon themselves for this innovation the severe censure of Bernard of Clairvaux. The dogma gradually, however, gathered strength, and became important enough to divide the opinions of the two great orders of the Franciscans and Dominicans ; the former maintaining, the latter denying it. The Franciscans could appeal to Duns Scotus, the Dominicans to Thomas Aquinas, as favouring their views respectively. The question led to so much dissension in the Church that in 1477 Sixtus IV issued a Bull, in which he aimed at a compromise : he sanctioned the festival, and condemned those who called the doctrine heretical, but he forbore to pronounce an authoritative decision, and so far left the question open. The dissension, however, continued, and reached such a pitch that Leo X contemplated taking steps to have the matter finally settled when the troubles of the Reformation broke out, and united all parties in the Romish Church against the common foe. This state of things accounts for the hesitation of the Council of Trent, as described by Sarpi and Pallavicini, to promulgate any positive decree on the subject ; and indeed the Tridentine Fathers themselves were divided in opinion. The hesitation is reflected in the actual decisions of the Council. It is well known that the Pontificate of Pius IX distinguished itself by a final decision, and the Immaculate Conception is now an article of faith in the Church of Rome.

It need hardly be observed that the doctrine has no foundation in Scripture. The impression which the latter leaves on the mind is that Mary was not without actual infirmity (Luke ii. 48 ; John ii. 4), which is incompatible with the notion of her being free from original sin. St. Paul makes no exception in her favour when he declares that all, save ONE, have sinned (Rom. v. 12). Moreover, if her conception was immaculate, it seems that that of her parents must have been so too, and their parents in turn ; and so on till we arrive at Adam, which subverts the received doctrine of original sin altogether. It has been already seen that there is no necessity for the dogma in order to secure the perfect sinlessness of Christ. In the practical system of the Romish Church, however, it has an appropriate, it may be said, a necessary, place. In that system the intercession of Christ in His priestly office has given place to the intercession of the Virgin ; it is to her that the worshipper is really directed to secure the acceptance of his prayers ; it is through her intervention that spiritual blessings are expected. But the instinctive feeling of the heart is that whoever discharges this office—not typically, as the Jewish High Priest, but in reality and truth—must be without sin ; whoever appears before God for us, in the court of heaven, cannot need supplication for himself. This feeling Scripture satisfies by revealing its appropriate object : 'Such an High Priest became us who is holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners' (Heb. vii. 26) : when His functions are transferred to another, the latter naturally becomes invested with His prerogatives.

38. *Original Sin as the Transmission of Guilt—Pelagian Controversy*

But how does this inherent tendency in man's nature come into existence ? Why is it found in all men ? The explanation which Scripture gives, so far as it gives any, is that it is a transmitted evil, transmitted from father to son in the way of natural propagation ; Adam after, and in consequence of, his fall, being the first link in the chain, the head and source of the universal depravation. And so we affirm that 'it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam' (Art. ix).

The passages which add this element to our previous knowledge are not numerous ; but they are sufficiently plain. When Adam is said to have begotten a son in his own likeness and after his image (Gen. v. 3), the idea of the propagation from father to son is prominent ; and of what character the likeness propagated was we may infer from the circumstances that before Adam fell he had no son at all, and even from the form of expression ; not in the image of God (chap. i. 27), but in his own image he begat Seth. David traces his inherent sinfulness to his having been born of human parents (Ps. li. 5). But the principal passage is Rom. v. 12 : 'By one man sin entered into the world.' This can hardly mean merely that Adam was the first of human beings to sin, but rather that through him the noxious element found entrance into a world hitherto free from it ; and having thus entered, it affected all his posterity; the proof of which is that death, the penalty of sin, 'passed upon all men,' whether actual sinners or not. If the effect were produced simply by the imitation of Adam, it would apply only to actual sinners, since they alone are capable of such imitation ; and then death should have been confined to them. Since the fact is otherwise, as the case of infants proves, some other connection with Adam must be understood; and none other is conceivable but that of natural descent; which, in fact, embraces every individual of the human race, the infant of a day old as well as the adult. To the same effect are our Lord's words, John iii. 6: 'That which is born of the flesh is flesh'; that is, the unregenerate nature comes into being through natural birth. An indirect proof, but of a cogent character, is furnished by the miracle of the Incarnation: if Christ alone was to be without sin and yet born of woman, this could only be effected by interrupting the chain of propagation from an earthly father. More ought not to be extracted from these passages than they contain, but, on the other hand, not less. Taken by themselves they do not explain the precise nature of the taint transmitted; nor whether the soul, the proper subject of sin, is the vehicle of transmission, or the body alone; nor do they affirm that all men being in Adam were parties to his sin; nor that the guilt of it is imputed to mankind: but they do imply that we are what we are by reason of our natural descent from Adam, or, in other words, that the depravation of our nature is hereditary.

As soon, however, as Christian speculation directed itself to this subject it was confronted with great difficulties. Can the corrupt tendency which we inherit from Adam be called sin in any proper sense of the word? If guilt is to be connected with sin, it seems essential that it should be voluntary, the result of an act of the will; but here this element seems wanting. Without his own consent an individual is born into the world, and finds himself impeded in his ascent heavenwards by a natural infirmity; and he is told that this is in itself sinful, and 'deserving of God's wrath and condemnation' (Art. ix). Is it not rather a misfortune, like being born blind, or lame? and does it not rather palliate, than the reverse, the actual sin which necessarily follows from it; as congenital blindness or lameness is a valid excuse for omissions of duty which would be culpable if the organs or limbs were in a sound condition? And this indeed is the mystery of original sin.

The Eastern Church, to whose taste theological questions, in the strict sense of the word, were more congenial, aimed at little preciseness of language on this subject. The general tendency of its teaching was to extenuate the effects of the Fall, and to make man the arbiter of his own destiny; a partial truth, indeed, everywhere presupposed in Scripture, but when exclusively dwelt upon liable to lead to error. It is not surprising then to find expressions in many of the most distinguished Fathers of that Church, such as Gregory Nazianzen, Cyril of Jerusalem, Chrysostom, and even Athanasius himself, which bear a Pelagian aspect, though it would be unjust to ascribe to them any deliberate approval of Pelagianism as a system. Origen attentuated the whole doctrine of an inherited taint from Adam by his theory of the pre-existence of souls, which, according to him, were already sinful before they came into the world. John of Damascus, in his systematic treatise, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, avoids the subject altogether.

It was to the Western Church that Providence assigned the task of supplying this omission ; but even in it the doctrine only gradually assumed a definite shape. Tertullian, to whom we owe the phrase *vitium originis*, speaks of a ' corruption of nature ' which is ' another nature ' ; yet the well-known passage of this author, dissuading from infant baptism, contrasts strongly with Augustine's doctrine, one of whose principal arguments for original sin is founded upon this practice. On the whole, however, the great writers of the Latin Church deliver a clear testimony on the real deterioration of man's nature, and its connection with the Fall. Augustine, in his work against Julian the Pelagian, was able to produce a long series of eminent Fathers—Irenæus, Cyprian, Ambrose, Hilary—of whose meaning there could be no doubt, and by whom he was himself anticipated in many of his favourite arguments. Whether he was equally successful in proving Chrysostom and Gregory to be on his side may admit of doubt.

Things were in this state—the doctrine substantially held, but not yet reduced to form—when Pelagius, or Morgan, a native of Britain, and Cælestius, his disciple, about A.D. 404, put forth a series of propositions in which is contained the system known by the name of Pelagianism. According to Augustine they were as follows : that Adam was created mortal, and would have died whether he had fallen or not ; that the sin of Adam injured himself only, and not the human race ; that the Law is a means of salvation as well as the Gospel ; that before the coming of Christ there existed men without sin ; that newly-born infants are in the same state in which Adam was before his fall ; that neither through the death and sin of Adam does the race die, nor through the resurrection of Christ does it rise again. These opinions were condemned in several Councils (Carthage, Milevis, Ephesus) ; but no authoritative statements, such as those relating to the Godhead or the Person of Christ, were promulgated on the subject. But soon afterwards the controversy called Augustine into the field ; that mighty champion of Divine truth, whose influence is to this day felt throughout the Christian Church, and to whom the Reformed Churches in particular look back as their spiritual progenitor.

Pelagianism was rather a tendency than a distinct heresy, and in fact it did not issue in any formal schism. It is simply the Christianity of human nature, or that reconstruction of the Gospel scheme which approves itself to natural reason and superficial worldly observation; hence its constant reappearance in the Church, and its affinity with the Arminian and Unitarian systems. All that was mysterious and inexplicable in the actual state of man, and in the statements of Scripture respecting it, was eliminated: and nothing remained but what was trite, and met the eye, or what flattered the pride of the human heart. Of the propositions above stated, the second, fifth, and sixth were obviously directed against the Church-doctrine that in Adam mankind, in some sense, fell, and that infants are born with a corruption of nature which is the source of actual sin, and which renders them objects of God's displeasure. And from the remarks previously made it will be seen that these are precisely the features of the doctrine which are difficult to explain or defend.

The merits of Augustine as an opponent of these pernicious tenets —for pernicious they were, notwithstanding their apparent solicitude for the moral attributes of Deity—may be briefly summed up; he exposes, with admirable force, their contrariety to Scripture, but seems less successful in reconciling his own explanations with our natural notions of equity. He insists upon the texts cited in the foregoing section, and especially on 2 Cor. v. 14 (from which it is doubtful whether he could extract the meaning he wishes); but when the Pelagian asks him to explain how sin can be properly ascribed to those (infants) who neither could actually sin, nor will to sin, he is obliged to fall back either upon a mystery, or upon the explanation that the voluntariness of *Adam's* sin supplies the lack of that element in original sin; which is evidently in itself not a satisfactory explanation. The fact of an original deterioration of nature, not fully removed even in the regenerate, he rightly infers from Rom. vii. 14–25, but still fails to connect the idea of *guilt* with it. And his whole argument from the existence of 'concupiscence,' dominant in the natural, kept under but not extinct in the regenerate man, seems to labour under a defect. St. Paul affirms in that passage that sin was at one time 'dead' in him (verse 8), a mere latent potentiality, and this is properly original sin: the 'lust' or 'concupiscence' of which he proceeds to speak, and which he traces to the provocative operation of the law (verse 7), seems another thing, rather the effect of original sin than that sin itself. A slumbering concupiscence hardly conveys an intelligible meaning, any more than in philosophy a quiescent force.

Augustine argues, with truth, that what even the regenerate have to struggle against must be sinful: that it did not, and could not, exist in Paradise; with less discrimination perhaps, that the particular form of it which he has in view cannot now be disjoined from the commanded, and in itself holy, act of procreation ; in short, that ‘ it hath of itself the nature of sin ’ (Art. ix) ; but the question still remains, Is he not rather explaining a fruit of original sin than this very sin itself ? Does he carry his analysis back far enough so as to reach the dark, quiescent ground of which all forms of concupiscence are but manifestations, intermediate between it and the actual sin ? The great theologian, in fact, dwells almost exclusively on the positive aspect of original sin, whereas its real character is rather negative : it acts like a weight, or a drag, rather than like a stimulant ; the operation of which is not felt at all in the unregenerate state, because the whole man moves under its influence, but of which the man immediately becomes conscious, as St. Paul did, when the law of the Spirit of life frees him from its uncontested mastery. He becomes conscious of it as being ‘ sore let and hindered ’ in his upward aspirations, as clogged with a weight which impedes his free motions, and causes him to fall behind in the race (Heb. xii. 1) ; it is a pull downwards which, like gravity, acts steadily, even when conscious concupiscence may be absent. And in proportion as it is seen in this its true nature, it becomes difficult to connect with it the idea of voluntariness, which reason seems to make an essential element of sin. A defect which belongs to the *nature* as distinguished from individuals seems removed from the ground of personality and free choice : nature and necessity are convertible terms ; and it seems as if we can as little connect the idea of *guilt* with what belongs to the human race as such as we can deem a beast of prey culpable on account of the savage dispositions with which it came into the world.

It was obviously necessary, if the Pelagian was to be met effectively, that the doctrine of propagation should receive an extension of meaning, and mankind be brought into a still closer connection with the first man. And Scripture seems to warrant such an extension. For it not only declares, as we have seen, that by one man sin entered into the world, but further, that ‘ all men sinned ’ (in him, as the context seems to require) ; that the ‘ judgment was by one to condemnation ’ (of the whole) ; that ‘ by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners ’ ; that ‘ in Adam all die ’ (Rom. v. 12, 16, 19 ; 1 Cor. xv. 22). It seems implied in such passages as these not merely that sin entered the world through Adam, but that when Adam sinned all mankind, in some sense, sinned in him, and thus contracted guilt. In fact they contain the rudiments of the theory of the imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, with which Augustine’s name is especially associated, and which from him passed into the received teaching of the Western Church.

This theory he had already virtually enunciated when he attempted to secure the element of voluntariness in original sin by making Adam’s will the will of the race ; but, in the progress of the Pelagian controversy his language became more definite, and the theory more complete. Not that he was really the originator of it, for it is found in the writings of many of his predecessors, and he takes care to appeal to them in support of his own statements ; but in his hands it first received systematic treatment, and a pointed application to the existing heresy. This latter considered mankind as an aggregate of independent atoms, affecting each other only in the way of teaching or example ; not as an organized whole, propagating itself along with its fundamental characteristics. Each man comes on the stage of life free to stand or fall ; and though placed in a disadvantageous position from the prevalence of evil in the world, a fact which cannot be denied, not otherwise incapacitated from working out his salvation.

Such a doctrine is not only inconsistent with Scripture, but with the analogy of nature. No individual, at least in the case of civilized man, comes into the world otherwise than as a member of a community, which is distinguished from other communities by laws, customs, a national life, and a national temperament of its own ; in the weal or the woe of the community he necessarily bears a part ; its peculiarities are stamped upon him. Races, nations, thus propagate themselves, and maintain a corporate life while individuals come and go. No branch of a tree exists independently, or derives its nature from itself ; no tree is a mere collection of branches ; but an organized body, with a common nature or quality, which pervades the whole. The Augustinian theory is merely the same fact applied to the spiritual condition of mankind. We were all in Adam, Augustine says, as Levi was in the loins of his father Abraham (Heb. vii. 9), and we all sinned in Adam ; that is, his sin became, in some sense, ours, even as the righteousness of Christ is laid to the account of those who believe upon Him (Rom. v. 19). Not only Adam's sinful nature (the consequence of his fall), but Adam's guilt (*reatus*), is transmitted by natural propagation, or, as Augustine calls it ' contagion,' to his posterity. Mankind is viewed as a whole, of which Adam was both the physical head and the moral representative : if he had remained upright, the advantage would have redounded to the whole, and in like manner his fall was the fall of the whole. The actual transgression of Adam, Augustine argues, is indeed a bygone thing, but not its guilt, and the corruption of nature consequent upon it. A crime committed is past, but the effect of it may remain ; and though the crime could not have been committed without an exercise of will the effect may continue apart from, and even against, the will, as in the remorse which the criminal experiences. And indeed, it is true that a sin once committed may perpetuate itself in many ways long after the act has become a thing of the past ; as bodily diseases, the result of a parent's sin, and even corrupt moral dispositions, often, as observation proves, becomes hereditary, and exist in the descendants long after the original author has passed away.

But Augustine does not stop even here. In order effectually to connect the idea of guilt with original sin, he holds the latter to be in a real sense the penalty of sin, according to the principle, *Peccatum pœna peccati :* so that the newly-born infant not merely shares in Adam's guilt, but also in the punishment thereof ; which in Adam was the forfeiture of original righteousness, or original sin. In Adam the depravation of his nature was strictly a punishment, because he sinned voluntarily ; and in his posterity it bears the same character. The idea of imputation here reaches its climax : mankind is so identified with the first man that its spiritual condition is a positive and not merely a natural penalty of the fact of connection. When, however, Augustine attempts to establish this principle (*Peccatum pœna peccati*) from Scripture, he is compelled to confine himself to cases of actual sin, in which no doubt it holds good. He refers to the Apostle's statement that because the Gentiles worshipped idols, therefore God gave them up to uncleanness (Rom. i. 24) ; and so the latter was both a sin itself, and also the punishment for a previous sin. Saul, he observes, was both unrighteous himself, and also a token of God's displeasure against Israel (' I gave thee a king in my anger,' Hos. xiii. 11). Pharaoh's hardness of heart was the punishment of his previous impiety. And indeed, in the case of an adult, in whom original and actual sin are so intermingled that separation is impossible, the former may be conceived of as imbibing a quality which really belongs to the latter. Original sin, however, should never be considered apart from the case of infants, in whom its specific nature is primarily to be sought for ; and to affirm that infants, as vicarious criminals, inherit it as a punishment not for their own but for Adam's sin, was needlessly to complicate the question, and to put more into the statements of Scripture on the subject than they warrant.

The use which Augustine makes of the practice of infant baptism to establish his conclusions is well known. And as against the Pelagians it was an effective *argumentum ad hominem.* For they too approved of infant baptism ; and the argument was difficult to meet, Why do you baptize infants ? Since they have no actual sin, it can only be for the remission of original. The Pelagian replied that it was necessary to secure for them the highest measure of bliss, the vision of God ; but he failed to dislodge his adversary from his position. As a general argument, however, it will hardly bear the stress placed upon it. The point was to prove that in a newly-born infant there is something which may be called sin ; the reasoning was not valid that because the Church on however good general grounds, adopted a modification of the original ordinance of baptism, this proved the fact, or explained the mystery ; at best it was but a proof of the Church's belief on the subject. And this will appear plainer from the circumstance that Augustine argues from the accompaniments of infant baptism, common in that age but abandoned in our Church, as strongly as he does from the ordinance itself. What means, he asks the Pelagian, the 'exsufflation,' the 'exorcism,' which we perform over infants at their baptism, if not that they are thereby delivered from the power of darkness ? To what extent infant baptism, and much more exsufflation and exorcism, can produce certain warranty of Scripture for their use, and still more for their alleged effects, so as to bear the weight laid upon them in this controversy, is a question which does not seem to have occurred to him.

It was not to be expected that Augustine's opponents would fail to charge him with Manicheism, probably with an oblique allusion to his early aberrations. If man is introduced into the world with sin, whence, asked the Pelagian, can that sin have proceeded ? Not from God, for He cannot be the author of sin ; not from baptized and regenerate parents, for how can an unclean thing come from a holy ? it remains that it must spring from a source independent of God, an evil principle co-eternal with God. But the answer was at hand. It rests upon the principle to which Augustine, as we have seen (§ 22), attaches so much importance, that evil has no independent existence, and is always found cleaving to something good, as the shadow to the substance. Every nature, and therefore man's nature, considered merely as such, comes from God, and is good ; but to a nature good in itself evil may become attached, as in the case of Satan, and of Adam in paradise. The faculty of will is a gift of God, and therefore good ; but it may become as in Satan and the unregenerate, an evil will, and bring forth corresponding fruits. In like manner, wedlock is a Divine institution and in itself holy ; but the procreation of children affected with an original taint is an evil, which in consequence of Adam's fall, has become connected with it : the parents transmit this evil, but they cannot transmit the gift of grace by which they themselves are regenerate, for such gift is not transmissible. If the Pelagian argument was valid, and evil can only spring from evil as an independent substance then children born in adultery must, by reason of their evil origin, be themselves evil ; whereas the Pelagian himself exempts them, no less than children born in holy wedlock, from original sin. Augustine triumphantly retorts the objection on his opponent, and proves that the latter rather than he himself is a promoter of Manicheism. Evil exists ; if it cannot attach itself to what is good so far as that good is a creature of God, it must spring from evil, evil which exists as an independent nature ; which is exactly what the Manichean wishes to see admitted.

This may be the appropriate place to notice Augustine's judgment respecting infants who die in infancy. Since they bear the guilt of Adam's sin, and also derive from Adam an inherent corruption of nature, these disqualifications for the kingdom of heaven must be removed ; and they can only be removed by baptism. Baptized infants then dying in infancy are certainly saved, but if they die unbaptized, it goes hard with them. Admitted into the kingdom of heaven they cannot be ; the most we can hope for is that their punishment will be comparatively light. Such was the force of theory on a subject on which it is impossible to frame a theory ; for Scripture is comparatively silent on the case of infants ; how far the work of Christ affects them ; what their regeneration is, if the word may be applied to them, and by what means it is effected ; whether they will rise from the dead as infants, and other like questions which may be raised. The humanity of later ages allowed natural feeling to prevail over theory, and piously believed all infants who died in infancy, whether baptized or not, to be safe in the bosom of their Father and their God. It is to be noted, too, that though the Traducianist hypothesis evidently falls in better with his views, Augustine refrains from making use of it, deterred probably by the difficulties on either side of the question ; on the one (Traducianism), of conceiving how an immaterial substance can be propagated, on the other (Creationism), of conceiving how God could create a soul pure, and then consign it to a defiled receptacle, sure to impart a taint to it.

Pelagianism, vanquished in argument, held its ground as a tendency, and the hierarchical spirit of the middle ages, as in later times, instinctively leant towards it in preference to the Augustinian system. It was rather, however, as regards the nature of original sin and its extent that Augustine's teaching was departed from, than on the point of imputation ; which continued, with some modifications, to be the received doctrine. Anselm professes himself unable to understand how the sin of Adam can be so propagated as to render infants as liable to punishment for it as if they had committed it themselves. His own theory is as follows : Adam sinned, in one point of view, as a person, in another as man (*i.e.*, as human nature which at that time existed in him alone) ; but since Adam and humanity could not be separated, the sin of the person necessarily affected the nature. This nature is what Adam transmitted to his posterity, and transmitted it such as his sin had made it ; burdened with a debt which it could not pay, robbed of the righteousness, with which God had originally invested it ; and in every one of his descendants this impaired nature makes *the persons sinners.* Yet not in the same degree sinners as Adam was, for the latter sinned both as human nature, and as a person, while infants (newly born) sin only so far as they possess the nature ; in confirmation of which view he cites, according to his interpretation of it, Rom. v. 14 (' them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression '). The fiction of infants having the actual eating of the apple imputed to them (for Adam's human nature as distinguished from himself did not eat it) is thus avoided, and it is their own mutilated or depraved nature that shuts them out from the kingdom of heaven. The point on which he is not quite distinct is whether the defective nature in itself makes them sinners, or only because it necessarily (if they live) leads to actual sin. But probably the former is his meaning.

The works of this great theologian on this as on other points exercised a vast influence on his successors. Accordingly his view is substantially reproduced by Thomas Aquinas. ' All men,' he says, ' who are born of Adam may be considered as one man, so far forth as the nature which they inherit from their first parent is one : as in civil matters all the men who belong to a community are considered as one body, and the whole community as one man. So the many men derived from Adam are, as it were, members of one body. In the human body a crime which the hand perpetrates is not ascribed to the hand alone, but to the man of whom the hand is but a single member. Original sin, in like manner, is not the sin of this or that person, except so far forth as he inherits a nature from Adam, and therefore it is called a sin of nature, as *e.g.* in Ephes. ii. 3 (" We were by nature children of wrath ").' The bold realism by which the *nature* of man abstracted from the person is made both by Anselm and Thomas susceptible of guilt is apparent ; but so is the sagacity by which the weak point of the Augustinian theory is evaded, or concealed.

The Protestant Confessions, with one exception, content themselves with simply tracing the depravation of human nature to Adam's fall, and dwell principally on the nature and extent of that depravation ; as might be expected, for this latter was the real point of debate between the Reformers and their opponents. Our own Article (ix) is an example of this reserve. We learn from Sarpi that at the Council of Trent lively disputes arose on the question ; and particularly that Ambrose Catharinus delivered a long address in which he stated his objections to the decisions about to be promulgated, and propounded a theory of his own. Concupiscence and the privation of original righteousness, he contended, were in Adam rather the consequences of original sin than that sin itself ; and that only which was sin in Adam can be sin in us. How, then, do we derive sin from Adam ? A federal compact had been entered into between him as the head of the human race and God, by which his obedience was to be the obedience, and his transgression the transgression, of the whole ; and when he fell the whole consequently became involved in guilt. Original sin, therefore, consists merely in imputation. But this solution obviously fails : for the question at once occurs, Was Adam commissioned by his posterity to enter into this contract ? Was their consent previously obtained to it ? If not, it is difficult to see how the breach of it should involve them in guilt. Nevertheless, Catharinus's theory only represents the general tendency of Romanism, which is to limit the corruption of our nature as much as possible to a mere imputation. Yet the assembled Fathers hesitated to endorse it, Scripture and the main current of ecclesiastical tradition being in their way. The decree, as finally settled, admitted that original sin is not only such by imputation, but is something inherent, a *fomes*, or material, from which actual sin proceeds. And this appears to be the received doctrine of the Romish theologians.

What then, on the whole, is the result of these controversial discussions ? Pretty much, it must be confessed, to leave the matter where Scripture leaves it ; a mystery, which, though it may not be denied or concealed, remains such in spite of all attempts to explain it. The doctrine of imputation, in some sense, appears to be taught in Scripture ; and even they who contend against it as supposed to be commonly held are obliged to invent a substitute of their own. Thus Jeremy Taylor, who in his treatise on this subject perilously approaches the Tridentine teaching, after setting forth strongly the difficulties in the way of supposing that infants (dying in infancy) are condemned to perdition for a sin which they did not consent to, devotes a chapter to prove that ' Adam's sin is in us no more than an imputed sin.'[1] In what sense ? ' His sin is reckoned to us so as to bring evil upon us, because we were born of him, and consequently put into the same natural state where he was left after his sin.' But this is no imputation at all, but, as Taylor remarks, a law of God's natural government, viz., that children often suffer for the faults of their parents, while no one would think of calling them guilty of those faults. The children of a spendthrift father do not enjoy the temporal advantages they otherwise might have done ; this is to them a misfortune ; but can their father's sin be said, in any proper sense, to be imputed to them ? Not unless some further and deeper connection is established between them and their father, which is the very thing which Scripture does seem to establish between Adam and mankind. In short, are not imputation and guilt correlative terms ? The difficulty does not seem removed by Taylor's modification of the doctrine ; perhaps it is irremovable by any such expedient.

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[1] *Further Explic.* § 2.

Anselm is a safer guide ; and if his theory is accepted it may serve to explain, not indeed the mystery, but such statements on the subject as that of Art. ix, that what is in every infant by reason of his descent from Adam is 'deserving of God's wrath and damnation.' Is it not, in fact, the nature and not the person that is regarded in all such statements ? Sin may be considered abstractedly from the person in whom it resides : in its own nature it is ἁμαρτία, or a missing of the mark, and ἀνομία, or contrariety to the Divine law. In whomsoever, therefore, it is found, even as a latent potentiality, it must *in itself* be an object of God's displeasure ; but it does not follow that the person must be so, still less that the sentence on sin will in such a case be actually inflicted. The *fomes*, or tendency, which if the infant lives will assuredly give birth to actual sin, cannot in God's sight be a thing indifferent ; but as it is only an objective guiltiness (to which the will has not consented, because the subject is incapable of will), it may be covered from God's sight by an objective atonement (not appropriated by an act of will) ; so that the infant himself, if he dies as an infant, is not, and never has been an object of God's wrath. But when the personality, as in adults, becomes developed, the case is different. The inherited taint inevitably produces its fruits ; in the language of Anselm, the nature corrupts the person ; it is no longer possible to distinguish between original and actual sin ; '*Non inviti*,' says Augustine, '*tales sumus*' ; and the whole man is guilty. By the work of regeneration this acquiescence of the fettered will is broken up, and the man becomes conscious of the law of sin in his members (Rom. vii. 23), and successfully resists it ; it still remains, however, as a perpetual drag upon him, and will do so until redemption is complete. His consciousness of this tendency is not merely that of misfortune but of culpability, and he himself assents to the verdict of Scripture that even before original sin could issue in actual it was, in itself, properly sin (Rom. vii. 7–11). And yet it may fairly be maintained that in no case does original sin, considered in and by itself, carry with it the penalty of eternal condemnation.

That all difficulties thus disappear would be too much to affirm ; and it is not surprising to find a theologian like J. Müller, dissatisfied with the traditionary explanations, resorting to others of his own. It may be doubted, however, whether the one he has chosen will find general acceptance. He can account for the combination of a natural, and therefore so far necessary, evil tendency in man with the sense of guilt on account of it—both of them facts which Scripture and experience establish—only on the hypothesis of a voluntary fall of souls before they came into their present state of existence.[1] Such a fall, he contends, and the faint recollection of it as a voluntary one—according to the Platonic notion that all knowledge is recollection—are sufficient to account for the facts. The speculation is ingenious; but as Scripture is silent on any such pre-existent fall, it is but a speculation. It is better to confess our inability to explain or reconcile things which we are obliged to admit than to indulge in theories which merely float in the air.

39. *Original Sin as the Corruption of Nature—Pelagian Controversy*

The *extent* of the depravation of man's nature through the Fall is a different question from that respecting the mode of its transmission or the guiltiness attaching to it ; and it was the one which occupied by far the larger space in the controversy on the subject between the Reformers and their opponents. It has been already observed that the tendency of the Eastern Church was to take a mild view of man's present condition ; and even Augustine, in controversy with the Pelagians, insisted rather upon the fact of original sin than upon the degree in which it affects our nature. The Pelagians held, as we have seen, that newly-born infants are in the same state in which Adam was before his fall, and that by the Law salvation may be obtained as well as by the Gospel ; in other words, that there is no real depravation of nature in man as he is. Augustine could not prove the existence of original sin without at the same time impugning these tenets ; but his line of argument did not lead him to make them a subject of special examination ; and whether as a consequence of this, or from the prevailing tendency of the Christianity of the middle ages, they survived, in a modified form, their author ; and one of the first tasks of Luther and his coadjutors was to rescue the truth on this point from the Pelagian glosses of the schoolmen, and to bring the doctrine of the Church into harmony with Scripture and experience.

It became an admitted doctrine of the schools, contrary to that of Augustine, that the original righteousness of Adam in Paradise consisted in certain supernatural gifts of grace, which were added to his essential nature, and which might be withdrawn, leaving that nature in no worse a position than it was when created. This doctrine appears in its least objectionable form in Thomas Aquinas, who so closely connects the superadded gift with the creation of man, that they can only be separated in idea, and thus secures to himself the power of making original sin something more than a mere imputation. But Duns Scotus, his rival, adopted it without reserve ; in which, indeed, he could plead the authority of Anselm, who reduces the notion of original sin to a mere privative one.

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[1] *Lehre der Sünde*, ii. c. 4.

The question came under discussion at the Council of Trent ; and the Dominicans and Franciscans, as was usually the case, took opposite sides. The former relied on Thomas, the latter on Anselm ; and the decree ultimately agreed upon seems of the nature of a compromise between the two. Original sin is declared to have passed, in some sense, from Adam to his posterity ; but it is also declared to be not merely forgiven but eradicated in and by baptism, and that the ‘ concupiscence,’ which is admitted to remain in the baptised, is not properly sin, but is called so because it proceeds from, and leads to, sin.

What is it then in the unbaptized ? The Council is prudently silent on this point ; for it is evident that a thing which is not sin in the baptized, and yet is common to them and the unbaptized, cannot be sin even in the latter ; which, in truth, is the doctrine of Bellarmine, who does not scruple to affirm that ‘ the state of man after the Fall differs from that of Adam *in puris naturalibus* (*i.e.* as created) only as deprivation differs from nakedness ; and that human nature is no worse, if original guilt be put out of view, nor does it labour under greater ignorance and infirmity, than when first created, and before the addition of the supernatural gift.’ The utmost that can be allowed is that it suffers from a certain ‘ languor,’ or debility, which, however, does not interfere with its power of meriting a bestowal of grace (grace of congruity).

This was the doctrine, with its consequences in the practical system of the Church, which the Reformers found commonly accepted, and which led to the strong counter-statements which we find in the Protestant Confessions. Man, as in the Pelagian system, became practically his own Saviour ; the statements of Scripture respecting the radical nature of the disease were set aside, or explained away ; superficial distinctions were drawn between venial and mortal sin, while the deep root of all sin lay undisturbed ; and as a consequence, the necessity of the atoning work of Christ was proportionably impaired, or its application made dependent on the interposition of the Church in her sacramental ordinances. For it is evident that if man can save himself, the work of the Christ assumes a casual character ; *i.e.* it may be necessary to one and not to another ; it is not necessary to the race.

The Confession of Augsburg declares that ‘ since the Fall, all men are born with sin, that is, without the fear of God, without trust in God, and with concupiscence ; and that this defect is truly sin, and issues in eternal death in the case of those who are not regenerated by baptism and the Holy Spirit.’ The Papal confutation replied that to be without fear and trust in God is a description that applies only to actual sin; which drew from Melanchthon the further explanation that it is the innate power to love God, and not merely the act, which is denied to the natural man ; and that concupiscence forms part of the definition because when man is unable to rise to communion with God, he necessarily concentrates his affections on lower objects, himself and the world.

Since original righteousness was natural to man and not an additional gift of grace, to be deprived of it necessarily involved a change, which the word ‘ corruption ’ was chosen to describe. This word properly means not annihilation but alteration ; a deterioration of the form in which a nature reaches it ideal. In the present case it means that though the substance of man remains the same, his nature, through the Fall, has lost its original form, and become, in fact, another nature. And the property of this other nature is to be ignorant of God, to be averted from Him, to place self on the throne which God ought to occupy, to act, when it becomes active, in opposition to His holy law ; in short, to be in itself sinful, which is what the doctrine of Rome persistently denies.

And it is evident from what has already been remarked (§ 37) that nothing short of this view of man's unregenerate state satisfies the statements of Scripture respecting it. The natural and the spiritual man ; the flesh and the Spirit ; the first Adam and his seed and the second Adam and his seed ; are contrasts which pervade the whole teaching of St. Paul, and to express which the ideals of ‘ debility ’ or partial deterioration, are inadequate. The nature of man itself needs to be re-formed, its corruption to be reversed ; which is what Scripture means by the new birth, or the new creation. And thus are to be understood the strong expressions which occur in some of the Protestant Confessions. ‘ Even if man,’ says the Lutheran *Formula Concordiæ*, ‘ should never think, speak, or do anything wrong, nevertheless his nature and person are sinful ; that is, infected, tainted, and totally corrupt before God, with original sin, which, like a spiritual leprosy, lurks in the deepest recesses of the heart.’ They represent the reaction from that type of doctrine which would make original sin to consist merely in the imputation of Adam's transgression, or in the deprivation of a superadded righteousness (*carentia justitiæ originalis*). And no doubt the pendulum in its swing may have gone somewhat too far in the opposite direction.

They are certainly not to be understood, as Möhler would understand them, viz., as implying either that human nature has lost one of its essential faculties, the capability of knowing God, a positive quality of evil taking its place ; or that original sin has become of the essence of human nature. The word ' faculty ' may be used in a twofold sense, to signify either capacity or power ; the brute has no capacity for religion, man in his worst estate has ; but the capacity may be in abeyance. Fallen man is still a reasonable creature, possesses conscience, retains, in some sense, the image of God (§ 30) ; nothing essential to human nature has been lost by the Fall. What is wanting is the proper direction of his faculties ; and every one of them suffers from this perversion.

Like the word ' faculty,' the word ' integrity ' admits of a double sense ; it may mean either that the sum-total of the parts is complete, or that each of the parts is in its normal condition. It is the latter sense, not the former, that the Protestant doctrine of original sin denies the integrity of human nature. And thus is to be understood the *quam longissime* of our Art ix. Man is gone from original righteousness as far as he possibly can consistently with his remaining, in all essential points, man. The spiritual leprosy has infected all his faculties, but destroyed none ; sin is an inseparable accident, but still an accident, of his nature.

The Protestant Churches had occasion to insist upon this, for, in truth, some of their teachers had spoken incautiously on the subject. Flacius, about A.D. 1560, had maintained against Strigel and others that original sin has become of the substance of man, and in his *Clavis Scripturæ*, a work otherwise of great merit, he openly defended this proposition. The question had been long ago fully discussed by Augustine, and determined as only it can be, that all evil, even in the devil, presupposes an originally good nature of which it is the depravation ; that it is a fault (*vitium*) not an essence, an accident not a substance ; and that fallen man is still, as regards the essential constituents of human nature, what he was when created. If sin has actually become the substance of man, how can man expect a future state of bliss wherein sin shall no longer exist ; that is, wherein he shall exist deprived of a part of his essence ? From such a doctrine the Lutheran Church took care to dissociate itself. ' Although,' says the *Formula Concordiæ*, ' in our present state we cannot visibly separate between our nature in itself and original sin in itself, yet the nature or substance of fallen man, the man himself in whom original sin dwells, and this sin, are not one and the same thing ; just as in a leper the man and his leprosy are distinct things. A distinction must be observed between our nature, as it is created and preserved by God, and the original sin which is an accident of it.' It remarks, very justly, that the opposite opinion interferes with the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation; for if sin is of the essence of our nature, Christ either did not assume that nature, inasmuch as He had no sin, or if He did He must have had sin ; either alternative leading to error. But while this error is repudiated, all the Protestant Churches maintain, as against Rome, that original sin—the *fomes* as the Council of Trent calls it—is not merely privative in its nature, but positively evil ; issuing, unless regenerating grace destroys its dominion, in an alienation from God which is not the less real even where it does not exhibit itself in open violations of the Divine law.

This may be an appropriate place to consider what is the full import of the sentence pronounced upon Adam in Gen. iii. It has already been observed (§ 35) that, on the surface, the narrative seems only to speak of the death of the body (including the temporal inflictions which culminate in it) ; but this is far from exhausting the meaning of the word 'death,' as it is applied in the later Scriptures. In the Old Testament it signifies very commonly Sheol, or the place of departed spirits, which even to the pious Hebrew conveyed the idea of desolateness and inactivity ; a shadowy existence, not unlike that which Homer assigns to his heroes after their departure from this life (Ps. vi. 5 ; Isa. xxxviii. 18). In the New Testament it is used in a spiritual sense, to denote the state of the unregenerate man ; as when the Apostle reminds the Ephesians and Colossians that they were once dead in sins (Ephes. ii. 1 ; Col. ii. 13) ; or, in the parable, the returning prodigal is represented as having been, in his unrepentant state, dead (Luke xv. 24). And this meaning is to be distinguished from that which the word bears in several passages of the Apocalypse ; in which 'the second death' closes this dispensation, in the final condemnation of the wicked.

Now what is the idea which the expression 'spiritual death' suggests ? Not merely that this state is the consequence, or punishment, of sin ; but that in itself it is a state loathsome, and without power of self-recovery. Sin is the death of the soul, and so it must have been in Adam's case, but for the regenerating grace which the Church piously believes to have been immediately vouchsafed to our first parents. And what was the result of sin in him we must suppose is transmitted to those 'naturally engendered of his offspring'; so that they too, antecedently to the new birth, are dead in sin. What description could have been chosen more calculated to convey to us the fearful depravation of nature and the spiritual helplessness of the natural man, consequent on Adam's sin? The nature is not merely 'wounded' or debilitated, but in such a condition that it naturally engenders corruption; and it must remain in this condition, separated from the source of spiritual life as in natural death the soul is separated from the body, unless the quickening word of Divine power approaches, and the dead hear the voice of the Son of God, and hearing live (John v. 25).

Yet this language of Scripture must not be pressed to its (apparently) logical conclusions, without taking into account other statements which modify, or perhaps it would be more correct to say restrict, its sphere. If unregenerate man is dead in sins, it may be argued, he must be supposed incapable of moral virtue, of either approving it in others, or striving after it himself; but to maintain this seems inconsistent with the facts of history, and the common judgment of mankind. Whence sprang the heroic deeds and sentiments of an Aristides, a Camillus, or a Scipio? whence the moral judgments and efforts of philosophers like Plato, or of practical reformers like Socrates? Whence, in short, the natural tendency of man to coalesce into communities which can only subsist as long as outward crime is restrained, and which, according to the ancient conception of a state, ought to be schools of virtue? These facts seem to prove not only that sin has not become of the essence of man, but that the corruption of his nature is by no means total.

Of the difficulty connected with the state of the virtuous heathen, a twofold explanation may be given. One is, that their good qualities, or the comparative absence of bad ones, did, in fact, proceed from an operation of Divine grace, but not saving grace; grace sufficient to restrain the outbreaks of sin, and to foster the moral virtues necessary to man's temporal well-being. Every good and perfect gift, we are told, natural therefore as well as spiritual, comes from above (James i. 17); and there is a divine light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world (John i. 9). Or it may be said that these virtues are the remains (*reliquiæ*) of the Divine image impressed upon Adam and not quite obliterated by the Fall; by reason of which man still has natural perceptions of right and wrong, and approves of what is right, though he may fail to practise it (*video meliora*, etc.). Practically they come to the same thing, viz., that there is a sphere of moral action and even sentiment which belongs even to fallen man, and in which he can display qualities which, in themselves, are deserving of admiration.

This sphere is described in the Protestant Confessions as that of *res civiles*, or *justitia civilis* ; that is, though of Divine appointment, and so far good, it is of the earth earthy, and is different in *kind* from the spiritual. The State, no less than the Church, is an ordinance of God (Rom. xiii) ; and by repressing crime, and giving scope to the moral virtues and affections, of which the heathen proved themselves not destitute, it was, and is, in a real sense, though not in the same sense as the Mosaic law, a schoolmaster to lead to higher things. There was a dispensation of heathendom as well as of revealed religion ; and God never wholly severed the connection between Himself and man. And the difference between a Camillus and a Catiline was, in this lower sphere, immense. But none of these virtuous faculties, or instincts, or achievements, could, or did, raise man to the higher element of the spiritual life, love to God and true holiness. They were all vitiated in this point of view by self-love, or the desire of human approbation ; they were not, in the specific sense of the words, the fruit of the Holy Spirit ; they were *splendida vitia*, as they have been not inaptly termed. The tree, Augustine says, bears corresponding fruits : a corrupt tree (the unregenerate heart) may indeed produce the wild fruit of morality, but not the divine fruit of grace. The natural man possesses the *capacity* of knowing God—otherwise he would be incapable of redemption—and therefore moral faculties and instincts ; and one natural man may be superior to another in moral perception and practice : but none of these things affects the whole condition of the natural man as such in reference to God ; which, until regenerating grace transforms it, remains so far totally corrupt.

Scripture by no means ignores the differences that exist on the lower level of moral disposition : of some of the Pharisees and Scribes Christ says that they would neither enter the kingdom of heaven themselves nor permit others to do so (Matt. xxiii. 13), and of another Scribe that he was not far from the kingdom of God (Mark xii. 34) ; yet all were equally outside the kingdom. In short, the natural moral faculties are active only in reference to the things of this world ; they are dead in reference to the life of God in Christ. It is in a sense thus restricted that the statements of Scripture, and of the Protestant Confessions, on this point are to be taken ; but in this restricted sense they only affirm what experience amply proves.

So deeply has original sin struck its roots in human nature that it continues to exist, and in its proper quality, even in the regenerate (Art. ix). This is one of the principal points of difference between the Romish and the Protestant doctrine on this topic. The Council of Trent, as we have seen, declares that original sin is not merely forgiven, but extirpated in baptism ; so that what remains in the baptized has not the nature of sin. The ' concupiscence ' which, it is admitted, does remain is nothing but what Adam was affected with before the Fall, when it was restrained by the bridle of superadded grace ; this restraining power is now replaced by the grace of baptism, and concupiscence is either brought under a necessary law of nature, or it is reduced to a mere deterioration of nature[1] ; nay, it may assume a salutary character as supplying material for the exercise of virtue. How then does it come from sin ? as the Council asserts. It is not easy to see. What Adam, still upright, possessed, if transmitted by natural propagation, can hardly be transmitted sin ; nor can it well be regarded as the punishment of Adam's sin when it belongs to the constitution of human nature, and existed before actual sin. Nor is it less difficult to see why it should lead to sin, as the Council also admits. Let it be granted that as in Adam so in us it supplies the *fomes*, or material, out of which, in the absence of restraining grace, sin may spring ; still as in Adam it was kept in check by such grace, so it is in us by the restored gift in baptism. Such are the difficulties in which the Council involved itself in its attempts to transfer the seat of sin from the affections to the outward manifestation, and yet to avoid coming into open collision with Scripture and Christian feeling.

The Protestant Confessions, our own among the number, hold not only that concupiscence remains in the regenerate, but that in them not less than in the unregenerate it has the nature of sin. In the unregenerate it is not removed either as regards its guilt or its dominion; and such a state is nothing but what Scripture describes under the terms, ' the carnal mind,' ' the flesh,' the ' old man,' the ' natural man.' In the regenerate the guilt is wholly removed through the merits of Christ, and the dominion broken, but the evil still remains, though no longer as the ruling principle ; the conflict between the flesh and the Spirit is experienced even by the Christian, and draws forth from him the daily prayer for forgiveness (Matt. vi. 12) ; the fallen nature is in process of being healed, but the complete cure is not to be expected in this life.

It was the great merit of Augustine to have established this truth, against the Pelagians of his day, on irrefragable evidence of Scripture ; and of the Reformation to have recovered it primarily from Scripture, but also from the writings of the great Father, against the Pelagian tendencies of the schoolmen. There is indeed some little ambiguity in Augustine's language on the subject, and it may seem doubtful in sundry passages whether he considers concupiscence merely as a penalty of Adam's sin (*malum pœnæ*), or as sinful in itself (*malum culpæ*) ; but on the whole his meaning, as the subject unfolds itself to him, becomes clear. 'The concupiscence of the flesh,' he says, 'against which the good Spirit strives' (therefore in the regenerate), 'is sin, because it involves rebellion against the law of the mind ; it is also the punishment of sin, because it was the fruit of one man's disobedience ; and it is the cause of sin, in case it meets with no resistance.'[1] Still more distinctly, referring to his statement that though the guilt of concupiscence is remitted in baptism the thing itself remains,[2] 'You seem,' he says, 'to suppose me to have meant that the nature of concupiscence is in the baptized so changed that it is no longer culpable (*soluto reatu quo ipsa rea est*), whereas my meaning was that it no longer renders the *person* culpable ; as in the case of homicide if you should hear that it was remitted you would not infer that the crime itself had been pronounced no crime, but that the person who had committed it was absolved.'[3] That is, concupiscence even in the regenerate is sin, because its nature is to be contrary to the Divine law ; but it does not, when resisted, affect the condition of the believer in the sight of God as a justified man. And this is precisely the doctrine of the Protestant Churches.

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[1] This relative deterioration of nature, of which concupiscence is the symptom, is not denied by Bellarmine : only he denies that it is, in itself, sin. ' Non est quæstio inter nos et adversarios, sive humana natura graviter depravata per Adæ peccatum. Id enim libenter fatemur ' (*De amiss. grat.*, lib. v. 5).

The great passage of Scripture on which Augustine and his followers relied was Rom. vii. 14–25. St. Paul therein, from his own experience, describes most graphically the conflict which goes on in the regenerate man. 'I am,' he says, 'so far as I am not wholly regenerate, carnal, sold under sin ; my actual attainments fall short of my aim, and too often I do what I hate. I approve of the requirements of the law as holy, just, and good ; I delight in it after the inward man, but though to will is present with me, how to render perfect obedience I find not, for in me, that is my flesh, or carnal nature not yet wholly crucified with Christ, dwells no good thing. I am conscious of a law, or tendency, in my members, or flesh, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to itself, so that I am compelled to cry out, Oh, wretched man, who shall deliver me from this body of death ? I thank God that, though helpless in myself, I am delivered through the grace of Christ ; delivered not from the existence, but from the dominion of the tyrant. It is therefore no longer I, the redeemed man, that do it, but the sin that dwells in me ; it is this and not my emancipated will that produces the disorder. Nor does the conflict interfere with my position forensically in the sight of God. So far as I am flesh, indeed, I serve the law of sin, but with the mind, the inner man, I serve the law of God ; and walking not after the flesh, but after the Spirit, there is no condemnation to me who am in Christ Jesus ' (Rom. viii. 1). This interpretation of the passage being assumed to be the correct one (and there were few dissentient opinions on the subject in the early Church), it expresses the whole of what the Reformers contended for in their controversial statements as against Rome.[1]

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[1] *Cont. Jul.*, lib. v. 3.
[2] *De Nup.*, i. 25.
[3] *Cont. Jul.*, lib. vi. 17.

40. *Freedom of the Will—Pelagian Controversy*

From the extent of human corruption as described in the Protestant Confessions naturally follows the impossibility of man's passing from a state of nature to a state of grace by his own inherent strength, and apart from Divine assistance. One of the tenets of Pelagius, as Augustine tells us, was ' that that cannot be called free-will which is not self-sufficient (*i.e.*, self-determining), since each man is able to do, or to abstain from doing, what he pleases ; and that our victory (in the spiritual conflict) is not from Divine help, but from the exercise of free-will.' Pelagius did not deny that grace in some sense is necessary to a spiritual change, but Augustine charges him, and justly, with equivocation in the use of the word. By ' grace ' Pelagius understood every natural gift of God, *e.g.* free-will itself, and every external aid vouchsafed, such as the precepts of the Divine law ; only not a supernatural influence, operating on the heart to sway its affections. As a corollary, the exercise of free-will in a right direction constituted a claim on the Divine assistance, and, as the schoolmen afterwards taught, grace *de congruo* was its due reward.

The answer of Augustine was substantially the same as that which has been given by Edwards and others, viz., that Pelagius confounded the faculty of will with its power to act independently of any determining cause. Fallen man has the faculty of will, as he has other moral and intellectual faculties ; and if he is free from external compulsion, since he does not act (like irrational agents) from inward necessity, as, *e.g.*, the plant grows by the necessity of its nature, he must will what he pleases to do. In this sense every one possesses free-will. But this does not determine the question whether it is in his power to direct his will so that it shall embrace whatever objects may be presented to it ; for example, spiritual objects as contrasted with those of an interior order. If he serves sin he does it willingly —*non inviti tales sumus ;* and if he serves God he does it willingly : but has he the power to do the one or the other, as he pleases ?

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[1] It is a hopeful sign that Augustine's interpretation of this famous passage, so long considered as untenable, has been revived by commentators of some note, such as Philippi, Delitzsch (*Psych.*, v. 6), Thomasius, and Von Hoffman, referred to by Delitzsch, *l.c.* The history of its exegesis would fill a volume ; a sketch of it may be found in Tholück's ' Commentary.' It was no superficial study of it that led to Augustine's final judgment : ' Ego prius eum aliter intellexeram, vel potius non intellexeram : quod mea quædam illius temporis etiam scripta testantur. Non mihi enim videbatur Apostolus de se ipso dicere potuisse, *ego autem carnalis sum*, cum esset spiritualis : et quod captivus duceretur sub lege peccati quæ in membris erat ejus. Ego enim putabam ista dici non posse nisi de iis quos ita haberet carnalis concupiscientia subjugatos. . . . Sed postea melioribus et intelligentioribus cessi, vel potius ipsi, quod fatendum est, veritati, ut viderem in illis Apostoli verbis gemitum esse sanctorum contra carnales concupiscentias dimicantium ' (*Cont. Jul.*, vi. 23).

Augustine replies in the negative : 'Which of us maintains that through the sin of the first man free-will has disappeared from the human race ? Liberty, indeed, has disappeared through sin, but that which belonged to Paradise, viz., the liberty of possessing perfect righteousness and with it immortality ; on which account human nature needs Divine grace, according to the Lord's saying, " If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be truly free," that is, to live holily. For free-will is so far from being in abeyance in the sinner that the essence of his sin consists in his sinning voluntarily, and with a pleasure in it. It is by free-will that men refuse the yoke of righteousness ; by the grace of the Saviour alone they become free from that of sin. Since men, unless made sons of God, do not live a holy life, how can Pelagius ascribe to free-will what is not given except by the grace of God, as St. John says, " As many as received Him, to them gave He power to become sons of God " ? If they reply that they received Him by free-will, and then, as a reward, had the privilege of adoption conferred on them, let them say what else to receive Him is but to believe on Him, and what else is to believe on Him but to come to Him ; and then let them ponder Christ's words, " No man can come to Me except the Father draw Him." He surely is drawn to Christ to whom it is given to believe on Him ; whence it follows that to receive the privilege of adoption, to receive Christ, to come to Him, and to believe on Him, are simultaneous ; and since to believe on Him is a gift of grace adoption is so too. Free-will, therefore, cannot merit the privilege, because there is no freedom for good, where the Deliverer has not made free ; but in the other case free-will does operate, the sinner indulging his sin with a deceptive feeling of pleasure.'

In this passage, which may serve as a specimen of the numerous similar ones in his anti-Pelagian treatises, Augustine, as will be seen, draws a distinction between the abstract faculty of will, which he allows not to be extinct in fallen man, and the agent who wills ; and the direction in which the agent wills is determined by the presence, or the absence, of a previous gift of grace, or, in other words, by the answer to the question whether he is regenerate or not. The unregenerate man is in a state of slavery as regards the *objects* of his will, and though he sins willingly, he enjoys no real freedom, which he first attains when he comes under the regenerating power of the Holy Ghost. His meaning will be clearly seen from another passage from the book *De Gratia Christi :* ' Pelagius holds that we have a possibility implanted in us by God which, like a fruitful root, may develop itself in either direction, and at the will of the possessor issue either in the blossoms of virtue or the thorns of vice. He does not perceive that in *making one and the same thing* the root both of good and evil, he teaches contrary to evangelical truth. For the Lord says that a good tree cannot produce evil fruit, nor an evil tree good fruit. Whence, if the two trees, the good and the evil, are two men, a good and an evil one, what is a good man but a man of good will, that is, a tree of good root, and an evil man but a man of evil will, that is, a tree of evil root ? But he becomes a good tree when he receives the grace of God, and an evil tree when he makes himself evil by falling away from the supreme good.' In other words, antecedently to any discussion respecting the nature or the freedom of the will, a prior question has to be determined, viz., What is the *man himself*, a πνευματικός or a ψυχικός? If the latter, however freely he may appear to act, he is an evil tree which can bear nothing but evil fruit ; his carnal nature, as *a whole*, is still dominant, and as long as it is so his will acts accordingly, and they that are thus in the flesh cannot please God (Rom. viii. 8).

The Pelagian doctrine was not more offensive to Christian instinct, and destructive of true piety and indeed true morals, than it was opposed to the plain statements of Scripture. In reference to the ' superior hemisphere—*i.e.*, the spiritual duties of loving and serving God—the intellect of man, in his natural state, is said to be darkened (Rom. i. 21 ; Ephes. iv. 18), nay, to be darkness itself (Ephes. v. 8) ; his mind is blinded by the god of this world (2 Cor. iv. 4) ; to the natural man the things of the Spirit are foolishness ; he can neither receive nor know them (2 Cor. ii. 14) ; of himself and his brother ministers St. Paul declares that what they did know on these matters was to be ascribed exclusively to Divine teaching (2 Cor. iii. 5). The will likewise of the natural man, as a motive power, is described as spiritually inoperative. The heart is stony (Ezek. xxxvi. 26) ; the unregenerate man is a slave of sin (Rom. vi. 17), and the reason is because the carnal mind is not and cannot be subject to the law of God (Rom. viii. 7) ; no man can come to Christ except the Father draw him (John vi. 44) ; the natural man is dead in sins (Ephes. ii. 1). As long as this state prevails, how can the will co-operate with God in the work of regeneration ?

Yet it must be confessed that triumphantly as Augustine refutes his opponent on this point, his own system hardly assigns due weight to other statements of Scripture which seem to imply the existence of some spiritual power in fallen man. He notices, as every candid controversialist must, the numerous passages in which invitations, exhortations, warnings, promises, are addressed to sinners, as if they had the power to comply with them, and as if the blame of their non-compliance must rest on themselves. 'Why will ye die, O house of Israel ?' (Ezek. xviii. 31) ; 'Ye will not come to Me that ye might have life' (John v. 40). His explanation is correct as far as it goes, but not exhaustive. He observes that such passages are 'pedagogical,' *i.e.* are intended to convince the sinner of his helplessness, and by the exhibition of the Divine requirements to suggest what he ought to pray for ; just as St. Paul describes the Law of Moses as a 'schoolmaster to lead men to Christ,' from its effect in awakening a sense of sin and the need of a Saviour. 'By the law of works God says, Do what I command. But the law commands in order that faith may know how to act ; that is, that he to whom the commands are addressed, if he has no power, may know what to seek ; but if he has power, and obeys, may know through whose gift it is that he has power.' 'Free-will avails nothing except for sinning, if the way of truth is not revealed ; and even when man's duty and proper aim are set before him, no action follows unless the truth becomes loved ; and that it does so is the fruit not of free-will, but of the Holy Spirit who is given to us.' 'The Pelagians think that there is some weight in their objection, "God would not command what He knows is not in man's power to accomplish" ; but let them consider that these precepts, though we cannot fulfil them, teach us what we ought to seek from Him.' 'The Apostle, writing to the Thessalonians (1 Thess. iii. 12), enjoins charity ; blames them for their want of it ; prays that they may abound in it. Learn, O man, by the commands what thou oughtest to have ; by the reproof that it is thine own fault that thou hast it not ; by the prayer whence thou mayest receive it.' But is nothing more than this to be inferred from the passages in question ? They seem evidently to imply a measure of responsibility on man's part, at least when favoured with Divine revelation, for the choice he makes when the issues of life and death are plainly proposed to him.

We thus stand face to face with the great problem which, since Augustine's time, has never ceased to occupy the minds of thoughtful inquirers, and which seems no nearer its solution than it was a thousand years ago. How are we to reconcile the doctrine of grace as plainly taught in Scripture with what seems equally plainly taught, the power of man to shape his spiritual destinies ? Or, to put the question in another form, why is it that exhortations, invitations, etc., can be addressed to fallen man which we consider it would be improper and useless to address to the fallen angels ?

The older theologians attempt an alleviation of the difficulty by a distinction between a passive and an active receptivity in reference to the Divine admonitions and invitations. By the former is meant what man can receive or do irrespectively of Divine aid. Thus he could not be addressed at all as Scripture addresses him if he were not a reasonable being, possessing understanding and conscience ; he is not a stone nor a brute ; the bare materials of human nature are still his, and it is on them that regenerating grace operates. An essential element of human nature has not, as Möhler charges Protestants with teaching, by the Fall been extinguished. Nor, again, can it be denied that as regards the ' inferior hemisphere,' or the sphere of morality as distinguished from that of religion, he possesses a power to do what natural conscience dictates, and to abstain from what it condemns ; though even this power exists only in a debilitated form, and is much impeded by sinful passions.

Moreover, Scripture implies a power in man to *resist* the appeals of Divine grace though not to yield to them ; he can keep the heart shut though he cannot open it. For he lies under no disability as regards sin, and is himself a free agent here as well as has the will free ; which is not the case as regards the love and fear of God. Scripture everywhere recognizes a difference in the hearers of the Word, according as some suffer themselves to be drawn by grace—*trahit Deus sed trahit volentem*—while some refuse the voice of the charmer charm he never so wisely. Some are ' of the truth,' exhibit a candour and docility which predispose them to ' hear the voice of Christ ' (John xviii. 37) ; others are of such an opposite spirit that they would even prevent inquirers from entering the kingdom (Matt. xxiii. 13). The soil on which the good seed falls varies in quality (Matt. xiii. 3–8), and there are characters which ' are not far from the kingdom of God ' (Mark xii. 34), which certainly cannot be said of all sinners.

Religion seems to root itself in some natures more easily than in others. To what is the difference to be ascribed ? Some would reply that it springs from a prevenient act of grace, which is the source of these favourable dispositions themselves. This may be so ; but it is important to note that in many of the cases in Scripture the better disposed were equally with the less outside the kingdom of God, though no doubt some of them were farther from it than others. In the visible Church, as in heathendom, these moral differences may exist in a high degree without passing the boundary which separates nature and grace. They do, however, prove that the reaction of natural conscience against hereditary corruption never ceases until conscience itself is seared with a hot iron, and that grace has a natural ally even in fallen man ; which the preacher may reckon on as more or less active. The death of the soul is, after all, a sleep from which there may be an awakening (Ephes. v. 14). And perhaps this constitutes the essential distinction between fallen man and the fallen angels, as regards capacity of recovery.

Until that sin, whatever it may be, by which the sinner places himself beyond the reach of mercy (Matt. xii. 32) is committed, the *capacity* for redemption, involving the religious faculty, the moral sense, and whatever else distinguishes man from brutes and devils, exists in every man, and it is in his power either to cherish or to extinguish it. He may attend the means of grace and hear the Word, he may keep himself from fleshly lusts which war against the soul (1 Pet. ii. 11), and so far assume a favourable attitude towards the summons to repent and believe ; but this is neither regeneration nor a co-efficient in the bringing about thereof : what is produced on this ground is but the wild fruit of nature until the creative power of grace sublimates it into another nature. It is, in the language of Augustine, the *adjutorium sine quo* the work of grace is not effected—the necessary material on which it works, but not the *adjutorium quo* it is effected[1] ; the condition of the result but not the result itself. The radical change may still be wanting.

There may be a great difference between a Socrates or a Marcus Aurelius and a Nero, as regards *justitia civilis*, and it must neither be denied nor undervalued ; but it is only a relative one, and sinks into nothing when compared with that between the natural and the spiritual man. And this is proved by the facility with which natural virtue may, and often does, pass into dispositions alien to Christianity. Patriotism becomes a narrow hatred and jealousy of other nations, generosity exhibits itself at the expense of justice. Above all, the stoical virtue of a Cato almost invariably terminates in self-complacency, a temper the furthest removed of all from that of the Christian. The taint of self-esteem infects all these *splendida vitia*, and renders them worthless as

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[1] See *De Correpţ*, 34.

religious acts. Nor can unaided nature expel the taint, or, as Augustine says, make the tree good. It is only the regenerate man that is a real worker with God, and even he not as on a co-ordinate level, or as an independent source of good. The receptivity of the natural man is a reality, not a name ; God deals with the unconverted as *persons*, reasonable, reflecting, morally endowed persons ; but the receptivity itself needs to be quickened and purified by grace before it can fully discharge its function. And this is the fact which Pelagian tendencies in every age deny, or overlook. Particular acts of will Pelagius was willing to admit might need Divine assistance to perfect them ; but that the carnal nature itself, the 'old man' of St. Paul (Rom. vi. 6), must be exchanged for a new one he persistently denied.

The decisions of the Council of Trent on this subject cannot be acquitted of the charge of ambiguity ; as Sarpi insinuates not unintended, in order that all parties might be satisfied.[1] It anathematizes those who hold that grace is only given to make holiness and eternal life *easier* of attainment, as if free-will without grace could achieve the same result but with greater difficulty ; those, too, who maintain that without the help of the Holy Spirit man can believe, repent, or love, so as to receive the gift of justification [2] ; with all which Protestants fully agree. 'If any one,' it proceeds, 'shall say that free-will, when moved by God, does not co-operate with such motions in disposing and preparing man for the gift of justification, and that it cannot refuse assent to them if it will, but, like an inanimate object, is merely passive in the work ; or if any one shall say that free-will was lost by the Fall, and is extinct, or is only a name without reality, let him be anathema.'

Certainly it cannot be said that the Fall has annihilated the faculty of will, for every one's consciousness tells him the contrary ; nor can the work of conversion take place without involving an exercise of the active principles of our nature, such as, fear, desire, hope, etc. But the question is whether man, apart from preventing grace, as he certainly has the capacity of religion, has also the power of evoking from himself an appetency towards God, which, as it were, reaches forth its hand to God to be laid hold of by Him and drawn up to higher things ? If this is what the Council means by the co-operation of free-will with the Divine solicitations (and it must be suspected that this is its meaning), it approaches the Pelagian, or semi-Pelagian, error long ago exposed by Augustine. Such an appetency itself, that Father would say, is the fruit of grace, and no man has a desire to co-operate with God until God gives the will ; that is, breaks the chain of a sinful nature. ‘Without our co-operation God produces in us a will towards good, but when we do will, and will to act, He co-operates with us.’ Human nature, that is, left to itself, cannot will to turn to God, or make any advances in that direction; if it does so, this is owing to a prevenient act of grace which gives the power to do what is commanded (*dat quod jubet*).

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[1] *Histoire*, lib. ii. 80.

[2] Sess. vi., Canons, 1–3.

The Protestant Confessions may and do recognize in the natural man a reaction of the original nature against its corruption, which is more or less active under the means of grace; and even in the heathen a feeling of the discrepancy between what they are and what they ought to be. But in *itself* this is not religion; it is merely the protest of conscience against the dominant tendency; and as in the visible Church so amongst the heathen, if ever this protest passed into the higher sphere of a new nature—and that there may be and have been saved even amongst the heathen no one is concerned to deny—it was the product not of unaided nature but of Divine grace. It is obvious that as regards this point there is no real distinction between the doctrine of Augustine and that of Calvin in subsequent times.

The same question gave rise to what has been called the Synergistic controversy in the Lutheran Church, and is substantially that at issue between the Calvinists and Arminians of a later age. Melanchthon appears, in his later years, to have modified his views, or at least his statements, on the inability of the natural man, and, in contrast with the strong expressions of Luther in his treatise *De Servo Arbitrio* to have taught that man had an independent power of meeting the approaches of Divine grace; that is, bridging over, to some extent, the interval between the natural and the spiritual man. A school of Philippists, as they were called after Melanchthon, sprang up after his death, advocating this view; and a lively controversy arose between its adherents (Pfeffinger, Strigel, etc.), and the more rigid interpreters of the Augsburg Confession. The latter obtained the ascendency, and procured the promulgation of a confession of faith, called the *Formula Concordiæ*, A.D. 1579, which was largely subscribed by the Lutheran Churches, though not universally, and is the fullest and clearest exposition of the later orthodox Lutheran faith.

What this was on the question of free-will may be judged from the following extracts: ‘We condemn the doctrine of the Synergists, who pretend that human nature in reference to spiritual things is only grievously wounded, but not quite dead. And that, although free-will is too feeble to initiate conversion to God, or obey the law, yet if the Holy Spirit through the preaching of the Gospel offers us His grace, remission of sins, and eternal life, then the human will can by its own power, however enfeebled, meet God, and prepare itself for the reception of grace. We believe that in man's nature since the Fall, and prior to regeneration, not even a spark of spiritual power remains, by which he can prepare himself for Divine grace, or contribute anything to his own conversion, and that his will is only free to do what is displeasing to God. Before he experiences the regenerating influences of the Holy Spirit man can do no more towards procuring them than if he were a stock or a stone. Nay, he is worse than a stock or a stone, because he can, and does, despise and resist the Divine commands.' In other words, he is *capable* of regeneration, which a stone is not, nor yet a brute, nor the fallen angels ; but the first movement towards it must come, not from himself, but from above ; which, as we have seen, is precisely the doctrine of Augustine. So unfounded is the notion sometimes, as it appears, entertained that the Lutheran doctrine on this subject is milder than that of the Churches supposed to have been under Calvin's influence. The contrary is the fact.

Although there is no substantial difference between the two great Reformers in their view of fallen human nature, yet Calvin's statements on the subject are by no means so sweeping as those of Luther, and the Helvetic Confession of 1566 even contains expressions which seem directed against certain modes of speaking familiar to the German Protestants. It admits that the faculties of understanding and will still exist in man, so that he is very far from being a stone or a stock ; and contents itself with affirming that these faculties have been so impaired since the Fall that they are no longer capable of what they were previously to that event. And our own Confession is equally moderate in its statements. It adopts the Augustinian doctrine that 'works done before the inspiration of Christ'—the *splendida vitia* of the early Father—do not deserve grace *de congruo* (Art. xiii) ; nay, 'have the nature of sin,' as not springing from the right motive, not being the genuine fruit of the new nature which comes through grace. They are not done as 'God hath willed and commanded them to be done,' with a single eye to His glory, but either from the mere promptings of the moral nature not extinct in man, or for selfish ends, or from a stoic temper of self-sufficiency ; they are defective, in scholastic language, *quoad substantiam actus*, in the form, if not the material of the act.

What Augustine and the Reformers meant is that antecedently to *individual* differences in relation to the hearing and reception of the Word, which may be great and manifold, there is a disability which belongs not to each man as an individual with a history of his own, but to human nature as such, and which can be removed only by our being transplanted from the wild olive into the new stock. This fundamental truth of Scripture being secured, both Augustine and his successors might have safely admitted more than they have done as regards the power of natural conscience, and the moral differences of hearers of the Word ; things plainly implied in many parts of Scripture (Matt. xiii. 12 ; Acts vii. 51), and matters of daily experience. With the latter the pressing necessity of the time was to erect a barrier, as far as might be, against the rampant Pelagianism of the dominant Church, which threatened to reduce the Gospel to little more than a system of natural religion : to future ages they left the task of attempting to harmonize the statements of Scripture on the subject.

Besides its dogmatical bearings, this subject has, as is well known, largely attracted the attention of the philosophical inquirer. According to Milton, these discussions date from a remote antiquity. Whatever corrections Calvin's own system may demand, Calvinism as compared with Arminianism has no need, on philosophical ground, to shrink from the contest. The principal point at issue, viz., whether the will is self-determining, or comes under the general law of causality —or, in other words, whether the will is ever in a state of equilibrium between opposite objects, so that contingency is essential to its real freedom—has been subjected to the keen analysis of Jonathan Edwards, and the Arminian tenet exposed in all its inconsistency. If the word ' will ' is used for the faculty of volition, to ask whether contingency attaches to it is to ask whether a man chooses to do what he does choose to do, or whether in the act of choosing a certain course of action he can choose another the opposite thereof. If will is used, as it probably is in this connection, for the agent willing, then it conveys no very exalted idea of a man that when good and evil are placed before him he is supposed to have no bias or tendency one way or the other, so that it is impossible to predict with any certainty what he will do or not do under given circumstances ; that his actions are the sport of chance, and himself ' like a wave of the sea driven with the wind and tossed ' (James i. 6).

It would follow, too, that men could not be pronounced either virtuous or vicious on account of settled dispositions of character ; whereas in common opinion and language these are the very things that enhance their virtue or vice. We do not think the less of a man of whom we say that, in our opinion, it is impossible that he should commit an unjust or a mean action ; nor do we mean to extenuate a man's viciousness when we say that it is just what we should have expected of him ; that he could not, according to his nature, have acted otherwise. On the contrary, it is the presumed *nature* prompting the action that determines our estimate ; and in proportion to the certainty we feel that they will act in one way or the other is the praise or blame which we attach to men. That is, a *moral* necessity is the condition of a perfectly virtuous state.

We believe that the elect angels now, and the saints in future glory, will be incapable of sinning ; but that surely does not interfere with the perfect freedom of their service. Or to ascend higher still, it is morally impossible that God can act otherwise than with perfect holiness and wisdom ; but He is not the less absolutely free. As of old in the Pelagian, so in the Arminian scheme, it is not remembered that prior to, and as it were behind, the will is *the nature ;* and that according as the nature is, the will, by a moral necessity, exerts itself : free in sinning if it is that of the old nature we derive from Adam ; free in holiness if it is that of the new one derived from Christ. And thus, though in strict propriety of language inability means a want of *power* to do what we have the *will* to do, and refers primarily to physical restraint or defect, yet when applied to fallen man it means the absence or inefficiency of the will itself, or moral inability consequent on the depravation of nature through the Fall ; the result of which is that man ‘ cannot turn and prepare himself to faith and calling upon God.’

If it be said that these objections only prove that the Arminian scheme involves self-contradiction while they leave the difficulties on the other side untouched, this no doubt is to some extent true. What is called Calvinism has also its own difficulties, and perhaps insoluble in our present state of knowledge. Either system, carried out to its logical consequences, lands us in conclusions which it is not easy to reconcile with the language of Scripture, in its apparently plain meaning. But the most unsatisfactory of all methods of adjustment is to explain away or attenuate passages which, if they do not imply the necessity of prevenient grace to sway the will by rectifying the nature, must be dismissed as having no certain meaning at all.

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The subject of the preceding sections is of vital moment as regards our apprehensions of the nature and object of Christianity. No one who considers the tendencies of modern thought can fail to see that the question of the corruption of human nature lies at the root of the divergencies of opinion and statement which we meet with in the controversial discussions of the day. And it is equally evident that to extenuate, to ignore, or to deny the effects of the Fall, as they have been usually understood in the Church, is a prominent feature of certain aspects of Christianity which have attracted notice of late.

Sometimes it is assumed that man has only to be placed under a system of external discipline, whether it be the natural providential history of the world, or a special dispensation like the Law of Moses, in order to reach the ideal of his nature; and further that the moral gains of one age are taken up by another as the basis of still further improvment, until at length by a natural development the race attains 'the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ' (Ephes. iv. 13)[1]; on which hypothesis there ought, at this advanced period, to be little or no sin, at least in such nations as have enjoyed this spiritual education. The birth-taint which every man in every age, according to Scripture, brings with him into the world, and with no decreasing intensity of virulence, and which is as much proof now as ever it was against all engines of assault but one, is here ignored as a factor to be taken into account. Sometimes the example of Christ and the moral precepts of the Gospel are extolled as the wheat, while its mysterious doctrines are the chaff; as if example and instruction are all that man needs to enable him to emerge from the ruins of the Fall. Sometimes, at the opposite pole, the radical change which is admitted as necessary is described as a magical effect, not necessarily involving or leading to any *moral* renovation of the heart; a gift indeed of grace, but neutral in character and result, which may or may not consist with an habitually sinful state. Under the former system man never did need a new creation; under the latter, a member of the visible Church does not need it because, whatever be his moral condition, he once received it for good. Under either system Pelagianism finds a natural footing. Under either aspect Christianity sinks from being a Divine method of redemption from fearful evils to a system either of mere naturalism or of crass supernaturalism. And under either system, in different measure—much more it must be admitted under the former than under the latter—the atoning work of the Redeemer suffers a depreciation, and becomes obscured. The Person and work of this Redeemer will next engage our attention.

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[1] *Essays and Reviews:* Essay i., 'On the Education of the World.'

THE PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST

'The Son, which is the Word of the Father, begotten from everlasting of the Father, the very and eternal God, and of one substance with the Father, took man's nature in the womb of the blessed Virgin, of her substance ; so that two whole and perfect natures, that is to say, the Godhead and the manhood, were joined together in one person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, very God and very man' (Art. ii).

'As Christ died for us, and was buried, so also it is to be believed that He went down into hell' (Art. iii).

'Christ did rise again from death, and took again His body, with flesh, bones and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature ; wherewith He ascended into heaven, and there sitteth, until He return to judge all men at the last day' (Art. iv).

'Christ, in the truth of our nature, was made like unto us, sin only except, from which He was clearly void, both in His flesh and His spirit ; sin, as St. John saith, was not in Him' (Art. xv).

'Item docent quod Verbum, hoc est, Filius Dei assumpserit humanam naturam in utero beatæ Mariæ Virginis, ut sint duæ naturæ, divina et humana, in unitate personæ inseparabiliter conjunctæ' (Conf. Aug. iii).

'Agnoscimus ergo in uno atque eodem Domino nostro Jesu Christo duas naturas vel substantias, divinam et humanam, et has ita dicimus conjunctas et unitas esse ut absorptæ aut confusæ aut immixtæ non sint ; sed salvis potius et permanentibus naturarum proprietatibus, in una persona unitæ vel conjunctæ, ita ut unum Christum Dominum non duos veneremur : unum, inquam, verum Deum et hominem, juxta divinam Patri, juxta humanam vero nobis hominibus consubstantialem, et per omnia similem, peccato excepto' (Conf. Helv. xi).

'Who truly suffered, was crucified, dead, and buried, to reconcile His Father to us, and to be a sacrifice not only for original guilt, but also for actual sins of men' (Art. ii). 'Vere passus, crucifixus, mortuus, et sepultus, ut reconciliaret nobis Patrem, et hostia esset non tantum pro culpa originis, sed etiam pro omnibus actualibus hominum peccatis' (Conf. Aug. iii).

'Qui, ut solus est Mediator, Intercessor, Hostia, idemque et Pontifex, Dominusque et Rex noster, ita hunc solum agnoscimus, et toto corde credimus redemptionem, expiationam protectionem' (Conf. Helv. A.D. 1536, xi).

'Quid deinde valet nomen Christi ? Hoc epitheto melius etiamnum exprimitur ejus officium. Significat enim unctum esse a Patre in Regem, Sacerdotem, ac Prophetam' (Cat. Genev).

PART I

THE PERSON OF CHRIST

41. *The Incarnation of the Logos*

IT is not necessary here to recapitulate the arguments by which the Deity of the Son is established.[1] But the Word became flesh (John i. 14) ; forasmuch as the children were partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself took part of the same (Heb. ii. 14) ; He was made of the seed of David according to the flesh (Rom. i. 3), made of a woman (Gal. iv. 4) ; so truly that if any confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh he is a deceiver and an antichrist (2 John 7) ; in a word, in the Person of Jesus Christ the Son of God became incarnate.

The idea of an incarnation is not foreign to the history of religion. Communion with the Deity, which is the essence of all religion, leads to the conception of union with Him, which, accordingly, appears under various guise in many of the forms of religion which preceded Christianity. Sometimes, as in the Nirvana of Buddhism, under the notion of final absorption into the Deity ; sometimes, as in the Greek mythology, under that of the apotheosis of heroes and sages, who after death were supposed to be promoted to the ranks of the gods. The second person of the Hindoo trimurti, Vishnu, assumes many material forms, and among them (as Krishna) that of humanity. The distinctions, however, between the forms which this vague instinct assumed in heathenism, and the Christian doctrine of the incarnation, are great. Either, as in Hindooism, the incarnation is not permanent, Krishna on his return to heaven laying aside his humanity, and the Nirvana extinguishing humanity altogether ; or, as in the West, it is not God that stoops to man, but man that is exalted to God.

It may seem as if the Old Testament not only did not reveal a proper incarnation (the mere Theophanies are not such), but rather, in its ritual and prophetic teaching, insists upon the barrier which sin had raised between fallen man and his Creator. And consistently with its ethical and pedagogical character it could not do otherwise. The ancient Hebrew was perpetually reminded that only by a special interposition of Jehovah could this barrier be removed. But in reality the Mosaic dispensation supplied the true basis of the idea of an Incarnation, in that it was a religion of revelation to prepare the way for redemption. Under it God entered into covenant with the chosen people, made Himself their tutelary God and their King, gave them an elaborate ritual, and a moral law which is the transcript of His own moral nature ; and placed on record, through the instrumentality of the Jewish lawgiver, the primitive history of the human race and of the Divine communications which had from time to time been made to it. Thenceforward, in the history of Israel and in prophecy, the designs of God towards fallen man become more and more unfolded, until the prophetic voice, having fulfilled its office, ceases, and a period of silent expectation ensues.

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[1] § 25.

All this is something very different from the revelation of God in nature, in which, though reason may discern the footsteps of Deity (Rom. i. 19), the Deity Himself retires from view behind the laws which He has impressed on matter ; here, on the contrary, we have God revealing Himself in history, under type and prophecy, by signs and wonders, through appointed organs ; manifesting Himself to man as the latter was capable of receiving it, and becoming in a sense incarnate before the incarnation itself. But only in a fragmentary and imperfect manner—πολυμέρως καὶ πολυτρόπως (Heb. i. 1) —not by the union of Himself with man in the person of a Redeemer. This consummation, however, was thus foreshadowed, and when it did arrive it was seen to be nothing but what the prophetic intimations had been long preparing the way for. In the person of Christ all previous manifestations of God are summed as in an epitome ; the scattered rays are here concentrated in a focus ; and for this reason we can expect no further, or more complete, revelation of God (John i. 18).

It may be observed that it was only on theocratical ground that the true conception of an Incarnation could take root and grow up. Philosophical Judaism never attained to it. The Wisdom of the Apocryphal books, and the Logos of Philo, are nothing but personifications of a Divine attribute or emanation ; not the personal indwelling of God in man. Matter is with Philo, as with the Gnostic sects, the source of evil, and to attain the end of his being man must be unclothed of his body. To such a habit of thought it was quite repugnant that God should condescend to assume a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting.[1]

In the prologue of St. John's Gospel (i. 3), as in other passages of Scripture (Heb. i. 2), the Logos appears as a Mediator between God, in His abstract essence, and creation : through Him the worlds were made. And it is the same Logos that communed with the Patriarchs, led the Israelites through the wilderness (1 Cor. x. 4), spoke through the prophets (1 Pet. i. 11), and presided over the fortunes of the nation ; so that when the final crisis was at hand, He could say of Jerusalem, ‘ How often would I have gathered thy children together even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not ’ (Matt. xxiii. 37). We can see how fitting it was that the Mediator between fallen man and God should be the same who had been Mediator in a lower sense ; that the Alpha should be the Omega (Rev. i. 8) : the the actual creator of nature its actual restorer (Rom. viii. 21) ; the first Adam have for his counterpart the second man, the Lord from heaven (1 Cor. xv. 47).

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[1] On Philo's theories, see Dorner, *Ent. Gesch.*, P. i. pp. 21, etc.

Was the first Adam, or the second, the prototype of humanity ? The latter opinion has been held by some who by the ‘ image of God ’ in which Adam is said to have been created (Gen. i. 26), understand the foreseen Incarnation of the second Person of the Holy Trinity. The question is involved in a more general one, viz., would the Incarnation have taken place if man had not sinned ? Was it a necessary factor in the consummation of man’s destiny, or a remedy for the effects of the Fall ? If regarded in the latter light, it is urged, it assumes the character of a mere contingent provision, for sin itself cannot, except on the supralapsarian hypothesis,[1] be supposed a necessary element in the Divine counsels. We should be compelled, too, to believe that the entrance of sin into the world procured for man a greater blessing than could have been attained without it ; according to the old saying, ‘ *O felix culpa quæ talem et tantum meruit habere redemptorem !* ’ And when the purposes of redemption are accomplished, why should not the Incarnate Son revert to His previous condition, and become once more a λόγος ἄσαρκος, on the principle that *cessante causâ cessat effectus* ? which, however, is not the orthodox belief. These considerations have led some distinguished writers to the conclusion, *Etiamsi homo non peccasset Deus tamen incarnatus fuisset, licet non crucifixus.*[2]

The contrary opinion, however, has prevailed,[3] and, as it should seem, on good grounds. Scripture seldom, if ever, assigns any other ground for the Incarnation than to carry out the purposes of redemption : though it may be thought to extend the benefits thereof to other orders of creatures than man (Ephes. i. 10 ; Col. 1. 20). But independently of this, the theory itself is of suspicious tendency. If Christ, irrespectively of redemption, is to be considered as the ideal Man, the head of humanity, the ' King of men ' as the phrase sometimes runs, there seems a danger of the distinction between nature and grace becoming obliterated, and a door being opened for the doctrine of the restitution of all men. Adam, as he was created, was the head of unfallen humanity, and if he had continued in his uprightness, would doubtless both himself have advanced in holiness, and propagated a race of sinless beings, to whose spiritual progress no limits can be assigned. But would humanity thus unfallen ever have attained the perfection which humanity *restored* does in Christ ? According to Scripture, Christ, the second Adam, is the head of *redeemed* humanity (Ephes. i. 22), and the gifts of regeneration and resurrection in the likeness of His glorified body are described as the fruit of His sufferings unto death, and of His subsequent exaltation. And we cannot suppose that these blessings are not in their nature superior to what would have, under any circumstances, accrued to man through an incarnation, even if man had never fallen, and Christ had never suffered and risen again. Regeneration is something more than creation, and the future glory of the saints a higher condition than that of Paradise.[1] The body, in short, of which Christ the Redeemer is the Head is not humanity in general, but the Church which He purchased with His own blood (Acts xx. 28).

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[1] Calvin. *Instit.*, lib. iii. 7. So Schleiermacher, though from another point of view, maintains that the original plan of the world comprised the necessity of sin for the sake of redemption (*Glaubenslehre*, s. 81).

[2] Martensen, *Dog.*, ss. 89, 131.

[3] ‘ Quamquam Deus peccato non existente potuerit incarnari ; convenientius tamen dicitur quod si homo non peccasset, Deus incarnatus non fuisset, cum in sacra Scripture ubique incarnationis ratio ex peccato primi hominis assignetur ’ (Thomas Aquinas, p. iii. q. 1, art. 3).

42. *The Twofold State* (*Humiliationis et Exaltationis*)

Whatever view may be taken of the question just mentioned, when Christ is considered as a Redeemer, His incarnation assumes a special character. For as a Redeemer He must be made in the likeness of *sinful* flesh (Rom. viii. 3), though without sin, and identify Himself with all the conditions of human existence as it is. He must be born of woman, be subject to the innocent infirmities of our nature, to suffering, temptation, and death; and further, He must be born in a particular nation, be ' of the seed of David,' and, as a Jew, submit to the ordinances of the law (Gal. iv. 4). Only by thus ' taking hold '[2] of fallen humanity in the points in which it contrasts with humanity before the Fall, could He be its Redeemer, according to the maxim, What is not assumed cannot be healed.[3] He not only emptied Himself, by becoming incarnate (Phil. ii. 7), but His human nature was in the form of a servant, and it was not until He had become obedient to the death of the cross, after a life of suffering, that God exalted Him and gave Him a name above every name (*ibid.* 8, 9).

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[1] See preceding section.

[2] According to one rendering of *ἐπιλαμβάνεται* (Heb. ii. 16).

[3] *Τὸ ἀπρόσληπτον καὶ ἀθεράπευτον.*

Thus the doctrine of the twofold state, which occupies so large a space in later Protestant theology, though comparatively unnoticed by the earlier writers, has Scriptural foundation, and indeed suggests itself to the most cursory reader of Scripture. Briefly, it expresses the distinction between our Lord's life upon earth and His present life at the right hand of God ; the former was one of humiliation, the latter is one of glory. It is usual, in describing each state, to assign to them respectively certain events—on the one hand, conception, birth, suffering, and death ; on the other, resurrection, descent into hell, ascension ; but it has not been sufficiently noted that the true ground of the distinction is the change which it implies in the human nature of the Saviour. The body of Christ before His resurrection was similar in all essential points to ours, subject to natural infirmities and sustained by the usual means ; the body with which He rose was, as St. Paul calls it, a spiritual and glorified body, whatever may be the precise conception we form of it (1 Cor. xv. 44 ; Phil. iii. 21), and as such exempt from the defects incident to the 'body of our humiliation.' The topic is concerned exclusively with what took place after the incarnation, and has nothing to do with the exinanition, or kenosis, of the Logos in assuming human nature ; which is a point that must be considered by itself.

Christ, the incarnate Logos, as He appears in the sacred history, advanced from that portion of His mediatorial work which consisted in suffering and death to that portion of it which consists in the application of His merits and the exercise of priestly and royal functions ; in the execution of which latter He is in a state of glory as compared with the preceding humiliation. But it is a mediatorial office which He is still discharging, and does not this imply, even at present, a certain exinanition of the Logos ? and that this is to last until the number of the elect is accomplished ? This, certainly, may be thought implied in the remarkable passage 1 Cor. xv. 28 ; from which, however, on account of its great obscurity, no positive conclusion can be hastily drawn. The humiliation therefore of the incarnate Logos must not be confounded with His exinanition ; the latter is an act of the Holy Trinity terminating, in scholastic language, in the Person of the Son, the former belongs to the man Christ Jesus. And the resurrection, or, as the Lutherans hold, the descent into hell, forms the point of transition from the one state of the mediator Christ to the other; the radical distinction, however, being the exchange of an earthly for a glorified spiritual body.

(Status Humiliationis)

43. *Born of a Woman—Growth in Wisdom and Stature*

The birth of Christ, including His conception in the womb, was in the way of nature. He did not, as the Valentinians held, merely pass through the Virgin like water through a canal. And as His birth was natural, so was His human nature a real one, and not the phantom of the Docetics. The Word of life incarnate could be seen and handled (1 John i. 1) ; could suffer hunger, thirst, and weariness (Luke iv ; John iv. 6) ; His flesh could be torn with stripes and pierced by the nails and the spear ; and He could die on the cross. His soul could experience joy and sorrow (Luke x. 21; Matt. xxvi. 38); He loved and was grieved (Mark x. 21 ; iii. 5) ; He could reason out of the Scriptures and refute the cavils of the Pharisees and Sadducees (Matt. xxii. 15–46). He passed too through the ordinary stages of growth and development, both bodily and mental. So Scripture declares, in the very few notices it contains of His private life. As an unconscious babe He lay in the manger; He grew, like other children, in stature as in wisdom (Luke ii. 52) ; at twelve years of age He astonished the doctors of the law with His precocious remarks (*ibid.* 46). With the exception of His visit to the temple, Scripture passes over in silence the interval between His birth and His public appearance ; and we can only conjecture that He lived with His parents, and, as tradition runs, followed His reputed father's occupation.

It was, no doubt, so appointed, in order that no place might be left for the legends which usually attach themselves to the infancy and childhood of remarkable men ; and of which the Apocryphal Gospels are full. From the insipid and grotesque incidents with which these productions abound we may gather what the Canonical writers would probably have indulged in had they not written under a special Divine superintendence. Scripture draws a holy veil over the life of our Lord, until the time came for His manifestation in Israel. Another reason may be given for this reticence, viz., that the Saviour's own consciousness of His mission advanced by gradual stages, and was not fully possessed by Him until He received the unction of the Holy Ghost (Matt. iii. 16). If Christ's manhood was a reality, and subject to the ordinary laws of humanity, it could hardly be otherwise than that the knowledge of His Divine origin, and of His appointed work, should keep pace with the expansion of His human intelligence, which, as we know, is dependent on the growth of the animal frame. As a babe He lay unconscious in the manger, like other babes; as a child the only visible distinction between Him and other children must have been

His freedom from childish faults; at the age of twelve the consciousness of a peculiar relation to the Father begins to appear, ‘ Wist ye not that I must be about My Father’s business ? ’ (Luke ii. 49). But not sufficiently distinct, any more than His mental faculties were mature, for His public ministry; and accordingly He passes again into retirement until He had attained the fulness of manhood.

During these years, no doubt, the ceremonial law and prophecy, both pointing to Himself, and now illuminated by the power of the indwelling Logos, were His study ; so that when He began to teach publicly it excites surprise that ‘ this man should know letters, having never learned ’ (John vii. 15). When His recognition of Himself as the Messiah was at length complete, but not until then, He emerged from the privacy of the home at Nazareth. Thus did the Logos submit to the conditions of ordinary human development, permitting, so to speak, the human nature a certain power over Himself, to limit the full exhibition of the Divine glory in accordance with natural laws. Nor did the process stop with His baptism at Jordan. It was not, *e.g.*, until the close of His ministry that the necessity and imminence of His death appear to have become distinctly perceived, and were foretold to His disciples (Matt. xvi. 21). Every natural stage of humanity, in short, infancy, childhood, youth, and manhood, was hallowed by the Saviour Himself passing through it ; and under the same law of natural progress to which we are subjected.

44. *Tempted, yet without Sin*

Christ not only grew in wisdom and stature like other men, but underwent the ordinary process of discipline by which virtue is matured and attains its due reward ; He grew ethically as well as physically and intellectually. He rendered meritorious obedience, and *earned* the crown by enduring the cross (Heb. xii. 2). The τελείωσις of which the Epistle to the Hebrews speaks (v. 9) implies a previous state of relative imperfection : what can this be in One whom we believe to have been sinless ? It must be considered as negative, not positive ; as analogous to the imperfection of the first Adam before he underwent his trial. Virtue, to prove itself such, must be tried ; and the severer the trial the greater the result if resistance to sin is successful. The second Adam, like the first, must pass through the furnace. He must be tempted and overcome the temptation, endure sufferings which culminated in death, ‘ learn obedience by the things which He suffered ’ (Heb. v. 8), and so become ‘ perfect ’ (Heb. ii. 10) in a different sense from that in which He was before. He attained the perfection of a proved and triumphant virtue as distinguished from a state of untried innocence. And thus He became fitted, from His own personal experience, to be 'a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God.'

The sufferings which our Lord underwent from sympathy with the condition of fallen man ('In all their affliction He was afflicted,' Isa. lxiii. 9), must be distinguished from those which He encountered in the exercise of His mission, and, so to speak, brought upon Himself. These latter are what properly formed His probation. And they may be classed under the two heads of direct temptation to evil, and indirect temptation to forsake the path of duty. With the former the Saviour came into conflict immediately after the anointing of the Holy Ghost (Matt. iv. 1). Must we not suppose that the temptation daily presented itself to Him to abandon the task He had undertaken ; or can we wonder if the struggle at the last was almost more than His human nature could bear? (Luke xxii. 44). It would be idle to contend that the Saviour was not in both ways tempted, that He did not really experience solicitations to sin. He must have done so if He was capable of appeals through the senses and the understanding, and if He felt a natural shrinking from pain and death ; and how otherwise could He have been a man like unto us ?

But whether we are to consider this liability to temptation as affecting His sinlessness depends upon the view we take of the proper seat of sin. The essence of sin lies in the consent of the will to what conscience pronounces wrong, and if this consent is withheld, felt solicitations, *coming from without*, do not of themselves partake of the nature of sin. Our first parents could not avoid seeing the fruit, and hearing the arguments of the tempter ; perhaps experiencing a momentary inclination ot disobedience; but had the will been sufficiently strong in its union with the Divine will to repel the temptation at once, they would not have fallen. So it actually was in our Lord's case. Relief from bodily hunger, reliance on Divine protection, even temporal dignity, are not in themselves improper objects of desire : whether they become so depends on the circumstances under which they present themselves to the mind. In our Lord's temptation they would have been sinful, both as suggested by Satan, and as inconsistent with the Divine plan of a suffering and crucified Messiah. A momentary attraction towards these things may have been felt by Him, but it was instantly repelled through the power of the indwelling Logos. In like manner the prospect of an ignominious death must have been unspeakably painful, and the temptation to decline it equally strong ; but not the less perfect was His submission to the Divine will : 'if it be possible,' expresses the conflict ; 'not My will, but Thine be done,' the victory (Matt. xxvi. 39).

Liability, then, to temptation is not in itself sinful ; and it was indispensable to the attainment of that moral perfection (τελείωσις) by which the Saviour merited His crown of glory. In pouring out His soul 'with strong crying and tears unto Him that was able to save Him' (Heb. v. 7), He learned what it was to be tempted, and so gained a fellow-feeling with those that are tempted, as well as furnished a real example to them. But though the outworks were assaulted, the citadel itself remained intact. In each moment of trial the Divine will in unity with the human asserted its supremacy ; and the *potuit non peccare* of the first Adam came, in the case of the second, to be eventually exchanged for the *non potuit peccare.*

But can we feel sure that, under these temptations, Christ was actually without sin ? Such is the faith of the Church ; but is it well founded ? The question is of vital moment, for however He might still be an example, a Redeemer from sin, He could not be if He had sins of His own to atone for. A moral elevation never before attained by man the unbeliever is willing to concede to Him, but to the Christian a sinless Saviour can alone be a real one. The Gospel history furnishes ample materials for our arriving at a conclusion on this momentous question.

The testimony of enemies naturally first claims our attention. No charge against the moral character of Jesus was ever substantiated by them. The witnesses suborned could not agree (Mark xiv. 56) ; Pilate appealed to the people to say what evil He had done, but received no reply (Matt. xxvii. 23) ; Pilate himself was convinced of His innocence (*ibid.* 24). The thief on the cross bore similar testimony (Luke xxiii. 41).

The impression produced by Him on those who for nearly three years had been in constant intercourse with Him comes next to be considered ; and here the confession of Judas the traitor that he had betrayed 'the innocent blood' (Matt. xxvii. 4) carries peculiar weight. Had this man been able to allege any obliquity of aim or conduct in his Master, he would doubtless have pleaded it as a palliation of his crime, but he was unable to do so. The disciple most intimate with Him declares that in Him was no sin (1 John iii. 5). Another describes Him as the Holy One and the Just (Acts iii. 14), as the Lamb of God 'without blemish and without spot' (1 Pet. i. 19, ii. 22). The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews pronounces Him 'holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners' (Heb. vii. 26, 27). And such, surely, is the impression which every unprejudiced reader of the Gospels receives. The character of Christ, as portrayed in them, stands alone in the annals of history. It is not merely that He propounded a pure system of morals; He was Himself the living transcript of it, a perfect example of what He taught. Where else shall we find such a union of majesty and humility, of hatred of sin and love to the sinner, of strength of purpose and boundless tenderness, of patience under suffering and active benevolence of patriotism and the widest human sympathies? In the greatest saints of the Old Testament, even in the most eminent of Christ's Apostles, we find an alloy of human infirmity; not so in Christ Himself. For the first time in history we behold in its perfection that combination of morality and religion which constitutes *holiness*; a term which has no proper counterpart in heathen antiquity.[1]

But it may be objected that the contemporaries of Christ could see only His outer life, and only a fragment of that, the greater part having been passed in obscurity; His sinlessness in the sight of God, and before He appeared in public, may yet admit of question. With respect to the former point, His inner purity, His own testimony is of the greatest moment. If bystanders could not read His heart, He Himself must be supposed acquainted with it. It is to be observed then that Christ, while reproving sin in all its forms, and insisting upon the duty and the efficacy of confession of sin, is never found confessing His own sins, or praying for forgiveness. In the prayer which He taught His disciples, and which contains a petition for forgiveness, He does not rank Himself with them: 'After this manner pray *ye*.' He challenges His enemies to lay any sin to His charge (John viii. 46); and this is not to be understood merely of the outward act, but of sin in the abstract (*ἁμαρτία*), the sinful impulse.[2] But no even ordinarily religious man, who knew himself to be a sinner, would claim a prerogative which to claim would in that case be itself a sin (1 John i. 8), or argue gross spiritual blindness.

His coming to John's baptism has been alleged as a proof that, like other Jews, He needed repentance; but in truth the narrative points the other way. To say nothing of the Baptist's indirect testimony to His having no sin to repent of ('Comest Thou to me?')—a testimony doubly valuable as coming from one who had probably been intimate with Jesus from His childhood—Jesus in His reply does not ground His request on the consciousness of sin, but on the duty of complying with divinely appointed ordinances (Matt. iii. 15). Made under the law, He was circumcised, though the symbol in His case lost its proper meaning; and similarly He submitted to John's baptism, which to Him was only the inauguration of His public ministry (Matt. iii. 16).

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[1] This topic is fully discussed in Ullmann's beautiful work, *Die Sündlosigkeit Jesu*, Zweiter Abschnitt.

[2] See Lücke's Commentary on this passage.

With respect to the other point, our ignorance of His previous life, it is enough to remark that moral perfection such as that which the Gospels exhibit could not, without a special miracle, appear all of a sudden, and *per saltum.* Each stage of advancement presupposes a former one, and the final result is always founded upon a previous history. As is the seed sown, such is the harvest. And if it be further urged that Christ may have attained the moral eminence which all ascribe to Him as He appears in the Gospels in the same way as ordinary men, viz., through inward conflict, sometimes overcome by sin, but on the whole overcoming, until the measure of holiness of which He was capable was attained, we reply that, apart altogether from original sin, one actual sin consented to leaves indelible traces behind it : the wound may be healed, but the scar remains. No man who, even for a moment, consents to an act of sin, inward or can outward, be the same man as he was before ; and hence in the case of ordinary Christians sinlessness in this life is impossible. If Christ had not been without sin in His private life He could not have been what He was in His public.

Christ, it is said, Himself disclaims the title of good (' Why callest thou Me good ? ' Mark x. 18). But the meaning of His reply depends upon that of the inquirer in his use of the word ' good ' ; and nothing is plainer than that the ruler used it without any true perception of what it implies, in a superficial manner, and as a mere compliment ; corresponding to his imperfect apprehension of his own sinfulness. In *that* sense our Lord refused the epithet, intimating further that if it was to be applied to Him at all, it must be so in the highest sense, even as it is applicable to God ; which far from implying a consciousness of sin rather implies the reverse.[1]

The result of the inquiry is that if Jesus was not sinless, He not only fell below the saints of the Old Covenant, a David, or a Daniel, and even heathen sages, in self-knowledge and humility, but instead of being what He claimed to be, the Light of the World, the way, the truth, and the life, born to bear witness to the truth (John xviii. 37), in short an infallible teacher and guide, He must be pronounced a blind leader of the blind, even if we acquit Him of conscious deception. In short, the Christ of the Gospels must either be what they describe Him to be, or forfeit all claims to our attention.

There seems to be no escape from this dilemma except in impugning the historical value of the Gospels, which accordingly is what the mythical theory of Strauss and his followers attempts to do. The enthusiasm of the first converts, we are told, threw a halo round the central personage, and invested Him with ideal qualities which had only a scanty basis of fact. But what can be more preposterous than to suppose that on Jewish soil and in the age of Christ a mythical system could have arisen ? Myth is intimately connected with polytheism, and the religion of Moses, monotheistic and severely ethical, could never have been favourable to such growths. And in the age of Christ, when prophecy and inspired song had long ceased, and in place of them the didactic service of the synagogue had arisen, presided over by Rabbis whose literary activity was confined to the interpretation of the sacred books, and under the chilling pressure of a foreign yoke, what place was there for mythical formations ? The early legends of Rome might as well be supposed to have arisen in the age of Livy or Tacitus. But further, nothing that we know of the culture or moral elevation of the Apostles, or the first converts, leads us to suppose that they could have imagined a character so original, and so consistent with itself throughout as that of Christ ; that is, drawn it from their unaided resources. This would be as great a miracle as the sinlessness of Christ itself. In short, if the Gospel history be rejected, the appearance of such a character on the stage of life is simply inexplicable. But the Gospel history gives us more information on the subject than merely a narrative of Christ's ministry.

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[1] The approved reading in St. Matthew removes all difficulty ; but there is no reason to question the authenticity of St. Mark's and St. Luke's version. See Alford on Matt. xix. 16.

45. *The Miraculous Conception*

The sinlessness claimed for Christ seems to some minds incompatible with the doctrine of original sin, according to which every man naturally born, engendered of the offspring of Adam, comes into the world with sinful tendencies, which are sure in some form or other to manifest themselves. Hence, it is argued, such perfection as is attainable by man cannot be exemplified in an individual ; it is the property of the race. The objection certainly would be strong, if Scripture did not give such an account of Christ's birth as renders His sinlessness, far from being an inexplicable phenomenon, the natural result of the circumstances of the case. The miraculous conception removes all difficulty.

The title ' Second Adam ' which in Scripture is applied to our Lord, implies not only His headship as regards the Church, but a peculiarity of origin as regards Himself. As the first Adam came into existence by a direct exercise of miraculous power, while his descendants are propagated by a natural law, so we naturally expect something analogous in the case of the second Adam. But this was not only appropriate; it was necessary. For if the effects of sin were to be reversed in the new spiritual creation, it is evident that He who was to be the first link of the series must Himself be free from the common taint; and this could not be the case, except by a miracle, had He come into the world in the ordinary way. That which is born of the flesh is, and must remain, flesh (John iii. 6). It was necessary, therefore, that as regards the person of the Redeemer an interruption should take place of the law of nature, and that though born of woman He should Himself inherit no original taint of sin.

For a human being to come into the world without sin requires that his birth should be, in whatever sense, supernatural.[1] This end, however, might, as a celebrated theologian (Schleiermacher) suggests, have been attained, even if Christ had had an earthly father, by a miraculous agency on the embryo in the womb, purging it from the taint of original sin. But this suggestion, which is thrown out in order to dispense with the doctrine of the Church that the Second Person of the Holy Trinity became incarnate in Christ, is precluded by the expressed statement of Scripture that Christ had no earthly father, that, as prophecy had intimated, a virgin conceived and brought forth a son (Matt. i. 18, 23). There is no reason to call in question the authenticity of the narrative—substantially the same in St. Matt. and St. Luke[2]; and the information was no doubt furnished by the Virgin herself, who survived the Ascension for some time. And its dogmatical import is obvious. If an embryo had been formed in Mary's womb in the usual manner, previously to the union of the Logos with it, there would have been in existence potentially, if not actually, a human person with whom the Logos formed a union, which would lead to Nestorianism, or the doctrine of two persons in Christ; whereas the doctrine of the Church is that the Logos took not an existing man but human nature in the abstract into union with Himself.[3]

It may be, as the theologian above mentioned adds, that the mere absence of earthly paternity is 'insufficient' of itself to establish the Incarnation of the Logos, but at any rate it leaves room for it, which his hypothesis does not; and the question is simply, What does Scripture teach on the subject ? It tells us, then, that a Divine overshadowing Power took the place of earthly paternity ;[1] in consequence of which the Word became flesh. This is a very different thing from the mere fact of a sinless man appearing in the world, begotten as well as born like other men. Nor is the objection valid that the absence of earthly paternity does not, after all, secure the desired end, since original sin must be supposed to descend from the mother as well as the father ; and therefore, to complete the theory, we must hold the immaculate conception of the Virgin, and of her ancestors up to Adam.[2] For in this case the mother was merely passive, merely supplied the necessary materials for an Incarnation ; and the object of the miraculous conception was that these materials should be purged of all taint of sin, so as to form a fit temple for the indwelling of Deity.[3]

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[1] So much as this is granted by Schleiermacher himself (*Glaubenslehre*, s. 97, 2).

[2] It has been objected that neither by Christ nor by the Apostles is allusion made to these events. But all the passages in which our Lord describes Himself, and the Apostles describe Him, as sent into the world from the Father, presuppose them. Especially is the miraculous agency of Christ in His public life a natural result of this unseen miracle of miracles; it is in accordance with the mode of His birth. Nor can we suppose the Apostle's expression 'born of a woman' (Gal. iv. 4) to be without emphasis.

[3] *Οὐ γὰρ προϋποστάτῃ καθ' ἑαυτὴν σαρκὶ ἡνώθη ὁ Θεῖος Λόγος, ἀλλ' ἐνοικήσας τῇ γαστρὶ τῆς ἁγιάς Παρθένου, ἀπεριγράπτως ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ὑποστάσει ἐκ τῶν ἁλνῶν τῆς Ἀειπαρθένου αἱμάτων, σάρκα ἐψυχωμένην ψυχῇ λογικῇ τε καὶ νοερᾷ ὑπεστήσατο, ἀπαρχὴν προσλαβόμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου φυράματος, αὐτὸς ὁ Λόγος γενόμενος τῇ σάρκι ὑπόστασις* (John of Damascus, *De Fid. Orth.*, iii. 2).

But on other grounds also, viz., that the Word who assumed flesh could not be begotten in time, only be born of woman, and that paternity cannot be predicated of the operation, whatever it was, of the Holy Ghost in the Virgin's womb, the idea of generation must be dissociated from the birth of Christ. Thus do the miraculous conception and the sinlessness of Christ furnish support, the one to the other ; and though it might seem as if the former were of minor importance, for a sinless being in the midst of sinful humanity would itself be a miracle, leading to conclusions beyond itself, yet when the explanation is added it is seen to be an adequate one. On the other hand, if any admixture of actual sin could have been discovered in our Lord, it would have been of little moment that the mode of the Incarnation had been revealed ; the foundation would be not merely without a superstructure, but out of harmony with the actual one.

(Status Exaltationis)

46. *The Descent into Hell*

The clause on this subject in the Apostles' Creed is not, as is well known, found in the earlier forms thereof, and appears to have been first admitted about A.D. 400. From its being placed between Christ's burial and His resurrection, there can be little doubt that in the Creed it means the temporary sojourn of our Saviour's soul in Hades, or the intermediate state. To this effect is the Article of Edward VI.: 'The body of Christ lay in the grave until His resurrection: but His spirit, which He gave up, was with the spirits which were detained in prison, or in hell, and preached unto them, as the place of St. Peter testifieth.' And by most of our writers no other descent seems to be understood.[1] There is no doubt that the soul of Christ, when He expired on the cross, did pass into hell; *i.e.*, not the final place of torment, but Sheol, or the intermediate state of the Old Testament. If such passages as Ephes. iv. 9 are of doubtful meaning, this cannot be said of St. Peter's exposition of Ps. xvi. 10 (Acts ii. 31); if Christ's soul was not left in hell, it must have gone thither. And with this agree our Lord's words to the thief on the cross, 'Today thou shalt be with Me in Paradise' (Luke xxiii. 43), or that division of Sheol which is assigned to the spirits of the just. Thus having submitted to death, He was made like unto His brethren in this point also, and fulfilled the ordinary law of humanity, viz., that they on whom death passes are not at once transferred to their final destiny, but await in an intermediate state Christ's second coming. And it is supposed that the fact was made an Article of the Creed against the Apollinarian heresy which denied that our Lord had a proper human soul.

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[1] Luke i. 35. *Πνεῦμα ἅγιον* in this passage probably means, not the third person of the Holy Trinity, but, as in Rom. i. 4, the Divine nature itself, considered as holy and the source of all holiness.

[2] Schleiermacher, *l.c.*

[3] See John of Damascus in the passage above quoted. 'Idem Spiritus singularissima præsentia et virtute Mariam semper virginem ad concipiendum mundi Salvatorem fæcundam reddidit, semen prolificum ex castis ejus sanguinibus elicuit, ab omni adhærente peccato purgavit, ipsi que Mariæ virtutem præbuit quâ conciperet ipsum Dei Filium ' (Quenstedt, p. iii. c. 3, Memb. th. 12).

It is open, however, to doubt whether this descent can properly form a part of our present subject, which is concerned with the twofold state through which Christ, in His whole proper person, passed to His final glory. The soul of Christ, though never separated from the Logos, can hardly be said to be Christ Himself while apart from His body. We must inquire then whether in Scripture any other descent is spoken of or implied. And this appears to be the case. In truth, the two famous passages 1 Pet. iii. 19 and iv. 6 seem to have been too hastily applied, as in the Article of Edward VI., to the Article in the Creed, whereas they may well bear a different meaning. It is not as in Acts ii. 31, the separate state of souls, but the resurrection of Christ, that the Apostle is principally referring to. The Saviour, he tells us, was put to death 'in the flesh' (in the body of His humiliation), but 'quickened in spirit'; in which 'He went and preached to the spirits in prison, which sometime were disobedient, in the days of Noah.' The passage, in its obvious meaning, seems to refer to some migration of Christ subsequent to His resurrection, but whether at the moment of that event and before He came forth from the tomb, or at some other time during His forty days' sojourn on earth is not specified.

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[1] Pearson, Art. v. See also Horsley's sermon on the subject.

A common interpretation of the passage makes it mean merely that the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Christ, inspired Noah to preach to the antediluvians while the ark was a preparing. Noah, no doubt, was 'a preacher of righteousness' (2 Pet. ii. 5), but it is not easy to see what connection the death and resurrection of Christ have with Noah's warnings. But there are grammatical objections also to this interpretation. The word 'went' of our English version is not in the original a mere expletive, but a principal term and significant: πορευθεὶς, having set forth on His journey, He preached, etc.: and the word 'sometime' (ποτε) is, as our version has it, connected with 'disobedient,' not with 'preached.' On the whole, the passage seems to allude to an event which took place at the moment of, or after the resurrection, and which, therefore, is not identical with the descent into hell of the Creed.

The object for which Christ is said to have thus appeared in Sheol was to preach to the antediluvian sinners, who in the days of Noah gave no heed to the patriarch's warnings. We can hardly suppose that our Lord visited them merely to confirm their sentence of condemnation; and indeed the word used (ἐκήρυξεν) does not usually bear that meaning. If we may apply the passage, 1 Peter iv. 6, to the same event, it declares that 'the Gospel was preached' (εὐηγγελίσθη) to the dead. But why to the antediluvians more than others? This the real difficulty of the passage hardly admits of a satisfactory solution. If they were penitents at the eleventh hour, it may have been to assure them of forgiveness; if they were not penitents, it may have been to offer them forgiveness on repentance. Perhaps to the Apostle's mind the human race presented itself under two great divisions, those who lived before the flood and those who lived after it. When the world was repeopled by the descendants of Noah, they were placed under a covenant of temporal mercies (Gen. ix. 15). The antediluvian sinners thus seemed to lie under a disadvantage as compared with their successors: to rectify the inequality by announcing to them the great mercies of the Christian covenant may seem not inconsistent with the Divine justice and goodness.

If this exposition of the passage be allowed, it may lead to a modification of the doctrine that the redeeming power of Christ is absolutely confined to this life, not only in reference to those who have enjoyed and misused spiritual advantages, but also in reference to the countless multitudes who, through no fault of their own, have lived and died without ever having had an opportunity of hearing of the Saviour. Dogmatical statements are on such a question out of place; but any hints of Scripture that under other conditions of existence a work of probation may still be going on, and the inequalities of this life rectified, are not to be summarily set aside. If one visit of the Saviour to the abodes of the dead is recorded, there seems no reason why it should be considered a solitary instance, and not rather a specimen ; at any rate, what occurred once may have occurred, and may occur, again.

If the foregoing view of the descent into hell is correct, the Lutheran theologians are in the right in making it the first stage in the state of exaltation, whereas the Reformed usually reckon it to that of humiliation. In fact, if the event took place at the moment of His resuscitation, the body in which He visited Sheol must have been a glorified one ; a change which, as we have seen, marks the passing from one state to the other. But the doctrine of the Lutherans that He went thither in order to triumph over Satan rests on no warranty of Scripture.[1]

47. *Resurrection, Ascension, Session at the Right Hand of God*

The resurrection of Christ is as well attested as any fact of history. The testimony is the more valuable, inasmuch as it is that of persons who, instead of being predisposed to imagine or believe the fact, showed great reluctance to receive it even when the clearest proofs were offered (Mark xvi. 11 ; Luke xxiv. 36–46). But what our Article principally insists on is that our Lord, when He rose, did so with ‘ body, flesh, and bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man’s nature ’ (Art. iv).

The materials which we possess for forming a conception of the risen Saviour’s body are scanty, and not easy of adjustment. All the accounts convey the impression that He rose not only with a real, but with the same body which had been laid in the grave. With a real body, for on His first appearance to His disciples He set at rest their doubts as to His being a spirit by tangible proof of His possessing ‘ flesh and bones ’ (Luke xxiv. 39–43). With the same body, for He showed them the print of the nails and of the spear (John xx. 27). Yet it is also evident that the resurrection-body possessed a dominion over space and matter which did not previously belong to it, or which Jesus did not choose to exercise. He passed through closed doors (John xx. 19), and though He partook of food it does not appear that He was compelled to do so by the necessities of nature. The miracle of the Ascension was an infringement of the law of gravity. The resurrection-body, in short, was not a natural, but a spiritual one (1 Cor. xv. 44).

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[1] [For further discussion concerning the interpretation of 1 Pet. iii. 19 and iv. 6 see E. G. Selwyn, *Commentary on the First Epistle of St. Peter* (London, 1947), *ad loc.*, and S. D. F. Salmond, *The Christian Doctrine of Immortality* (Fifth Edition, Edinburgh, 1913), pp. 364 ff. Editor.]

Was this change accomplished at once in all its perfection when He rose; or did it advance by gradual stages until the time when He was taken up? The latter supposition seems the more probable. The Saviour rose with an essentially glorified body; but this is not inconsistent with His having passed from one degree of glory to another until, the process being complete, He ascended to heaven.[1]

48. *Council of Chalcedon*

The elements, so far as Scripture furnishes them, of the great problem are now before us. They are, the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father and the Holy Ghost, His Incarnation in time, His real manhood, His sinlessness, and His Ascension to heaven in a real but glorified body. Christ is God and Christ is man; this is the substance of the Christian faith, and perhaps in this state of being we shall never know much more. But, as in the case of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, heresies soon made their appearance on the subject, and these gave rise to controversies and Councils which occupy a large space in Church history.

The statements of the Council of Chalcedon, A.D. 451, which is understood to have fixed the orthodox doctrine on the Person of Christ, are as follows: 'We acknowledge one and the same Christ to be perfect God and perfect man; of the same substance with the Father as regards His Godhead, and of the same substance with us as regards His manhood—in all things like unto us, sin only excepted: begotten of the Father from everlasting, but in the last days born of the Virgin (τῆς θεοτόκου); subsisting in (*al.* of) two natures, without confusion, conversion, division, or separation (ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως): the distinction between the natures not being destroyed by the union, but each preserving its own properties and both culminating in one Person and Hypostasis (ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ ὑπόστασις): one and the same Christ, not divided into two Persons. To the same effect is the language of the Athanasian Creed: 'Our Lord Jesus Christ is God and man, God of the substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds; man of the substance of His mother, born in the world: perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting: who although He be God and man is not two, but one Christ: one not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the manhood into God: one altogether not by confusion of substance but by unity of Person : for as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ.' Such definitions as these are obviously the result of protracted theological controversy.

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[1] [The supposition which Litton describes here as "more probable" is *mere* supposition unsupported by any argument which would favour its greater probability and, what is more, entirely devoid of any scriptural warrant. Editor.]

At the Council of Nice the Church finally severed itself not only from the Ebionite theories[1] which, under various forms, taught that Jesus of Nazareth was a mere man, the natural son of Joseph and Mary, but from the Arian heresy which denied his eternal Godhead. The *homoousios* of the Nicene Creed secured the proper Deity of Christ. His proper manhood had been sufficiently declared in the Apostles' Creed. But the further questions respecting the mode of union of the two natures in one Person, and of their relation to the Person, had been left in the undetermined state in which, for the most part, they are found in the writings of the early Fathers. These questions now came to the front. How could a unity of Person be secured with a duality of natures ? How could a singleness of nature be made consistent with the doctrine that the Word became flesh ?

Early in the fourth century Apollinaris, Bishop of Laodicea, a man of piety and ability, and highly esteemed even by those who differed from him, propounded the theory which bears his name, and which has not by any means received the attention which it deserves. Apollinaris was a strong opponent of Arius, but each, from different points of view, arrived at a similar conclusion. Arius appears to have held that the human nature of Christ consisted merely of His body, with which the Word entered into union, so that He had no human soul.[2] And to this he was driven by the exigency of his position. For since the Logos of Arius was a created being, and the soul of Christ, if He had one, must also have been created, the absurdity would arise of two created intelligences in one Person, a thing which is inconceivable. But if the manhood of Christ consists merely of a body, this difficulty is evaded. Apollinaris borrowed a part of his antagonist's theory, but with the view of effectually guarding against his conclusions. He assumed the trichotomic view of man's nature, according to which he is composed of body, soul, and spirit,[3] and allowing Christ the possession of an animal soul, he made the Logos take the place of the spirit, or rational faculty.[4] His motive was to obviate the Arian conception of Christ, by investing the rational nature with the attribute of unchangeableness, and consequent sinlessness. And no doubt his theory does this effectually. But it stands or falls with the validity of the trichotomic division. And independently of this, a body with a mere sensitive soul is not a man: such a being is incapable of temptation, and of moral and intellectual development. The problem, in fact, was simplified by ignoring one of its main factors. After some years of controversy, Apollinarianism was condemned at the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381, and its author deposed from his bishopric. Nevertheless, the theory, however indefensible as it came from its author, remained as a leaven in the Church, reappearing in another form in the Eutychian and Monophysite controversies. Had Apollinaris perceived that the object he had in view, viz., the *non potuit peccare* of the Saviour, might have been attained without robbing the human soul of its rational faculty, inasmuch as this faculty, the νοῦς or πνεῦμα of man's nature, has in itself an affinity with the Logos, he would probably have occupied a more important place in the history of this dogma than he does.[1]

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[1] A good account of these will be found in Dorner's work *On the Person of Christ*, i. 296, etc.

[2] Pearson on Creed, note 1 on Art. iii. Under the term ' soul ' Arius understood what the trichotomists would call ' soul and spirit.'

[3] See § 29.

[4] Apollinaris appears not to have been the first to broach this theory. It is attributed to Justin Martyr. See Hagenbach, *Dogm. Ges.*, s. 66.

About A.D. 428 Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople, a Syrian by birth and a disciple of Theodore of Mopsuestia, took occasion to side with one of his presbyters, Anastasius byname, who in his discourses had condemned the use of the word Θεοτόκος (' Mother of God ') as applied to the Virgin Mary. To Nestorius this term seemed to imply that the Virgin had given birth to Deity, thereby introducing into Christianity an idea proper to heathen mythology; in his opinion Χριστοτόκος (' Mother of Christ') was the fitting word to use. He found a vehement opponent in Cyril of Alexandria, and painful recriminations ensued. Cyril assembled a council at Alexandria A.D. 430, and anathematized Nestorius. Nestorius retorted by anathematizing Cyril. The Emperor, in the hope of allaying the strife, summoned a general Council at Ephesus A.D. 431; which, presided over by Cyril, and in the absence of the Syrian bishops, condemned Nestorius and deposed him. The sentence was carried into effect, and Nestorius ended his days in exile.

There is some difficulty in ascertaining the exact views of this unfortunate prelate; for we have to rely on the statements of opponents, who not unfrequently attributed to him what were merely their own inferences from his teaching. Thus he was accused of holding a duality of Persons in Christ, whereas he constantly disavowed any such doctrine, and even, towards the close of the contest, expressed his willingness to admit the term Θεοτόκος if accompanied with suitable explanations.[1] But whatever may have been the private views of its author, the essence of Nestorianism as a system consists in holding that the Logos, in becoming incarnate, united Himself to an existing human being ; which necessarily leads to a double personality. The Word did not assume a man into union with Himself, but became man ; the incarnation and the existence of the human factor were coincident in time. The Logos did not either find a man, or create one, and then as a secondary act unite Himself to this man ; but in the very act of incarnation a man came into being who was both Divine and human.

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[1] See Dorner, i. p. 1074.

Apart from this particular controversy, the schools of Antioch and Alexandria did really represent different tendencies. The former insisted especially on the reality of the manhood, and its likeness to ours ; the latter on the Godhead and the distinction between Christ and us. The teaching of the former might issue in a double personality, that of the latter in Monophysitism. Had Nestorius asked himself what he meant by the word *Χριστοτόκος*, which he wished to substitute for *Θεοτόκος*, he might have seen that either the change was needless, or that the word *Χρίστος* with him signified the manhood alone, not the whole Person, which it properly denotes. On the same principle he ascribed the sufferings of Christ to the manhood alone, excluding the Logos from all participation therein. He cannot, therefore, be acquitted of making, as Cyril remarks, the union a mere juncture (*συνάφεια*) of natures, otherwise wholly distinct, an inhabitation of the Logos in humanity, not a true incarnation. Against such a mechanical union Cyril maintains a ‘ physical ’ one (*ἕνωσις φυσική*) ; *i.e.* that in the act of incarnation the Logos so assumed the complex of predicates which constitute a human nature as that they cannot be applied to the manhood without at the same time being applied to the Godhead ; which, of course, effectually precludes a double personality. Yet it may be doubted whether Cyril's own doctrine advances beyond making the humanity a complex of predicates, or a mere *ὄργανον* of the Logos, without a will of its own and a relatively independent mental and moral history. The complex of predicates is held together only by the Logos, who forms the true personality and bond of union. His favourite illustrations are physical ; as the mixture of water and wine, or a piece of red-hot iron ; which latter, as Dorner remarks,[2] makes for the Nestorian as much as for the

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[1] [For a full discussion of the Nestorian question see J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Nestorius and His Teaching* (Cambridge, 1908) in which special attention is given to the discovery of the Apology of Nestorius entitled *The Bazaar of Heraclides ;* also F. Loofs, *Nestorius and His Place in the History of Christian Doctrine* (London, 1914) and R. V. Sellers, *Two Ancient Christologies* (London, 1940), pp. 107 ff. Editor.]

[2] ii. 80.

Alexandrian doctrine, since, though the fire and the metal are in union, the qualities of the one are not imparted to the other.

The difficulties on either side probably led the Council to hesitate to endorse the anathema of Cyril, or to frame a new Creed ; and on the arrival of John of Antioch with his attendant bishops, a formulary of a milder type which he had brought with him was proposed, which both Cyril and the Syrian bishops subscribed, though Nestorius was left out of the compromise. In this formulary the title *Θεοτόκος* was retained ; Christ was pronounced to be 'perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul, and with a body begotten of the Father according to His Godhead, and of the Virgin Mary according to His manhood : as regards the former, of the same substance with the Father ; as regards the latter, of the same substance with us : for of the two natures a union took place.'[1] Notwithstanding the condemnation of Nestorius, his followers multiplied and formed independent churches in the East, some of which still exist. It was, as Dorner observes, the first schism which the Church proved herself unable to overcome ; and this because she did not fully assimilate into her own system the element of truth which the doctrine contained, viz., the proper personality of the human nature.[2]

Each party continuing to propagate its views, the dispute broke out afresh, and from the opposite quarter. Eutyches, the head of a monastery in Constantinople, was charged with teaching that after the incarnation there was but one nature in Christ. This might, as in Cyril's writings, be capable of a good interpretation ; but Eutyches proceeded to explain the union of the two natures in a manner which was a virtual revival of Apollinarianism. He does not seem to have held, as is commonly supposed, that the human nature was absorbed into the Divine ; or that from the union of the two a third nature, neither the one nor the other, proceeded ; but that the human nature became so altered in its qualities as to be no longer our nature, that is, not a true human nature. He was condemned at a particular Synod held under Flavian, Patriarch of Constantinople, and deposed. His cause, however, was warmly taken up by Dioscurus, the successor of Cyril, a man of violent and unscrupulous temper, who persuaded the Emperor to allow a Synod to be convened at Ephesus A.D. 449, which from the proceedings of Dioscurus at it has received the name of the 'Robber-Synod.' This Synod reversed the condemnation of Eutyches. The passions of the contending parties rose to such a pitch that, had it not been for the influence of Leo the Great of Rome, the Eastern Church would probably have been rent in twain.

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[1] *Δυὸ γὰρ φύσεων ἕνωσις γέγονεν*. The Council evidently shrank from a more definite statement.

[2] ii. 86.

That sagacious prelate, who had allowed himself not unwillingly to be appealed to by Flavian, persuaded the Emperor Marcian to summon another Synod at Chalcedon, which formed the fourth General Council. He had previously addressed to Flavian an epistle in which, with admirable dialectical and rhetorical skill, he expounded his views of the Person of Christ. When the Council assembled, Leo's epistle was publicly read and received with acclamation ; Dioscurus was deposed ; and the celebrated Confession of Faith which derives its name from the Council was promulgated.

It would be neither pleasant nor profitable to attempt to unravel at length the tangled web of the Monophysite and Monothelite controversies ; the last of importance which on this subject agitated the ancient Church, and, like the Nestorian, led to a permanent schism. The Alexandrian school adhered to the traditions of Cyril, and Monophysitism had struck its roots deep in many other Churches of the East. Peter, Patriarch of Antioch, surnamed Fullo, from his original occupation, took occasion from the sanction of the epithet *Θεοτόκος* by the Council of Ephesus to endeavour to introduce its counterpart 'God was crucified for us' into the Trisagion of the Church. Hence arose a controversy which, under the name of Theopaschitism, continued for some years.

The more moderate Monophysites contented themselves with maintaining that after the union the natures could be distinguished only in thought (*ἐν ἐπινοιᾷ*), since, in fact, they coalesced into one nature, which however is not a simple, but a compound one. But, in truth, it was rather the practical tendencies of Monophysitism than its theoretical errors which led to its final rejection. The Council of Chalcedon had insisted upon the duplicity of the natures ; the Monophysites seemed to disavow its authority ; this was one ground of contention. The other, a more legitimate one, was that, at least in its extreme form, Monophysitism did really obscure the humanity of Christ to such an extent as to imperil its reality: the 'one nature' of Dioscurus and his followers was the Divine nature with a semblance of humanity attached to it. After vain attempts by the Emperors Zeno and Justinian I to find a middle ground on which both parties could meet, the more decided Monophysites separated themselves, choosing as their leader a monk named Jacob Baradæus. This remarkaable man, after procuring for himself episcopal consecration, travelled through the East in the garb of a beggar, ordaining Monophysite bishops and presbyters, and founding Churches ; and at his death left the sect in a flourishing condition in Syria and Mesopotamia. From him they received the name of Jacobites. The favour which the Saracen invaders naturally showed to the Monophysite tenets widened the breach between them and the Church ; and independent Churches, still existing, were founded in Egypt, Abyssinia, and Armenia. Those of the two former countries acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Alexandria ; the Armenian Church is entirely independent.

The controversy, under the form of Monothelitism, broke out again in the seventh century. Sophronius, a monk of Alexandria, taking exception to the phrase ‘ one energy ’ (μία ἐνέργεια) as applied to the miracles of Christ, signalized his accession to the patriarchate of Jerusalem by a confession of faith in which he strenuously maintained a duplicity of energy, corresponding to the duplicity of the natures. Cyrus of Alexandria, his opponent, had the matter referred to Honorius of Rome, who counselled the avoiding altogether of the terms in debate, but incidentally remarked that the real point in dispute was not whether there was a singleness of energy, but whether there was a singleness of will in Christ. He himself inclined to the latter opinion. This gave rise to the Monothelite controversy, which ran through the usual stages of theological rancour. Scripture appears plainly to ascribe two wills to Christ (‘ not My will, but Thine be done ’) ; but the Monothelites were ready with a reply which is used by John of Damascus himself in another connection, viz., that Christ in such passages did not speak in His own person but in ours, by way of instruction and example. After the death of Honorius mutual excommunications and depositions took place, until at length Constantinus Pogonatus summoned a Council at Constantinople A.D. 680 (the sixth general one), at which, after the reading of an epistle from Pope Agathon, it was determined that there are two natures in Christ so there are two wills, not opposed to each other, but the human subject to and always in harmony with the Divine. Monothelitism, thus condemned, lingered for a time in the Syrian sect of the Maronites, but it died away in the Church.

There is no more uninviting chapter of Church history, in its external aspects, than that which relates to this controversy. The rancour of the disputants, their mutual anathemas, the unconcealed rivalry of the Sees of Rome and Constantinople, the political influences at work, leave a painful impression on the mind of the student, who on reading the account of some of the proceedings feels how true the statement is that even General Councils are ‘ an assembly of men whereof all are not governed with the Spirit and Word of God ’ (Art. xxi). These reflections, however, will probably give place to others when the matter is considered on its own merits, and apart from the infirmities of the human agents.

The questions at issue were really of vital importance, which cannot be said of all ecclesiastical movements ; and the decisions ultimately arrived at display a sobriety of judgment and a consistency with Scripture which lead to the conviction that in forming them the Church at large enjoyed the promised presence and assistance of her Divine Head (Matt. xviii. 20 ; xxviii. 20). It is important, however, to note the character of these decisions. They were negative rather than positive, repellent of error rather than explanatory of the truth. There were not two Persons in Christ, there was not one nature, nor one will and energy ; the union took place without change, admixture, etc. The Church laid down certain landmarks, or, to vary the image, buoys, beyond which it was not safe for speculation to venture ; but wisely forebore to attempt a positive explanation of the mystery. Within the channel marked out varieties of exposition are admissible ; but they probably will only issue in disappointment. For, in truth, the problem of the incarnation, like the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, is beset with difficulties which the finite mind of man seems incapable of grappling with. We see here, emphatically, through a glass darkly. An attentive reader of the history of the dogma will probably perceive that it involves three main questions : 1. That relating to the kenosis, or exinanition, of the Logos. 2. That relating to the hypostatical union. 3. That relating to the perichoresis, or interpenetration of the natures.

49. *Kenosis, or Exinanition, of the Logos*

This point did not specially engage the attention of the early Church, which was occupied rather with the notions to be formed of the Person of Christ *after* the incarnation. It came into greater prominence in the disputes between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches in the seventeenth century ; and in more recent times, but principally in Germany, it has drawn to itself the attention of many distinguished theologians.

St. Paul tells us (Phil. ii. 7) that Christ when He was in the form of God thought it not a thing to be snatched at or retained to be equal with God, but made Himself of no reputation (ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε) —literally, ' emptied Himself '; and on the meaning of these last words the controversy mainly turns. By the Lutheran theologians they are understood of the Logos incarnate, and of the earthly life of Christ. Being by virtue of the communication of Divine properties to the manhood, which took place from the moment of the conception, in the form of God, He yet laid aside His native dignity, and took upon Him the form of a servant ; *i.e.*, as it is explained, while retaining the *possession* of the Divine attributes (omnipotence, omnipresence, etc.) He forbore the *use* of them, hid them as it were under a veil, and only occasionally permitted glimpses of them to appear.

But the difficulties connected with this interpretation are very great. It imposes on us the belief that Christ as a babe in the womb possessed omniscience without using it, which seems a contradiction, and exercised omnipotence while unconscious, as man, of His own personality. Thus an air of unreality becomes attached to the manhood in that stage, and the same, to some extent, may be said of all the subsequent stages till the ascension. Moreover, deliberately to renounce the exercise of powers latently possessed implies a conscious act of will ; and the difficulty recurs, how are we to conceive Christ as a babe exerting such an act of will ? There seems, further, no room left for a real human development, for the Logos from the first absorbs the manhood into Himself, and the latter becomes a mere instrument, a Theophany, a dramatic representation. In short, the theory is plainly of Docetic tendency. But a still more formidable difficulty remains. The conception in the womb is itself assigned to the kenosis ; but if so, where is the manhood which laid aside its inherent majesty ? It must be one antecedent to the conception, *i.e.* it must be a pre-existent manhood, sharer of the Divine glory and attributes, which it abdicated in order to enter the Virgin's womb. And thus, in its natural result, the Lutheran doctrine seems to lead to the notion of a double manhood, one before time, the other in it.

The preference then must be given to the interpretation generally adopted by the Reformed theologians, according to which the words 'being in the form of God' refer to the Logos ἄσαρκος, or the second Person of the Holy Trinity before He became man ; and the passage will then be to the effect that the Logos submitted to a self-limitation whereby it became possible for Him to enter into union with the manhood, without annihilating its natural properties, or interfering with its relatively independent development. In other words, the act of incarnation itself, and irrespectively of the subsequent humiliations endured by the Saviour, was a kenosis, or self-emptying. What conception are we to form of this ?

There appear to be only two ways in which we can imagine such a kenosis to have taken place. We may suppose that the Logos, in order to adapt Himself to the state of the embryo in the womb and the babe in the manger, a state devoid of self-consciousness, suspended for the time His own Divine self-consciousness, gradually recovering it as the babe grew according to the ordinary laws of humanity ; a theory which has been maintained by distinguished names abroad.[1] By a

[1] Thomasius and his followers.

free act of omnipotence and unbounded love, the Logos extinguished for the time being His personality, and became unconscious in the unconscious infant, partially conscious in the child, fully so in the man.

The first objection to this hypothesis is that it seems inconsistent with the ἀτρέπτως of the Council of Chalcedon, and tends to a temporary eclipse of the Holy Trinity; the personality of the second Person, which cannot really be separated from His nature, suffering *pro tempore* an extinction. Moreover, instead of the Logos being Himself the active animating principle of the incarnation (which is the doctrine of the Church), He here becomes a mere impersonal nature on a level with the impersonal embryo;[1] and in order to obtain such an active principle presiding over the union of the natures, the Holy Ghost takes the place of the Logos. This latter, indeed, is a characteristic of the Reformed theology as compared with the Lutheran. It is plain that the union of two unconscious natures, neither of them exercising the functions of a true personality, seems hardly to come up to the idea of the incarnation, as it is represented in Scripture.

But if this theory is rejected, the only other conceivable mode of self-limitation is that which leaves the Logos in full possession of His active personality, but supposes that the fulness of the Divine nature was not at once communicated to the human, but gradually, according to the receptivity of the latter.[2] That is, the union was not, as the Lutheran divines teach, complete from the first, but was itself a *process*, involving successive acts; a continual efflux of the Divine nature into the human, not an act perfected at once. The union kept pace with the growth of the manhood; being different in the babe from what it was in the man, and in the earthly life from what it is in the heavenly, and in the present heavenly life from what it will be when the time spoken of in 1 Cor. xv. 28 arrives. The Logos *intra carnem* was never during the earthly life present in His fulness as He is *extra carnem*; not because He had abdicated His essential Godhead, but because He had not communicated it to the manhood in all its fulness, nor could do so until the manhood was *capax infiniti*.[3] There was a kenosis therefore of the Logos, so far as the man Christ Jesus was concerned, but none of His own essential nature. The knowledge, *e.g.*, which Christ possessed was Divine; not merely such a knowledge as Christians also possess, but Divine through the indwelling of the Logos : it was a knowledge *sui generis*, and absolutely free from error : but it was not omniscience as an attribute of Deity. The Logos exercised, so to speak, a measure of self-restraint in communicating this and the other Divine attributes, in tender condescension to the weakness for the time being of the human factor. And thus Christ could and did say, ‘ My Father is greater than I,’ as well as ‘ I and the Father are one ’ (John xiv. 28, x. 30) ; He could be, and was, ignorant of the day when the end should come (Mark xiii. 32).

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[1] The embryo is called ἅγιον, in the neuter gender (Luke i. 35). Compare τὸ γεννηθὲν, Matt. i. 20. See Martensen, *Dog.*, s. 132.

[2] The theory of Dorner and others. See Dorner, *Theil*, ii. 1272.

[3] This capacity, according to Dorner and those of his way of thinking, was actually attained at the Ascension: so that Christ's human nature is now fully partaker of the Divine attributes (*Theil.* ii 1200–64). Dorner alleges the possibility of death, or the separation of soul and body, as a proof that the hypostatical union was not, during our Lord's earthly sojourn, complete.

This notion of the kenosis certainly avoids the difficulties connected with the former, but it involves one of its own hardly less formidable. It involves the idea of a *double consciousness* in the Logos, viz., that belonging to Himself as a Divine Person and that belonging to Him as incarnate in Christ, which plainly, according to the theory, are not, or at least were not for a time, coincident. And is such a double consciousness consistent with the unity of the Person, or rather of the personality, of Christ ? In truth this is a difficulty which meets us, more or less, in every attempt to explain the mystery. Even if we suppose that this duality of consciousness is now at an end, the human nature having become capable of receiving the Godhead in all its fulness, must it not have existed during the state of humiliation ?

50. *The Hypostatical Union* (ἕνωσις ὑποστατικὴ—*unio personalis*)

The doctrine of the Council of Chalcedon is that the Divine and the human natures are united in one Person, viz., the Person of the Logos ; hence the term *Unio personalis*. This union is distinguished from several other kinds. It is not, says Hollaz, *notionalis sive rationis*, as when genus and difference make the species ; not *respectivè* (σχετικὴ), as when two friends are said to have one soul ; not accidental, of which whiteness and sweetness in milk, honey and water in mead (κατὰ σύγχρασιν), two beams in juxtaposition (κατὰ παράστασιν), the matter and grace of the sacraments, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the faithful, are examples ; not *essential*, as when two imperfect substances go to make one nature, *e.g.*, the soul and body in man, whereas in Christ two perfect natures are in union ; but altogether singular and wonderful, a union of natures but not a natural one, a personal one, but not of persons. It is called perichoristic, *i.e.*, intimate and most perfect, denoting a mutual inter-penetration of the things united. He adds, very properly, that such a union can only be of substances in themselves, *i.e.*, abstractedly, diverse in nature. John of Damascus mentions other kinds of union not to be confounded with this ;—κατὰ ταυτοβουλίαν as when there is a unity of will between two persons, καθ' ὁμοτιμίαν as when God is said to have exalted the man Christ Jesus to like honour with Himself, καθ' ὁμωνυμίαν merely nominal and κατ' εὐδοκίαν of goodwill. The Council attempted no positive explanation of the manner in which the union of the natures in the Person took place.

The technical words employed in these discussions, ‘ Nature,’ and ‘ Person,’ labour under an ambiguity which has led to much fruitless controversy. The Logos must be held to have assumed, not indeed *a* man, but still *a* human nature ; the totality of our nature, but individualized in His person. And this is what the Council means by affirming that Christ is a ‘ perfect man,’ for a complex of predicates, without will and intelligence, and a central Ego, would not be such. By the two natures then we must understand *concrete* natures, God Himself subsisting in an individual man.

Then with respect to the word ‘ Person,’ which the Council distinguishes from the ‘ natures,’ when it declares that two natures are combined in one Person, we may ask, What is the Person of the Logos apart from His nature, *i.e.* the Divine essence ? A mere mode of subsistence in the Godhead ; not what we usually mean by the word, viz., an individual with an independent will, and real subsistence. God the Son is God with the personal property of filiation, which is a mere relation in which He stands to the Father. What we mean by personality belongs to the One God, the common ‘ substance ’ or essence of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, not to the immanent relations of the Holy Trinity considered by themselves ; just as in the case of an earthly father personality belongs to him as a man, not to his paternity, or the relation in which he stands towards his son. Hence it will be seen that such a question as Thomas Aquinas has proposed, whether the union took place in the Person, or in the natures, has no proper meaning.

The trinitarian hypostasis, or Person, of the Logos, without the connotation of His nature, *i.e.* the Godhead itself, does not seem capable of assuming a human nature. The union was effected neither in the Person alone, nor in the nature alone, but in both ; *i.e.*, the incarnation was the work of the Holy Trinity so far as it was God who became flesh, but it terminated, in scholastic language, in the Person of the Son : in which latter sense it cannot be said that the Father, or the Holy Ghost, became incarnate. Does it not seem to follow that if the Person of the Son is severed from His nature, while the two natures are to be considered as abstractions, not living realities, little place is left for a true personal subject, a thinking and willing agent, in the incarnate Logos ?

These remarks may serve to point out the difficulties that beset the subject. The question the Church had to deal with was this : the true meaning of the words ‘ Person ’ and ‘ nature ’ as used in this connection, being borne in mind, how were the natures to be brought into union so as to form the One Christ as He appears on the page of Scripture ? The illustration of the Athanasian Creed, from the compound nature of man, is not to the point. The soul, the animating principle of the body, and which corresponds to the Divine nature in Christ, is not, like the Godhead, a complete nature in itself, but only a part of man’s nature ; whereas the Divine nature is no part of any other, it exists *a se*, in the plenitude of its personality and attributes.

Shall we suppose the two natures so to combine as to form a mixed one ? But then Christ is neither God nor man, but a *tertium quid.* Shall we suppose a process of absorption to take place ? But if the human nature is absorbed in the Divine, Christ has no real manhood : if the Divine in the human, He has no real Godhead, to say nothing of the impropriety of ascribing a change to what is absolutely unchangeable. If, as we have seen, the natures are not mere abstractions, and this Scylla is to be avoided, how are we to keep clear of the Charybdis of a double personality in Christ ? If the natures are supposed to be united in the Person (*unio personalis*), which is in fact the received mode of explanation, is a Trinitarian Person, in its proper meaning, capable of such a function ? But it may be well to let one of the orthodox writers of the Church, a standard authority both in the East and West, John of Damascus, speak for himself in his attempt to frame a consistent theory.

In his treatise on the Incarnation this writer, after speaking of the miraculous conception, thus proceeds : The Logos was not united to a human body already in existence, but dwelling in the womb of the Virgin while in his own person uncircumscribed he formed the subsistence (ὑπεστήσατο) of a body and a rational soul, the Logos Himself becoming the hypostasis of the human nature : so that there was simultaneously flesh—the flesh of the Logos—and flesh animated by a soul.[1] Wherefore we do not say that man was deified, but that God became man ; for God perfect in nature became man perfect in nature, yet without coalescing into one. If this latter were maintained Christ would be of the same substance neither with the Father, whose nature is simple, nor yet with His mother, whose nature was not compounded of Deity and humanity. The errors of heretics proceed from their confounding the nature with the hypostasis. When we speak of one nature of man, we mean that which is common to many hypostases

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[1] *Ἅμα σὰρξ ἅμα Θεοῦ Λόγου σάρξ, ἅμα σὰρξ ἔμψυχος* (*De F. O.*, lib. iii. c. 2)

(*i.e.* persons), viz. having a body and soul, each hypostasis possessing these two natures (or substances). But as regards our Lord, since there never was, or can be, more than one Christ, there can be no such thing as a common Christ-nature, a *Χριστότης* ; but we have one Hypostasis in two perfect natures, the Hypostasis being on this account a compound one (*σύνθετος*). As in the Holy Trinity the subsistence of three Persons does not affect the unity of the Godhead, nor is the Unity of the Godhead inconsistent with the subsistence of the three Persons, so a duplicity of natures is not inconsistent with the one Christ, *for they are united in the Person* (*καθ' ὑπόστασιν*). We do not affirm that the whole nature of the Godhead was united to all the persons of humanity, but that the whole nature of the Godhead was united to the whole nature of the manhood, *ὅλος ὅλῳ*. The peculiar property of the Person of Christ, that wherein He differs from the Father and the Holy Ghost, from His mother and from us, is that He is at the same time God and man. By the terms ' perfect God ' and ' perfect man ' we signify the fulness and completeness of the natures ; in saying ' wholly God ' and ' wholly man ' we signify the individual singularity of the Person. In the Holy Trinity the proper phrase is not *ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο*, but *ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος* ; but as regards the Person of Christ it is *ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο*, not *ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος*.[1]

The following is of importance : ' Although no nature is without an hypostasis, or essence without a person in whom it inheres, it does not follow that natures united to each other in an hypostasis should have each its own hypostasis ; for they can unite into one hypostasis, both having one and the same. The hypostasis of the Logos, being that of both natures, occasions the human nature neither to be without an hypostasis nor yet to have one of its own ; both natures possess it in its totality, without division or separation. The human nature was not made an hypostasis alongside the hypostasis of the Logos, but subsisting in the latter it may be called *ἐνυπόστατος*, *i.e.* owing its hypostasis to another, whereas *ἀνυπόστατος* would mean that it has no hypostasis at all, neither one of its own nor a borrowed one.'[2]

The substance of this exposition is that the prime movement, towards the incarnation came from the Logos, *i.e.* God under the hypostatical character of the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, not from the manhood ; the former being the active, the latter the passive agent : that the two natures even after the union remain distinct : that there is, however, but one Christ, the unity of the Christ being secured by the union of the natures in the hypostasis of the Logos. Thus far it is merely an expansion of the statements of the Council of Chalcedon, and no doubt fairly represents the accepted doctrine of the Church. But when it is examined carefully, and with a view to its inner consistency, it is less satisfactory. The natures remain distinct, *i.e.* as the writer explains it, Deity is not humanity, nor humanity Deity : this indeed is self-evident ; but is he not attaching to the word ' nature ' that self-same abstract sense which, as we have seen, is quite inapplicable to the Divine nature, *i.e.* making it a complex of predicates instead of God Himself in His full personality ? Deity (Θεότης) did not unite itself to humanity, but the Logos became man in the actual man Christ Jesus. The natures in the abstract sense appear in Christ as living realities; God, not Deity ; an individual man, not humanity. But if this be so, how can the natures thus understood be said to remain distinct after the union ? Do they not rather seem to unite so as to form the one God-man, as He actually appears on the sacred page ?

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[1] *De F. O.*, lib. iii. cc. 2–8.
[2] *De F. O.*, iii. c. 9.

It seems as if the ἀτρέπτως, ἀσυγχύτως, etc., of the Council refer not so much to the *result* of the union as to the *mode* in which it was effected; it was not effected by conversion, fusion, etc., but by the hypostatical assumption. But this does not determine what view of Christ's Person we are to take *after* the assumption ; and if even then we are to consider the natures, in their proper sense, as distinct, it is not easy to see how we are to avoid the notion of a mere juxtaposition of the Logos and the man Christ, the συνάφεια which Cyril contends against, whereas St. John says that the Logos became flesh. This is one difficulty that meets us. And another is connected with John of Damascus' statement that the human nature has no proper hypostasis, or personality, of its own ; that of the Logos fulfilling this function. But a humanity without a central ego, the source of will and determination, seems a mutilated one ; it seems at best but a mere instrument, or ὄργανον, of the Logos. That is not the conception we form of the Christ of the Gospels. According to this theory, we seem to have in Christ a human nature defective in the property of personality, on the summit of which, to supply the defect, is placed the Divine personality of the Logos ; apart from which common bond of union the natures would have a tendency to fly asunder.

But a human nature distinct from the Divine, and, in order to keep it in union therewith, deprived of its own independent hypostasis, which is replaced by a Divine hypostasis, is a conception certainly not without its peculiar difficulties. And these were felt, and attempts made to obviate them. The assumption was made that personality did not in fact appertain to the perfection of a human nature. Thomas Aquinas supposes an opponent to urge that the human nature in Christ cannot be supposed of less dignity than ours ; and that to a perfect humanity it certainly does appertain to possess a proper personality, *i.e.* whenever the nature becomes individualized as it did in Christ. His reply does not seem very satisfactory. Personality, he says, only belongs to the perfection of a thing in so far as it belongs to its perfection to subsist by itself. But this condition disappears if it subsists in another more exalted than itself ; which is the case as regards the human nature in Christ. The absence of its own personality is compensated by that of the Logos; it gains by the loss. The human nature in Christ is more excellent than ours, just as the sensitive soul, which is common to man and the brute, is more excellent in the former by reason of its conjunction with an intelligent nature. But the question relates not to the excellence of what a thing is joined to, but to the perfection of the thing itself which is joined ; and the illustration does not determine whether an individualized human nature without a personality of its own can be considered a perfect one.

Another illustration which Aquinas uses betrays the weakness of his position. Not every individual substance, he says, is a person, but only that which subsists by itself ; the hand of Socrates, *e.g.*, though an individual substance, is not a person, because it subsists only in something more perfect than itself, viz. Socrates. If the human nature bears only the same relation to the Person which the hand of a man does to the man, it plainly occupies a very subordinate position in our conception of Christ. In later times, after the Adoptionist controversy, the theory was fully carried out, and the general doctrine of Church writers was that the manhood in Christ is impersonal. What John of Damascus means by a ‘ compound hypostasis ’ is not quite clear. If it is only that the hypostasis of Christ is that of both natures, it is but repeating what he had already said ; if that the human nature had, after all, a personality of its own, but that it was, in some sense, united to that of the Logos, the union of a Divine and a human personality into a compound one seems as difficult of comprehension as the union of a Divine and human nature into a compound nature.

The same line of reasoning is pursued in reference to the duplicity of wills in Christ, and occasions the same difficulty. Against the Monothelites John of Damascus remarks that the faculty of will is a property not of the person but of the nature. What we possess without learning it belongs to the nature, but we all possess the faculty of willing without learning it. Man was created in the image of God, who is absolutely free, and therefore he must have a will. If will were a matter of the person and not of the nature there would be three wills in the Holy Trinity, for there are three Persons ; but inasmuch as there is but one

Divine will, it must belong to the nature (*i.e.* the common essence) of the Godhead. But since in Christ there is confessedly a duplicity of natures, it follows that there is also in Him a duplicity of wills. Scripture attributes a real human will to Christ. And the same may be said of the 'energies' of Christ, which are twofold, corresponding to the natures. It will be seen that throughout this reasoning the 'nature' is not regarded as an abstraction, such as Deity or humanity, which as such can have no will, but as individualized in a person ; and then arises the question, How are the wills to be held in union so as that the unity of the Person shall not be impaired ? The answer is, as before, that the wills are held together in the hypostasis, or Person, of the Logos. 'It is impossible to combine two wills into a compound one, any more than two natures ; what name could we give it ? It would neither be Divine nor human.' But how can the person of the Logos, a mere relation, operate apart from His nature, which is the real source of His will ? And if under His Person we include His nature, is not the whole tantamount to saying that the will of the Logos holds the will of the manhood in union ? which, whether it be true or not, seems inconsistent with what John of Damascus elsewhere says respecting the independence of Christ's human will. For the Divine will holding the human one in union must plainly be the dominant principle, and the human will can only exercise itself so far as that of the Logos permits. And thus it seems deprived of the characteristic of a really free will, viz., self-originating power. The Logos makes use of the human will much as the soul makes use of the body.

It cannot be disguised that the general effect of the theory that the Trinitarian Person is the bond of union between the natures and the wills otherwise distinct, is to leave the natures without a real union and to assign an undue preponderance to the Divine aspect of the Redeemer's person. And since the mediatorial office of Christ as our High Priest rests on the truth of His human nature (Heb. ii. 17), it cannot be matter of surprise that there should have been a tendency in medieval Christianity to lose sight of the Saviour as our advocate with the Father, and to set up other mediators in His place. It may be doubted, too, whether such a manhood is capable of ethical development. Could Christ be really tempted, resist the temptation, submit His will to that of the Father, learn obedience by what He suffered, become perfect through suffering, earn His crown of glory as a reward —all which Scripture attributes to Him—without a human personality, the seat of self-determining energy ? Or could He be an example and an encouragement to us ? The Councils and theologians have negatively guarded the essentials of the faith, but it can hardly be said that they have given us the full portraiture of God manifest in the flesh. The difference of the natures *in the abstract* it is no doubt essential to maintain, but what we want to realize is the unity of the Person including the natures, the Person of the one Christ, God and man.

As Nitzsch remarks (*Syst.*, § 131), perhaps the point of departure has been taken too much from physical analogies, such as the soul and body, or the heated iron, which after all explain nothing ; and too little from the descriptions which Scripture gives of the Christian life. In Scripture the nature of God and the nature of man do not repel each other, like the opposite poles of a magnet, but rather have a mutual affinity. Man was created in the image of God, and God from the beginning was actuated by a love of man, φιλανθρωπία (Tit. iii. 4). The union restored between fallen man and God, in and through Christ, is ethical rather than physical. But very strong expressions are used concerning it. ‘ I live,’ says St. Paul, ‘ yet not I, but Christ liveth in me ’ (Gal. ii. 20) ; ‘ Christ is our life ’ (Col. iii. 4) ; ‘ he that is joined to the Lord is one spirit ’ (1 Cor. vi. 17). The Holy Spirit bears witness with their spirits that Christians are sons of God (Rom. viii. 14–16). Prayer is the voice of the Spirit Himself in their heart (*ibid.* 26). Yet Paul's individuality stands out distinct on the inspired page, and is not interfered with by the presence of Christ in him. He lived with the consciousness of perfect freedom, and yet his human life was continually taken up into the life of God. Here is a union of God and man entirely removed from physical conceptions, and yet surely not the less real. And it may aid us in our attempts to explain the incarnation, so far as it can be explained. Christ stands out on the inspired page as a man like ourselves, with a human will, and human energies ; tempted, resisting, suffering, victorious ; but His human will, though real, yet being free from any taint of sin, was evermore, and immediately in each crisis, taken up into perfect union with that of the indwelling Logos. From one point of view He is altogether Divine, and from another He is altogether human ; and this probably is the mode in which most simple-minded Christians receive the mystery.

51. *Personal Propositions. Communication of the Attributes*
(*Propositiones personales. Perichoresis. Communicatio idiomatum*)

The natures, however abstractedly distinct, cannot be supposed to be in mere juxtaposition, united by a Divine hypostasis which like a ring contains them within its circumference. A communion between them of some sort there must be. Leo had attempted to satisfy this requirement by his well-known Canon, ‘Each nature acts according to its own properties, but with the participation of the other; *e.g.*, Christ walked on the lake by virtue of His human nature to which alone walking belongs, but that He did not sink was owing to the participation of the Divine nature in the act. But even this left the natures too far apart, and it was felt necessary to bring them into some closer relation. The explanation of John of Damascus is as follows:

'The Logos made human properties His own, inasmuch as what belongs to His flesh belongs to Him, and imparts to His flesh (*i.e.* His human nature) Divine properties; according to the method of mutual communication (ἀντίδοσις), and by virtue of the interpenetration of the natures (περιχώρησις). Thus the Lord of glory is said to have been crucified (1 Cor. ii. 8), although His Divine nature could not suffer; and the Son of Man is said to be in heaven while upon earth in his human nature. For it was one and the same that was Lord of glory and Son of Man. And we acknowledge that to the same Person both the miracles and the sufferings belong; though by virtue of one nature (κατ' ἄλλο) He performed the miracles, and by virtue of the other endured the sufferings. When we contemplate the natures we call them Deity and humanity; but the one compound hypostasis we sometimes name Christ, *i.e.* both God and man, or God incarnate; sometimes, from one of its parts, God only or the Son of God, and man only or the Son of Man. When we speak of the Deity (*i.e.* in the abstract) we do not attribute to it human properties; we cannot say it was created, or capable of suffering: nor, again, do we attribute to the humanity (in the abstract) Divine attributes, *e.g.* to have been uncreated. But when we speak of the Person we attribute both the one and the other to Him: Christ died, Christ is in heaven (while upon earth); this Man is uncreated, and uncircumcised, etc. This is what we mean by antidosis; either nature imparting to the other its own properties, by virtue of the unity of the Person and the Perichoresis.'[1] He speaks also of a certain deification (θέωσις) of the human nature, through its union with the Divine; which he explains as being 'enriched with Divine energies'; as, *e.g.*, in the miracles, it did not perform them by virtue of its own properties, but through its union with the Logos in His hypostasis, the Logos exerting His Divine power through the human nature.[2] But this adds little to what he had previously said concerning the antidosis and the perichoresis.

It may be doubted whether in all this John of Damascus arrives at any real perichoresis of the natures. At least, the examples he gives are merely those which were afterwards called 'Personal propositions,' from their belonging rather to the Person which holds the natures in union than to the natures themselves.

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[1] *De F. O.*, lib. iii. cc. 3, 4.

[2] *De F. O.*, lib. iii. c. 17. He extends this deification to the human will in Christ, from its union with the 'Divine and omnipotent' will of the Logos. But can a human will deified by union with an Omnipotent will be said to remain a human will in any proper sense?

Thomas Aquinas does little more than reproduce the reasoning of his predecessor. 'Since the Person,' he says, 'of the Son of God, which is correctly expressed by the Word "Deus," is the sustaining principle (*suppositum*) of the human nature which the word "Homo" in the concrete denotes, it is plain that this proposition, *Deus est homo*, is true and proper, not only on account of the truth of the terms, but on account of the truth of the predication.'[1] That is, in reference to this particular Man, the proposition holds good, *Deus est homo*; but, as he explains afterwards,[2] the natures in the abstract, Deity and humanity, exclude each other.

The question concerning the adoration of Christ is treated in the same way by both writers. 'In what hypostasis,' asks John of Damascus 'dost thou worship the Son of God? One incarnate nature in the hypostasis of the Logos; worshipped with one worship since the Person (*πρόσωπον*), though of two natures, is one.'[3] So Thomas Aquinas.[4] In other words, the human nature in the abstract is not an object of adoration, but the whole Person is; and this person is man as well as God; so that we may say, not that humanity but that this Man is to be worshipped.

Shortly after the Reformation the differences between the Reformed and the Lutheran branches of the Protestant Church brought the question of the union of the natures into prominence. Luther taught that Christ in His glorified body is present in the consecrated elements; Zwingli, and the Swiss churches in general, allowed only a spiritual presence. Among the arguments employed by the latter against the Lutherans, a principal one was that ubiquity must thus be ascribed to the human nature, and this re-opened the whole controversy respecting the communion of the natures. The Reformed Confessions touch lightly on the subject. We do not hold, says the Helvetic Confession 1566, that the Divine nature in Christ suffered, or that Christ according to His human nature is omnipresent. For the body of Christ, though glorified, has not laid aside its properties, or become absorbed in the Divine nature.[1] So the Heidelberg Cathechism : ' Christ is true God and true man ; therefore according to the human nature He is not on earth, but according to His Deity, majesty, grace, and Spirit, He is never absent from us.[2]

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[1] *De Incarn.*, q. xvi. art. 1. The truth of the terms *i.e.*, the same Christ is truly God and truly man, therefore God is man; the truth of the predication, *i.e.* man may be truly predicated of God. This may be the place to notice an ambiguity in the use of the word 'hypostasis,' or 'persona,' which John of Damascus not infrequently falls into. Sometimes he uses it, as Thomas Aquinas does here, to signify the *suppositum*, or sustaining principle (*ὑπόστασις*), of the human nature; that the human nature has the ground of its subsistence in the Logos. At other times he seems to mean by it the central ego, the personality, of an individual; that is, of the Logos, so far as He can be considered an individual. The former sense may be consistent with a true ego, or personality, of the human nature, hardly the latter.

[2] *De Incarn.*, q. xvi. art. 5.

[3] *De Sanct. Trin.*, q. 5.

[4] *De Incarn.*, q. xxv. art. 1.

The Lutheran Confessions are more distinct. We teach, says the *Formula Concordiæ*, that though each nature retains its essential properties, so that, *e.g.*, to be omnipotent, omnipresent, etc., are not properties of human nature essentially, and to be circumscribed, to suffer, to die, etc., are not properties of the Divine nature essentially (that is, that the one nature is not formally changed into the other), yet on account of the hypostatical union that of the natures is much more than a mere nominal one,[3] otherwise it would be impossible to say, This man is God. After the incarnation the human nature belongs to the Person not less than the Divine ; therefore wherever Christ is, there He must be in His human nature. But in His Divine Nature He is omnipresent ; unless, therefore, we rend the Person asunder so must He be in His human nature. Yet this does not mean that the human nature is *locally* expanded, so as to fill all places in heaven and earth ; this cannot be said even of the Divine nature. That the humanity is not receptive of Divine properties cannot be proved : does not Christ Himself say, ' All power is given unto Me,' etc., and ' Where two or three are gathered, etc., there am I ' ? If the union of the natures were merely nominal, of what value would the atonement be ? Whereas it was the participation of the Divine nature in Christ's sufferings that rendered them efficacious to take away sin ?

Here then is a difference of no small moment amongst Protestants themselves. On the Lutheran side it may be said, ' You admit that the Person of the Logos constitutes that of the manhood ; does, then, the nature pass with the Person or not ? If it does, the Divine attributes must sooner or later pass with it, for in God the attributes cannot be *in re* separated from the nature. If it does not, the Person of the Logos apart from His nature is, as already explained, a mere relation. Nor must we argue to the capacities of human nature from the actual condition of man born in sin and subject to death, but from human nature as it appears in the second Adam, and in its glorified state ;

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[1] Augusti, *Lib. Symb. Eccl. Ref.*, p. 27.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 549.

[3] The antidosis of John of Damascus and ἀλλοίωσις of Zwingli, against which Luther inveighs so vehemently.

of *this* manhood, though not of our present empirical one, it may be true that *Finitum capax infiniti est.*'

Had the Lutherans stopped here, it might not have been so easy to dislodge them from their position. But they took up other ground hardly tenable, *e.g.* that the communication of the properties was complete from the moment of the incarnation, so that the babe Christ even in the womb was omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient. Only He forebore the *use* of these attributes. It has already been observed how in the crucial instance of omniscience this theory *must* be modified, the possession and the use being here inseparable. The Logos, in short, according to the Lutherans, is not and cannot be *extra carnem.* Wherever He is, there is also the manhood which is now inseparable from the Person. And in order to make this consistent with the nature of a real body, which must, if it become visible, be circumscribed in space, they invented the curious notion of an ' illocal ' presence (*illocalis præsentia*), *i.e.* a presence which, like the Divine omnipresence, is disconnected from the ideas of space and visibility. When Christ, *e.g.*, shall appear at the last day, it will be a *manifestation* in space of the illocal Presence, and as such come under the laws which govern a visible and tangible body. Thus they hoped to obviate the absurd idea, attempted to be fastened on them by their opponents, of Christ's body filling all space ; which, even if it were conceivable, would be a very different thing from the Divine attribute of ubiquity. If Christ becomes visible in space, it can only be as He was visible to the Apostles after His resurrection, viz., in a circumscribed body like ours.

The doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* was worked out by the Lutheran divines with scholastic precision. It is defined to be not merely *Verbalis* or *Intellectualis* (as when genus communicates its properties to the species), but *Realis* (*i.e.* between two substances really distinct) ; nor, again *exæquativa* (*i.e.* the difference of the natures *per se*, or essentially, remains) : nor *multiplicativa* (as when a man communicates according to the traducian theory, his soul to his son) ; nor *transfusiva* (as when wine is poured from one vessel into another, leaving the former empty) ; but *συνδυαστική*, *i.e.* between two natures perfectly and intimately united ; yet not *commixtiva* (*i.e.* the properties of the natures are not commingled) ; nor *essentialis* (as between the three Persons of the Holy Trinity) ; but *personalis et supernaturalis.* There are three kinds of it. The first, when the properties either of the Divine or the human nature are attributed to the whole Person ; *e.g.* Christ is begotten of the Father from everlasting, Christ was born of the Virgin Mary (*genus idiomaticum*). The second, when the Son of God is said to have communicated the properties of His Divine nature to the human, really and truly, to be possessed and used in common (*genus majestaticum*). The third, when in the work of Christ (atonement, etc.) either nature is said to operate according to its own properties but to a common result (*genus apotelesmaticum*, θεανδρικὴ ἐνέργεια) ; *e.g.* when Christ is said to have died for sin, the dying properly belongs to the human nature, but the efficacy of the sacrifice is derived from the Divine ; and they both combine to the result, viz. satisfaction for sin, and are ascribed to the one concrete Person, Christ.

It was the *genus majestaticum* to which the Reformed theologians principally took exception, and not without reason. They argued that no created being, which the human nature of Christ was admitted to be, however exalted and glorified, could be receptive of the infinite Being in all His fulness, that *finitum* never can be *capax infiniti.* The Logos, therefore, in the Person of Christ must be supposed to be, more or less, in a state of self-limitation. That if some Divine attributes, *e.g.* Omnipresence, were communicated, all must have been, for we cannot, except in thought, separate one class from another ; and consequently eternity must be predicated of the incarnation, which yet we know, as a fact, took place in time. That a real antidosis implies a communication of human properties to the Divine nature as well as of Divine to the human, which yet is incompatible with just views of the Divine nature, which being infinite, can admit of no additions.

It will be seen that the Reformed type of doctrine is formed rather on the lines of the Council of Chalcedon and John of Damascus, while the Lutheran aims at bringing the natures into union in themselves, and not merely through the connecting link of the Person. And in order to secure some real communion between the natures, the Swiss theologians were compelled to introduce the Holy Ghost between the Logos and His human nature. What the *communicatio idiomatum* is in the Lutheran theology the excellent gifts of the Holy Ghost are in the Reformed. Such are, the power of working miracles, a knowledge far transcending ours, a *relative* independence of the ordinary laws of humanity, such as passing through closed doors, vanishing out of sight, etc. ; which, however, are to be carefully distinguished from the Divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, or omnipresence. The possession of these gifts was not denied by the Lutherans, but they asked whether the singularity of Christ's Person could be secured by the impartation of spiritual gifts which, at least as regards their ordinary manifestations, are the property of every good man. The result of the controversy may be briefly summed up : that neither type of doctrine succeeds in giving us a fully adequate representation of what we want—a Divine-human personality, a Theanthropus, one Christ both God and man.

PART II

THE WORK OF CHRIST

52. *The Threefold Office*

THE Person of Christ is the foundation of His work, but the work itself consists in the restoration of the normal relations between man and God. As such it is properly described as a mediatorial work. The word 'Mediator' is used in the New Testament in a twofold sense—that of a peacemaker between two parties at variance (1 Tim. ii. 5), and that of the founder of a religious polity, as when the Mosaic dispensation is said to have been given by the hand of a Mediator (Gal. iii. 19); and in both it is applicable to Christ. He came to effect a reconciliation between man and God separated by sin, and to establish a new spiritual polity, of which Himself should be the Head, and His Church the visible manifestation (Heb. xii. 24; Phil. iii. 20). Everything connected with this mediatorial work belongs neither to the one nature nor to the other singly, but to both in conjunction, or to the Person of the Redeemer. And it is described under a threefold aspect, as consisting of prophetical, sacerdotal, and kingly functions; a division which, though assailed by some modern writers, is of ancient date, and is founded not only on express statements of the New Testament, but on the typical appointments of the Old, in which the offices of the prophet, priest, and king formed the main pillars of the institution. Since part of the ceremony by which persons were set apart to these offices was anointing with oil, the title Messiah, or Christ, was applied to the Saviour; the antitype being the anointing of Jesus with the Holy Ghost and with power (Acts x. 38), which event formed the point of transition from His private to His public life (Matt. iii. 16). Although these offices must not be exclusively assigned to particular periods of the life of Christ, as if, *e.g.*, the work of atonement did not commence until the close; indeed the typical ones were, in the later times of the Jewish commonwealth, sometimes found united in the same person at the same time; yet in their main features they naturally fall into the order which they usually occupy in works on theology.

53. *The Prophetical Office*

Although Christ does not give Himself the name of prophet, yet He is so called in the New Testament; and this in accordance with ancient prophecy itself (Deut. xviii. 15). And if His kingdom was to be founded, not, as that of Muhammed, on physical force, nor, as the Mosaic dispensation, on a typical and ceremonial law with its visible priesthood, nor yet on a magical effect of external ordinances, but on free conviction and the obedience of faith—if it was to be in its essence 'righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost' (Rom. xiv. 17)—it must rely on the spiritual weapons of instruction and persuasion. By these methods Christ must win His way to the conscience, unfold the nature of true religion, sever from connection with Himself and His religion superstitious or merely political accretions, gain for Himself the title of teacher (ὁ διδάσκαλος); all which in fact formed also the main functions of the Jewish prophet.

The prophetic ministry of Christ has been divided into immediate and mediate; or that which He exercised on earth in His own Person, and that which He continues to exercise through human ministers. But since the latter is rather the office of the Holy Ghost, to whom also the inspiration of Holy Scripture is properly ascribed, it seems better to consider the prophetical office as commencing with the baptism in Jordan and ending with the Ascension. As regards the New Testament gift of prophecy, it is manifestly part of the dispensation of the Spirit (1 Cor. xii. 10). The matter of Christ's teaching corresponded to the well known division of ancient prophecy into didactive and predictive matter. To expound the meaning and comprehensiveness of the moral law; to insist on its superiority to ceremonial enactments; to expose the immoral casuistry by which its spirit had been superseded—this formed a large part of Christ's teaching, as it had done that of the ancient prophets. Thus far from destroying, He fulfilled (Matt. v. 17) and promulgated not a new law, but the meaning of the old.

But there is, withal, a marked peculiarity in the *manner* of His teaching. While the prophets disclaim an independent mission, and speak of themselves as mere interpreters (προφῆται), and unworthy, too, of the office (Isa. vi. 5), Christ taught with authority and from Himself; He spake what He knew, and testified what He had seen (John iii. 11). The predictive element, though not wanting, occupies a subordinate place; and necessarily so, for He who was the subject of ancient prophecy had come, and type and prediction had given place to the reality. It was not to a future Messiah, but to Himself, as the way, the truth, and the life, that He directed the minds of His disciples. His predictions relate chiefly to the establishment and progress of His Kingdom on earth, and partake, like ancient prophecy, rather of the character of intuition than of specific vaticination. The curtain of time, as in the Apocalypse, when lifted, discloses the fortunes of the

Church under symbolical representations, which refuse to be tied to the literal interpretation. Or He speaks in parables, which contain in themselves a germinant fulfilment, by no means as yet exhausted. And as Christ is the fulfilment, so He is the end of prophecy. We expect no essential additions to revelation ; even inspired Apostles only expanded the germs found in His discourse. The prophetic gift in the Church is conifined to exposition ; and he who professes either to improve, or to add to, what Christ has delivered occupies a place outside the pale of Chrstianity.

Although it is not stated of all the prophets of the Old Testament that they performed miracles as an evidence of their mission, it was a usual accompaniment of the prophetic function. And in our Lord's case this sign was very conspicuous. But His miracles, like His teaching, had a character of their own. They were not merely marvels, but works of beneficence, and of an eminently symbolical character ; having their counterpart in the miracles of Divine grace, and naturally leading the mind from the cure of bodily ailment to that of spiritual. They were performed, too, without effort ; He spake the word and it was done, as if all nature confessed its Lord, and bowed to His will. Miraculous powers of a similar kind continued in the Church for some time after the Ascension, but gradually disappeared as the new faith consolidated itself. Miracles are the proper accompaniments of the introduction of a religion, but are out of place in its progress. Christianity promulgated under miraculous attestation, and furnished with an inspired standard, is left to work out its history and its problems under the ordinary operation of the Holy Spirit in the Church.

54. *The Sacerdotal Office*

The sacerdotal office naturally follows the prophetical, for conviction of sin, which the prophets especially aimed at producing, is the first step towards a hearty reception of the atonement provided in the Gospel. It has been matter of debate whether Christ was a Priest while upon earth, or first exercised the office after the Ascension. The doubt seems to have arisen from the circumstance that to slay the victim was not on common occasions a necessary part of the priest's office under the old covenant (Lev. iv. 29), and the offering Himself as a sacrifice for sin was the main work of Christ in His state of humiliation. But the doubt will disappear if it is remembered that in Scripture it is the sin-offering on the great day of atonement, with which that of Christ is almost exclusively compared, and on that day the High Priest not only carried the blood into the most holy place, but himself slew the sin-offering (Lev. xvi). This part of the High Priest's office our Lord did unquestionably perform while on earth, what followed in the Jewish ritual being appropriated to Him in His glorified state. His priesthood, then, is one and undivided, but partly fulfilled on earth, partly in heaven. And it is usually considered under the two heads, corresponding to the functions of the Levitical High Priest, of offering atonement for sin, and making intercession for His people.

The Levitical ritual first claims our notice. If indeed the judgment of a modern writer, that 'Jewish sacrifices rather show us what the sacrifice of Christ was not than what it was,' [1] is correct, the subject could have no interest for us. This, however, is not the view which Scripture gives of them, and especially that great Epistle in which the subject is formally discussed. The ceremonial law, we learn from the Epistle to the Hebrews, was both symbolical and prophetical. As a system of symbol, or as Warburton calls it, 'representation by action,' [2] it conveyed present lessons of instruction. The devout worshipper was constantly reminded of the Divine holiness, his own sinfulness, and the need of atonement. But a mere symbol may terminate in itself, without prospective reference; and though suitable to the infancy of religion it naturally gives place, later on, to a more spiritual mode of instruction. But Scripture describes this ritual as typical also (Heb. x), ordained with reference to a more perfect dispensation in which it was to find its fulfilment; it was a prophetic symbol. And this more particularly as regards its ordinances of sacrifice and priesthood. Its use, therefore, towards an understanding of the atoning work of Christ must be very great.

The rite of sacrifice appears in all nations as the earliest mode of Divine worship, and in Scripture is represented as coeval with the human race (Gen. iv. 4). Whether it was of human origin, dictated by the natural feelings of sinful man, or of express Divine appointment, may be doubtful; in the Mosaic law, at any rate, it receives Divine sanction, and appears under a new aspect. It is in the ritual of the great day of atonement that the distinguishing features of the Mosaic institute are found concentrated. On this occasion, when atonement was made for the nation in its corporate capacity, the High Priest as the representative of the priesthood, and through it of the whole people (for all Israel was in one sense 'a kingdom of priests,' Exod. xix. 6), alone entered the holy of holies with the blood of the sacrifices which he had offered, and which he sprinkled on the mercy-seat, thus symbolically covering, or removing from God's sight, the sins of the people. The sin-offering for the people contained special features. It consisted of two goats, one of which was offered in sacrifice, and the other, after the imposition of the hands of the High Priest, was sent away alive into the wilderness, laden, as it is described (Lev. xvi. 22) with the iniquities of the children of Israel.

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[1] Jowett, *Com.* vol. ii. 479.

[2] *Div. Leg.*, bk. iv. s. 4.

Of this expressive transaction the following seem to be the leading ideas. In the first place, a power of expiation. To no sacrifices previously mentioned in Scripture—not to that of Abel (Gen. iv. 4), nor to that of Noah (Gen. viii. 20), nor to that of Abraham (Gen. xv. 9)—is this efficacy attached. In the Mosaic sacrifices generally, and especially in this one, it is the declared object of the institution. ‘ On that day the priest shall make an atonement for you to cleanse you, that ye may be clean from all your sins before the Lord ’ (Lev. xvi. 30) : the blood sprinkled on the mercy-seat covered or removed from the eye of God the impurity which rendered the people, and even the vessels of the tabernacle, unfit for His service.

Secondly, the atonement was the appointment of God Himself. Not only was the declared expiatory power, but the whole ritual of the institution, in its minutest details, matter of revelation ; so that no room was left for the unauthorized suggestions even of real piety, and the worshipper was reminded that the covering of sin was a mystery which reposed in the bosom of God. He could not entertain the idea of propitiating an offended Deity, though the Septuagint usually renders the Hebrew word by *ἱλάσκομαι* or its derivative *ἵλασμος* ; for the ritual represented Jehovah as taking the initiative, and Himself devising means whereby the barrier which intercepted the exercise of His mercy might be removed.

Thirdly, the atonement was effected through suffering, viz., the death of the victim. That is, it was founded not merely on the announcement of the willingness of Jehovah to pardon on repentance, but on an expiatory act which He was pleased to accept ; and expiation always involves the idea of suffering, and moreover of suffering as the punishment of sin. It has been argued indeed that not the death, but the blood of the victim possessed the atoning virtue ; and it is true that the sprinkling of the blood was the culminating point of the whole transaction. But the blood was obtained only in one way, viz., through the death of the victim, and the two acts cannot be severed from each other. The true view seems to be, that the expiation of sin was effected by the death, the covering of sin by the application of the blood, or as it is termed ‘ the life ’ (the life being in the blood) ; which blood, or life, was no longer unclean, but fit to be presented to Jehovah.

Fourthly, the ceremony exhibited a vicarious element. The sinner, excluded from theocratical privileges and condemned by the moral law, was permitted to substitute for himself an animal sacrifice, by which he recovered his theocratical standing. And the details are not less significant. In all cases of the sin-offering the offerer (or the priest) was to lay his hand on the head of the victim, which forthwith became unclean because identified with the sinner, and as such was slain. That is, a spotless victim, spotless physically, and morally so far as an animal is incapable of guilt, took the place of the sinner, and that spotless life presented at the mercy-seat availed to hide sin from the eye of God.

In most of the religions of antiquity we find priests as well as sacrifices, and both sprang from the same feeling, that of an existing barrier between sinful man and God, which called for a mediator if communication was to be restored. And in order to confer permanency and dignity on the order, the principle of caste was commonly adopted ; that is, the priestly function was attached to a certain tribe, or family, and passed from father to son irrespectively of moral or intellectual qualifications. Such was the Jewish priesthood, though in this instance the tenure was subject to revocation in case of moral delinquency (1 Sam. iii). At the head of the order stood the High Priest. On his breast the names of the twelve tribes were borne ; he only could enter the most holy place on their behalf ; and yet he was one of themselves, encompassed with the same infirmities, and capable of feeling ‘ compassion for the ignorant and those out of the way ’ (Heb. v. 2).

Such are the impressions which any unprejudiced reader would gather from a study of the Levitical ritual. And the question now is, Is the teaching of the New Testament accordant therewith, or of an opposite character ? The statements of Christ Himself first demand attention. We are not, of course, to expect any systematic exposition of His atoning work when the atonement itself was not effected ; this was reserved for the fuller revelation vouchsafed to his chosen ministers. In our Lord’s discourses the atonement is either presupposed (as in the Lord’s prayer) ; or it is implied in casual sayings ; or it is veiled under parable and allegory. Yet His teaching contains the germ of what was afterwards more fully explained. He describes Himself as the good shepherd who gives his life for the sheep (John x. 15) ; as having come to give His life a ransom (*λύτρον*=כֹּפֶר) for many (Matt. xx. 28) ; as about to be lifted up (on the cross) in order to accomplish a spiritual deliverance analogous to the temporal wrought by the brazen serpent (John iii. 14). And above all, on the most solemn occasion conceivable, the last supper with His disciples. He compares the import of His death with that of the expiatory sacrifices of the Mosaic covenant : ‘ This is My blood which is shed for you and for many for the remission of sins ’ (Matt. xxvi. 28).

The Book of Acts does not add much to our information on the point before us. Not so with the Epistles. St. Paul, after having proved the whole world under sin, declares that redemption from this state is by Jesus Christ, whom God has openly proposed as a sin-offering, or propitiation ; thus vindicating His righteousness, which had seemed to be somewhat obscured by the passing over, without due retribution, of the sins of the ancient world. And again, that One died for all, *i.e.* vicariously, and in Him all died (2 Cor. v. 14) ; that God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, *i.e.*, removing the impediment that existed to the exhibition of His mercy, and this by making Him who knew no sin, not a sin-offering, nor a sinner, but a partaker of the very element of sin itself *in its penalty* (*ibid.* 21). Christ is said to have purchased us out of the curse of the law, as slaves regained their liberty by payment of a ransom, by becoming a curse for us (Gal. iii. 13). In corresponding language St. Peter affirms that ‘ Christ bore our sins in His own body on the tree ’ and that with His precious blood we are redeemed (1 Pet. i. 18 ; ii. 24). Nor does St. John teach otherwise when he writes that the blood of Christ cleanseth (*καθαρίζει*, the proper term for legal cleansing, see Heb. ix. 14) from all sin (1 John i. 7 ; iv. 10).

The Epistle to the Hebrews is a formal treatise on the subject, designed to show that the type must disappear now that the Antitype is come. The Levitical sacrifices could never take away sin, but Christ in the end of the world has appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself (Heb. ix. 26). The Levitical priests came and went, but Christ is a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedek, that mysterious personage who appears suddenly on the page of history, without notice of his birth or his death, or the register of his family. He entered into the Holy of holies above with His own blood, having obtained eternal redemption for us, and to appear for us in the presence of God (chaps. vii, ix). The perfection of His sacrifice forbids its being ever repeated, for by one offering He has perfected for ever them that are sanctified, or cleansed (Heb. x. 14).

With this plainly-declared correspondence between the type and the Antitype, it is impossible to suppose that the language of the New Testament was framed merely in accommodation to Jewish habits of thought. The contrary is evident, that the work of Christ was the original plan in the Divine mind, and the Jewish ritual was framed as a preparation for it. If the Apostles, from their natural associations, wrote erroneously on this subject, the grave question arises, why was it ordered that Christianity should spring from a Jewish stock, and not from some religion free from such misleading associations ? Why were the first heralds of Christianity almost necessitated to give a false portraiture of it ? This is a difficulty which the Socinian has to meet, and it does not appear how it can be met. On this hypothesis, too, neither can the Divine origin of the Jewish dispensation, nor the inspiration of the writers of the New Testament, be maintained.

55. *Continuation—Theory of Anselm*

Unlike the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation, that of the atoning work of Christ did not form a prominent subject of controversy in the ancient Church : whence it arises that the three Creeds only declare in general terms that Christ suffered and was crucified for us. Nor do the early Fathers enter very deeply into the subject. The first speculations on it are connected with the Scriptural figures under which the atonement is described as the payment of a price, or a ransom. ‘ To whom,’ it was asked, ‘ was the price paid ? ’ A common answer was, ‘ To the devil ’ ; who through the Fall had acquired rights over man which he could not, without an equivalent, be fairly called on to surrender. This curious theory was afterwards modified to signify, not payment to the devil, but still, as if he had some equitable claim, the overcoming of him by a crafty device. By Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory the Great, the human nature of Christ is compared to a bait concealing the hook of the Divine nature, which the devil swallowed, but to his own destruction. Thus was he overreached in his subtlety. It does not seem to have occurred to them that such a notion seems making the end justify the means, and that to allow the devil independent rights, which by some means must be satisfied, is to sanction a kind of Manichee or Gnostic dualism. Yet this notion held its place for a long time both in the Eastern and the Western Churches. ‘ Since the enemy,’ says John of Damascus, ‘ had tempted man by promising him equality with God, he in turn is tempted by the presentation of the flesh (of Christ). It was only just that whereas man was overcome by the tyrant, the latter should be overcome by man, and that not by mere force (but on grounds of equity) man should be rescued from the power of death.’

In the eleventh century the treatise of Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, entitled *Cur Deus Homo ?* appeared, and formed an epoch in the history of the dogma. This great theologian, whose theory became the accepted one in the Western Church, introduces his pupil as professing himself unable to understand why an Omnipotent God should, in order to restore fallen man, have assumed our nature with its natural infirmities and died on the cross as a malefactor. If it be said, to redeem us from sin, from wrath, and from the power of Satan, why could not all this have been effected by a simple fiat of the Almighty ? Among men, to attain an end through toil and suffering which might have been attained directly, is deemed inconsistent with wisdom. To remove these doubts it must be proved that the end could be attained in no other way. And this is the problem which Anselm proposes to himself.

He sets out with rejecting, in the person of the inquirer, the notion that anything is due to the devil (bk. i, c. vii) ; a sentiment which in his own person he emphatically repeats at the end of the treatise. God, he continues, claims from man perfect obedience ; sin consists in not rendering it, *i.e.* in robbing God of His due, and dishonouring Him. The sinner, therefore, is a debtor, and a contumelious one ; and it would be inconsistent with the attribute of Justice to cancel the debt without satisfaction : it must either be paid in full, or the penalty for non-payment be inflicted (c. xi). The alternative is demanded by the moral order of the universe (c. xii). The mercy of God cannot be exhibited at the expense of His holiness. The question then is, Who is to pay the debt ? For that a restoration of man, to some extent, at least, is intended we may infer from the improbability that the end of his creation should be wholly frustrated, and especially from the consideration that the elect are intended to fill up the gap which sin made in the ranks of the angels. If it be pleaded that the debt may be paid by repentance and good works, the answer is that we owe these to God already ; but how is *past* sin to be atoned for ? (c. xx). The greatness of sin must be estimated not by the mere act, but by the circumstances under which, and the Person against whom, it is committed (cc. xxi, xxii). To render an adequate satisfaction it would be necessary that man, as he allowed himself to be overcome by Satan, should overcome Satan in turn ; and further should undo the damage he brought upon the race by working out a means of justification and life for the elect : neither of which, from his inherent weakness, he can do (cc. xxii, xxiii). This inability is no excuse, for man brought it on himself (c. xxiv). The case then would be hopeless if Christ be put out of view. But matters assume another aspect, in the Scripture doctrine of redemption. It has been shown that man's debt never can be paid except by one who can render to God something greater than everything else except God ; and He who can do this must be God. But it must be rendered by man also, for it was man that sinned. Therefore it must be rendered by One who is both God and man. And such is Christ. The Redeemer, being miraculously conceived, though born of woman, was without sin ; and therefore not naturally liable to death. But He voluntarily underwent death for our sakes, and thereby rendered to God the 'something' which is of greater value than everything else except God. The value of the death is to be measured by the preciousness of the life, than which nothing was more precious. God could not justly demand a life from Christ ; therefore the free-will offering in our stead redounds to our advantage. In Christ man is sinless, overcomes Satan, is obedient unto death, gives up his spotless life to God ; here is what we have been seeking for—full satisfaction for sin. For the sinless sufferer justly claims a reward for what He thus, in obedience to the will of God, undeservedly underwent, and the reward which He receives is the salvation of the elect (bk. ii).

Such in substance is the argument of the *Cur Deus Homo ?* and such in substance must be every theory on the subject which aims at being Scriptural. Not that any theory can be pronounced quite satisfactory, for the atonement is one of those subjects which human reason must ever fail fully to fathom. The key-note of Anselm's doctrine is the idea of 'satisfaction,' and against the idea expressed by this word it is that Socinian and rationalist objections are principally directed. The word itself does not occur in Scripture, and appears to have been first used by Tertullian and not in connection with the work of Christ[1] ; but the terms 'ransom,' 'price,' 'redemption,' and the like, involve the idea, and cannot be supposed to have been adopted without reason. When a slave was bought out of captivity, the price paid was a satisfaction to the owner for his loss ; when sin, in consequence of what Christ did and suffered, was remitted, satisfaction may be said to have been made to Divine justice. All such terms are analogical : they do not pretend to explain the mystery as it is *in itself*, but so far as it can be explained *to us*, by figures with which we are familiar. No price, or ransom, was really paid to God, but something analogous to what we understand by such a transaction took place when Christ died. In like manner anger finds no place in God, but He is said to view sin in a manner analogous to what we feel when we receive an injury or insult ; and He is propitiated as we should be if due reparation were made. If the deep things of God, which only the Spirit of God knows as they are (1 Cor. ii. 11), are to be in some measure brought down to our comprehension it can only be by analogical language, which, however differs from merely figurative in that it expresses *facts* in the Divine economy.

The real point at issue is, Does the Atonement involve a change in *God's* attitude towards man, or merely in man's attitude towards God ? God is love, and immutability is part of our conception of

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[1] *De Pœn.*, cc. 5–10. The 'satisfaction' of Tertullian is what the sinner himself (by penitence, etc.) renders (Hagenbach, § 68, 5).

Him ; but the idea of the Divine wrath against sin does not necessarily trench upon these Scriptural representations. For wrath in this connection is but holy love ; love sorrowing and indignant at the perverted relation between the creature and his Creator ; love not resting until the true relation is restored. A God indifferent to moral obliquity and the misery it produces would indeed be an ominous conception : disguised as it might be under the mask of pure mercy or benevolence, it would in reality differ little from that of a malignant Deity. A parent who feels indignant against the sin of a child, and shows it, does not the less love the child in so feeling and acting.

Now the whole tenor of Scripture is to the effect that through the vicarious sacrifice of Christ a change was wrought in God Himself of this nature, that whereas previously He could not, consistently with the perfection of His attributes, grant forgiveness on repentance, now He can. The blood of the sin-offering, covering the sin of Israel, symbolically represented this change, the blood of Christ effects the reality. God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, *i.e.* expiating its sin (2 Cor. v. 19) ; and not until this was done could there be any preaching of an atonement or invitation to men to be reconciled to God (*ibid.* v. 20). What men needed to be told was not that they should repent and turn to God, but that if they did so, God could be just and yet forgive. Here, too, the language is analogical. How the Atonement could have affected the mind of God towards man is a profound mystery ; but we know thus much, that if an offender against us has expiated his offence by great suffering, this is a consideration which changes wrath into pity, and paves the way for our favourably receiving his overtures of reconciliation. It was the sufferings of the prodigal son no less than his repentance that moved the father to grant forgiveness. Something analogous to this Scripture declares to have been produced in the attitude of God towards man by the sacrifice of Christ. It is true that redemption, in its full sense, involves the sinner's also being reconciled to God ; but the accepted expiation of the Redeemer, ' while we were yet sinners ' (Rom. v. 8), is the necessary condition of Christ's saving work in us. This is substantially what Anselm means by the term ' satisfaction,' and the figure of a debt which has been paid. And surely it is nothing more than the doctrine of the Apostle when he declares that the ' handwriting of ordinances that was against us ' *i.e.* the law with its demands, was taken out of the way being nailed to the cross, nailed in token of the debt's having been cancelled (Col. ii. 14). In the case of the believer, the eyes of God cannot rest on the requirements of the law without at the same time resting on the cross, which is the evidence of their having been satisfied.

In Anselm's mode of stating the argument, no doubt imperfections may be perceived, which, however, do not impair the essential solidity of the structure. He is careful, for example, to impress upon us that to the Divine honour, so far as it relates to God Himself, nothing can be added, and nothing taken from it (c. xv). When the creature refuses obedience, he does what in him lies to dishonour God, but the sin and shame of the action terminates with the sinner himself. But if God never can be dishonoured in *Himself*, how, it may be asked, can we speak of a debt as being due to Him ? The answer is not given by Anselm, but it is obvious. It is due to God not merely as a Person, but as the Author and Upholder of the moral order of the universe, as a Lawgiver and a Judge. The distinction holds good in common life. A crime committed may not and does not dishonour the magistrate as a man, but it does dishonour the law of which he is the visible representative, and the penalty may be considered a debt due to him under this particular point of view.

It has been objected, too, that Anselm's reasoning wears too much of a commercial, or forensic, aspect, and does not assign sufficient prominence to the Divine love which prompted the sacrifice of the Son. But the treatise was intended to be an answer to the particular question, *Cur Deus Homo ?* or why was the Incarnation necessary ? and the author must be judged accordingly.[1] Yet it is a real defect that, in examining wherein the value of Christ's work consists, he does not sufficiently insist on its *ethical* aspect, as the work of One who earned by obedience a crown for Himself and the salvation of His Church. It is true that he points out that, unlike the legal sacrifices in which the victim was not a free agent, Christ was under no compulsion to suffer and die (c. ix) : He might have called down more than twelve legions of angels to rescue Him (Matt. xxvi. 53) : He offered Himself, a willing sacrifice, to God (Heb. ix. 14). But the interval between the Saviour's birth and His death is passed over in silence, as if the life of Christ had little or no bearing on the work of atonement, whereas by St. Paul His obedience up to the culminating point of His death is made an important element (Phil. ii. 8).

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[1] [Litton's observation regarding the scope of Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo?* is just. That Anselm did in fact have a proper understanding of the love and mercy of God is shown by the following passage (which is all too readily overlooked by his critics) : " So, then, the mercy of God, which seemed to you to vanish away while we were considering God's justice and man's sin, we now find to be so great and so perfectly consonant with justice that neither greater nor juster could be conceived of. For what can be understood as being more merciful than that God the Father should say to the sinner who was condemned to eternal torments, and who had nothing wherewith to redeem himself : ' Take My Only-Begotten Son and offer Him for thyself ' ; and that the Son Himself should say : ' Take Me and redeem thyself ' ? " Editor.]

It may have been on account of these defects that Anselm's doctrine was far from being at once accepted by the Church, and indeed seems to have made but little impression on his contemporaries and immediate successors. Abelard opposed it, and made the essence of the Atonement to consist in its moral effect, the love of God therein exhibited drawing forth our love towards Him ; in which he was followed by Peter Lombard and others. Duns Scotus denied that the value of Christ's sacrifice was infinite, as having been offered only by the human nature ; consequently the debt was not fully paid, but God *accepted* it as an equivalent ; thus anticipating the theory of Grotius in after times, commonly called that of *Acceptilatio*, a legal term signifying the creditor's giving a discharge for the whole on receiving part of his debt. But Thomas Aquinas, after expressing hesitation on some points, accepts the theory of Anselm as a whole, and from his authority, as well as from its intrinsic merits, it gradually prevailed, and forms the basis of the theology of the Reformation on this subject.

The question debated by the older theologians, and commonly answered by them in the affirmative, whether Christ suffered exactly what we should have had to suffer but for His interference, *e.g.* the pains of hell, is an instance both of the influence and of the abuse of the theory of Anselm. It was occasioned by the absence of the ethical element from this theory, and which is its great defect. A mere debt is satisfied by being paid, no matter by whom or from what motives ; but the value of Christ's sacrifice depends upon other considerations than that of the *lex talionis.* Scripture gives no countenance to the doctrine. The consciousness of guilt which forms a necessary ingredient of the pains of hell could not in the case of Christ exist. The exclamation on the cross, ' My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me ? ' so much insisted on, does not bear out the inference ; for the very form of it, ' My God,' proves that whatever anguish the soul of Jesus at that moment experienced, total separation from God did not form part of it. If what we had to suffer was literally exacted from Christ, and in our stead, why should most Christians be still subject even to temporal death ? Quantitative measurements are not applicable to this case.

56. *Continuation.—Active and Passive Obedience*

According to Anselm, Christ might seem to have been born only that He might die. There is no doubt, indeed, that Scripture speaks of His death as the special act by which expiation was made for sin. Had His expiatory sufferings stopped short of this, He would not have drained the cup which His Father had given Him to drink. But previously to it He had lived above thirty years in the world, partly in private and partly in the exercise of His public ministry ; and the question might, and did, arise, whether a connection existed between that spotless life and the work of atonement ? We need, it has been argued, a vicarious fulfilling of the law as well as a suffering of the penalty, and Christ rendered the former for us as well as endured the latter. By His death we obtain pardon, by His righteousness eternal life. A king may pardon a rebel, but it does not follow that the latter should be reinstated in more than his former position of favour and dignity. The father in the parable not only forgave his repentant son but put a new robe on him, a ring on his hand, and shoes on his feet.

It may be questioned whether, as commonly stated, this doctrine is either Scriptural or safe. Scripture nowhere treats of the *atoning* work of Christ under two distinct heads of suffering and righteousness, with two distinct benefits resulting therefrom ; but rather of one great act by which sin was expiated. But neither does it seem safe. Redemption, in its full meaning, implies deliverance from the power as well as the penalty of sin ; and to maintain that Christ's work was vicarious for us in the former sense might lead to dangerous practical consequences. At least, the statement needs to be carefully guarded. It may possibly be so by discriminating between the mere sinlessness and the sinless sufferings of the Redeemer. What rendered these sufferings of infinite value in the eye of God was the dignity of the sufferer. His perfect submission, and His absolute sinlessness : but the expiatory effect belonged to the sufferings themselves, not to the circumstances which rendered them altogether peculiar. And thus though the whole life of Christ must be reckoned to His atoning work, and not any particular scene or act as the agony in the garden or the crucifixion, yet primarily it was as a life of unmerited suffering, as one of passive obedience, that it merited the power of expiation.

Is, then, the imputation of the active obedience, the righteousness of Christ, an unscriptural idea ? By no means. Only it belongs not to the article of atonement, but to that of justification ; it is the privilege of the Church, not of the world. To have Christ's righteousness imputed to us, or what is equivalent in sense to be counted righteous for His sake, is far more than a mere expiation for sin : it involves the gifts of repentance, of faith, of adoption in the family of God, it corresponds to the robe and the ring with which the prodigal son was invested as tokens of reinstatement in his former privileges. So far as it is not our own but counted to us it is vicarious, but not in the sense of being wrought for us irrespectively of our actual condition, as the atonement was wrought for us. Christ's righteousness is imputed only to those in whose hearts He dwells by faith. And hence the remark is not without foundation that between the forgiveness of sin and the imputation of righteousness there is no real distinction. Undoubtedly to him whose transgression is forgiven the Lord imputes not iniquity (Ps. xxxii. 1, 2), but then forgiveness of sin is more than atonement for it. Forgiveness implies the actual conversion of the sinner, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit assuring him of his adoption (Rom. viii. 15), the process of sanctification begun. It is merely a question of words whether we say that such a person has received forgiveness of sin or has the righteousness of Christ imputed to him ; the thing meant is the same. But we cannot say that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to those who have no vital union with Christ, or make this privilege co-extensive with atonement or expiation. To do so would indeed be to open the door to antinomian tendencies. It seems hardly correct therefore to apportion the satisfaction, in Anselm's sense of the word, between Christ's active obedience to the law and His passive obedience in suffering the penalty. He 'died for our sins'—this is one thing ; He 'rose again for our justification' (Rom. iv. 25)—this is another. 'If when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of His son, much more being reconciled we shall be saved by His life.' (*ibid.* v. 10).

57. *Continuation.—Extent of the Atonement*

This question is not by any means so simple as is commonly supposed. Numerous passages of Scripture can be cited in which what is called, though not very accurately, universal redemption appears to be plainly taught. Thus the Baptist bare witness to Christ that He is the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world (John i. 29) ; God is said to have so loved the world as to have sent His Son that through Him it might be saved (*ibid.* iii. 17) ; to have been in Christ reconciling the world to Himself (2 Cor. v. 19) ; to will that all men should be saved by coming to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim. ii. 4) ; Christ gives His flesh for the life of the world (John vi. 51); it was appointed that by the grace of God He should taste death for every man (Heb. ii. 9) ; One died for all (2 Cor. v. 14). At first such passages seem decisive of the point at issue. On a more careful examination, however, they will not appear so clear.

That *some* limitation must be imposed on their meaning is obvious. If they are to be taken as literally asserting that Christ purchased the salvation of all men, the doctrine of universal restitution seems to follow; for, it may be argued, how can He be conceived as failing to receive the reward for which He paid the price? But further; the advocates of what is called particular redemption allege that the passages are all perfectly susceptible of a limited interpretation. It is argued that they need mean no more than that, in contrast to the Jewish religion which was intended only for one nation, God under the Gospel dispensation proposed to Himself to gather a church out of all nations, kindreds, people, and tongues (Rev. vii. 9), 'the other sheep not of this fold' of whom Christ speaks in John x. 16. That they sometimes contain their own limitation; as in John iii. 16 the 'world' is explained by the clause immediately following 'whosoever believeth on Him,' viz., out of the world; in 1 Tim. ii. 2, the mention of 'kings and those in authority' makes it probable that by 'all men' the Apostle meant of every class; and in 2 Cor. v. 14, 'one died for all' must be understood by reference to the next words, 'all died,' which do not apply to the whole world but only to those who by union with Christ in His death die to sin, *i.e.*, to true believers. That it is customary with the Apostle to use the word 'all' when the context proves it cannot be taken literally. Thus he says, 'As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive' (1 Cor. xv. 22); and again, 'As by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation, so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life' (Rom. v. 18); in both passages the context proves that it is believers in Christ whom he has in view. That where this mode of explanation fails, we must compare passages, and not enforce a construction on one which we cannot possibly apply to another. Thus if Heb. ii. 9 'That He should taste death for every man,' is cited, 1 Cor. xii. 7 must not be overlooked, in which St. Paul says that 'the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal,' which plainly means to every believer. Such are the arguments used in favour of the doctrine of particular redemption, as that term is understood by writers on the subject.[1]

The impression, however, after all remains, that the passages in question cannot be fully explained on this hypothesis, and that Scripture does seem to connect benefits with Christ's death which extend beyond the salvation of His elect, and affect the race. If the holy angels are interested in it (Col. i. 20; Ephes. iii. 15), why not mankind as a whole ? Perhaps some ambiguity has arisen from the use of the word ‘ redemption ’ in this connection. There is no doubt that this word, as used in Scripture, signifies salvation in all its fulness, and, like the words ‘ elect ’ and ‘ saints,’ belongs to the Church, not to the world.[1] To be redeemed by Christ is to be delivered from the captivity of sin and Satan, to be made a child of God and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven. And the question is, had Christ in dying for sin no special reference to, or foresight of, His Church to be redeemed, as compared with the whole race of mankind ? It is difficult to think so. In dying for His Church He not only procured for it the general blessing of Atonement, but also all other spiritual blessings necessary to its salvation, *e.g.* effectual calling, forgiveness, and adoption (Art. xvii). He earned for Himself by His death the right and the power to send the Holy Spirit, without whose efficacious influence, even if the prison-doors should be thrown open, the paralysed inmates, who have learned to love their prison rather than liberty, would not and could not come forth, and the Saviour might be left without a Church, the reward of His sufferings and death.

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[1] See Owen's very able treatise, *The Death of Death in the Death of Christ* (new edition, London, 1960). If it were urged that in the typical dispensation the covering blood was applied to all Israel, the answer might be that this makes rather for 'particular redemption,' since Israel, the elect nation, was a type not of the world but of the Church, the heavenly Jerusalem (Gal. iv. 26; Heb. xii. 23).

In this sense, the term ‘ particular redemption ’ only expresses an unquestionable truth ; redemption in its fulness must be particular. And in fact, the statement does not occur in Scripture that Christ died for the sins of the world. The Arminian doctrine that the effect of the Atonement is merely that God was thereby enabled to *offer* to man a new covenant, viz., salvation on believing, is only half the truth, for it ignores what the Redeemer purchased for His *Church*, the mystical body of all faithful people, or true believers. But if for the word ‘ redemption ’ we substitute ‘ atonement,’ or ‘ expiation,’ this doctrine does contain a fragment of truth, which is overlooked by its opponents. For, if redemption is particular, it does not follow that atonement or expiation for sin should not be a universal benefit. And this distinction, in truth, seems the only method of reconciling the various statements of Scripture on the subject. The death of Christ placed mankind as a whole in a new and favourable position as regards God, though by many this position may never be realized or made their own ; it was a propitiation not for our sins only, but also for the sins of the whole world (1 John ii. 2). A public advantage was thereby secured, which however may become a savour of death unto death or of life unto life according as it is used (2 Cor. ii. 16). And is not this substantially the meaning of the assertors of particular redemption when they admit, as they do, the *sufficiency* of the Atonement for the sins of the world, or ten thousand worlds ?[1] and on that sufficiency ground the right and the duty of ministers or missionaries to proclaim to all men that if they repent and believe they will be saved ? This proclamation could not be made if there had not been effected by the death of Christ a general expiation for our fallen race. And thus the combatants may not be in reality so much at variance as they had supposed. The most extreme Calvinist may grant that there is room for all if they will come in ; the most extreme Arminian must grant that redemption, in its full Scriptural meaning, is not the privilege of all men.

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[1] When St. Paul declares of himself and his fellow-Christians that they had ‘ redemption through His ’ (Christ’s) ‘ blood, even the forgiveness of sins (Ephes. i. 7), can he be supposed to speak merely of a benefit which equally appertained to Herod, Pontius Pilate, or Judas Iscariot ?

And thus, too, some light may be thrown on the vexed question respecting the state of the heathen. How can redemption be described as universal when it has never even been made known to countless millions ? Redemption cannot in any circumstances be described as universal ; but if the death of Christ placed the race in a new relation towards God, it may, in some manner unknown to us, benefit those who never heard of Him. And it were unduly to limit the most High to suppose that He has no other means of bringing men to Himself than by *explicit* faith in a preached Gospel.

It has been questioned whether the intercession of Christ, as distinguished from His oblation of Himself, does not belong rather to the regal than to the sacerdotal office.[2] Formally, no doubt, it is part of the latter, and a sublime instance of it though anticipatory, as it could not otherwise be, occurs in John xvii, while the Saviour was yet on earth. Yet, as it consists in virtually presenting His finished atonement before God, in His glorified state, it seems to be more appropriately considered in connection with the assumption of the regal office, the exercise of which more especially belongs to that state.

58. *The Regal Office*

Under the typical dispensation there were kings, as well as prophets and priests, and prophecy pointed not only to a suffering, but to a conquering and triumphant Messiah. God in His secret counsels had set His King upon His holy hill of Zion (Ps. ii. 6) ; a King was to reign and prosper in whose days Judah was to be saved and Israel dwell safely (Jer. xxiii. 5, 6) ; David (who had long before been gathered to his fathers) should be Prince over God's people for ever (Ezek.

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[1] As, for instance, Bellarmine, who will not be supposed a partial witness : ‘ Illæ promissiones quæ absolutæ reperiuntur in Scripturis testantur sufficientiam pretii nostri, id est, meritorum Christi. Fuit enim Christi passio, quoad sufficientiam, propitiatio pro peccatis, non solum nostris sed etiam totius mundi ’ (*De Justif.*, lib. i. c. xi).

[2] Schleiermacher, *Glaubenslehre*, ss. 104, 105 ; Martensen, s. 169.

xxxvii. 25). Whatever might be the primary application of these prophecies, the image of a righteous theocratical King, as it presented itself to the mind of the seer, was too lofty to be satisfied even by the splendour of Solomon's kingdom ; and the faith of the pious Jew, especially in the later times of national decadence, must have been sustained by the hope of a further fulfilment.

Christ did not decline the title of King when it was applied to Him in irony (John xviii. 37), and only explained that His kingdom was not of this world. Even in the state of humiliation He exercised royal functions. He called unto Him whom He would, and they came (Mark iii. 13) ; and as it was the office of the Jewish King to represent and maintain the unity of the body politic, so Christ, before He ascended, laid the foundations of the visible Church, choosing Apostles, ordaining outward tokens of Church-membership (Matt. xxviii. 19 ; xxvi. 27–29), conferring powers for the exercise of discipline (Matt. xviii. 15–19), and promising His presence with such societies to the end of time.

But with His ascension the plenary exercise of the regal office commenced. It must not be confounded with the dominion which, as the Logos, He exercises over all creatures : the power which is now given unto Him in heaven and in earth is for mediatorial purposes, and dates from the ascension. But as Mediator He reigns and must reign until all enemies shall be put under His feet (1 Cor. xv. 25). Against sin, the world, and Satan, He wages incessant warfare ; not with the carnal weapons of temporal power, but with the spiritual ones befitting such a religion, and day by day His kingdom extends its boundaries. In His Church He reigns by His Word and His Spirit, gathering in His elect from age to age, and conducting them to the end when He shall present them to Himself a glorious Church, without spot or wrinkle (Ephes. v. 27). At the end He will resign His mediatorial sceptre as being no longer needed (1 Cor. xv. 28) ; the present means of grace will be superseded by His immediate presence (Rev. xxi. 22) ; but the union of God and man, by virtue of which He is the Head of His Church, will remain indissoluble throughout eternity.

The intercession of Christ may properly be considered under this head because it is not a mere deprecation on behalf of His people, but an efficacious pleading of His finished and accepted sacrifice. Hence it is, that, in St. Paul's view, the resurrection, which was a necessary condition of the ascension, is of vital moment (1 Cor. xv. 17). Had Christ merely died for our sin, what warrant should we have that the atonement was accepted, or that those sins, as well as 'the accuser of the brethren,' might not rise up against us in the court of heaven, and demand satisfaction ? But the Saviour appears perpetually before God for us, opposing the virtue of His sacrifice to the accusations of the law and Satan, and claiming the just recompense of what He suffered on our behalf. And with Him the Father is always well pleased. Regarding Him in this capacity, the challenge of the Church throughout the ages is, ' Who is He that condemneth ? It is Christ that died, yea rather, that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us ' (Rom. viii. 34).

ORDER OF SALVATION (INDIVIDUAL)

'Predestination to life is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby (before the foundations of the world were laid) He hath constantly decreed, by His counsel secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those whom He hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honour. Wherefore, they which be endued with so excellent a benefit of God be called according to God's purpose by His Spirit working in due season : they through grace obey the calling : they be justified freely : they be made sons of God by adoption : they be made like the image of His only-begotten Son Jesus Christ : they walk religiously in good works, and at length, by God's mercy, they attain to everlasting felicity. . . . We must receive God's promises in such wise, as they be generally set forth to us in Holy Scripture ; and, in our doings, that Will of God is to be followed, which we have expressly declared unto us in the Word of God' (Art. xvii).

'Æterna electio seu prædestinatio Dei ad salutem non simul ad bonos et ad malos pertinet sed tantum ad filios Dei, qui ad æternam vitam consequendam electi et ordinati sunt, priusquam mundi fundamenta jacerentur' (Sol. Decl. xi. Lutheran).

'Credo Filium Dei, ab initio mundi ad finem usque, sibi ex universo genere humano cœtum ad vitam æternam electum, per spiritum suum et verbum, in vera fide consentientem, colligere, tueri, ac servare, meque vivum ejus cœtus membrum esse, et perpetuo mansurum' (Cat. Heidel. liv. Reformed).

'Constituimus duas partes pœnitentiæ, vid. contritionem et fidem. Si quis valet addere tertiam, vid. dignos fructus pœnitentiæ, hoc est, mutationem totius vitæ et morum in melius, non refragabimur' (Apol. Conf. Aug. v).

'Per pœnitentiam intelligimus mentis in homine peccatore resipiscentiam verbo evangelii et Spiritu S. excitatam fideque vera acceptam, qua homo agnatam sibi corruptionem peccataque omnia sua . . . agnoscit, ac de his ex corde dolet' (Expos. Simpl., c. xiv).

'Quapropter loquimur in hac causa . . . de fide viva vivificanteque quæ propter Christum quem comprehendit viva est' (*Ibid.* xv).

'We are accounted righteous before God only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ by faith, and not for our own works or deservings. Wherefore that we are justified by faith only is a most wholesome doctrine' (Art. xi).

'Albeit that good works which are the fruits of faith, and follow after justification, cannot put away our sins, and endure the severity of God's judgment ; yet are they pleasing and acceptable to God in Christ, and do spring out necessarily of a true and lively faith' (Art. xii).

'Voluntary works, besides, over and above, God's commandments, which they call works of supererogation, cannot be taught without arrogancy and impiety' (Art. xiv).

'Not every deadly sin willingly committed after Baptism is sin against the Holy Ghost, and unpardonable. Wherefore the grant of repentance is not to be denied to such as fall into sin after baptism' (Art. xvi).

'Item docent quod homines non possint justificari coram Deo propriis vivibus, meritis aut operibus, sed gratis justificentur propter Christum per fidem, quum credunt se in gratiam recipi, et peccata remitti propter Christum. . . . Hanc fidem imputat Deus pro justitia coram ipso '(Conf. Nug. iv).

'Item docent quod fides illa debeat bonos fructus parere' (*Ibid.* vi).

'Interim proprie loquendo nequaquam intelligimus ipsam fidem esse quæ nos justificat, ut quæ sit duntaxat instrumentum, quo Christum justitiam nostram apprehendimus' (Conf. Belg. xxii).

It was the Saviour's command, after His ascension that the Apostles should remain at Jerusalem, refraining from the active discharge of their office until the promise of the Father, to send upon them the

Holy Ghost, should be fulfilled (Acts i. 4). For the accomplishment of redemption was one thing, the application of it another. The former was the work of the second Person of the Trinity—the Son Incarnate, the latter that of the third, the Holy Spirit, and this Divine Agent could not, in the appointed order of things, be vouchsafed in the fulness of His gifts, until the Redeemer, made perfect through suffering, had passed into the heavens to claim the reward of His obedience unto death, and to exercise His regal and priestly functions on behalf of His Church (John vii. 9). The prophetical office of Christ was to be perpetuated, not by Himself in person but by the Holy Spirit, His Vicar, and only Vicar, upon earth ; the active Administrator of the Christian dispensation. From the Holy Spirit's inspiration were to be derived the further revelations which were needed to supply what was wanting in Christ's personal teaching (John xvi. 13) ; and by His gracious co-operation with the Word and Sacraments the Church was to be called into being, perpetuated, and conducted to its consummation. Christ has not left His Church in a state of orphanhood (John xiv. 18) ; He is still present with it, but not as the Incarnate Son, but as the third Person in the economy of redemption.[1]

'The Lord,' we read, 'added to the church daily those who were being saved' (Acts ii. 47). The process thus briefly indicated may be resolved into several parts or stages, which, collectively, have received the name of the order of individual salvation. Scripture itself furnishes examples of such an arrangement, of which the most complete is that in Rom. viii. 29, 30 : 'Whom He did foreknow He did also predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son ; moreover, whom He did predestinate, them He also called ; and whom He called them He also justified ; and whom He justified them He also glorified.'[2] The Apostle here proceeds from the eternal counsels of God to their accomplishment in time ; but it may be of advantage to adopt the reverse method, and commencing with facts which come under our cognizance, to ascend from them to the Divine causality which is their ultimate source. These may be summed up under the three principal heads of

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[1] Hence the interchange of the terms Christ and the Holy Spirit in the New Testament : *e.g.*, 'I will pray the Father and He shall give you another Comforter that He may abide with you for ever : I will not leave you comfortless, I will come to you' (John xiv. 16, 18). 'That Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith' (Ephes. iii. 17)' 'Christ in you the hope of glory' (Col. i. 27). Hence, too, the difference of meaning in which the same word 'grace' is used in reference to the three Persons of the Trinity. Thus the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ (2 Cor. viii. 9) is not the same as the grace of God which made Paul what he was (1 Cor. xv. 10) ; and neither is identical with the grace of the Father spoken of in Tit. ii. 11 ; if, indeed, we may introduce the Trinitarian relations into this last passage.

[2] Compare 1 Cor. vi. 11 : 'Ye are washed, ye are sanctified, ye are justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of God.' Also 1 Pet. i. 2.

Calling, Justification and Regeneration, each comprising or implying several distinct operations of Divine grace. The Divine Election may claim a place, and the last place, to itself, as not being among the ' earthly things ' of redemption which take place in time (John iii. 12) ; while as regards the final glory to which the Church is predestinated, it belongs rather to the topic of Eschatology, and leads our thoughts beyond the present life.

PART I

CALLING

59. *Connection of the Word and the Holy Spirit*

ON the subject of the divine calling theologians have proposed various distinctions. It is either extraordinary or ordinary, mediate or immediate, external or internal. Extraordinary calling is that which takes place, not through the regular ministration of the Word, but in the way of miracle ; as when the Magi were led by a star to Bethlehem, or the thief on the cross, according to Jerome's opinion, to faith in Christ by the prodigies that accompanied the Crucifixion. The term may also be applied to designation to any special office or function in the Church, as when St. Paul describes himself as called to be an Apostle (Rom. i. 1). Ordinary calling is through the appointed means—viz., the Word. Mediate is when God makes use of angelic or human instrumentality ; immediate when He dispenses with such agency, as in Abraham's call and Saul's conversion. External calling consists in the public preaching or other ministry of the word ; internal in the secret operation of the Holy Ghost. As to the extension of meaning which some Lutheran theologians have given to the term 'calling,' in order to establish its universality—viz., that it may include the spiritual lessons to be derived from the works of creation—it seems out of place in this connection. It is true that Scripture attributes it to a culpable blindness on the part of the heathen that they did not profit by the traces of deity in creation and providence (Acts xvii. 27–29 ; Rom. i. 20), and seems also to suppose an internal presence in man of the Logos, or divine Word, beyond the pale of revelation and universal (John i. 9). But what we are here concerned with is that Divine vocation which is founded on an accomplished work of redemption and is effected through appointed means, and which invites those to whom it comes to repent and believe on the Lord Jesus Christ. And the first question that here occurs is that indicated in the heading of the section.

The Protestant confessions, as cited above, assign distinct, though never disunited, offices to the Word and the Holy Spirit in the calling of the sinner. A professed call of the Holy Spirit which disavows connection with the written Word is always open to suspicion. Such a pretended inward illumination is commonly the offspring of enthusiasm, sometimes fanatical, sometimes even immoral. On the other hand, the

Word may remain spiritually inefficacious from its not being accompanied by the influence of the Spirit who dictated it, as daily experience proves. Paul may plant and Apollos water, but God alone can give the increase.

The glad tidings of salvation were committed to inspired heralds for promulgation throughout the world, as the appointed means of gathering in the Church. The Gospel was to be preached to every creature (Mark xvi. 15) ; Christ, either in person or through His ambassadors, came to call sinners to repentance (Mark ii. 17) ; His sheep hear His voice (John x. 3, 16) ; when the wedding-feast was ready, the King's servants were sent to invite the guest to come (Matt. xxii. 3). The Gospel was to produce its effect by appealing to man as a rational creature, with a power to choice either to receive or reject the message. This excludes the notion of a mere external disciplinary institute, such as the law of Moses, or of a magical change independent of the will and affections.

Changes of moral sentiment can only be produced, as far as human agency is concerned, by a presentation to the mind of truth, real or supposed, old or new, or the old under a different garb—truth which shall supply motives to action. The Word, no doubt, was confirmed at first by signs and wonders following (Mark xvi. 20), but this was to launch it on its career under a divine attestation ; and God will not, in the ordinary course of His dealings, repeat these evidences of the Holy Spirit's presence, or, where the Word remains unfruitful, supply in any other way the defect (Luke xvi. 31). Faith, according to St. Paul, is the connecting link between the soul and Christ, but faith and the Word are correlative terms. Hence we cannot conceive how a Church is to be gathered out of heathenism except through the ministry of the Word. 'How shall they call on Him in whom they have not believed ? and how shall they believe in Him of whom they have not heard ? and how shall they hear without a preacher ?' (Rom. x. 14). Until this first step is taken there is no room for questions about sacraments or polity. An invitation, and an acceptance or rejection thereof, are the turning-points in the spiritual history of every individual.

It is not necessary or possible to confine the term 'Word of God' to the written Scriptures. It was by the oral teaching of the Apostles, for many years before the revelation was committed to writing, that Churches were formed and built up ; and it is by oral teaching, founded on the written Word, that Christianity is now propagated among the heathen. Those who are called, whether out of heathenism or in the visible Church, may be so in a variety of ways : by catechetical instruction as well as by formal preaching, by the providential events of life, by the atmosphere of Christianity which more or less surrounds every member of a Christian Church. To those baptized in infancy the period of confirmation is a special summons to make the decisive choice. But in some way or other the call must come to each person individually. Such a type of mission as that with which the Jesuits are credited, of baptizing in the mass without previous instruction, cannot plead Scripture as an example.

It would be transcribing a large portion of the New Testament to adduce proof that the Holy Spirit must co-operate with the Word to produce a saving effect ; and not merely by signs and wonders, but by inward illumination and spiritual suasion. 'No man can call Jesus Lord' to a saving result, 'but by the Holy Ghost' (1 Cor. xii. 3). If Lydia attended to the things spoken by the Apostle, so as to become a Christian, it was because the Lord opened her heart to do so (Acts xvi. 14). To the Thessalonians the Gospel came not in word only, but in power and in the Holy Ghost, and its reception was an evidence of their election of God (1 Thess. i. 4, 5). 'The things which God has prepared for them that love Him' need to be 'spiritually discerned' as well as recorded in the volume of inspiration (1 Cor. ii. 10, 14). St. Paul begs the prayers of the Thessalonians that the word of God might have free course and be glorified—prayers which he anticipated would be the means of securing the assistance of the Holy Spirit (2 Thess. iii. 1).

Thus far Protestants and Romanists are in substantial agreement, though the different degree of prominence which they respectively assign to the Word and the sacraments in the process of salvation betrays itself even here. With Protestants the Word is the primary instrument of regeneration, with Romanists the sacrament of baptism. But, as regards the connection of the Word with the Holy Spirit, a difference of view exists in the Protestant formularies, or principal theologians, themselves, at least after a certain date.

The Confession of Augsburg declares, in general terms, that through the Word and sacraments, as instruments, the Holy Spirit is conferred ; who produces faith, when and where it seems good to him, in those who hear the Gospel. The *Formula Concordiæ* (Lutheran) seems, at first sight, to confine itself within the same limits—'the preaching of the Word and the hearing thereof are instruments of the Holy Spirit, with which and through which it pleases Him to work efficaciously on men' ; but, on closer inspection, the notion appears in it which was adopted by the Lutheran theologians of the next century, viz., that a certain Divine power is immanent in the Word itself, an inherent efficacy resides in the very letter. It will be observed that the *Formula Concordiæ* declares not only that the Holy Spirit works *through* the Word but *with* it ; and in this addition consists the advance of doctrine on the Lutheran side. For to work with the Word, as distinguished from through it, can only mean that, independently of the Holy Spirit's influence, the written (or preached) Word is instinct with life, and may, by its own light, shine into the soul. This seems to be the meaning of Quenstedt : ' The instrumental cause (*causa organica*) of conversion is the external preaching of the Word, appointed thereto by God, and always, as far as His serious intention is concerned, efficacious. For the preached Word of God possesses an intrinsic Divine and sufficient power to effect regeneration, conversion, illumination, etc. ; whence it is called " the power of God unto salvation." ' And still more clearly of Hollaz : ' The power of the Divine Word is intrinsic to it ; not accidental but essential, by Divine appointment ; and, therefore, not separable, but the reverse ; and inherent, irrespectively of the hearer (*extra usum*).'

The aim of these writers appears to have been twofold : first, to oppose the false spiritualist tendencies which, as in all religious revivals, appeared here and there in the early years of the Reformation, divorcing the inward light from the written Word, Christ in the heart from Christ in the Scriptures. And, in the next place, to strengthen their position against the Calvinistic doctrine of absolute decrees. It is, in fact, evident that in proportion as the Word is supposed to possess an inherent efficacy, whenever and to whomsoever it is preached, the doctrine of a special Divine influence, working where and when it wills, is, if not ignored, thrown into the background. Since the Word addresses itself to all indifferently, if the Holy Spirit is so united with it as to be inseparable, then the Holy Spirit, likewise, in the Word approaches all ; and the distinction between calling and effectual calling may be overlooked. It will depend on the receptivity of the hearer whether the result is beneficial or not.

The analogy between this theory and the Lutheran doctrine of the Eucharist cannot fail to suggest itself. Just as the Body and Blood of Christ are united with the elements, independently of the reception (*extra usum*), so here the Holy Spirit is, by a kind of consubstantiation, supposed to be inherent in the Word written or preached (*extra usum*). And the result is to reduce the agency of the Holy Ghost to the original act of inspiration, under which the Scriptures were written.

What notion can we form of a spiritual presence supposed to be immanent in a book, or an oral discourse ? The Divine calling is spoken of in Scripture as a personal act, but incorporated in a book, even though that book be the Bible, it loses its personality ; it becomes a quiescent force, which is a contradition in terms. Moreover, though nothing could be further from the intention of its framers, the theory seems to approach the confines of Pelagianism. For a book, or a discourse, produces its effect by presenting motives to the mind, which operate thereon in the way of natural suasion. The Bible, no doubt, from its quality of inspiration, possesses, as no other book does, a power to awaken the conscience and move the affections ; it is, even as a book, the Word of God in a sense in which no other book is ; still its mode of operation, as a book, must be supposed analogous to that of uninspired compositions. In short, it is assumed that the instrument, though of Divine origin, operates of itself and by moral impression ; and this, if efficacious to salvation, presupposes in the natural man a power to respond to the appeal, and thus to pass, unaided from above, from a state of nature to a state of grace.

That the primary act of inspiration dispenses with further Divine assistance is indeed nowhere maintained by these writers ; it could hardly be so except by those who reject the doctrine of spiritual influence. On the contrary, they speak of a Divine power accompanying the Word, analogous to the *Concursus Dei generalis* in nature, or that presence of God which is not withdrawn even where it seems to operate under the form of impressed laws. But in other hands the theory has been worked out to results not in harmony with Scripture. The point in which it is deficient is in not assigning due prominence to the agency of the Holy Spirit as a Person, working with His own instrument, indeed, but independently thereof. The Word was inspired by Him ; the Word is the mean which He uses (*ὄργανον*) ; He speaks to us in and by the Word ; but the calling of God implies more than this, and the necessities of the case demand more. The mind of fallen man is darkened, and his affections carnal ; no book, not even the volume of inspiration, can of itself or by virtue of an immanence of the Holy Spirit therein remove these impediments : what is needed is an immediate work of the Holy Spirit on the spirit of man, that of a Person on a person, operating with the direct and subtle influence which only a person can exercise.

We cannot think too highly of the Scriptures as the one inspired record of the mind of the Spirit ; but we must not embody the Spirit in His own appointed channel of grace ; we must allow Him to remain outside and over it. Calvin, rather than his Lutheran brethren, speaks in accordance with Scripture. ‘ When St. Paul tells the Ephesians that they were “ sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise,” he intimates that an internal Teacher is necessary, by whose assistance the offer of salvation is brought home to the mind ; which offer otherwise would beat the air, or only strike our ears. In vain would the light present itself to the darkened eyes of our mind unless the Spirit should open them ; in vain would preachers cry in the wilderness unless Christ Himself, by the internal teaching of His Spirit, should draw those who are given Him by the Father.' [1] The general teaching of the Reformed Churches, our own included, is in accordance with these statements. And, curious to say, they receive unexpected confirmation from the great Tridentine theologian, Bellarmine : 'If it be said that efficacious grace seems not to belong to the category of inspiration' (in the general sense of the word) 'or calling, for that these latter are concerned with the letter not with the spirit ; if it be asked, what difference is there between internal suasion and external preaching, and we know that external preaching is letter, not spirit ?—we reply that there is a great difference. For external preaching addresses itself to the bodily ears, internal to the inner man ; the one proposes the object, the other communicates an inward light, and affects the will.' [2]

60. *Effectual Calling*

Why is it that when the same Word is addressed to an assembly of hearers (or readers), some give heed to it and some do not, or not to the same extent ? Of the fact there can be no doubt. Experience amply proves it. It is matter of common complaint that whether in missions or in Christian countries the effect of the Word preached is apparently but limited. And the statements of Scripture lead to the same conclusion. In the parable of the sower, only one kind of soil bore fruit ; in two the seed sprang up, but failed to come to perfection ; and one remained entirely without impression. Yet all received the same seed, and from the same sower. Christ Himself complains in prophecy that He had stretched out His hands to a disobedient people (Isa. lxv. 2), and His personal ministry was of the same character. It was comparatively but a few, in each sphere of labour, to whom the preaching of the Apostles appealed with salutary effect. A twofold answer may be given to the question ; it may be said, either that the difference is to be sought in the subjects themselves to whom the Word comes ; or that the intensity of spiritual operation, the degree of grace, accompanying the Word, is not the same in all cases, with the result of failure in some and success in others.

The Lutheran theologians above mentioned (§ 59), who held that the Holy Spirit is, in some sense, immanent in the Word, were compelled, from their theory, to adopt the former alternative ; for if the spiritual agency necessary to conversion is supposed to be imbedded in a book, it is difficult to conceive of its being otherwise than one and the same, in all instances. That is, they denied the distinction between ordinary, or, as it is sometimes called, sufficient, and effectual grace ; grace is always sufficient if it meets with a favourable soil. The Reformed type of Protestantism, and also the Romish theologians who belong to the school of Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas, naturally lean to the other hypothesis. That is, they supposed a distinction in the nature of the grace itself, antecedently to the result : in some cases it is effectual, in others not. To which side our church inclines is sufficiently plain from Art. xvii ; 'They which be endued with so excellent a benefit of God' (predestination unto life) 'are called, according to God's purpose, by His Spirit working in due season ; they, through grace, obey the calling,' etc.

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[1] *Instit.*, Bk. iii., c. 1 ; comp. Bk. ii., c. 5.
[2] *De Grat. et Lib. Arb.*, i., c. 13.

That some calling must be what is called effectual follows from the doctrine of original sin, as commonly held in the Church. According to it mankind, as a whole and antecedently to differences between individuals, is involved in spiritual ruin ; in regard to which all men are upon a level. In the lower sphere of natural virtue (*civilis justitia*) great differences of character appear ; some are respectable and amiable, others not so ; some, such as Christ Himself, as the Son of Man, could love (Mark x. 21), others in His sight hypocrites and a generation of vipers (Matt. xxiii. 33). But into the superior sphere of the new life in Christ none can enter by the powers of unaided nature ; the natural man 'cannot turn and prepare himself by his own strength, or good works, to faith and calling upon God' (Art. x). Out of this corrupted mass it is the purpose of God, as our 17th Article declares, to bring a certain portion by Christ to everlasting salvation ; not merely to the possibility of attaining it, but to the thing itself. In the case of these persons it is obvious that a grace of calling so effectual as not to fail of its intended object must be presumed : that is, it must be a grace not dependent on free-will for its efficacy, for of free-will as implying a power to originate, or maintain, a decision for what is spiritually good mankind is by nature destitute ; it must be of such a character as not to be liable to be finally overcome by human resistance. For the very reason why the remainder of mankind does not attain to eternal life is that whatever common, or ordinary, grace may accompany the act of calling, or of incorporation in the visible Church, it is not adequate to secure the proposed end, as experience proves.

According to the doctrine of the Church, every descendant of Adam comes into the world with the will enslaved in a wrong direction ; when it may be asked, is it even so far emancipated as to have the power of choosing the right ? Every infant, it is sometimes replied, born in a Christian Church and baptized, recovers this power, to a greater or less extent ; the will is restored to a state of equilibrium ; it cannot, of course, actually operate, owing to the immaturity of the subject, but the faculty is present, to be exercised in due time. But, in the first place, it is difficult to understand how the mere fact of Christian birth, or the administration of baptism to an unconscious subject, can replace a power which was lost by the fall ; at best, it is a mere hypothesis and never can be proved. We can form no real conception of the state of Adam before the fall, since it transcends all our experience ; as possessing the gift of independent personality he must have been endowed with that of free-will, coupled with the possibility of falling, as the event proved, but also with the possibility of resisting temptation ; created in a state of moral perfection, and needing no superadded gift of grace, as the Romish Church teaches, to curb the propensities inseparable from a material nature. We have no right, indeed, to introduce the Biblical term ' grace ' into the dispensation of Paradise, where it could have no place.[1] Adam's will was free, but not in a state of indifference. This is all that we can surmise respecting a condition so far removed from what we actually find in and around us.

The state of man after the Fall is that, though he possesses will as a mere faculty of human nature, his will is inclined to evil, under bondage to sin ; and whether Christian birth or baptism can break the fetter is not told us. But, in the next place, to restore to the will the mere power of choosing between good and evil, to leave it in a state of indifference, would be entirely inadequate to ensure the salvation of any individual, and under these circumstances, Christ might be left without a Church to share with Him the glory which is the recompense of His cross and passion. Assisting grace, it is said, is offered and will be given to those who use the partially emancipated will aright, to those who endeavour to wish in accordance with the will of God ; but against this merely assisting grace are arrayed the remaining ' infection of nature,' which Art. ix pronounces not to be removed, even in the regenerate, still less so, surely, in the merely called ; the prevalence of evil example ; and the temptations of Satan. Is it any wonder if, to say the least, in the majority of instances, it succumbs ?

This grace, supposed to be vouchsafed to all the members of a visible Church, is sometimes called ' sufficient,' an unhappily-chosen term. It cannot be sufficient if its success is dependent on the proper use of a will which is in a state of indifference, and which, under the circumstances of the case, is far more likely than not to go in the wrong direction. What is needed is a grace which shall determine the will to action, take it out of its equilibrium, and incline it to obey the voice of the Divine invitation in preference to other charmers, charm theynever so wisely. It is of little avail to strike off some of the chains of a prisoner and bid him come forth, while others confine him beyond his strength to free himself from.

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[1] See § 30.

Does the sufficient grace become efficacious from the co-operation of men, or from some further special assistance of God ? That is the question. The Pelagian would adopt the former alternative, the orthodox Christian the latter. And this Christian would be supported by the general language of the Scripture, which ascribes effectual calling to a work of God analogous to that of creation, or the resurrection of a dead body (Ephes. ii. 1, 10), and by the spiritual instincts of the believer himself. He would be the first to repudiate the notion that his conversion is partly owing to his own efforts, and partly to Divine grace. Afterwards, no doubt, he may be exhorted to work out his salvation with fear and trembling, on the very ground that it is God that works in him both to will and to do (Phil. ii. 12, 13). In short, sufficient grace, as understood by those who use the term, must become controlling, or, as it is sometimes called, sovereign grace, to issue in a saving result. The premisses of original sin and predestination being granted, there seems no escape from this conclusion.

The two doctrines, taken as the Church understands them, and according to the apparent meaning of the Scripture, necessitate a series of middle terms, of which the first is of effectual calling. The chain cannot be broken except by either extenuating the effects of the fall, or reducing the notion of election to that of a national one, or that of admission to privileges which may or may not be improved. Bellarmine justly remarks : ‘ That there is such a thing as efficacious grace follows from the simple fact that, if we deny it, we overturn the doctrine of the Divine predestination ; for predestination, as Augustine says, is preparatory to grace, but grace itself is the actual gift. Predestination is the foreknowledge and prearrangement of that Divine mercy by which whosoever are freed ’ (from sin and death) ‘ are most certainly so freed. God knows that there are certain spiritual gifts by which spiritual freedom is infallibly effected, and in the case of the elect bestows them ; but what is this but effectual grace ? ’ The substance of which is, that a more powerful agent is needed for the purpose in view than the grace which the same writer calls sufficient, but which is thereby proved to be not sufficient.

The term ‘ irresistible ’ grace is equally ill-chosen ; all grace is resistible ; what is meant by it is that some grace, though it may be resisted, eventually prevails, comes out victorious from the conflict. The Arminian, represented by Tomline, Mant, Lawrence, and others of their school, makes this contingent on such freedom of will as fallen man either possesses by nature or recovers in baptism ; the Augustinian replies that this is not enough, that the case demands a more powerful remedy ; such a grace as shall fix the will in its moral freedom, or render it morally impossible that it should not choose the good ; a freedom of will such as we must suppose the elect angels to possess. And this more powerful remedy is what Augustine and Calvin understood by the efficacious grace which is bestowed on the elect.

The conclusion seems unanswerable ; and yet it is encountered by a body of Scripture-language to which we must assign its due weight. Can God seriously wish the salvation of those to whom, as the event proves, this efficacious grace is not given ? Scripture abounds with general invitations : ‘ Come unto Me, all ye that are weary and heavy laden ’ ; ‘ him that cometh unto Me I will in no wise cast out ’ ; ‘ whosoever will, let him take of the water of life freely ’ ; they seem inconsistent with any other supposition than that salvation is intended for all to whom the external calling is addressed. And if so, must not some sufficient accompanying grace be also vouchsafed ?

But, in fact, such a mode of address presents no difficulties. As long as the ministry of man is employed in the work of calling, no other mode can be adopted. For since the human ambassador cannot know who are to be the subjects of efficacious grace, or whether the whole assembly to whom he speaks may not be of the number, he has no alternative but to propound the offer in general terms ; there is no method of calling in the elect except by a promiscuous invitation. But it is otherwise with *expostulations* addressed to those who refuse to accept it. Their refusal assumes in Scripture the character of culpability. ‘ Why will ye die, O house of Israel ? I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth ’ ; ‘ Wherefore when I looked that My vineyard should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes ? ’ ‘ How often would I have gathered thy children together, and ye would not ? ’ ‘ Ye will not come to me that ye may have life.’ In these, and similar passages, blame is attached to the recusants, and why should it be so if they had no power, without special grace, to comply with the call ?

If we discard the misleading term ‘ sufficient,’ there seems no inconsistency in supposing that influences of the Holy Spirit may accompany the word which falls short of effectual grace. In the case of those born in a Christian Church and brought under religious instruction, such initial strivings of the Spirit may well be anticipated as probable ; and that they are not peculiar to the Gospel dispensation but were common under the law may be inferred from Stephen's reproof of his hearers : 'Ye do always resist the Holy Ghost, as your fathers did, so do ye' (Acts vii. 51). Some Calvinistic theologians, though not Calvin himself, are prone to make effectual grace the only grace applied ; and some Lutheran, too, deny any distinction of grace ; possibly both may be in error.

The Synergistic controversy, which, soon after Luther's death, arose among Protestants, was chiefly concerned with these preliminary stages of spiritual influence. Those who held the necessity of co-operation on man's part argued, not without reason, that if the Holy Spirit could be resisted, He might also be admitted ; but they failed to explain to what it is due if the resistance is overcome. Their contention, in fact, only amounted to what all must acknowledge, that God, in this matter, does not exercise a blind force, a *natura naturans*, but deals with the being whom He has endowed with the privilege of independent personality, after the manner of a free agent—by moral appeal and tentative solicitation (inward as well as external)—and in this way overcomes the impediment. The controversy, in substance, repeats itself in every age of the Church. There must, it is argued, be even in fallen man a faculty receptive of grace ; else how would he differ from the fallen angels ? Something to which grace can attach itself, whether we call it natural conscience, or the image of God, defaced indeed, but not wholly obliterated. Scripture speaks of an 'obedience of faith' to the Gospel-call (Rom. i. 5 ; 1 Thess. i. 8), and of relative differences in the natural man when it describes some as 'of the truth' (John xviii. 37), and others as hardening themselves against it. Shall we ascribe these differences wholly to natural temperament, and not also in part to a pedagogical and preparatory[1] work of the Spirit ?

The ministry of the Word is represented in Scripture as never without some spiritual effect, though it may be for the worse : it is a 'savour of death as well as of life unto life' (2 Cor. ii. 16) ; it may be the innocent occasion of arousing the enmity of the natural heart, which had previously lain dormant, and transforming indifference into hostility. As regards the parable of the sower, we may ask whether the different results sprang wholly from natural differences in the hearers ? Those who for a time received the Word with joy, and those who suffered it to be choked with worldly cares, brought no fruit to perfection ; but how came they to be impressed with it at all ? The unclean spirit, after being expelled from his abode, returns to it (Luke xi. 24) ; but mere nature could not have effected even a temporary expulsion. The well-known passages, Heb. vi. 4–6, x. 26, admit of more than one interpretation, and one is that the grace therein described did not amount to effectual. If some branches in the true vine are fruitless, still as branches, and not merely connected by an external ligature, they must, it would seem, in some sense and to some extent, have derived life from it (John xv. 2).

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[1] This term is more appropriate than 'preventing' ; for, as will be seen from Art. x, preventing grace, as understood by the compilers, is the first step towards effectual.

The same truth seems to follow from the history of religious revivals. Waves of religious impression, as in the Baptist's ministry, from time to time pass over the Church, and yet leave little permanent result behind. We dare not ascribe them to any source but that whence all good comes, but they are of a different quality from an effectual Divine vocation; grace may have ruffled the surface of the soul without penetrating to the centre of the moral being. Such initial grace Bellarmine not inaptly described as conferring a *power* to wish to repent, but not the actual wish. The will is so far emancipated from the thraldom of sin as to be able to feel its misery and seek for deliverance, but at present no further: it is, as observed above, *arbitrium liberatum* but not *arbitrium liberum*. Such may be supposed to have been the state of Saul of Tarsus before his conversion, who, according to one interpretation of Acts ix. 5, had found it hard to resist the goads of conscience even before Christ was revealed to him.

The difficulty, of course, remains, why the Holy Spirit, after apparently proceeding to a certain extent in the communication of grace, should not complete His work by transforming preparatory into efficacious grace? Why should He retire before the end is attained? We cannot assent to Turretin's mode of removing the difficulty: 'Although God does not intend the salvation of the reprobate by calling them, yet no hypocrisy is to be imputed to Him. Seriously and truly He exhibits to them the way of salvation, seriously exhorts them to follow it, and most sincerely promises salvation to all who repent or believe.'[1] It is not the general invitation that causes perplexity (see above); if the elect are to be gathered in, the net, as cast by man, must include the reprobate; but the fact that some grace, which does not issue in salvation, appears to be vouchsafed wherever the Word is preached. Still less can we accept, indeed, we must reject with abhorrence, Calvin's suggestion that such insufficient grace is given to render the disobedient the more culpable.[2]

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[1] *Inst. Theol.*, Bk. xiv., Q. 2.

[2] Nihil absurdi est quod cœlestium donorum gustus ab Apostolo, et temporalis fides a Christo illis (reprobis) ascribitur; non quod vim spiritualis gratiæ solide percipiant, ac certum fidei lumen; sed quia Dominus, *ut magis convictos et inexcusabiles reddat*, se insinuat in eorum mentes, quatenus sine adoptionis spiritu gustari potest ejus bonitas. *Inst.* iii. c. 2, 11. A warning example of the danger of pushing theories to their logical conclusions.

The Synod of Dort attempts to solve the problem by a distinction between the bare announcement of the plan of salvation (*voluntas signi*), and the application thereof (*voluntas beneplaciti*) ; and Turretin, in the above-cited passages adopts its statements literally. But, even if the distinction may be allowed, we have no concern directly with the *voluntas beneplaciti*, it is beyond our sphere of knowledge. ‘ That will of God is to be followed which we have expressly declared unto us ’ (*voluntas signi*) ‘ in the word of God ’ (Art. xvii) ; and we gather from it that God does really wish the salvation of all men. We stand, in fact, in presence of one of those antinomies which we not infrequently meet with in Scripture, and which appear insoluble to human reason.

Pushed to its logical conclusion, the necessity, from the condition of fallen man, of a grace superior to common, or preparatory, grace, leads, in conjunction with the doctrine of predestination, to reprobation, at least in its milder form of ‘ preterition ’ ; pushed to its logical conclusion, the Arminian doctrine, which acknowledges no grace, but what is common, leads to Pelagianism. We await a fuller measure of revelation for an adjustment of the two lines of thought. Our wisdom, at present, is to fall back on the Apostle's treatment of the subject : ‘ Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault, for who hath resisted his will ? Nay, but, O man, who art thou, that repliest against God ? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus ? . . . How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out ! For who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor ? ’ (Rom. ix. 19, 20 ; xi. 33, 34).

Efficacious or creative grace, as the only sufficient one, excludes the notions of merit implied in the scholastic terms ‘ grace of congruity ’ and ‘ grace of condignity.’ The former means that works done before the inspiration of Christ's Spirit may be so pleasing to God as to attract the bestowal of grace ; the latter, that by the due improvement of grace given a meritorious claim to further grace is established. Art. xiii affirms that works done in a state of nature—*i.e.* not springing from faith in Christ—do not ‘ make men meet to receive grace ’ ; they are of a different quality from the good works of the Christian.[1] Indeed, to hold otherwise would be Pelagianism. Grave discussion prevailed at the Council of Trent on this subject,[1] and the Council prudently forbore the use of the term ' *de congruo* ' in its decrees. Indeed, there is little to find fault with in its statements on the Divine calling. 'If any one shall assert that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and His assistance man can believe and repent as he ought in order to obtain the grace of justification, let him be anathema.'[2] Waiving the characteristic clause ' to obtain the grace of justification,' which points to the doctrine of inherent justifying righteousness, the Synod takes its stand on the teaching of Scripture and of the whole Church. It is in no man's power to fix the time of his own awakening ; his hour must strike, and experience proves that no mere moral virtue is the condition of its striking. The last are often the first, and the first last. The mild and sensible Gamaliel never, as far as we read, was effectually called ; while Zacchæus, under unexpected circumstances, received the decisive impulse (Acts v. 34 ; Luke xix). And hence we learn to despair of no man, for the perations of Divine grace follow no ascertained law, and often take us by surprise.

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[1] It is characteristic of a certain school of theology to evacuate the distinction between works done before grace, and works done by grace. ‘ God, the Holy Ghost, visits every soul which God has created, and each soul will be judged as it responded or did not respond to the degree of light which He bestowed on it.’ . . . ‘ God, when He created all His rational creatures, created *them also with grace*, so that they had the full power to choose aright, and could not choose amiss except by resisting the drawing of God.’ Pusey, *What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment ?* pp. 22, 23. It is to be presumed that in the latter extract the author speaks of Adam as created, not of man as fallen. But it is going beyond Scripture to maintain, as he seems to do, that the Holy Ghost visits every soul of man, investing the dictates of natural conscience with the quality of grace.

61. *Conversion*

Calling (*vocatio externa*) is the preliminary step to conversion, and issues therein where efficacious grace accompanies the Word. What is meant by the term ' conversion ' is, as appears above, variously expressed in the Protestant Confessions. In the Apology for the Confession of Augsburg it bears the traditional name of *pœnitentia*, but with the fundamental distinction that whereas the Church of Rome makes this to consist of three parts—contrition, confession, and satisfaction—the Apology mentions only two—contrition and faith. The *Formula Concordiæ* seems to identify conversion with regeneration. The Helvetic Confession describes ' true repentance ' as a ' sincere conversion to God, and an equally sincere aversion from all evil.' In fact, the terminology of the early writers on this subject is far from fixed. The word ' repentance ' is sufficient as an equivalent for conversion ; for sin may be repented of without being abandoned ; and there may be a repentance, as in the case of Judas Iscariot, which has no element of grace in it—' the sorrow of the world which worketh death ' (2 Cor. vii. 10).

Conversion may be described as a change of mind (*μετάνοια* Matt. iii. 11 ; *ἐπιστροφή* Acts xv. 3), the result of effectual calling ;

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[1] Sarpi, Bk. ii. 76.
[2] Sess. vi., Can. 3.

which change consists in sorrow for past sin, with a determination to renounce it in all its forms, faith in Christ for the forgiveness of sin, and a surrender of the heart to God to be sanctified by His grace. In its negative aspect it is a death unto sin ; in its positive, a resurrection to righteousness. And all scriptural accounts of it ultimately may be reduced to this twofold division. The Romish Church, by associating one inward act (contrition) with two outward (confession and satisfaction) in conversion, confounds the inward work of the Holy Spirit with matters of ecclesiastical discipline, and produces a theory resembling Daniel's image, which was composed of gold, silver, brass, iron, and clay (Dan. ii. 32, 33).

The state of the unconverted is described in Scripture under various aspects, which, though separable in thought, are in fact always combined. ‘ Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead ’ (Ephes. v. 14). Here the unconverted are represented as sunk in spiritual slumber, from which they have need to be aroused. They are insensible to the misery of their natural state, and to the spiritual blessings offered to them in the Gospel. The image of sleep is sometimes exchanged for that of death, as in chap. ii. of the same epistle, with a still stronger figurative meaning. Out of this condition the subject of efficacious grace is awakened or quickened, and this awakening or spiritual resurrection may be considered the first element of conversion. It must be distinguished from temporary impressions which come and go, which never become dominant, and not unfrequently, from repetition without endurance, terminate in a peculiar insensibility to spiritual appeals. Nor must it be insisted on as a regular stage to be passed through in the Christian life independently of other, and with special accompaniments of its own, such as a sense of God's wrath against sin, the terrors of future judgment, and intense spiritual conflict, to be exchanged in due course for peace and joy in believing.

It has been the error of some forms of Methodism thus to attempt to mark out, with a precision which Scripture does not warrant, the successive operations of the Holy Spirit, and to demand in every instance a uniform intensity of feeling, uniformly manifested. The epoch, indeed, is a critical one in the spiritual history of the individual. It is peculiarly liable to impure admixtures, which too clearly betray their earthly origin, and not always free from immoral tendencies. The quality of a religious awakening which assumes the form of an epidemic is open to suspicion. In many persons, particularly females, the nervous system is sensitive and liable to the contagion of religious excitement, whence the strange and sometimes repulsive incidents which occasionally occur in revivalist meetings, even when held with the best intentions. The genuine work of the Spirit, however it may pierce ‘ to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit ’ (Heb. iv. 12), is individual rather than multitudinous, acts in conjunction with free moral agency and leads to moral results.

Any dangers or mistakes liable to arise at this stage may be obviated by bearing in mind another aspect of conversion, viz., spiritual illumination, which is equally a Scriptural one (‘ Awake, and Christ shall give thee light ’), and embraces both the rational and the emotional side of human nature. The word ‘ darkness ’ is used in Scripture to signify both intellectual blindness and a depraved bias of the will ; and indeed, the former is a consequence of the latter (Rom. i. 21). Unregenerate man is represented as in darkness (Ephes. v. 8) ; and though Christ is the light of the world, and manifests Himself in the natural conscience (John i. 9), Christians are in a special sense children of light, and subjects of a special illumination of the Holy Spirit. In what does it consist. Those to whom the Gospel has never come are surrounded by an atmosphere of darkness which, even if they had the faculty of vision, prevents them from seeing things in their true colours and relations ; and the ministration of the Word is the appointed means of placing them, so far, in a more favourable position. This, however, is little more than saying that the Holy Spirit, as a rule, makes use of external means to begin and carry on His saving work ; the light of revelation removes the darkness of heathenism as a preliminary step towards individual illumination. But Scripture further represents the natural man as in darkness, in the sense of being without the faculty of spiritual vision ; as in himself blind, as incapable of spiritual discernment, even if the light shone around him. ‘ God,’ says St .Paul to the Corinthians, ‘ who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath ’ (besides this objective effect of the word) ‘ shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ ’ (2 Cor. iv. 6).

If we may consider the mind (*νοῦς*) and the affections (*καρδία*) separately, both suffer from spiritual blindness ; the understanding is darkened (Ephes. iv. 18), the affections no longer go forth towards their proper object ; and this state continues as long as the ray from heaven cannot find an entrance. To the Jew the announcement that the crucified Jesus is the promised Messiah, and that faith in Him, without the observance of the law of Moses, avails to justification, was a stumbling-block, to the Gentile world it was ‘ foolishness ’ (1 Cor. i. 23) ; foolishness, because the pride of reason rebelled against a religion the first demand of which is the acceptance of mysteries which philosophy had never anticipated, and could not explain. The reception which the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, as preached by St. Paul, met with on the part of the polished Athenians is an instance in point (Acts xvii). There is in the natural understanding no connecting point between such mysteries as the incarnation, the atonement, the necessity of the new birth, and the resurrection, as there is between it and the morality of Scripture ; hence the latter gives no occasion of offence, and, indeed, is cordially accepted by many who reject the former as unworthy of belief. But so, and on the same ground, is the teaching of Confucius or Socrates admired, as far as it approximates to the standard of the Bible.

As long as a sense of sin, the effect of the Holy Spirit's work in His special office of conviction (John xvi. 8), is dormant, the philosophy of the plan of salvation is not likely to be appreciated ; the wisdom of the world counts it foolishness, a charge which itself anticipates and glories in. It is of little avail to remind the man of science that, whatever be the branch he cultivates, his researches pushed far enough invariably end in mystery ; a fact, therefore, which may be expected to appear in the Gospel scheme also. The difference is this : Christianity not only ends but begins with the assertion of supernatural facts, builds itself upon them, transforms the duties of the moral law into Christian obedience by a constant reference to those facts, and proclaims that if they are forgotten or denied, it is robbed of its vital force and is no longer Christianity. It would be unjust, in all such cases, to ascribe this reluctance to admit the supernatural element of Christianity to the influence of a depraved will on the understanding, certain as that moral fact is ; it is met with where the virtues of ordinary life are cultivated, and to an extent which some Christian believers would do well to imitate. The true cause is, as has been remarked, that the Holy Spirit's work of conviction of sin has not been experienced, or not sufficiently so ; and in consequence, Christianity is not recognized as a religion of *redemption.*

But darkness, in the moral sense of the word, is also ascribed in Scripture to the natural man. In this sense it means that his affections, and through them the will, are diverted from their proper object and enslaved to sin. 'The carnal mind' (*φρόνημα τῆς σάρκος*) 'is enmity against God ; it is ' not only ' not subject to the law of God, but neither, indeed, can be' (Rom. viii. 7). It labours under a moral impotency in respect of the spiritual life. The actings of such a life, conflict with sin, faith, love, prayer, etc., are foreign to its experience, and to its inclinations ; in short it gravitates to earthly things. Whether the object that engrosses the affections is of a more refined or a grosser character, the aversion from a life hid with Christ in God is substantially the same in every case in which spiritual illumination has not displaced the love of the world by the love of God. Moreover, this innate disposition to spiritual things is aggravated by the terms on which alone the Gospel promises its blessings. The demand is for the whole heart ; it is felt that if indeed the Son of God became incarnate and died for sin no less is due ; but against such a surrender the carnal mind rebels ; compromises which aim at uniting the service of two masters are devised and full submission only takes place when ‘ the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ ’ supplants the old affection by a new one. And this is the second feature of real conversion.

There remains yet a third : this vital change always terminates in an appropriation of Christ as Redeemer, or in other words, in justifying faith ; which, therefore, the Protestant Confessions couple with repentance and a change of mind as completing the conception. Negatively, conversion is the renunciation of a past sinful life ; positively, the restoration of fellowship with God. But for the sinner there is no possibility of the latter except through the mediation of Christ, and an appropriation of the promises which centre in Him. Mere convictions of sin, however profound, which stop short of this decisive step, issue either in despair, or in a return to spiritual insensibility ; the strong man armed has been driven out, but because the habitation has been left empty he finds means to return. The Church of Rome likewise speaks of faith in this connection, but the faith which it means is of a different nature from what Protestants understand by the term, and occupies a different place in the process of conversion. It is not an element of conversion itself, but an act antecedent,[1] and consists in a mere acceptance of the declarations of Scripture as true ; in fact, it is that historical faith which may be predicated even of those fallen beings who ‘ believe and tremble ’ (James ii. 19).[2] Whereas faith, in the other sense, embraces, under a sense of sin, the gratuitous offer of mercy which the Gospel proposes, and is the last step in conversion, the point of transition at which the latter passes into habitual sanctification. Both in the Old and the New Testaments the application of the Divine law to the conscience, producing conviction of sin, is always accompanied with promises of mercy to the penitent. The ceremonial law spoke of atonement through shedding of blood : prophecy is full of encouragement to the repentant sinner ; and the chief Expounder of the requirements of the law in its full spiritual meaning (Matt. v.–vii) was no other than He who announced Himself as sent to seek and to save the lost. The ministration of the Word, therefore, simultaneously charges sin upon the conscience, and points out the mode of relief ; and the Holy Spirit, in the process of conversion, not only awakens and enlightens the sinner, but completes the work by leading him to Christ.

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[1] In eo quem pœnitet, fides pœnitentiam antecedat necesse est ; ex quo fit ut nullo modo pœnitentiæ pars recte dici possit. *Cat. Rom. De Pœnit.*, viii.

[2] Disponuntur ad ipsam justitiam dum excitati divina gratia et adjuti fidem ex auditu concipientes, libere moventur in Deum, credentes vera esse quæ divinitus revelata et promissa sunt. *Con. Trid.*, Sess. vi., c. 6.

It is not, of course, to be supposed that these various operations of the Holy Spirit are confined to the primary act of conversion. On the contrary they are necessary accompaniments of the Christian life from first to last. Conviction of sin, like the roots of a tree, grows downwards in proportion as the fruits of the Spirit grow upwards ; spiritual illumination is a progressive work, and the Christian must always be endeavouring to understand what the will of the Lord is (Ephes. v. 17) ; and as to faith in Christ, it is as necessary to the maintaining as to the entering upon a justified state. But a true conversion remains, notwithstanding, the *first* occasion on which these spiritual habits are implanted in the soul.

Some subordinate points remain to be noticed. Quenstedt's definition applies, as he observes, only to adults ; and, indeed, it is obvious that infants, before the dawn of reason, cannot be supposed to have a sense of sin, or to understand the Gospel message, or to exercise faith in it. In other words, infants, whether within the Church or outside of it, are incapable of conversion, in the strict sense of the word. This will be admitted ; but it may be argued that those infants who have been born of Christian parents, and have received the sacrament of baptism, do not need conversion : they have only, as reason begins to act, to improve the grace given them in baptism, and they will grow up unconsciously into a state of confirmed religion, neither needing nor remembering any such spiritual change as that denoted by the word conversion. And hence the question arises—' Is conversion in all cases necessary, or not so ? '

We must draw a distinction between those infants who depart this life before the dawn of reason and those who become, in whatever degree, conscious moral agents. The former are incapable of conversion ; and we may presume that they do not need it in order to be saved. In truth, we know little or nothing respecting their spiritual condition, and Scripture does not come to our assistance. If, born of Christian parents and in the bosom of a Christian Church, they receive baptism as a ' charitable work,' pleasing to Christ, we trust He hears our prayers on their behalf and takes them into His gracious keeping ; we have no doubt that, if removed before a corrupt nature can act, they are safe in the bosom of their Father and their God. But beyond this it is not safe to advance. We know not what kind or amount of grace is given to them in baptism, or whether the terms regeneration or justification, according to the meaning they bear in Scripture, are applicable to this exceptional case. We may suppose that something *analogous* to what these terms express takes place in every child of Adam before he is admitted to the kingdom of heaven ; but positive statements on the subject are out of place. And this because it *is* an exceptional case ; the subject labours under a natural incapacity to fulfil the conditions which Scripture demands in the normal case of adult baptism, a circumstance which by no means compels us to question the propriety of infant baptism, but which does seem to recommend the language of faith and charity, in preference to that of dogmatic assertion, respecting its effects.

But if the infant arrives at an age when he can be brought, to whatever extent, under religious instruction ; when the conscience can be appealed to, and a choice between right and wrong can be made—we must hold that conversion, or something equivalent to it, is necessary even in those who have been dedicated to Christ in baptism. The privileges which such an infant enjoys correspond to the external calling of the Word in the case of an adult. And the need of a distinct act of obedience to the summons is plain enough in the sinful passions, the frivolity and indifference to religion, which, as a rule, mark out earliest years. To argue that apart from these appeals, baptismal grace will of itself become active, will, in fact, improve itself ; or that it can be improved in any other way than by the presentation to the infant mind, as it is capable thereof, of the truths of the Gospel ; would be to ascribe a magical effect to the ordinance to which Scripture gives no countenance.

Whatever notion we may form of baptismal grace—if it be a seed it requires watering, if it be a germ of faith (as Calvin and others have held) it must have the objects of faith in due time presented to it—the grace, apart from other means of grace, will not of itself grow up into even the most elementary apprehension of the Gospel, or of Him to whom the Gospel bears witness. ‘It is your parts and duties to see that this infant be taught, so soon as he shall be able to learn, what a solemn vow, promise and profession he hath here made by you. And that he may know these things the better, ye shall call upon him to hear sermons,’ etc. (Baptismal Service). That is, he must be approached as an adult candidate for baptism would be, in the way of moral suasion, only adapted to the immaturity of the subject. The meaning of baptism must be explained to him, and this cannot be done without at the same time instructing him in the fundamental truths of the Gospel, and especially those connected with the ministration of the Holy Spirit. Somehow or other he must be called upon to repent and believe on Christ, if his baptism, or the grace conveyed in it, is to be beneficial.

But here we pass from the region of sacramental grace into that of the ministration of the Word, with which conversion is specially connected ; the religious instruction, on the presumption of which the infant was baptized, taking the place of the preaching of the Word to adults, whether in missions or at home. The only difference is that in the case of an adult candidate for baptism, his conversion precedes the Sacrament, while in the case of the baptized infant it follows it. Such infant conversion may differ much in circumstantials from that of an adult ; it may be marked by no great sense of sin ; the notions entertained of religion may be as infantile as the subject who entertains them ; the struggle between the flesh and the Spirit may be so faint as to be hardly perceptible to the inner man. But these do not affect the essence of conversion, which consists in an individual summons and an individual response. And if the analysis be carried far enough, it will be found, even in the most immature forms of religious life, that some transaction must have taken place between the soul and God, and that where the response has been favourable it is owing to efficacious as distinguished from preparatory grace. The conclusion is that, extraordinary cases being set aside, conversion, in its substance, is universally necessary. In the case we have been considering it may be regarded as the inward aspect or side of confirmation ; it supplies the condition which was wanting to make the baptism a complete one. Confirmation is a public assurance to the Church that the imperfection of infant baptism is made good, and that no hindrance now exists to full admission to Christian privileges.

Another remark of Quenstedt's is, that the 'ultimate act' in conversion is instantaneous (*in instanti, quoad ultimum actum*). And, indeed, we cannot think of it otherwise. To regard it as a gradual process would be to confound it either with sanctification or with the preparatory work of grace which leads up to it. The turning from sin and the turning to God may be distinguished in thought, but, in fact, there can be no middle, neutral ground between a state of grace and its opposite ; light and darkness cannot co-exist.[1] This will appear more plainly if we remember that conversion is regeneration itself, in its inward or essential aspect; regeneration in the sight of God, though not as yet visibly sealed by admission to the Church.[1] But regeneration does not admit either of degrees or of successive acts. The analogy of natural birth is to the point. Previously to the birth, for a considerable time, a hidden life goes on in the womb; but the birth itself is momentary or comparatively so. And such must be the new birth by the Holy Spirit.

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[1] Probe distinguenda præparatio ab ipsa ex statu iræ in statum gratiæ translatione. Præparatio habet suos gradus, et fit successive ; ipsa vero ex statu iræ in statum gratiæ translatio fit in instanti et in momento, cum impossibile sit ut subjectum aliquod vel per momentum sit simul in statu iræ et in statu gratiæ, simul sub vita et sub morte. Quenstedt, P. ii. c. 7 § 1, Thes. 22.

A distinction, however, may be drawn between the fact and the consciousness of it. From the former's being instantaneous it does not follow that the subject of the change may be able to fix the precise moment of the passing of preparatory into creative grace; indeed, the natural analogy is against such an assumption. For no one is conscious, at the time of his birth, of the fact, or can afterwards remember anything about it. In due season he knows that he must have been born; but he knows it only by the activity of the vital functions, and the circumstances with which he is surrounded. When Charles Wesley, therefore, tells us that his conversion took place in Aldersgate Street, on a certain day, at a quarter before nine o'clock in the month of May, 1739,[2] it would, indeed, be unphilosophical to assert that such an alleged fact is impossible, and improper to make it a subject of ridicule; but we may certainly ask whether it is likely that any one, under such a profound agitation of mind as that here pre-supposed, could have noted the moment so exactly. According to the old distinction, which in the main is correct, grace is '*preveniens*, *operans*, *et co-operans*'; prevenient grace, comprising the external means which the Holy Spirit employs, such as the Word and other means of grace; operative, the internal agency (awakening, enlightening, etc.) which issues in conversion; co-operative, that which accompanies the Christian to the end, and assists him in the work of sanctification. An attempt to analyse too minutely the complex state of mind which belongs to the second head is likely to fail, and to lead either to unnecessary distress of mind or to delusions more dangerous.

Scripture contains instances of sudden conversion, such as that of Saul, and of the gaoler of Philippi; and the time and circumstances must have been indelibly impressed on the memory of these converts. The subject of such a change must, in the language of Paley, 'both be sensible of it at the time, and remember it all his life afterwards. It is too momentous an event ever to be forgot. A man might as easily forget his escape from a shipwreck.' But in such cases as that of Lydia, whose heart the Lord opened to attend to the preaching of St. Paul, or Timonthy, who from a child had known the Holy Scriptures, it would have been more difficult to fix the hour of their conversion ; and the investigation could lead to no beneficial results. All were conspicuous examples of Divine grace ; all bore fruit worthy of repentance. Even in the two former instances it is impossible to say that a prevenient work of grace had not occurred. The very bitterness of Saul's hostility to the Church seems evidence that his conscience was ill at ease as he journeyed to Damascus ; and the gaoler had probably become acquainted with the missionary labours of Paul and Silas, at Philippi. To determine empirically the moment of conversion, or to distinguish accurately between the several stages which lead to it, is beyond our power ; so great is the variety of circumstances in each case, such as age, previous history, and particularly the greater or less duration of the preliminary work of the Holy Spirit. Some surrender to His gracious influences at once, others after a lengthened period of hesitation, or even resistance. 'The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, whither it goeth ; so is every one that is born of the Spirit' (John iii. 8).

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[1] Regeneratio conversionis synonymum est, quatenus illa est adultorum, et per verbum fit. *Ibid.*, Thes. 9.

[2] Southey, *Life of Wesley*.

The present is what we have to deal with, and the true test is progressive sanctification. There can be no true sanctification without an assurance of the changed relation towards God, whereby we cry, 'Abba, Father' (Gal. iv. 6) ; and sanctification is the putting on of the mind of Christ, in its various particulars. Those who can entertain a reasonable hope that such is their present spiritual state may also conclude—however different their experience may have been from that of others—that they have been brought out of darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God (Acts xxvi. 18).

PART II

JUSTIFICATION

FALLEN man, in order to his spiritual restoration, needs not only a liberation of will from the thraldom of sin and a change of heart, but also a change of relation towards God as a righteous Lawgiver. The first symptom of an awakened conscience is a sense of guilt ; but, as we have seen, conversion involves or terminates in acceptance, through faith, of the promises of mercy, founded on the work of Christ, and offered in the ministration of the Word ; and this acceptance issues in a justified state, a state in which the guilt of sin, past and present, is remitted. ' Whom He called, them He also justified ' (Rom. viii. 30) ; a connection simultaneous in fact, but separable in thought. Here, then, arises a class of questions of a distinctive character. What is the meaning of justification ? What office does faith discharge in connection with it? Of what nature is justifying faith? Questions which formed a prominent topic of controversy in the Apostolic age, then for centuries passed into comparative oblivion, and at the Reformation once more asserted their paramount importance, and lay at the root of the separation of the Protestant churches from the communion of Rome.

Our Article on the subject (xi) contains no definition of justification, merely declaring that ' we are accounted righteous before God only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ by faith ' ; a statement which, if the clause ' by faith ' were allowed to be variously understood, might be accepted by all Christian Churches. Nor is the Augsburg Confession—after which our own formulary was, on this point, evidently framed—much more explicit : ' We teach that men are justified before God, not by their own works or deservings, but for Christ's sake through faith ; which faith God imputes to them for righteousness' (Art. iv).

The Protestant theologians of the next century, especially the Lutheran, enter more into detail. Quenstedt's definition is : 'Justification is an act of the Holy Trinity *ad extra* ' (*i.e.*, common to all three Persons) ; ' forensic in nature ; of mere grace ; by which, on account of Christ's merits, the sinner is gratuitously pardoned and counted righteous ; to the praise of the Divine mercy, and the salvation of those who are justified.'[1] The causes of justification these theologians describe as follows : the efficient cause, the Triune God ; the impelling (internal), the gratuitous mercy of God ; the impelling (external), the meritorious active and passive obedience of Christ ; the secondary impelling (*minus principalis*) faith in Christ ; the formal cause, remission of sin, which involves the imputation of Christ's righteousness.[1] Sometimes the formal cause is described as faith, by which is to be understood a faith apprehensive of the merits of Christ. It will be seen hereafter that remission of sin, or the imputation of Christ's merits, and an operative faith, are really two aspects, or sides, of the one formal cause, so far as the category of formal causes is applicable to justification. By many writers—*e.g.*, J. Gerhard (*Loci.*, xvii., § 64)—faith is termed the ' instrumental ' cause, or the instrument of justification, the *means* by which the gift passes to the receiver ; and such, indeed, is the common mode of speaking on the subject.

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[1] *De Justif.*, § 1, Thes. 22. So Hollaz, P. iii. § 1 c. 8 ; except that he adds the condition : Peccatori converso et renato. Comp. Baier, *De Justif.*, § 15. And Calvin : Nos justificationem simpliciter interpretamur acceptionem, quâ nos Deus in gratiam receptos pro justis habet. Eamque in remissione peccatorum ac justitiæ imputatione positam esse dicimus. *Inst.*, iii. c. 11.

The Council of Trent, to some extent, covers the same field with the Protestant Confessions and theologians. The final cause of justification it declares to be the glory of God and life eternal ; the efficient, the gratuitous mercy of God ; the meritorious, our Lord Jesus Christ. At this point, however, the divergence between it and the Protestant formularies appears. The instrumental cause is the sacrament of baptism ; and ' the only formal cause is the righteousness of God, not that by which He is righteous, but that by which He makes us righteous, that, namely, by which we are renewed in the spirit of our minds, the love of God being ' (in the act of justification) ' shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost ' (Rom. v. 5).[2]

62. *The Etymology of the Word*

It is admitted, on all sides, that justification, in its active signification, is a gift of God ; but whether the gift is of a declaratory or a creative nature is matter of debate. The Protestant Confessions adopt the former view, the Romish the latter ; at least, that is the tendency of each. The testimony of Scripture leaves little doubt on the subject. Nothing adduced on the other side has invalidated the etymological argument in favour of the forensic meaning of the word, as set forth in the works of Chemnitz, J. Gerhard, and their successors. The Hebrew verb צָדַק signifies in Kal either to be righteous or to be declared so (Gen. xxxviii. 26 ; Job ix. 2) ; in Piel, to make righteous (in ecclesiastical Latin, *justificare*, Ezek. xvi. 51), and occasionally to declare righteous (Job xxxiii. 32) ; and in Hiphil, almost always to acquit forensically (Exod. xxiii. 7).[1] The LXX Version renders the verb in Hiphil, with few exceptions, by the Greek verb *δικαιόω*; with the meaning of which we are at present chiefly concerned. In classical Greek this verb bears two principal senses: to pronounce a thing, or a course of action proper,[2] and to visit judicially.[3] It does not appear that any instance occurs in classical writers of its signifying to make righteous, in the sense of infusing a quality, as heat is communicated to iron by the agency of fire. But, as Chemnitz remarks,[4] the question is, not in what secondary senses the word may occasionally be employed, but how the sacred writers use it when they expressly discuss the topic of justification.

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[1] J. Gerhard, L. xvii., § 199. Baier, P. iii. c. 5, § 11.

[2] Sess. vi., c. 7. To the same effect, justification is described as ' non solum peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio, et renovatio interioris hominis.' *Ibid.*

The nearest approach to a formal treatment of the subject is to be found in the Epistles of St. Paul to the Romans and Galatians, to which we may confine ourselves. All men, according to the Apostle, are—on account of their connection with Adam and their actual transgressions—subject to the condemnation of the law, its judicial sentence against sin (Rom. v. 18); but, through faith in Christ, they are justified, *i.e.*, the curse is removed (*Ibid.*, iii. 24); in the sense in which 'the many were made sinners' by one man's disobedience, in the same 'by the obedience of one shall the many be made righteous' (v. 19). Apart from the context, this latter passage might refer either to the imputation of guilt, or to the propagation of a corrupt nature through Adam's fall, or to both together, the one as the consequence of the other; whence, as Bellarmine argues, the righteousness due to the obedience of Christ might be understood as comprising both imputed and inherent. But the context determines the sense of it. If death is the wages of sin, the prevalence of death 'over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression' (v. 14), either by disobedience to a positive command, or (as in the case of infants) by any personal sin at all, proves, the Apostle argues, that the whole of mankind was, in some mysterious manner, involved in the *guilt* of Adam's sin; in consequence of which 'judgment came upon all men to *condemnation*' (v. 18), not to the corruption of human nature, of which the Apostle is not speaking. In like manner, by the obedience of One, those who had been adjudged guilty sinners may, if they receive the free gift, be absolved from all their offences. Condemnation on God's part is a different thing from the transmission of an hereditary taint in our nature; and so the 'righteousness of God,' or God's method of justification, is a different thing from the infusion of inherent righteousness.

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[1] See Gesenius, s. v.

[2] *ὅποι ποτὲ θεὸς δικαιοῖ.* Sophocles, *Phil.*, 780.

[3] *ὑμᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον δικαιώσεσθε.* Thucydides, iii. 40.

[4] *Exam.*, Art. ii. § 6.

The examples which St. Paul cites from the Old Testament lead to the same conclusion. Abraham believed God, and his faith was set to his account (ἐλογίσθη) for righteousness ; he was accounted, not made, righteous (iv. 5). And, as if to leave no doubt respecting his meaning, he refers to Psa. xxxii : ‘ Even as David also describeth the blessedness of the man unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works, blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven and whose sin is covered ; blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin.’ The justified man, then, is one whose sins are forgiven or covered from the eye of God ; to whom righteousness is imputed, not who is made righteous or sanctified. He is one whose *accusers* are silenced. ‘ Who shall lay anything to the charge of God’s elect ? Who is he that condemneth ? ’ Not God, who justifies them, pronounces judgment in their favour ; and if He be for them, who can be against them ? (Rom. viii. 33, 34). Precisely in the same sense is the word used in the parable of the Pharisee and the publican : ‘ This man went down to his house justified or forgiven (δεδικαιωμένος) rather than the other ’ (Luke xviii. 14).

Even St. James, who, in the opinion of some, intended to modify or explain his brother-Apostle’s statements, adheres strictly to the *meaning of the word* as it is used by the latter. Abraham’s faith ‘ wrought with his works ’ proved itself to be a justifying faith by its fruits ; but his justification, according to St. James himself, consisted not in the infusion of a quality, but in an imputation ; for the very same passage is cited by him which St. Paul employs : ‘ Abraham believed God, and it was imputed unto him for righteousness ’ (Jas. ii. 23). It has been well observed that, as regards past sins at any rate, justification is incapable of any other sense than a judicial acquittal. For what is done cannot be undone ; the sin is past, but the guilt remains. The only relief which the case admits of is that it should not be imputed to the offender. But if this is the necessary character which justification bears in reference to past sin, why should it assume a different one in reference to present sin ?[1] To which we may add that the distinction between past and present does not apply to God. ‘ He must be almost blind,’ says Bishop Bull, ‘who does not perceive that this (the forensic) sense of the term is the predominant one in Scripture, and especially in the New Testament ;[2] whose judgment seems entirely consistent with fact.

But, it is alleged, admitting that justification as the act of God is a declaration, we must bear in mind the potency which Scripture ascribes to the Word of God as such. If it begins as a word, it ends as a fact. 'The voice of the Lord is powerful; the voice of the Lord is full of majesty.' He said, 'Let there be light, and there was light'; 'He spake, and it was done; He commanded, and it stood fast.' What man does by an effort and with difficulty, and by the use of means, God does by the simple fiat of His Word. When, therefore, He declares a person righteous, He makes him so; so that justification and renewal are not merely inseparable in fact, but the effect of the same Divine operation; the Word declaring is the Word making. Justification, therefore, may properly be considered and called renewal.'[1] The reasoning, however, is not valid. The Word or voice of the Lord no doubt effects what it intends to effect in each particular utterance of it; but there may be a variety of occasions, each with its specific object, on which it exercises its power, and it does not follow that because the instrument is the same, the object is so also. When by the word of creative power He called the world out of chaos, the effect followed—viz., the appearance of the world out of chaos, because this was the specific object in view; but that same Word of God did not produce light. To remove the darkness which brooded over the earth a second Word was employed. God spake again and said, 'Let there be light,' and a specific effect followed—'there was light.' And so throughout the whole of creation separate acts of the Word produced distinct effects, and yet the instrument was the same in all.

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[1] See Newman, *Justif.*, Lect. iii.

[2] *Harm. Apost.*, c. i.

To apply this to justification: As an act of God it is a pronouncing the sinner righteous, a declaration that his sin, past and present, is remitted or forgiven. That is the specific object of this particular utterance of the Word of God, and it never fails to pass into deed; the sinner is forgiven, or counted righteous, or justified. How he is assured of the fact is another question (see next §). But the Divine act, consisting of declaration and deed, terminates, as far as justification is concerned, with itself, and produces, as the voice of God, no further spiritual effect. God may, and does intend also to sanctify the believer, to make him as well as count him righteous, but not in the special act of justifying him. To count righteous and to make righteous are clearly distinct ideas—as distinct as calling the world out of chaos and creating light; and we can no more argue that the declaration and the renewal take place *simultaneously* and by virtue of the *same* Divine Word than we can say that the creation of the world and the creation of light were simultaneous, and proceeded from the *same* coming forth of the voice of God; that is, we cannot say it merely because the Word is represented in Scripture as creative.

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[1] Newman, Lect. iii.

Of course, the whole of this mode of speaking is anthropomorphic. We cannot attribute succession to the acts of God ; we know nothing really of the relation between His Word and the act following ; but when an argument is founded on the anthropomorphism of Scripture, it is properly met by a similar appeal thereto ; and the analysis of Scripture language concerning the Divine Being, if it is not to mislead, must take in the whole, and not a part only, of the language. Scripture treats the matter of justification according to the analogy of human tribunals, and every one can understand that the judicial acquittal of an accused person is neither identical with making him virtuous, nor necessarily issues in that result. So the active justification of God does not necessarily go further than itself—not necessarily as far as arguments can be drawn from the usage of terms. It may be that, in fact, there is an inseparable connection between justification and renewal, that no one can be justified without being sanctified ; but the connection may not be founded on what Scripture says respecting the Word of God.

The fallacy lies in the ambiguous sense attached to the expression, 'calling a person righteous,' making it to mean either judicially declaring him righteous, or calling him righteous with the intent of making him so, and combining the two senses in the matter of justification without warrant or necessity. The Word of God may be operative to one purpose, and yet not be intended to operate to another of a different character ; and no argument can be founded on the mere fact that in either case it is the Word of God to which the effect is assigned, since separate acts of the Divine will are represented in Scripture as necessary to produce distinct results. The fallacy is akin to that into which Möhler, and Bossuet before him, fall in attempting to evade the etymological argument. 'Nothing,' the former says, 'has contributed more to erroneous views of the nature of justification than want of acquaintance with the forms of thought and expression of the ancient world. Ancient writers are wont to employ the outward figure for the inward reality, because thus only can the latter clothe itself in an intelligible form. When, therefore, under the old covenant' (and surely he might have added, 'in the New Testament'), 'justification is described by terms derived from a human judicial process—that is, as a mere forensic acquittal—it is the greatest mistake, and a proof of ignorance of ancient modes of thinking, to suppose this does not connote an inward deliverance from the power of sin.' And then referring to Gerhard's remark (*Loci*, xxii., § 6), that justification is described in Scripture under a variety of terms borrowed from the processes of judicature, he adds : 'The very multiplicity of such expressions should have raised a surmise that they, in part at least, must be understood figuratively.'[1]

That both in the Old and the New Testament the Divine act of justification is described by analogical terms borrowed from the proceedings of human tribunals is true, and, so far as analogy partakes of a figurative element, the description is figurative. But the reality intended must correspond to the figure employed, not to a different one. Now, a judicial process is a different thing from the infusion of a quality. By analogy the base of a mountain is described as its foot. Let the figure be removed, and it is still the base, or lowest part of the mountain that is meant, not the top, or the middle, or the interior of it. Under the analogical description of justification in Scripture there must be a special thing intended, and that thing must be the reality which the analogy describes figuratively ; that is, what must be signified is the *divine* act, which corresponds to the human—viz., the divine act of absolution. But Möhler, like the Council of Trent, makes one figure represent two different, however inseparable, things—pardon and renewal, deliverance from the power of sin, as well as from its guilt ; which is the same as maintaining that the foot of a mountain may signify both its lowest part and its middle. Justification, the Council declares, consists *both* of remission of sin and internal renovation. And such is the definition of the Schoolmen, founded not on the Greek original, but on the word '*justificare*,' as used by the Latin Fathers, who render it 'making just,' as '*calefacere*' means making hot. 'Justification,' says Thomas Aquinas, 'is a movement towards righteousness, as heating is a movement towards heat' ; that is, it is inherent righteousness (as heat is inherent in the metal) as well as remission of sin ; and this it is which constitutes the fundamental distinction between the Romish and the Protestant doctrine on the subject.

63. *The Witness of the Spirit*

Justification, we have seen, is a declaratory act on the part of God ; but how does He make known His judgment of acquittal ? It is not enough to say, in reply, that in the Gospel the promise of forgiveness is made generally to all who who believe in Christ, and therefore (by implication) to each individual believer ; for this holds good in respect to those who are mere hearers of the word, and never advance beyond the privilege of external vocation ; who, therefore, are not really justified at all. Nor can the sanctification of those who are justified, whether it be inward or outward, decide the point, for it is at best imperfect, and not adequate to the demands of the Divine law (see § 64). Justification is a making over to the individual a share in the general atonement which Christ has made for the sin of the world ; and how is the individual to be assured that such appropriation has taken place ? An application for baptism is an assurance to the church that, so far as profession is a test, justification in the sight of God has already taken place ; but baptism cannot convey to the candidate himself any satisfaction on the point, unless, indeed, we suppose the sacrament to be accompanied with a sensible inward effect, leaving no room for doubt.

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[1] *Symbolik*, § 13. So Bossuet : ' Comme l'Ecriture nous explique la remission des pêchés, tantôt en disant que Dieu les couvre, et tantôt en disant qu'il les ôte, et qu'il les efface par la grace du Saint-Esprit, qui nous fait des nouvelles creatures ; nous croyons qu'il faut joindre ensemble ces expressions pour former l'idée parfaite de la justification du pêcheur ' (*Exp.*, c. vi).

It may, perhaps, be argued, as, in fact, the Romish schools do, that such an assurance is not intended ; that the normal state of the Christian is to be in doubt whether he has passed from a state of condemnation to one of acceptance ; that it would not be beneficial to him to emerge out of this uncertainty ; that, especially after baptism, he can expect no formal acquittal until that of the day of judgment. Unquestionably, any such inward assurance tends to independence of the visible Church and its ordinances, as the appointed channels of salvation ; though it would be unjust to insinuate that a suspicion of this kind is at the root of the Romish teaching on this subject.

Suffice it to say, that the uncertainty finds no countenance in Scripture. No doubt ever seems to cross St. Paul's mind whether he is a child of God and an heir of salvation. He inculcates upon himself and others the duties of prayer and watchfulness, of working out their salvation with fear and trembling ; but never of harbouring doubt respecting their new relation towards God : ' Know ye not your own selves how that Christ is in you, except ye be reprobates ? ' (2 Cor. xiii. 5). The question, then, recurs, how is the declaration of justification on God's part conveyed to the repentant and believing sinner ?

It must be admitted that the Protestant doctrine, as often stated, is incomplete as regards this point. It insists so strongly on the forensic aspect of justification, or, rather, so exclusively, as to lose sight of the fact that this gift of God passes on to become subjective, or a matter of consciousness. Möhler charges it on Protestants that their conception of justification is too external, while their conception of the Church is too inward[1] ; the righteousness of Christ is only imputed, and never becomes imparted ; He casts His shadow over the believer, but leaves him unrighteous ; while to define the Church as, in its idea, 'the blessed company of all faithful people,' and so far invisible, is too inward a view of it. With respect to the former topic, it is sufficient to observe that the appropriation of the Gospel-promise by faith—a faith which springs from conviction of sin and apprehends Christ as Redeemer—imparts, to say the least, as inward a character to justification as an appropriation of Christ by baptism does, which sacrament, according to the Council of Trent, is the instrument of justification. But this is not the real reply to the objection. The real reply is that God, in justifying the sinner, not only anticipates the final judgment by some act in the Divine mind of a forensic character, but conveys inwardly a pledge thereof by the Spirit of adoption which He communicates; whereby the consciousness of guilt is removed, a filial spirit takes its place, and the believer is enabled to cry, 'Abba, Father' (Rom. viii. 15, 16; Gal. iv. 6).

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[1] *Symbolik*, § 13.

The offices of the Holy Spirit in the Church, especially the one just named, have never occupied a place in Protestant theology corresponding to that which is assigned to them in Scripture. The reason is not far to seek. The great controversies of the Reformation turned on two main topics—the offices of Christ as Redeemer, and the sacraments; and although that of the Holy Spirit and His work was never quite overlooked, as indeed it could not be in any system of Christian doctrine, it cannot be said to have received the attention which it deserves. Previously to Owen's great work, it would be difficult to name one which takes a comprehensive view of the subject. In our own Church particularly, the type of theology which prevailed in the last century[1] and the early part of this[2] was adverse to the doctrine of spiritual influence; which, moreover, owing to the reaction from the Puritanism of the seventeenth century, and the extravagances sometimes exhibited by the followers of John Wesley, came to be regarded with suspicion by persons of whose piety there can be no doubt. When the witness of the Holy Spirit in the Christian's heart, as St. Paul describes it, became associated with bodily convulsions, outcries, or bitter sectarian spirit, it is no wonder that the subject was considered a dangerous one to meddle with, and that expositors who came across it in their labours did their best to explain away the plain meaning of Scripture.

This meaning is indeed plain. It is the great privilege of the Gospel dispensation, the fruit of Christ's atonement and His ascension, that the Third Person of the Holy Trinity takes the very place, but in a more efficacious manner, which Christ would occupy if He were upon the earth ; He is not only the teacher, but the Comforter of the Church. And if Christ were upon earth, and any sinner approached Him in faith—the same faith in essence, though with clearer promises to rely upon, which prompted the applicants in the Gospel to come to Him for relief under the bodily ailments of themselves or their friends—would He not at once have calmed the fears of the suppliant with the assurance, ‘ Son, be of good cheer, thy sins are forgiven thee ’ (Matt. ix. 2) ? This assurance of the Holy Ghost, His Divine Vicar, conveys in the act of justification. ‘ He bears witness with our spirit,’ making use of it as the medium of His communications, ‘ that we are the children of God ’ (Rom. viii. 16) ; He sends forth ‘ the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father,’ the Holy Spirit, as it were, identifying Himself with the Christian’s own spirit in this new relation (Gal. iv. 6) ; ‘ in whom,’ says St. Paul to the Ephesians, ‘ ye were sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance,’ and he warns them not to ‘ grieve the Holy Spirit of God, whereby ’ they were ‘ sealed unto the day of redemption ’ (Ephes. i. 13 ; iv. 30) ; ‘ the love of God,’ he declares, ‘ is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us ’ (Rom. v. 5).

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[1] [*I.e.*, the eighteenth century. Editor.]
[2] [*I.e.*, the nineteenth century. Editor.]

This last passage is particularly deserving of attention, for from Augustine downwards through the Middle Ages to our own times it has been interpreted of the love which the believer has towards God, and made to support the scholastic theory of an inherent justifying righteousness. Whereas the context proves that not the Christian’s love towards God, but God’s love towards him—God’s adopting love—is what is intended by the Apostle [1] ; ‘ God’s acceptance of us, for Christ’s sake, is made known to us by the inward testimony of the Holy Spirit.’ And this explains Rom. iv. 25 : ‘ Who was delivered up ’ (to death) ‘ for our sins, but was raised for our justification.’ By the death of Christ general forgiveness of sin (*secundum potentiam*) was effected ; but by His resurrection (the step to His ascension) the gift of the Holy Ghost was bestowed, whose office it is to convey to the individual believer the assurance of justification. Compare Rom. viii. 34 : ‘It is Christ that died, yea, rather, that is risen again, Who also maketh intercession for us ’ ; one subject of that intercession being that the Holy Ghost may bear witness with our spirit that we are children of God.

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[1] ‘ According to the Pelagian-rationalistic interpretation, which is adverse to spiritual influence, the love of man to God is here meant ; according to the mind of the Apostle, God’s love to man ’ (Olshausen, *in loc.*). ‘ That this love is not the love of man to God, but the love of God to the redeemed is proved by verse 8 ’ (Tholuck, *in loc.*). ‘ Amor εἰς ἡμᾶς erga nos ’ (Bengel, *in loc.*). Comp. De Wette, *Kgf. Handbuch, in loc.*

Now it is to be observed that this is not directly renewal or sanctification, but the root and foundation thereof. The same Holy Spirit, indeed, who thus seals the faith of the Christian by His witness, renews at the same time the heart ; but in the order of nature the latter follows the former. For there can be no love to God—that is, no true sanctification—without an assurance that on account of Christ's work and a reliance on that work God is reconciled to us ; and that assurance is the gift of the Holy Ghost, antecedent, in the order of ideas, and necessarily so, to the fruits of faith and holy dispositions and a holy life. Something must be first in the order of ideas, and this inward testimony is the first thing—the foundation on which all subsequent sanctification proceeds.

This is the point to which so many Protestant writers, even Luther himself, even the Confessions, do not give sufficient prominence, thereby laying themselves open to the charge that their doctrine of justification makes it an imputation without a reality, a shell without a kernel, a declaration without a corresponding effect, an external covering leaving the nature beneath unsanctified. The multiplicity of Scripture expressions describing justification as a judicial process they rightly insist upon as a proof that it cannot and does not mean in itself renewal ; but they fail to see that the analogy does not hold good in all respects. It is the duty of a human judge to condemn or acquit an accused person irrespectively of any private sentiment either of esteem or aversion towards the person ; whether the latter be a friend or an enemy, a relative or a stranger, are questions with which the judge, as such, has nothing to do ; he has merely to investigate whether the law has or has not been broken, and to decide accordingly. But God, in the salvation of a sinner, does not stand towards him merely in the relation of a judge. His aim is to recover the sinner from his state of death in trespasses and sins, to make peace between Himself and the offender, to establish a filial relation instead of one of enmity.

Such a change cannot be effected without the preliminary operation of the Holy Spirit in producing conviction of sin and a sense of guilt, and this if not removed would be an impassable barrier against perfect reconciliation. Judicially, therefore, God in His Word announces that He can be just and yet the justifier of him that believeth, and this on the ground that an atonement for sin has been made by One who could make it ; but He does more than this : He reveals Himself inwardly to the penitent sinner as the merciful Father, as the Redeemer, as the Sanctifier ; He sheds abroad His redeeming love in the heart. He acquits, indeed, but not to leave the person absolved in a state of indifference towards his Judge, but to fill him with joy and peace in believing ; justification becomes inward as well as outward ; the declaration of forgiveness is not a mere movement of the Divine mind ending there, and intransitive ; external to us and remaining so ; it is conveyed to the spirit of man by the witness of the Holy Spirit. 'Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee. . . . Bring forth the best robe and put it on him, and put a ring on his hand and shoes on his feet, for this my son was dead and is alive again, he was lost and is found.'

64. *The Doctrine of Formal Causes*

Both in philosophy and in theology the doctrine of formal causes has given rise to controversy. The formal cause of a thing is usually understood to be that which makes it what it is, that which immediately gives occasion to a definition or description of it. Thus a rational soul is said to give *form* to a man, because it is that which makes him a human being, as compared with the brute creation, so that we can define him as a rational animal ; rationality, therefore, is here the formal cause. So in animals, the animal soul is the form of any given animal, that which distinguishes it from a stone or vegetable, and completes the idea of it. In such instances the formal cause bears an analogy to the 'specific difference' of logic ; with this distinction, however, that in the logical definition 'man is a rational animal,' the term man is an abstraction and has no reality corresponding to it, whereas a formal cause presupposes an actual subject in which it inheres. The term may also be used of the accidents of a thing. Thus, of a whitened wall whitness, which is but an accident, is the formal cause, and heat of a piece of hot iron. Moreover, when what is predicated assumes the passive form, it may either denote or not an inherent quality. Thus in a whitened wall whiteness inheres ; but a man may be said to be loved, honoured, condemned, or acquitted, without any intrinsic quality in him deserving love, honour, condemnation, or absolution. It is sufficient if he is so regarded by another. There must be some reason why he should be so, but the reason may not be in himself. In such a case, the term formal cause, if employed, has an extended application ; it belongs to a relation not to a thing, and resides in an extrinsic source. It is a quasi-formal cause, taking the place of a real one, equivalent in office, but not strictly answering to the definition. In point of fact, indeed, the sentiments felt towards another rarely exist without something in that other to call them forth ; but the possibility of its being otherwise is conceivable.

The question before us is, What is the formal cause of justification—the cause to which it is immediately attached—with nothing intervening either in fact or idea ? If the form of justification is, as it is, a declaration on God's part, what is the immediate moving cause which leads Him to pronounce, in the case of an individual, a sentence of remission of sin and restoration to favour ? Or, as it is sometimes expressed, What does God behold, whether outside or in the individual, in consideration of which justification takes place ? In answering these questions Romanists and Protestants take opposite sides. According to the former, in baptism (which presupposes a certain kind of faith, but not what Protestants mean by the term) grace is infused—no doubt in the last resort through the merits of Christ, but still infused—whereby sin is not only covered, but obliterated, the remaining concupiscence not being of the nature of sin ; and the person thus justified—that is, made just—is enabled so to fulfil the Divine law, so to work out a righteousness of his own, that on account of it God can and does justify him, without a direct reference to the work of Christ, though not without a presupposition of it, so far as no inherent justifying righteousness can come into being except under and by the covenant of grace (to teach otherwise, indeed, would be simple Pelagianism). So runs the decree of the Council of Trent : ' Finally, the *only* formal cause of justification is the righteousness of God; not His own righteousness, but that whereby He makes us righteous, in that we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and are not merely considered, but are righteous.'[1]

Here justification and sanctification are openly identified. Yet the infused grace, though *relatively* independent, is to be ultimately referred to the merits of Christ : ' Although no one can be righteous, unless the merits of the Passion of Christ are communicated to him' (by the sacrament of baptism) ' yet this communication takes place when, through the Holy Spirit, the love of God is shed abroad in the heart' (according to the erroneous interpretation of Rom. v. 5), 'and inheres in it ; so that in the act of justification along with remission of sin, faith, hope, and charity are infused.'[2] The part that Christ discharges in the process is more clearly explained in Can. x. : ' If any one shall say that we are justified without the righteousness of Christ, through which *He acquired* (*meruit*) *the gift for us*, or that His righteousness is the formal cause of justification, let him be anathema.' Christ, by His obedience and Passion *earned* for the Church the power of conveying through baptism infused justifying grace ; but the idea of direct imputation through faith must not be entertained.

[1] Sess. vi. c. 7.

[2] *Ibid.*

Subsequent writers of the Romish communion have found some difficulty in commenting on the decisions of the Council. Christ and His work cannot be quite put out of view ; the Council itself does not venture to do that. But how and where are they to be introduced ? Imputation of some kind, and at some point, must be assumed, if the Pelagian heresy is to be avoided ; but how to bring it in is the problem. Is it conveyed once for all at the first infusion, transforming the subsequent righteousness from a process of nature into a gift of grace, as Adam's sin changed the nature of man for the worse antecedently to actual sin ; or does it go along with the inherent righteousness either in the way of tacit reference or of secret virtue communicated from time to time ? *Sub judice lis est.* It is not enough to say that the Holy Spirit, dwelling in the Christian's heart and sanctifying it, is, in fact, Christ, with His merits, dwelling there ; for Scripture teaches that the gift itself of the Spirit is the fruit of Christ's atoning work, so that we come at last to the idea of a meritorious cause external to us, that is, to the idea of imputation. Such is the doctrine of Rome.

The Protestant Confessions, however they may differ on subordinate points, agree in this—that no righteousness inherent in us, however introduced, can abide the strict scrutiny of God's judgment, or enter into the process of justification ; not even with a latent or avowed reference to the work of Christ to supply its deficiencies. Indeed, if Christ's merits are to be called in to make up for the defects of our own, this is proof positive that the latter are not sufficient. The formal cause of justification, therefore, is not inherent, but imputed ; or, in other words, that which God has regard to in justifying the sinner is the obedience of Christ, active and passive, laid to the account of the believer because of his faith, as our sin was laid to the account of Christ in the Atonement (2 Cor. v. 21). We are ' made the righteousness of God ' exactly in the same sense as Christ, who knew no actual sin, ' was made sin for us.'

As regards the justified person himself, or the state of justification, it is held that what God has regard to is his faith. This is what distinguishes the justified person from others who are not so ; whence, although the expression ' Christ's righteousness imputed,' does not occur in Scripture, it is said of Abraham, and, by implication, of Abraham's spiritual children, that faith is imputed to them for righteousness (Rom. iv. 20–25). Now, if by faith we are to understand, as Bishop Bull and others have done, imperfect obedience, since there is no question of faith's being an intrinsic quality, we seem to approximate to the Romish theory ; only, instead of the infusion of faith, hope, and charity, we have here the infusion of faith alone, as an epitome of all other graces, or the root whence they spring. And thus it would seem that some Protestant writers assign a double formal cause of justification—one connected with the imputed righteousness of Christ without us and the other with the faith within us ; so that, after all, inherent righteousness, in some sense, seems to claim a place in justification.

In fact, many writers of the Romish communion hold this view, of whom Pighius [1] particularly deserves mention ; and it has been ascribed to Bucer among Protestants, though J. Gerhard affirms that this Reformer cannot be so understood.[2] But, we may surely ask, If one formal cause is enough, why should we seek for another ? The truth is that when Protestants speak of faith as the instrument, or means, or condition, of justification, they mean merely that it is the act of appropriation whereby the merits of Christ, otherwise a common benefit to mankind, become an individual possession ; which therefore derives all its justifying efficacy, not from any virtue in itself, but from the object which it apprehends. Faith is not actually righteousness to the believer, but it is imputed to him as such ; which is equivalent to saying that its intrinsic merit is not such as to justify, for there is no need of imputation where the reality exists. Imputation in this case is a merciful acceptance of something in the sinner which is allowed to take the place of perfect obedience ; but not because it contains the seed of all obedience, but because it leads the soul directly up to Him who has wrought out a perfect righteousness for us ; because it appropriates the offered gift, and make the righteousness of Christ *our* justifying righteousness.

This does not imply that faith is not in itself pleasing to God ; it must be so, since it is appointed the condition to which the promise is attached ; but it is its object, not its contents, which renders it the means of justifying. So that it is not at all adapted to furnish a secondary formal cause of justification, even an improper one ; it does not occupy an independent position ; it is part of the system of imputation which reposes ultimately on the meritorious work of Christ. It is no reproach, therefore, to Protestants, or to some of our own divines—as Jackson and Hooker—if they eventually arrive at the conclusion that, strictly speaking, there is no formal cause of justification. In fact, the work of Christ which is imputed is rather a *meritorious* cause ; so that the formal must here be also the meritorious, which circumstance takes it out of the category of proper formal causes, these implying physical inherence ; while faith, which really is a quality of the mind, is incapacitated from discharging the office of a formal cause by its deriving its virtue entirely from the object which it apprehends. Such is the state of controversy between us and Rome. Faith being, as it were, put out of court, nothing remains to establish the Romish theory but the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit, which the Council pronounces the *sole* formal cause of justification, and many Romish writers a conjoint formal cause. To this question, therefore, we proceed.

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[1] Albert Pighius, died 1542. His work *Controv. Præcip. Explicat.*, 1541, contains his views on justification. He insists strongly on the insufficiency of any righteousness of ours to meet the demands of the law, and hence the necessity of an imputation of the perfect righteousness of Christ ; yet assigns some justifying power to the work of grace wrought in us. See J. Gerhard, *Loci*, xvii, c. 4, § 215.

[2] *Loci*, xvii, c. 4, § 197.

The point at issue must be clearly understood. It is no reply to Protestant objections that the inherent justifying righteousness infused at baptism is, after all, the gift of God, and cannot be conceived of as independent of His grace ; it may be from God, yet once called into being it is as independent a gift as reason is in a man, which ultimately, however, is the gift of God. Nor does the Protestant deny that inherent sanctification is the inseparable accompaniment of justification. No more pernicious distinction can be made in fact, however it may be admitted in idea, than between Christ who justifies, and Christ who sanctifies. The same Holy Spirit who convinces of sin, and calls forth faith, implants, and contemporaneously, a principle of renewal. Nor is it to the point to argue that the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, as distinct from its *effect*—viz., a renewal of the heart—supplies the proper formal cause we are in search of ; for it is the effect, not the agent, that we are here considering. This is, in fact, a revival of Osiander's theory that the essential righteousness of God implanted in us the true form of justification ; a theory which for a time attracted attention, and passed away as a meteor.

Nor is it quite fair to substitute the word ' saved ' for ' justified ' in these discussions ; for they are concerned with justification in its technical theological sense, and we only beat about the bush when we employ a more general term. We are saved by being born again, by being justified, by being sanctified, by obedience to the law, by being kept from final declension, by the resurrection of the dead. But the inquiry relates to justification as, in idea, distinct from other gifts of grace.

Again, Protestants affirm, no less strongly than their opponents, that the fruits of the indwelling of the Spirit are in themselves really good, are pleasing to God, and will be rewarded by Him. There is no difference on this point. For the true doctrine of Rome we must go back to the Council of Trent : ' The one formal cause of justification is renewal in the spirit of our mind ' ; ' If any shall affirm that, under the covenant of grace, it is not possible to keep the law' (as the context proves, so as to be justified thereby), 'let them be anathema' (Sess. vi., c. 7.; Can. xviii). We hold, on the contrary, that inasmuch as a justifying righteousness must be a perfect one, and no one—not even the regenerate—can render this perfect obedience, nothing intrinsic in us can either justify, or form a part of justification.

We observe, in the first place, that the Romish doctrine confounds the offices of the Second and Third Persons of the Holy Trinity. For though it is true that, *opera ad extra*, such as creation, are, in one sense, to be ascribed to all three Persons in common; yet in the economy of redemption a special one belongs to each; redemption to the Son, sanctification to the Holy Ghost. Now justification, in its proper Biblical sense of remission of sin or imputation of righteousness, is evidently connected with the atoning work of Christ, the Son, who became incarnate that He might reverse the consequences of the fall; not with the work of the Holy Spirit, to whom this part of redemption is never ascribed. He 'sanctifies the elect people of God,' but did not redeem them; His office is to apply the atonement, to quicken the dead soul, to form the new man within, and to carry on the work of sanctifying grace to perfection. But He is never said to have paid the price, provided a ransom, blotted out the handwriting of ordinances, which was a record of our debt; all which figurative expressions describe the means of our justification, not of our sanctification. Justification, then, by an inward presence, or an inward work, of the Third Person, 'confounds the Persons,' not in their internal relations to each other, but in the functions which each discharges in the dispensation of grace.

But further, the Council can only maintain its ground in connection with another dogma; viz., the effect of baptism as regards original sin. 'If any one,' are its words, 'shall assert that in baptism the whole of that which properly has the nature of sin is not extirpated, let him be anathema'[1]; that is, not merely the guilt, but all trace of original sin is obliterated. The *fomes*, or material, of concupiscence, it is declared, 'the Catholic Church has never understood to be called sin, or that it has in the regenerate the nature of sin.'[2] If this be so—if the grace infused at baptism so transfigures the '*phronema sarkos*, which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh' (Art. ix), as that God no longer sees any sin in it, then, no doubt, justification by inherent righteousness may be tenable. The Protestant Churches, our own included, decide otherwise, holding that 'this infection of nature remains even in the regenerate,' and that the lust and concupiscence to which it gives rise has 'of itself the nature of sin' (*Ibid*). As it is not denied on either side that concupiscence, in the Christian's present condition, is active, the above statement of our article amounts to saying that no Christian of the Church militant is without sin; whence it follows that he is not justified by the measure of sanctification which he attains in this life.

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[1] Sess. v., 5.

[2] *Ibid.*

Either side appeals to Scripture. To Scripture, then, let us turn. We note that in the prayer which our Lord gave to His disciples—intended to be the model of all prayers, and used by the Church throughout the world—it is taken for granted that sin still cleaves to the regenerate, for such only can approach God as their Father; sin which, however venial it may be, needs to be forgiven through continual application of the blood of Christ. Psalmists, prophets, apostles, know nothing of an inherent righteousness which can abide the judgment of God. David extols the blessedness of the man, not who is without sin, but whose sin is forgiven and covered (Ps. xxxii. 1); and beseeches God not to enter into judgment with His servant, who could not, any more than other men, expect acquittal on that ground (Ps. cxliii. 2). Isaiah confesses that he is 'a man of unclean lips,' and unfit for the vision of God (vi. 5), and numbers himself amongst those who 'are as an unclean thing,' and their 'righteousness as filthy rags' (lxiv. 6). Daniel's prayer (ix) is chiefly taken up with confession of the sin of his people, but lest we should suppose that he does not include himself, he takes care to add, 'While I was confessing *my* sin, and the sin of my people Israel' (verse 20).

It may be replied that these holy men lived under the old covenant, and did not enjoy the gift of grace vouchsafed to us; we pass on then to the recorded experience of Christians and our fathers in the faith. St. John declares that 'if we say that we have no sin we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us' (1 John. i. 8). St. Paul, writing to those whom he supposed regenerate, reminds them of a struggle going on between 'the flesh,' or their carnal nature, and the Spirit; the one lusting against the other and striving for the mastery, so that they could not do the thing that they would (Gal. v. 17). The Spirit, indeed, in true Christians is the dominant principle, and keeps 'the flesh' under, but not without an effort and a conflict; so that the perfection attained is not even that of Adam before the fall, in whom no such strife can be conceived (see § 30). It matters not whether we interpret the clause 'So that ye cannot do the things that ye would,' as meaning 'So that ye are hindered from doing what ye would,' or 'In order that ye may not do the things that ye would'; you cannot attain the holiness which you desire, or you are enabled to overcome the evil tendencies within you ; either way a corrupt bias is supposed to be in existence, and to struggle against its Divine antagonist. This 'flesh,' or 'old man,' as the same Apostle terms it, is indeed crucified with Christ, but it is not as yet slain ; it is destined to extinction, but the time is not yet come (Rom. vi. 6). Accordingly he avows that, in the matter of sanctification, he had 'not attained, or was already made perfect,' but only 'followed after,' that he might eventually reach the prize of his high calling (Phil. iii. 12–14).

Most graphically is the conflict and its result described in Rom. vii. It may seem hardly allowable to refer to this passage, inasmuch as from the earliest times it has been a subject of controversy ; the Greek Fathers generally adopting the view that St. Paul does not refer to a regenerate state, Augustine and most of his illustrious followers of the Western Church contending that he does. Among the Reformers, foreign and British, no doubt was entertained that the Apostle is describing his own experience, and of the Roman Catholic theologians the great names of Bellarmine and Cornelius à Lapide may be cited on the same side. There seems, indeed, no reason to suppose that, at any rate from verse 14 of the chapter, he is not speaking of himself, and as a Christian. The idea of a double soul in the same individual, inclining the will in opposite directions, is a familiar one in classical literature ;[1] and our Lord Himself seems to use similar language when He speaks of one soul that must die in order that another may live (Mark viii. 35–38). Literally, no man can have two souls ; but the single I, the central personality, may be drawn one way or the other, or both ways at once, by the conflicting principles of good and evil. Our Lord did not mean merely that he who submits to martyrdom for his Master's sake shall live eternally, true as this is ; but that, as St. Paul expresses the thought, 'the old man' must be crucified with Christ in order that the 'new man' may occupy the throne of the heart and gradually proceed to reign alone. 'In me,' says the Apostle, 'that is in my flesh,' in my carnal nature considered in itself, the old Adam which still lives and moves in me, 'dwelleth no good thing.' It cannot be improved by the discipline of the law or any human means into the new creation in Christ ; it must die as Christ did, in order that as Christ rose from the dead there may be a spiritual resurrection to a new life. Thus, in one sense, 'I am sold under sin,' but in another, 'I delight in the law of God after the inward man.' Thus, 'to will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good' (according to the full requirements of the moral law) 'I find not.' I find 'a law in my members warring against the law of my mind,' and tending to bring me into captivity to the law of sin 'which is in my members.' Unaided from above, I might well despair of victory; but I thank God that I am not under the law but under grace, and through Christ our Lord, I, the man of whom I have been speaking, 'with the mind serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin.'[1]

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[1] *Δύο γὰρ σαφῶς ἔχω ψυχάς· οὐ γὰρ δὴ μία γε οὖσα ἅμα ἀγαθή τέ ἔστι καὶ κακή, οὐδ ἅμα καλῶν τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν ἐργῶν ἐρᾶ, καὶ ταύτα ἅμα βούλεται τε καὶ οὐ βούλεται* (Xenophon, *Cyr.*, vi. 1). 'Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor' (Ovid).

It is to be observed that in the passages cited, particularly those from St. Paul's Epistles, it is not so much actual sins which the writers have in view as the 'infection of nature' inherited from Adam, in process indeed of being healed but still operative. The effect of this imperfect recovery is not merely to produce shortcomings in practice, but to debilitate the habit of righteousness, to hang like a weight on its actings, to mar its complete conformity to the Divine ideal. The patient is convalescent but not restored to health. Concupiscence, even when successfully resisted, has of 'itself the nature of sin'; it is a symptom, to say the least, of spiritual languor. St. Paul found in himself 'a law, a tendency, antecedently to any outbreaks of sin, causing him when he would do good to fall short of perfection. This the Council of Trent declares not to partake of the nature of sin, but it elicited from a higher authority to cry, 'O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?'

The Council draws a distinction between venial and mortal sin, admitting that the former is found even in the greatest saints; but whence does even venial sin arise? Why should pardonable sins of infirmity sully his bright robe in whom baptism has completely stanched the original taint? Actions spring from habits, and as the actions are in quality so are the habits. A perfect habit of sanctification, such as the Church expects thereafter, must and will produce the dissappearance even of venial sin; if we cannot predicate this of any Christian in this life, we infer that the implanted habit itself has not arrived at its full development. It may be a genuine work of grace, it may contain the germ of future perfection, but at present it does not constitute a perfect righteousness in the sight of God. And such a perfect righteousness, either inherent or imputed, is what is needed in the matter of justification. It is possible, the Council says, so to observe the Divine law as to be justified thereby ; it is not possible, the Protestant replies, except on the supposition that original sin is extirpated in itself as well as in its guilt.[1] There is only one method of escaping from the difficulty, viz., by lowering the standard of the Divine law to meet the necessities of the case.

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[1] Tholuck, in his commentary, gives an interesting history of the intrepertation of this passage. No one, neither the Jewish people (Reiche) nor any individual has ever, since the fall, been 'under the law' as a covenant of works; but it is the office of the Holy Spirit to awaken in the sinner a feeling of what such a state would be. And none but a regenerate man can thank God for a deliverer from it. There is much truth in Olshausen's remark, that the understanding of the passage depends very much on the reader's spiritual experience.

Our attention, however, is directed to passages of Scripture which seem to favour the Romish doctrine. For example, to our Lord's reply to His questioner, Matt. xix. 17, 'If thou wilt enter into life keep the commandments' ; to St. Paul's statement that God's object in sending His Son was that 'the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us' (Rom. viii. 4) ; to Christ's command, 'Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect' (Matt. v. 48) ; to the examples of Abel, Noah, Daniel, Zacharias, Simeon, Cornelius and others, to whom the epithet 'righteous' is applied ; to our Lord's warning that unless our righteousness exceed that of the Scribes and Pharisees we cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven (Matt. v. 20) ; to St. Paul's profession, 'I can do all things through Christ who strengtheneth me' (Phil. iv. 13).

The explanation of such passages has been long ago given by Augustine in the Pelagian controversy. He observes that they are 'pedagogical,' that is, intended to convince the sinner of his helplessness and by exhibiting the Divine requirements to suggest what he ought to pray for ; just as St. Paul describes the law of Moses as 'a schoolmaster' to lead men to Christ. 'Then Pelagians think that there is some weight in their objection, God would not command what He knows is not in our power to accomplish ; but let them consider that these precepts, though we cannot fulfil them, teach us what we ought to seek from Him.'[2] 'The Apostle, writing to the Thessalonians, enjoins charity ; blames them for the want of it ; prays that they may abound in it. Learn, O man, by the command what thou oughtest to have ; by the reproof that thou hast it not ; by the prayer, whence thou mayest receive it.'[3] To the Pelagian misuse of the instances of Zacharias, etc., he replies : 'Celestius does not understand that a man may be called righteous who approaches the standard nearly, which we do not deny has been the case with many even in this life. But it is one thing to be without sin, which in this life could not be said of any but Christ, and another to be without blame, which has been the privilege of many just persons. There is a certain common standard of righteousness against which no charge can be laid ; yet by the very prayer which such a righteous man puts up, " Forgive us our trespasses," he confesses that' (in the sight of God) 'he is not without sin.'[1]

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[1] The question is not whether, as the Council puts it, it is abstractedly possible for the Christian to attain perfection in this life : no limit can be placed to the Divine power : what God will do hereafter He may, by a special act of grace, do now : but whether it is possible, on the supposition that regeneration does not annihilate the power of original sin.

[2] *De Correp.*, iii.

[3] *De Grat. et Lib. Arb.*, xvi.

That an inchoate righteousness is found in every justified man ; that the same Holy Spirit who leads Him to Christ for the blotting out of his guilt dwells in him as the Author and Giver of sanctifying grace ; that corresponding fruits of holiness will be produced ; that such fruits are acceptable to God ; all this is admitted ; what is not admitted is that this inchoate righteousness of sanctification can ever, in this life, become so perfect as to satisfy the demands of the law, and absolve from its condemning sentence.[2] As to the Arminian doctrine, prevalent at one time in our Church, that we are justified by an obedience the deficiencies of which are made up by the atoning sacrifice of Christ imputed, it may be dismissed to the lumber-room of the *via media* theology. It is Daniel's image partly of gold and partly of clay, in an aggravated form, and is as little able as its prototype (Dan. ii. 34) to withstand the shock of the adversary, to silence the accuser of the brethren, to still the alarms of conscience, and to impart confidence in the prospect of death and the future judgment.

To sum up : as long as we hold concupiscence, even before the assent of the will, to have a taint of sin ; as long as a struggle between the flesh and the spirit, with however favourable an issue, exists, indicating that the work of sanctification is not complete ; it is impossible to assign the formal cause of justification to an inherent righteousness, unless, indeed, we lower the requirements of the Divine command to love God with all the heart and soul, and our neighbour as ourselves, so as to fall in with the hypothesis. And it is the consciousness of the difficulty which has prompted the various modes of overcoming it, proposed by Romish theologians or those who substantially agree with them ; such as the distinction between venial and mortal sin, the supposition of a supernatural Presence, or Shekinah, infused at baptism, which, though *not necessarily of a moral tendency*, invests our imperfect obedience with a Divine glory, and imparts to it a justifying power[1] ; or a plain denial that concupiscence is of the nature of sin, which involves the doctrine that Adam unfallen was capable of being thus solicited in a wrong direction, and needed a superadded gift of grace to keep him from danger.[2]

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[1] *De Perf. Just.*, xi.

[2] Quisquis dicit post acceptam remissionem peccatorum ita quenquam hominem juste vixisse in hac carne, vel vivere, ut nullum habeat omnino peccatum, contradicit Apostolo Johanni (1 John i. 8). Non ait Apostolus, ' Habuimus ' set ' Habemus.' Quod si quisquam asserit de illo peccato esse dictum quod habitat in carne secundum vitium quod peccantis primi hominis voluntate contractum est ; non autem peccare, qui eidem peccato, quamvis in carne habitanti, ad nullum opus malum consentit, quamvis ipsa concupiscientia moveatur quæ alio modo peccati nomen accepit, quod ei consentire peccare sit, nobisque moveatur invitis ; subtiliter quidem ista decernit, sed videat quid agatur de dominica oratione ubi dicimus, Dimitte nobis debita nostra : quod, nisi fallor, non opus esset dicere si nunquam, vel in lapsu linguæ, vel oblectanda cogitatione, ejusdem peccati desiderio aliquantulum consentiremus. Aug., *De Perf. Just.*, xxi.

Against all such theories Art. xi is directed : ‘We are accounted righteous before God only for the merits of our Lord Jesus Christ.’ For these last words must not be understood as affirming merely that Christ earned a power to communicate in baptism, that is, through the Church, a righteousness which, weighted in the Divine balances, shall be found adequate to justify ; that He is the ultimate cause why the proximate causes are efficient. They mean that there is nothing in ourselves which, if we take up a position on legal ground, can justify us ; as, indeed, the word ‘accounted’ sufficiently implies. To be accounted and to be made righteous are essentially different ideas, and the hinge of the controversy turns on the difference. There is no need of ‘accounting,’ that is of imputation, if any inherent habit or quality, either in itself or by reason of Christ’s presence encircling it, is so perfect as that God can see no sin in it, and therefore, as a matter of justice, must absolve.

Let the expression, ‘Christ’s righteousness is imputed to us,’ be avoided, as not literally found in Scripture ; what does the opponent thereby gain, if he accepts our Article, ‘We are *accounted* righteous before God *only* for the merits of Christ ?’ Is there any real difference between the two statements ? The old high church view that our obedience justifies, but completed or sprinkled by the atoning Blood, is excluded by the word ‘only’ ; the merits of Christ refuse a mere partnership in the matter. If, indeed, by the expression were meant that the obedience of Christ was imputed to us for *sanctification*, that His righteousness dispenses with our aiming to be pure as He is pure, it would be objectionable as tending to Antinomianism ; but justification, not sanctification, is the matter to which it refers. God remits our guilt, from a view of Christ’s merits, not of anything in ourselves ; this is its simple meaning, as it is that of the Apostle Paul.[3] ‘All,’ says Davenant, ‘depends on the meaning of Scripture, not on the particular form of words or niceties of language.’[4]

[1] We may well believe that it is an inward, yet not a moral gift, but a supernatural power or Divine virtue’ (Newman, *Just.*, bk. vii., 4).

[2] Newman, Lect. xii., 2. So Bull, *State of Man Before the Fall.* Tum originalis justitiæ admirabile donum addidit (viz., to Adam as he came from the hands of his Creator), *Cat. Conc. Trid.*, A, i., c. 2, 22.

[3] The words δωρεὰν, χάριτι (Rom. iii. 24) of themselves convey this meaning.

[4] *De Just. Hab.*, C. xxiv.

The internal means, or instrument, or condition, that which God has in view when He justifies the individual, is faith, and 'faith only.' Not, however, a general acceptance of revealed truth, or an epitome of all Christian graces, but a special apprehension of the promise of mercy under a conviction of sin. (This point will be considered more at length in the next section.) Through this faith Christ's righteousness is made the believer's own, or becomes inward as a possession ; and is no mere shadow or external covering. Yet faith does not justify as a grace, but as the connecting link between us and Christ. Justification is not merely declarative, but transitive, on God's part, conveying the spirit of adoption ; it is more, therefore, than remission of sin, or atonement, such as St. Paul declares may consist with our being personally 'enemies' (Rom. v. 10) ; it is an assurance to the individual of his being interested in the atonement, and presupposes not merely the death, but the resurrection of Christ. In this point of view it is the truth (and all forms of religious extravagance take their rise from some truth overlooked or forgotten) which, in the early years of Wesley's revival, asserted itself under aspects which too often raised a prejudice against the movement, and, what was of greater moment, against the scriptural doctrine itself of the Holy Spirit's work.

65. *Justifying Faith*

One of the historians of the Council of Trent, of great repute, tells us that the assembled fathers were much exercised in attempting to explain the Apostle's statement, 'We conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law' (Rom. iii. 28). We cannot wonder at their perplexity when we remember the scholastic training which they had received, particularly as regards the theory of an infused justifying righteousness. In what sense were they to understand the faith which St. Paul apparently makes the instrument, or condition, of justification ? How reconcile his words with the prevalent teaching of the Church ? It is obvious that faith, for some reason and in some sense, occupies a very prominent position in his reasoning on justification ; it cannot be overlooked ; it must be explained, or explained away. The difficulty was obvious, and was met as best it might. 'With few exceptions,' says Pallavicini, 'they all agreed that when a man is said to be justified by faith, faith must be taken, not as the whole and the immediate cause of justification, but as the first preparation, and the first necessary root, to the actions whereby the gift is obtained ; or if we may, in some sense, assign it the function of an immediate cause, yet it must not then be thought of as alone, but in conjunction with penitence and baptism.'

This description of justifying faith was adopted by the Council, and appears in its decree. 'Whereas,' it says, 'the Apostle declares that we are justified by faith, and gratuitously, he must be understood in the sense which the Catholic Church has alwas assigned to His words, viz., that faith is the commencement, the root, and the foundation, of all justification, since without it it is impossible to please God. And as to the gratuitous nature of justification, it means that none of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works, deserve the grace of the justification itself.' Faith is thus classed with the preparatory antecedents to justification, such as conviction of sin, alarms of conscience, and a general hope of God's mercy. In itself it is assent to the truths of revelation, especially as interpreted by the Church ; as such it places the sinner on the road to justification ; but it is not the direct instrument, still less the only one, of receiving that gift, or of retaining it when received. This amounts merely to saying that a man must be a professed believer in Christianity before we can enter into the question of his justification ; which, however true, does not throw much light upon the matter. The only office of faith, then, is to lead up to the sacrament of baptism, in which the special grace of justification is infused, and which faith itself is transformed from acquiescence in the truth of revelation into a faith informed by love (*fides formata*). In this state it may be allowed to take its place as a means of justification among other graces ; and so St. Paul is to be understood. The Council, however, does not explain why, of all graces, faith should be singled out so remarkably by the Apostle for the office of justifying.

It is only by inference and comparison that we arrive at last at the true meaning of the decisions of Trent, for it is by no means easy to gather from them what connection the fathers wished to establish between faith and justification. Faith is necessary as a *radix*, or *fundamentum* ; but that this is what Protestants call a dead, historical faith (*notitia historica*), appears not only from its being defined as a passive reception of revealed truth, but from the statement, more than once repeated, that whereas the grace of justification is lost by mortal sin, faith is not affected thereby. It appears, too, from the process of recovery from mortal sin, as described by the Council, in which faith holds no place at all.

Now, a faith which is consistent with a state of mortal sin can have no direct connection with justification, particularly if the latter term, as explained by the Council, includes sanctification. It certainly cannot be the faith of which St. Paul speaks in Rom. iii–viii, for the faith of Abraham, to which he compares it, was no oitose belief in the existence of God, but confidence in a promise (Rom. iv. 21) ; and this confidence can hardly be supposed existing in one living in mortal sin. Moreover, the whole scope of the Apostle's argument is to show that the renewal of heart which the law is unable to effect is the direct fruit of the justifying faith which he has in his mind—that this faith is incompatible with a state of habitual sin (Rom. vi). 'Received ye the Spirit,' he asks of the Galatians, 'by the works of the law or by the hearing of faith ?' 'Even as Abraham believed God, and it was accounted to him for righteousness.' 'They which are of faith' (and by the Spirit mortify the deeds of the body) 'are blessed with faithful Abraham' (Gal. iii. 2, 6, 9). The faith of St. Paul then, is a sanctifying faith; of an entirely different quality from the Tridentine radix of justification, which can consort amicably with mortal sin.

The truth is that such a faith would not have been considered faith at all by the Apostle in connection with the subject of which he was treating: all through his epistles saving faith is supposed to be an active principle, operative in the way of love (Gal. v. 6), not animated by love. We read of 'a work of faith' which is connected with a 'labour of love' (1 Thess. i. 3). In the Epistle to the Hebrews, written under the influence of St. Paul's teaching, if not actually by the Apostle, faith prompts to great sacrifices and mighty deeds (chap. xi). It was only when Antinomian tendencies began to appear in the Church that St. James was moved to make distinctions between Christian faith and the faith of devils, and between a dead and a living Christian faith. Such distinctions do not appear in St. Paul's writings, not even when he alludes to faith which may be destitute of charity (1 Cor. xiii. 2) ; for it is evident from the context that he is speaking in the passage alluded to not of saving, that is, justifying, faith, but of an extraordinary spiritual gift, not necessarily of moral quality, similar in nature to the gift of tongues or of prophecy.

The mere preparatory faith, therefore, which the Council describes as 'the foundation' of justification, and which can hardly be distinguished from indifference, is inadequate to explain the office, and virtue, and position, which St. Paul assigns to faith in the matter of justification. And the Tridentine fathers show their sense of this by admitting that faith as the mere radix, which is compatible with mortal sin, must be vivified, receive a soul, become instinct with energy, before it can be directly connected with justification. When the preliminary 'dispositions' are complete, then the act of justification takes place, which consists in 'infusing into the soul, along with remission of sin, faith, hope, love' ; 'for faith' (it must be presumed the faith which is a mere negative condition), 'unless it receives an addition of hope and love, does not unite us perfectly with Christ, nor make us living members of His body; whence it is most truly said that faith without works is dead and otiose.' The infused qualities are probably taken from 1 Cor. xiii. 13, but there is some ambiguity in the mode of expression. Faith as the radix 'disposes' to justification; but it appears again as infused, and love comprehends hope. The meaning, however, is clear.

What the Council intends is that the otiose substructure of faith must be transformed into the *fides formata* of the Schoolmen before it justifies. This latter term is derived from the Aristotelian philosophy. Matter and form were supposed to constitute a thing as we actually find it; matter supplying the material, from the distinctive feature or principle; here faith, as a condition *sine quâ non*, supplies the material, but in this state it is *informis*, has no justifying power—impregnated with love, it receives its form, or animating principle. At what moment or by what means does the *fides informis* advance to *fides formata?* The Council is not very distinct on this point, but the answer is incidentally supplied. The instrumental cause of justification is the Sacrament of Baptism; before the sacrament catechumens do not possess *fides formata*, but seek it *from the Church*; the Church, through the sacrament which it administers, effects the desired change, and the candidate emerges from the baptismal font with love infused into his previously imperfect faith. But now arises a difficulty. Faith informed by love is in danger of being no longer faith. When a passive acceptance of the creed and the energetic principle of love are fused together, the weaker constituent must give way to the stronger; the combination will derive its nature from the predominant element; the *name* of faith may be retained, but the result will practically be love, and to love, that is, to inherent righteousness, justification is after all inscribed. The *fides formata* of the Schoolmen and of Rome ends by referring us to ourselves, and not to Christ for justifying righteousness. No wonder that the fathers at Trent were perplexed how to interpret St. Paul. Neither faith as a mere radix or indispensable condition, nor faith informed by love as the true and immediate means, of justification could be made to fit in with his statement: 'A man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law.'

A man cannot be said to be justified by faith who is really justified by love under the guise of faith (*fides formata*); but the difficulty was increased when the latter clause, 'without the deeds of the law,' came under consideration. For 'love is the fulfilling of the law' (Rom. xiii. 10), that is, the moral law, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself' ; and it is with the moral law that we are here concerned. Love to God must manifest itself in obedience to God's commands, and love to our neighbour in works of charity. If, then, justifying faith is in fact love, an inherent quality, from its very nature the fulfilling of the law, how can justification be 'without the deeds of the law ?'

To clear up the question, it must be observed that St. Paul does not mean that justification can exist without obedience, or without issuing therein—obedience is a necessary accompaniment of a justified state—what he means is, that justifying faith in its essence, as it must be conceived of, is not obedience either inward or outward ; the preposition in fact, is *χωρὶς*, apart from, not *ἄνευ*, without ; 'apart from the works of the law, which necessarily follow it, but do not enter into its conception, the faith of which I am speaking justifies.' But the Council had already defined justifying faith as in effect love, and the Apostle's exclusion of works from it caused some embarrassment. Various methods of explanation were suggested ; such as that St. Paul meant only the ceremonial law of Moses, or works done before the infusion of grace, and did not mean to exclude works done after justification. In fact, Bishop Bull was anticipated by several of the members of the Council. Precisely the same position is taken up by this writer in his *Harmonia Apostolica*, the second dissertation. He was too acute to argue that the Apostle had only the ceremonial law in his mind ; an interpretation which is supposed to have originated with Jerome, but which has been abandoned by all commentators of note, the Romish included. 'It is plain that St. Paul referred both to the ceremonial and the moral precepts of the law' (*Diss. Post.*, c. vii). How could it be otherwise, when he declares that 'by the law is the knowledge of sin' ? (Rom. iii. 20) ; and adds, as an illustration, that 'he had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet,' which is part of the decalogue. Bull's efforts, therefore, are directed to prove that by 'works of the law' are meant works done under the law, and with only the aids which it could supply ; works which, since the law neither revealed a sufficient atonement nor gave a promise of grace, were, in fact, works done in a state of nature, and could not be supposed to justify. It does not follow that works done by 'the grace of Christ and the inspiration of His Spirit' (Art. xiii) may not have this power. So runs the argument ; but it is built upon the sand.

It is certain that by *ἔργα νόμου* (works of the law) we must understand not works done under the law, but works which the law commands. The contrast is never drawn between *ἔργα πίστεως* (works of faith) and *ἔργα νόμου* (works of the law), but between faith and works of the law; between the mode of justification by faith, and the mode of justification by fulfilling the requirements of the law. The only question, then, is whether St. Paul's statement refers solely to the first act of justification and not to its continuance, or whether it applies to the whole course of the subsequent Christian life. To explain: According to the doctrine of Rome, the Sacrament of Baptism infuses justifying grace—this is a single act not to be repeated—thenceforward the justified person, on the basis of *fides formata*, or love infused, co-operates towards his justification by good works, even to the extent of meriting, on the principle of condignity, an increase of justification. Now, supposing that St. Paul's discussion in Romans, in which faith plays so prominent a part, is only to be understood of the entrance into a justified state, we should expect that his language would be very different when he comes to speak of those—for instance, himself—who had passed that primary stage. This, however, is not the case. On the memorable occasion, fourteen years after his conversion, when he 'withstood Peter to the face' at Antioch, he expresses himself exactly as in Romans: 'Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law; for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified; the life which I *now* live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave Himself for me' (Gal. ii. 16, 20).

The whole scope of the Epistle to the Galatians is to warn them that, 'having begun in the spirit,' having through faith received complete remission of sin, they should not attempt to supplement that justification either with moral, inherent graces, or with what he calls 'the weak and beggarly elements' of the ceremonial law; still less with the authorized additions which the Jews made to that law, or the ascetic exercises and 'satisfactions' which a false gnosticism had begun to introduce into the Church (Col. ii; 1 Tim. iv. 3). Their justification was not capable of, nor did it need, any improvement or increase by such means. And in a later epistle he professes not merely that at first, but when he wrote near the end of his course, his desire was that he might be found in Christ, not having his own righteousness which is of the law, but 'that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God' (God's gift), 'by faith' (Phil. iii. 9). The justifying faith of St. Paul, then, is neither a mere assent to Gospel truth, nor a faith vivified by love and practically swallowed up in the inherent gift to which it leads. Nor is it a faith which, after having led to baptism, disappears thenceforward as the maintaining principle of an accepted state. However we may define it, it is with him the first connecting-link with Christ, and the mainspring of the Christian life to the end ; and this apart from, though not without, works, evangelical or other.

Bishop Bull's exegetical mistakes arose from his attempting to establish an identity between the faith of St. Paul and the faith of St. James ; with a view to the leading principle of his work, that not faith alone, but faith conjoined with evangelical obedience, is the intrinsic ground of our acceptance with God. St. James declares that ' by works a man is justified, and not by faith only ' ; the words, taken as they sound, and without comparing Scripture with Scripture, favour the Bishop's theory, and he had to prove, if possible, that St. Paul does not contradict his brother Apostle. The task was a difficult one, and must always end in failure if it be assumed that the word ' faith ' is used in the same sense by these Apostles. As regards Bull's theory itself, with the exception of the dogma of grace of condignity, it is the same as the doctrine of Rome. Faith is not the ὄργανον ληπτικὸν, the means of appropriating a promise, but the complex of all Christian graces : ' The faith which is so extolled in the New Testament is by no means to be taken for a single grace. For it comprehends in its embrace all the works of Christian piety.' Had he meant that ' good works do necessarily spring out of a lively faith,' as the fruit from a good tree ; and possibly, when he calls faith ' the root,' or ' mother,' of such works, some such idea may have been present to him ; he would have been in accordance with Scripture. But his aim is different. It is to make out that faith justifies, not on account of the object which it embraces—Christ and His merits—but from its own inherent acceptableness, as comprehending all evangelical obedience. And if it be asked why should faith, rather than love or humility or any other Christian grace, be connected with justification, the reply is, that it more than any other expresses the fact that the whole scheme of salvation is of grace, a free gift of God. It is thus deprived of its apprehensive character, and becomes, in the language of the Council of Trent, either a mere radix, or foundation, of a justified state, or the *fides formata* of the Schoolmen.

That to make faith the *instrument* of justification incurs his severest censure may be anticipated. And, indeed, if by the expression it were intended that faith is either the meritorious, or the physical, cause of justification—by a physical cause being understood one which *produces* its effect—his criticism would not be misplaced. But by the word ' instrument ' as used in the Protestant Confessions is meant merely that faith is the receptive faculty of the offered gift—a moral instrument, as some term it ; and this is what Bull really objects to. 'If in this sense faith is called an instrument, we deny that it is the only one ; repentance' (in its eleven manifestations), 'as we have abundantly proved, being as much a condition or means of justification as faith itself' (*Diss. Post.*, ii. 7, 9). He cites the Protestant Confessions as stating that 'faith alone, without works, justifies' ; but one of them, with which he must have been familiar, and which explains the saying, he passes over in silence, the 'Homily on Justification' (the only one which is of symbolical authority, Art. xi) : 'Faith does not shut out replentance, hope, love, dread, and the fear of God, to be joined with faith in every man that is justified ; but it *shutteth them out from the office of justifying*.' As regards St. James, when he reminds those to whom he writes that 'faith, if it hath not works is dead, being alone, and that as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also,' can he be supposed to mean that the addition of works to a faith presumed to be a dead one can vivify it, or co-operate with it to justification ? Life is not thus communicated *ab extra*, but springs up from within. It would be a mechanical admixture and nothing better. We may be sure that no such idea was present to the Apostle. He describes not justifying faith, but a faith which does not justify because it is dead. But, to turn from an author who, from the vivacity of his style will always be read with interest, but who is no safe guide in doctrine, let the matter be considered in its real bearings.

What is the true distinction between the Romish and the Protestant doctrine of justification ? On both sides it is admitted that Christ came into the world to be a saviour ; on both sides that justification and sanctification are always found together ; and that salvation, begun here and completed hereafter, comprehends both these gifts. That the objective salvation wrought out by Christ must be applied, and become appropriated, individually, and that means are provided for this purpose, viz., the Word and the sacraments, is not a matter of debate. The distinction is this : The Romanist teaches forgiveness of sin through sanctification, the Protestant sanctification through forgiveness of sin. All other points of difference run up eventually into this one. And the question is, Which is in the right ?

Christ, like His forerunner, preached repentance as a necessary preliminary to entering the Kingdom of God, and in the Sermon on the Mount exhibited what the law requires, if it was to be relied on as a means of justification, and what the standard is at which His followers should aim ; but as the time approached when He should be received up unto the Father, forgiveness of sin came more and more into prominence as the great object of His mission. 'Son, be of good cheer, thy sins be forgiven thee' (Matt. ix. 2); this was the special blessing which the Son of Man was empowered to bestow, and how it was to be procured is gradually disclosed. He was to 'give His life a ransom for many' (Mark x. 45); 'to be lifted up from the earth' that He might draw all men unto Him (John xii. 32); to give His flesh for the life of the world (*Ibid.*, vi. 51). And in the sacrament which He appointed for a perpetual remembrance of Himself and His work, the bread and the wine were to be the symbols of His body broken and blood shed for the remission of sin. To proclaim that the ransom was paid, the atonement between God and man effected, was the last charge which He gave to His Apostles. 'Go, preach this Gospel to every creature' (Mark xvi. 15). They went forth as they were commanded, and 'ceased not to teach and preach Jesus Christ' (Acts v. 42); not as a lawgiver but as a redeemer, 'to whom all the prophets give witness that through His name whosoever believeth on Him shall receive remission of sin' (*Ibid.*, x. 43). They announced themselves ambassadors for Christ, beseeching men to be reconciled to God on the ground that God had reconciled Himself to man through the atonement (2 Cor. v. 20, 21). The acceptance of their message issued in forgiveness of sin, and this was ever the first step towards all that was to follow in the way of redemption. The word translated 'redemption' in Ephes. i. 7 (ἀπολύτρωσις) signifies all that is comprised in that term, even the resurrection of the body (Rom. viii. 23), but especially 'the forgiveness of sins.'[1]

And how was the message to be received, to the actual salvation of individuals? How could any word of promise be received, except by faith? 'He that believeth and' (as a consequence) 'is baptized, shall be saved'; 'believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved.' Not by an infused gift, conveyed in baptism, but by the faculty, whatever name it may bear, by which *promises* are received and appropriated, is this promise made our own; an offered gift is not received by a gift. It is by and through the Word that God deals with man in the first instance; and the first step on man's part in the order of salvation is to believe what that Word declares; and not merely its general contents, but the specific promise of forgiveness of sin through Christ, to be apprehended by faith. For this is what the conscience burdened with a sense of guilt craves to be assured of; how man, unable to meet the accusations of the law or renew his own heart, can be just with God. Until this vital point is settled, there can be no question of loving God, or walking in His ways. Sin, past and present, raises a barrier between the God of infinite holiness and the fallen creature ; a barrier which never can be removed either by the obedience of works or by Church ordinances considered in themselves.

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[1] Comp. Col. i. 14: *ἐν ὧ ἔχομεν τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν διὰ τοῦ αἷματος αὐτοῦ τὴν ἄφεσιν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν*

Hence the circle in which the Romanist is perpetually driven, without finding rest : he is justified only by a faith vivified by love (*fides formata*) that is, in effect by the grace of love ; but he cannot love God until he is reconciled to God, and he can neither attain nor be conscious of reconciliation except by simple reliance on the promise ; and this simple reliance, according to the Council of Trent, is not sufficient for the purpose. But faith, it is replied, is itself a condition or means ; true, but not faith as the complex of Christian graces, or as a mere assent to articles of faith, but faith as the recognition and confession on the part of the sinner that there is no good thing in him, and a thankful acceptance of gratuitous mercy offered through Christ. Not the love which the believer has, but the love which he desires to have, but feels that he has not ; and under this feeling of deficiency, reliance on the Redeemer, and Him alone, justifies ; that is, in other words, apprehensive faith. For the very essence of faith is renunciation both of itself as meritorious and of any inherent righteousness attainable in this life, as availing for justification.

And this leads us to remark that Protestantism has its *fides formata* as well as Romanism, only the form is not love but conviction of sin. Conviction of sin is what transforms otiose assent to revealed truth into active living faith ; faith that fastens on the promise directly, and is followed, in various measure according to its strength, by the witness of the Spirit testifying to the inner man the Divine absolution. Where there is no conviction of sin, there is not, there cannot be, justifying faith, and where there is no justifying faith there cannot be evangelical love to God. The woman who washed Christ's feet with her tears (Luke vii) testified her love to Him because her sins had been already forgiven, not that they might be so ; her love was the proof, not the meritorious cause, of forgiveness.[1] Conviction of sin had led her to the Saviour—when and where we are not told—and from His lips she had received the assurance of forgiveness ; thence sprang her devotion to Him, as the fruit from the tree ; ' Woman, thy faith hath saved thee ; go in peace ' (ver. 50).

It is thus, too, that justifying faith comes to be called the gift of God ; a special gift of grace. The faculty of assent to a statement is born with us, but we do not act upon the statement until the will is influenced by some constraining motive, such as in the affairs of this life the prospect of gain or of deliverance from temporal damage. In spiritual things the motive power is wanting, interest in the promise is not aroused, until, by the special operation of the Holy Ghost, the misery of our natural state becomes felt. Then languid acquiescence gives place to the passionate inquiry, ' What must I do to be saved ? ' (Acts xvi. 30), and faith, quickened into life, grasps the promise unto salvation ; ' with the heart man believeth unto righteousness ' (Rom. x. 10). And thus it is that sanctification builds itself on forgiveness of sin, not the latter upon the former.

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[1] Remissio peccatorum, Simoni non cogitata, probatur a fructu. Bengel, *in loc.*

Such is justifying faith in its nature, its office, and its effect ; similar in essence, though not in object, to the faith which our Lord demanded, and so much commended, in those who applied to Him for the cure of their bodily diseases, and to the instances enumerated in Heb. xi. In the former cases there was, strictly speaking, no promise on which the sufferers could depend, but there was what was equivalent to such a promise. There was the fact before their eyes that the Saviour had never refused to afford relief on previous similar occasions, and that relief had always followed His interference. His power and His willingness to heal had been sufficiently demonstrated ; the applicants believed that He had power to assist them, ' Lord, if Thou wilt, Thou canst make me clean,' and they trusted that He would exercise that power on their behalf, a trust which was never disappointed—' I will, be thou clean.' Here saving faith exhibited itself in its essential elements. There could be no question of assent to revealed truth, for no full revelation thereof had as yet been given, at least in connection with the person and work of Christ ; and no such assent was required by the Saviour as a condition of His miraculous cures. ' If thou believest with all thine heart, thou mayest' be baptized (Acts viii. 37) ; and the Eunuch's profession, 'I believe that Jesus is the Son of God,' was deemed by Philip sufficient ; not a belief that Jesus, as the only-begotten Son, was consubstantial with the Father, however implicity truths of this kind may have been involved in the confession, but that the crucified and risen Jesus was He of whom the prophet Isaiah spake, when he foretold that a Redeemer should appear upon whom the Lord would ' lay the iniquity of us all ' (Isa. liii). It was the special fact that forgiveness of sin was to be obtained through Jesus of Nazareth, which the Eunuch believed, and which opened his way directly to the baptismal font.

As regards Heb. xi, Noah, Abraham, Sarah, Rahab, and Moses, acted on a special promise of temporal advantage or deliverance ; the other instances resemble those of the Gospel narrative, they believed generally that ' God is, and is a rewarder of them that seek

Him' (Heb. xi. 6). Psychologically their faith resembled Christian faith, but the object was different, and the object, to some extent, conditions both the nature and the intensity of the exercise of faith. Reduced to its primary element, faith is a realizing of the existence of unseen things (Heb. xi. 1), but clothed with flesh and blood it assumes, in each case, a character of its own.[1] Hence it is an inadequate description of *justifying* faith, that it is an acceptance of the articles of the creed, even though it is added that this assent must influence the will and affections.[2] It approaches too nearly the language of the Council of Trent, that men are 'disposed' to justification by being moved by Divine grace to believe as true what has been revealed, especially that the sinner is justified through the redemption that is in Christ; and by being brought, under conviction of sin, to entertain hopes that God in His mercy will be propitious to them; whence they begin to love God, etc.[3] The Council does not maintain that a mere assent of the understanding is sufficient to prepare for the infusion of grace; it anticipates that the truths of revelation steadily contemplated will have an effect on the will and affections, and produce love to God of some kind and to some extent. What it does systematically keep out of view is that faith, to become justifying, must lay hold upon a special promise, the promise of forgiveness of sin, and appropriate it. It never intensifies faith up to this point; its faith remains a mere radix, or preparation towards real justifying grace.

Faith admits of various degrees; the preparatory stages of conversion or regeneration all involve faith; but it is of a lower order and inferior intensity as compared with the decisive internal act which conveys the spirit of adoption, and completes the acceptance of the penitent. Much nearer the truth is the view which identifies justifying faith with trust,[4] although it may be thought to err in defect. Belief is the correlative of a promise, trust is concerned with the person who makes it. Can we depend on his truthfulness, his goodwill, his power to fulfil the promise? If there is doubt on these points hesitation may arise, no matter how attractive the announcement may be ; but let the promise be exactly such as is needed, and trust in the Author of it complete, and the combination will furnish as accurate a conception of justifying faith as the subject admits of. This is the *fiducia* of the Reformers as distinguished from the assent of Romanism ; and so essential an element is trust of it that they do not hesitate to describe trust as the soul, or, in scholastic language, the form, of justifying faith.[1] Whether trust or conviction of sin be selected as thus vivifying a mere assent is immaterial ; either way the true nature of justifying faith is indicated, and distinguished from the mere preparatory faith of Romanism.

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[1] [It would have been well had Litton pointed out that Heb. xi clearly depicts the patriarchs as looking beyond earthly objects to the heavenly reality (see, *e.g.*, verses 10–16). Moreover, that Christ was, in an anticipatory manner and with reference to the Messianic promises, the true object of faith, is indicated by the case of Moses, who is described as 'accounting the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures of Egypt' (verse 26), and also by the case of Abraham, concerning whom Christ said to the Jews: 'Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day; and he saw it and was glad' (Jn. viii. 56). Cf. 1 Pet. i. 10f. Editor.]

[2] Heurtley, *B. L.*, Serm. v.

[3] Sess. vi. c. 6.

[4] *Ten Sermons on the Nature and Effects of Faith*, by Bishop O'Brien. Not, certainly, such a trust as may be common to good and bad. 'I do not say that there is no such thing as trusting in Christ's mercy for salvation, and a comfort resulting from it. *Bad and good feel it.*' Newman, *Justif.*, L. xi.

66. *The Doctrine of Assurance*

The Council of Trent, in its decrees on justification, deems it necessary to caution Christians against entertaining too strong a conviction of their acceptance with God. ‘ We must not assert that they who are truly justified ought, without doubt, to conclude with themselves that they are justified ; and that none are so save those who with certainty believe it ; and that by this faith alone justification is effected. For as no pious person ought to be in doubt concerning God’s mercy, Christ’s merits, and the virtue of the sacraments, so there is no one who feels his own shortcomings but may hesitate to say he has grace ; at least, with such a certainty of faith as to exclude the chance of mistake.’[2] The corresponding canon (viii) somewhat modifies these statements. It contents itself with anathematizing those who hold ‘ that it is essential to remission of sin that no hesitation arising from a consciousness of infirmity should be felt on the point.’ But there is no doubt as to the general meaning, and as little doubt as to the object aimed at. It is contrary to the spirit of Romanism that the Christian should be too independent of the Church, that is the priesthood, and of the power of the keys ; and of this there might be a danger if he were encouraged on account of his faith alone to expect a sense of reconciliation with God through the remission of sin.

There was little need of the caution, and the Council gave itself superfluous trouble when once it had decided that our justifying righteousness is, in whatever sense, inherent. For there is no more sure method of keeping the Christian in a state of doubt respecting his acceptance than to direct him to his own attainments as the ground either of his meriting or being persuaded of it. In fact, since in our present state (*status viatorum*) our sanctification consists very much in an increasing sense of our sinfulness and our need of gratuitous mercy, it is plain that the more we grow in grace the greater may be our difficulty in assuring ourselves that we are in a state of grace at all. Doubtless the recollection of a time when we neither felt nor lamented the struggle of the old man against the sanctifying principle may lead to the persuasion that some great change must have passed over us, and from this we may draw a favourable conclusion ; but it is doubtful whether assurance or uncertainty will on the whole prevail. The Romish definition of justification was in itself sufficient to ensure the hesitation recommended.

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[1] Ex fide historica sive ex notitia promissionum per efficaciam S.S. nascitur fiducia (trust), quæ est fidei justificantis velut anima, *quâ promissiones divinas nobis applicamus*, ac certa animi πληροφορίᾳ illis innitimur. Gerhard, *De F. J.*, c. iii., § 1. Fiducia est forma fidei justificantis quatenus certa animi persuasione *promissionem gratiæ* amplectimur. *Ibid.*

[2] Sess. vi. c. 9.

The Christianity of the New Testament is remarkable for the absence of that morbid introspection which occupies a prominent place in the religious literature of modern times, and of which among ancient writers the Confessions of Augustine is a specimen. It consists in fixing attention on the varying emotions of the religious life, carefully noting, perhaps registering, the falls and rises of the spiritual barometer, and analysing each successive feeling as it arises with microscopic accuracy. It is an unhealthy occupation, because it diverts the mind from the proper *objects* of faith, bright and clear in the heavens, to the impure exhalations which arise in an imperfectly sanctified heart and mingle with its best aspirations. Holy affections do not grow by being analysed, but by contemplating the objects which draw them forth. Self-examination indeed is a duty incumbent on all Christians ; but it should relate rather to moral practice than to feelings or motives, which are of too delicate a nature to bear handling without being soiled. The result of this introspection, as regards a confident hope, is the same as that of the doctrine of Rome. In either case the discoveries are unsatisfactory, and furnish no solid ground for a sense of acceptance with God. It can point to no precedent or sanction in the inspired volume. St. Paul laments his struggle with a sinful nature crucified but not slain, confesses that he had not attained neither was he already perfect (Phil. iii. 12), exercised due discipline over the flesh lest it might encroach unawares ; but we never find him expressing a doubt whether he was a child of God and in a state of salvation.[1] No more do his brother Apostles. An unclouded confidence on these points is their prevailing sentiment. In St. Paul's case the secret of it is made known to us by himself : ' The life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave Himself for me ' (Gal. ii. 20).

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[1] A 'state of salvation,' by the very force of the words, means not merely the state of one who *may* be saved (*e.g.*, if he makes use of privileges, etc.) but of one who is actually at the time saved ; the state of the σωζομένους in Acts ii. 47. Whether he will continue so to the end is another question.

The Scriptural doctrine of assurance must not be confounded with others with which it is by no means identical. Though intimately connected with faith in the sense of trust (*fiducia*), it is not the same thing, for there may be genuine faith where there is no uninterrupted assurance. ' Lord, I believe ; help thou mine unbelief ' (Mark ix. 24), is not unfrequently the prevailing temper of mind with many of whose eminent piety there can be no question. The ray from heaven advances straight to its mark, but is liable to be refracted in its necessary passage through a grosser element. Much depends in this matter on constitutional temperament ; much, too, on the circumstances in which the Christian may be placed. The voyage of one may be over smooth waters, of another amidst tempests and breakers, which sorely try his faith. And if the Council had intended nothing more than that saving faith is not to be tested by the possession of plenary assurance, it would have been in the right ; but its aim is further, it is to make uncertainty the law of the Christian life. Nor, again, ought it to be brought into connection with the doctrine of predestination, as Calvin seems to do in the *Institutes*,[1] which has not improbably been the occasion of the prejudice entertained in some quarters against the doctrine.

Properly it has to do with the present, not with the future. Whether the Christian who enjoys present assurance does so in consequence of being inscribed in the Book of Life is a question incapable of solution, until it be determined that a final fall from such a state of grace is impossible. If it be possible, assurance supplies no infallible proof of election, for only the elect persevere to the end. Now, the Epistle to the Hebrews, in the sixth and tenth chapters, especially the sixth describes a work of the Spirit, which it is difficult to distinguish from regeneration, and which yet, if lost, is declared to be incapable of recovery. Calvin would reply that, if there was a final declension, that this would be proof that the regeneration in question was not real. According to Augustine, it might be real and yet fail, because the special gift of perseverance had not been attached to it. But the predestination controversy should be here put out of view. The assurance of present acceptance is one thing, and the assurance of final salvation is another ; and it is with the former only that we are concerned.

Now that the normal state of the Christian should be a consciousness of peace with God through Christ, a rejoicing in hope of the glory of God, an assurance, especially in tribulation, that ' neither death nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor height, nor depth nor any creature, shall be able to separate him from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus.' (Rom. viii. 38, 39), is plain from the teaching and examples of the Apostles. The source of it is that special gift of the Gospel dispensation, the witness of the Holy Spirit, on which enough has been said in a preceding section (63). It is His gracious office to bear witness directly, yet not without the co-operation of our own spirit, that we are the children of God. Since it is the *Holy* Spirit who confers the gift, it is incompatible with continuance in sin : and even consent to a single sin will grieve this Divine Guest, and cause Him to withdraw His consolations. And this witness must be maintained by the same means through which it first visited the soul, not by multiplying religious exercises, or dissecting the spiritual emotions, but by abiding in Christ through faith. And as faith admits of various degrees, the stronger our faith the greater our assurance. To go out of ourselves, and to be content to receive all from Christ, is the secret of spiritual peace—a secret which is revealed only to those who are His.[1]

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[1] iii. c. 24.

67. *Degrees of Justification*

As little need was there for the Council to decide, as it did, that justification admits of degrees. 'Those who are thus justified, advancing step by step in virtue, that is, mortifying their carnal affections and growing in holiness, through obedience to the commands of God and the Church, make progress in justification itself, and are more and more justified, according as it is written, " He who is just, let him be further justified " '[2] (Rev. xxii. 11). A Church which practically identifies justification with sanctification might have dispensed with this statement. It is admitted on all sides that sanctification exists in different measure, and ought to be continually progressive ; and if justification is nothing but sanctification under another name, there is an end of the debate. With the Protestant doctrine the idea is incompatible.

As there can be no degrees in natural friendships, as a son cannot be more or less a son of his father ; no more can there be in the spiritual relationship between fallen man and God, which we term justification. Forgiveness of sin, if it takes place at all, is complete ; so is spiritual adoption, and so in itself is the witness of the Spirit, which testifies of both. And the Church bears witness to this truth, in its profession that there is 'one baptism for the remission of sins.' As we do not repeat baptism, so we neither repeat nor augment the remission of sin which the sacrament symbolizes ; we continue it by faith until faith is lost in sight. The doctrine of Rome is founded on its assumption of a first and second justification. The first has no element of merit in it, or, if so, it is only a *meritum de congruo*, the preliminary dispositions (including faith as a radix) rendering it *suitable* that God should bestow further grace ; up to the infusion of justifying righteousness in the Sacrament of Baptism, the process is of a gratuitous character. So that once only in his life is the sinner justified purely of grace. The second justification follows, and is acquired, not, indeed, without faith (probably *fides caritate formata*), but primarily by good works, especially such as are enjoined by the Church ; and since these good works may be multiplied even to the pitch of works of supererogation, it is obvious that the justification of which they are the cause is capable of increase. Not only so ; but they establish a *meritum de condigno*, a claim to acceptance on the score of desert. This doctrine is but ill-concealed under the guise of an inward Divine presence, which is not in itself renewal, but the source thereof, and which, like the Shekinah of old, may manifest itself in different degrees of brightness. The Shekinah was not the Divine presence itself, but the symbol of it ; and the fruits of the Holy Spirit are not identical with the indwelling in the heart of that Divine agent. The brightness of the Shekinah might admit of increase, and the fruits and even witness of the Holy Spirit may vary in degree ; but both in the one case and in the other the Divine presence, the foundation, remained and remains unchangeable. So here,—the *results* of justification may be more or less, but the gift itself is incapable of growth or improvement.

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[1] Mundus et ratio non capit quam sit cognitio ardua, Christum esse justitiam nostram : ita operum opinio nobis incorporata agnataque et innaturata est. Luther.

[2] Sess. vi. c. 10.

In short, the figment of a first and second justification finds no countenance in Scripture. Whether we take the word actively, as God's declaring the sinner just, or passively, as a justified state, it remains the same throughout. It commences with our being counted righteous on account of a faith which receives the promise and apprehends Christ, and in no part of our Christian course is it more or less than that. The song of the Church triumphant strikes no other chord (Apoc. v. 9). The feeblest Christian is justified equally with the strongest, and the sun shines with equal splendour on the infirm and the healthy. As regards the passage from the Apocalypse (xxii. 11), on which the Council relies, the reading is uncertain ; but this is of little moment. If we interpret it of sanctification, the meaning will be, ‘ He that is pure in heart, let him strive to continue so ’ ; if of justification, ‘ He that is justified by faith, let him still be so,’ for from first to last ‘ the just shall live by his faith ’ (Hab. ii. 4).

68. *Baptismal Justification*

The instrument, or, to speak more accurately, the channel through which, according to the Council of Trent, justification is conveyed, is the Sacrament of Baptism. Everything up to this point is but preliminary ; even the faith required (and faith must in some sense be required, unless the Apostolic testimony is to be entirely ignored) is without a ' form,' *i.e.*, lifeless, inoperative, devoid of saving efficacy ; and first, through baptism and the accompanying infusion of love, becomes a living faith, or *fides formata.* The statement of our article is that ' we are justified by faith only,' which seems to exclude not merely ' our own works and deservings,' but every other means—at least, ' before God,' for how we are justified in the sight of man is another question. It is probable, however, that the relation of faith to the sacraments, in the matter of justification, was not the point immediately before the minds of the compilers, but rather its relation to works. Not the less, however, deserving of attention is the former question, especially if the remark of a writer, whose work in former times was a standard one in use at our universities, is correct that ' the doctrine of sacramental justification is justly to be reckoned among the most mischievous of all those practical errors that are in the Church of Rome.'

That the reception of baptism is incumbent upon all who believe in Christ ; that in some sense it is connected with remission of sin (Acts ii. 38 ; xxii. 16) ; that it ' is a sign of regeneration, whereby, as by an instrument, they that receive baptism rightly are grafted into the Church ' (Art. xxvii) ; on these points no difference exists between Romanists and Protestants. But the question now before us is, What is its office *in justification* ? Is it the means in and by which justification is first made over to the sinner ? Or, put it in another way, is the gift suspended on the receiving of the sacrament, so that before its reception the believer is not in the sight of God a justified person, or not fully justified ?

We turn to Scripture for an answer, and especially to that portion of it which more than any other bears the appearance of a systematic discussion of the subject (Rom. iii—viii). It so happens that in the centre of the argument, as if by anticipation, moved no doubt thereto by the inspiring Spirit, the Apostle Paul deals with this very question, and to elucidate it employs the same typical instance from which he had proved the office of faith in general. ' Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness ' ; or righteousness was imputed to him on account of his faith. The promise was repeated

(Gen. xvii), and on this occasion the ordinance of circumcision was appointed, to which baptism is supposed to have succeeded. Now, to St. Paul's argument, that the Gentiles equally with the Jews are to be justified by faith, that there was to be one mode of justification for all men, it was important to determine at what time Abraham was announced righteous through faith, before or after circumcision. If before, then it would be proof that the uncircumcised Gentiles who believed might also be partakers of the blessing. The point was no collateral one, but entered into the very texture of his reasoning. ' How was it, then reckoned,' he asks, ' when in circumcision or in uncircumcision ? ' (Rom. iv. 10). And the answer is, ' Not in circumcision, but in uncircumcision ' (*Ibid.*). That is, he was justified in the sight of God (κατέναντι τοῦ Θεοῦ) before he received circumcision. And to place the matter beyond doubt, he explains what was the office and import of circumcision—what place it had in Abraham's justification. He received the sign of circumcision, not as a channel or means of justification, but ' as a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had yet being uncircumcised ' (verse 11).

If for circumcision we substitute baptism, the Apostle may be supposed to speak thus : He that believes on Christ with a living faith is justified by that faith, and justified before baptism, which sacrament no doubt he, in obedience to Christ's command, subsequently receives. Baptism does not convey the gift, but is a ' sign and seal ' of its previous bestowal ; even as Abraham, in reference to an inferior promise, but by a faith similar in essence, was counted righteous before God, previously to his receiving the visible seal of the covenant.

There is only one way in which the inference might have been obviated. If the Apostle in what follows had cautioned his readers not to argue from circumcision to baptism, had explained that there is an essential distinction—a distinction affecting the point in question (*some* distinction, of course, there is)—between the two ordinances, had stated that, whereas the one was only a seal, the latter is an instrument, the analogy might have been thought to fail. But, in fact, throughout the whole discussion there is no mention of baptism in connection with justification, nor allusion to any difference between it and circumcision. Baptism is first named in chap. vi, where it is said to be the means, not of justification, but of ' being buried with Christ,' whatever that may mean, on which more hereafter. Nothing but faith is spoken of as the channel through which remission of sin is obtained. The initiatory sacrament of the ' new law ' (as the Council of Trent is wont to describe the Gospel) occupies, for aught that appears to the contrary in this formal exposition of the subject, the same place in reference to faith which the initiatory rite of Judaism did in the instance of Abraham—that of a sign or seal of what had taken place previously, not that of an instrument.

This, then, is the leading passage on the very important question whether baptism conveys or only seals the grace of justification ; and instead of its being passed over in silence, as is often the case, or forced to surrender its plain meaning to other passages in which baptism is incidentally mentioned in connection with remission of sin, or which are figurative in character, these others ought to be interpreted so as to fit in with it. Some of them it will be proper to notice. 'Buried with Him by baptism into death' (Rom. vi. 4) ; the figurative nature of the language is established by the next verse, 'If we have been planted together in the *likeness* of His death, we shall be also in the *likeness* of His resurrection.' It seems hardly safe to argue from such a passage as this that because baptism is said (in some sense) to unite us to Christ, and union with Christ includes justification as the general includes the particular, therefore baptism conveys justification.[1]

What do we mean by union with Christ ? A physical one, such as that which existed between the Siamese twins ? Repulsive as such a notion is, it seems the natural consequence of theories which from time to time have been put forward in connection with the Eucharist.[2] The same Apostle uses still stronger language in Ephes. v. 30, 'We are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones' ; but the context explains what he means. The allusion is to Gen. ii. 24, in which Adam and Eve are said to be 'one flesh,' because Eve was taken out of Adam ; but as soon as this process was complete Adam and Eve were not physically united. The relation of husband and wife, to which the union of Christ with the Church is compared, is the closest earthly one, but they are not one flesh. Christians are united to Christ by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from Christ ; who, as regards 'the substance,' is one with Christ ; but this indwelling is, in the order of ideas, subsequent not previous to justification ; and baptism is a symbol of that death unto sin and new life unto righteousness of which the Holy Spirit is the Author. But this teaches us nothing respecting the special process of *justification* ; and, in fact, the context proves that not this gift but sanctification is what St. Paul is speaking of. These remarks apply in substance to such passages as : 'As many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ' (Gal. iii. 27) ; or, 'Buried with Him in baptism' (Col. ii. 12) ; or,

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[1] Heurtley, *B.L.*, Serm. vii.

[2] See Wilberforce on the Eucharist, *passim.*

'By one spirit we are all baptized into one body' (1 Cor. xii. 13), and, therefore (so runs the argument), into Christ, and, therefore, into a justified state. That the 'one body' here does not mean the aggregate of visible churches into which Christendom is divided is plain from the fact that these churches do not form one body under one Head; they are independent communities, connected indeed by *sameness* of faith, sacraments, perhaps polity, but their unity is not organic, as of one commonwealth under one visible head; and this alone might suggest that the word 'baptized' may be, and is here to be, taken in a figurative sense.[1]

But let our Lord Himself decide. 'John indeed baptized with water, but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Spirit not many days hence' (Acts i. 5). Here baptism with water is contrasted with baptism with the Holy Spirit; and reference is made to the Pentecostal effusion of the Spirit, which event took place without any administration of water-baptism. Whence we infer that by a figure the word 'baptized' is used by Christ to signify a plentiful spiritual effusion; and if so, it may be, and without doubt is, thus used in 1 Cor. xii. 13. By a similar figure derived from the other Sacrament it is said, 'we have been all made to drink into one Spirit.' But even on the supposition that the Christian baptism is intended in the former part of the verse, and that the meaning is, the Holy Spirit by baptism incorporates us into the Body of Christ, and through His Body into Christ Himself, this has no direct bearing on the connection of *justification* with baptism, still less on the question whether or not faith justifies antecedently to that Sacrament. 'Repent and be baptized for the remission of sins' (Acts ii. 38); there is no ground for connecting remission of sins with the single word 'baptized,' and not rather with the whole command, 'repent and be baptized'; 'believe, and as a proof of it receive baptism,' and your sins will be forgiven.

To which we may add that the same expression is used in reference to John's baptism, which is described as 'a baptism of repentance unto the remission of sins' (Mark i. 4); yet that a justifying power was attached to John's baptism is not usually held. How, indeed, could it be so attached before the Atonement and the Resurrection were accomplished facts? 'Arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins' (Acts xxii. 16); this adds little to the previous passage, except a more direct allusion to baptism in the words 'wash away thy sins,' which take the place of 'for the remission of sins.' But we must compare this condensed account with the fuller one, Acts ix. 17, 18: 'Ananias went his way and entered into the house, and putting his hands on him said, Brother Saul, the Lord, even Jesus, that appeared unto thee in the way as thou camest, hath sent me, that thou mightest receive thy sight, and be filled with the Holy Ghost. And immediately there fell from his eyes as it had been scales, and he received sight forthwith, and arose and was baptized.' The apparent order is, that Ananias laid his hands on Saul; that the latter there and then 'received the Holy Ghost,' and then, as the last step, was baptized. It is difficult to conceive that one who had been spiritually enlightened, and had received the sealing of the Holy Ghost, nevertheless was not, in the sight of God, justified by the remission of sin until he had been baptized.

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[1] In fact, where the church is described as the Body of Christ under its *invisible* Head Christ (that is, under His Vicar the Holy Ghost), it is the invisible church of Protestantism that is meant, not visible Christendom; and water-baptism does not incorporate us into the former.

Such is the state of the Scripture evidence. On the one hand we have a dogmatical statement in Rom. iv. 10, 11 on the point expressly raised, on the other we have no passage in which it is unequivocally laid down that baptism justifies. It is not to the point to urge that baptism is said to 'save' (1 Pet. iii. 21), that the Church is cleansed 'with the washing of water by the Word' (Ephes. v. 26), that baptism is the saving 'laver of regeneration' (Tit. iii. 5), that it brings us into union with Christ: the expressions, salvation, cleansing by the Word and Sacrament, union with Christ, do not enable us to say that baptism is, in the strict and definite sense of the term, the instrument of *justification.* Indeed, we may ask, how could circumcision, and how can baptism, be supposed to *add* anything to the justification already effected by the reception of the promise and testified to by the Spirit, unless in the way of infusion of a special grace; which latter notion transforms the Sacrament into something like a magical charm?

It will hardly be denied that justification is, to say the least, *begun* by appropriation of the promise; faith and the promise are correlative terms; but since it is a judicial act on God's part, if begun it must be *ipso facto* complete; if God *declares* the sinner justified on account of His faith, He does it once for all, and the declarative act cannot be severed into two parts, one belonging to faith, and the other to a subsequent instrument. Baptism, therefore, cannot add to the virtue of the declarative act, but it may and it does visibly announce to the Church that this act is presumed to have taken place in the particular instance; it may and it does symbolize, seal, and confirm to the recipient the same truths of remission and sanctification which the Word had previously proclaimed; it is the visible sign of the *appropriation* of the promise which the Word could only convey in general terms.

In all these respects it is, as the ancients term it, *a visible word* (*verbum visibile*), a *declaration* under a special form, necessary to the *confirmation* of the candidate's faith, and to the existence of a visible Church. But it is a *verbum visibile*, not as if it stood alone, but because the Word explains its meaning and use ; otherwise it would be an unmeaning ceremony. That is, it is a repetition of the promise under a new form ; a form indicating *application* of the promise instead of its general promulgation. It does not, therefore, and cannot, supplement or transfigure into something else the previous declaration of God within Himself, conveyed to the believer by the witness of the Spirit. What it adds must be of the *same character* as the act of Divine acceptance, viz., a declaration ; and it can convey nothing higher, or different in kind, as compared with the Word, although it is the symbol of appropriation, whereas the Word is only the instrument of general promise. In short, a rite is not the proper instrument of applying a declarative judgment, though it may be of conferring a gift ; the Word *is* an appropriate means, but it needs baptism to individualize it.

The Romish theory of a *special* infusion of grace in baptism renders it possible to sever the Divine declarative act from this infusion, and so to make baptism the proper instrumental cause of justification, and, as a consequence, to treat the justification which is by faith as only an inchoate and imperfect one, if any at all. And what, then, is the faith which is still allowed some place in the process ? It is not the faith which directly apprehends the promises of God in Christ, but faith in the Sacrament, a ‘ desire ’ for the Sacrament, an intention to receive the Sacrament ; that is, the Sacrament becomes the real source of salvation.

Baptism, too, partakes of the imperfection which belongs to all ordinances entrusted to the Church to administer to individuals. When it is said that *God* conveys justification in baptism, what can this mean but that He has appointed it as a means of grace, not that He administers the sacrament Himself (were it so the sacrament would be an infallible token of regeneration) ; but since the Church cannot read the heart, and takes men at their profession, it may be, and often is, administered to those who are destitute of the proper qualifications. It is no certain proof, therefore, that the baptized person is accepted by God ; though if he is accepted it ministers to important needs which cannot be supplied in any other way. If, indeed, the sacrament works *ex opere operato*, and there is no bar to its effects except mortal sin, this difficulty may be alleviated, but not otherwise.

To come closer to the point ;—justification, in its proper sense, as the act of God's declaring the sinner pardoned, is a transaction between the soul and God, with which the visible church has nothing to do, except in the ministration of the Word. The office of the church begins with the Word preached, and it is resumed again at baptism ; what lies between, viz., the faith which apprehends the promise, and the witness of the Spirit, is hidden from man, but it comprises nothing less than justification.

It is important here to observe the relation of the sealing, or earnest, of the Holy Spirit to baptism : it has no established connection with this Sacrament ; sometimes, as in the instance of Cornelius, the gift preceded baptism ; generally it followed, and not baptism, but the laying on the Apostles' hands was the regular means of conveyance, of which we have a striking example in Acts viii, where we read that Peter and John were sent to lay hands on the baptized Samaritans that 'they might receive the Holy Ghost, for as yet He was fallen upon none of them ; only they were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus' (vv. 15, 16). And so the Ephesian disciples, who had received only John's baptism, were first baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus—'and when Paul had laid his hands upon them, the Holy Ghost came upon them' (Acts xix. 6). For our present purpose these latter passages are not to the point, for it may be said that the persons mentioned were first justified in baptism, and then received the Spirit ; they do, however, prove that the gift of the Holy Ghost might be disconnected from the Sacrament. But it is otherwise with the case of Cornelius. It is difficult to conceive that, if he and his friends were not in the sight of God justified, they should have received, antecedently to baptism, the special attestation of the Holy Ghost. Justified no doubt he was before he received baptism ; and so was Lydia, 'whose heart the Lord opened,' to attend to Paul's preaching ; and so was the gaoler of Philippi, who received the announcement in faith, 'Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved.'

But this hidden transaction between God and the soul needs to be brought out into light, and to be professed before men ; needs it for the individual's own sake, as well as for the maintenance of a visible church in the world 'to be, like a city upon a hill, a standing memorial to the world of the duty which we owe our Maker ; to call men continually, both by example and instruction, to attend to it, and, by the form of religion ever before their eyes, to remind them of the reality ; to be the repository of the oracles of God ; to hold up the light of revelation in aid to that of nature, and propagate it throughout all generations to the end of the world.'[1]

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[1] Butler, *Anal.*, P. ii., c. 1.

The individual needs it for his own sake, to prove the sincerity and energy of his faith both to himself and others. It is one thing to cherish religious sentiments in private, it is another to be willing to take up the cross and suffer for Christ's sake ; and this, on the supposition that water-baptism is intended, appears to be the true meaning of John iii. 5. Nicodemus was a well-disposed man, inclined to become a disciple, but not prepared to encounter the obloquy which he knew must ensue if he publicly professed faith in Christ ; he, therefore, ' came to Jesus by night,' hoping to escape observation ; but, on the threshold of discussion, he was met by the announcement, that except a man be not only born of the Spirit (regeneration in its inward aspect), but submit to be born of water (regeneration in its outward aspect), he cannot be recognized as a disciple ; in other words : no disciple of Christ must be ashamed of the Gospel, or shrink from professing it. It is well known that among Jews or heathens, a man may be an inquirer or, as we should call him, a catechumen, without incurring the enmity of his co-religionists ; let him announce his intention to be baptized and carry out his intention, and, thenceforth, he is an excommunicated man, and has to suffer accordingly. For his own sake, too, because, if he does not join himself to the existing visible society of Christians, he will be deprived of the mutual help, sympathy, and edification which the society is intended to promote ; to say nothing of the means of grace which, with the exception of the ministration of the Word, he cannot approach. The society cannot recognize anyone as a member who does not consent to pass through the act of initiation. In fact, his refusal to do so ought to lead himself, and may well lead others, to doubt the sincerity of his faith ; it is an open act of disobedience to the command of the Master who he professes inwardly to love and serve.

Submission to baptism is also necessary to the maintenance of the church, because, if professing Christians might dispense with it, there would soon exist no visible church in the world. And so the order of things must ever be that prescribed by St. Paul : ' with the heart man believeth unto righteousness ' (δικαιοσύνη, the very term used in Romans for justification), ' and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation ' (Rom. x. 10) ; the justified state in itself inward and hidden, must be ' confessed ' in and by baptism.

These considerations, apart from any others, sufficiently explain why baptism is spoken of in such exalted terms : as burying with Christ, as saving, as the laver of regeneration, as connected with remission of sin, etc. (though never plainly as *justifying*) ; in the eye of the Church it is all these, for it is the only evidence which the Church can have of participation in these blessings. To the Church it is the very door into communion with the body of Christ, the marriage ring, the seal attached to the deed of conveyance, the token of the covenant, or by whatever other similar figures we describe it. And thus, perhaps, are Hooker's words, so often quoted, to be understood. 'We hold it to be the door of our *actual* entrance into God's house, the first *apparent* beginning of life, a seal, perhaps, to the grace of election before received, but to our *sanctification* here a step that hath not any before it.'[1]

It is not contended that its office extends no further than what is contained in the foregoing remarks. Spiritual effects may flow from it which we can but partially understand : 'we know in part, and we prophesy in part.' Our Church contents herself with describing baptism as the means of grafting into the (visible) Church ; as visibly signing and sealing the promises of forgiveness of sin and of our adoption to be the sons of God (which, therefore, are presupposed to be already inwardly in existence) ; of confirming faith ; of increasing grace (though as regards this last effect, she, seemingly of set purpose, reminds us that it is 'by virtue of prayer to God'). All this may freely be conceded. But neither does Scripture, nor Art. xi, nor the Homily to which the Article refers us, speak of it as the special instrument of *justification* in the sight of God.[2]

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[1] *Eccl. Pol.*, V., c. 60. 3.

[2] Such modifications, then, of the genuine Protestant doctrine as the following do not commend themselves : 'In adults faith is instrumental to our incorporation into Christ, in that it leads us cordially to close with the terms of the Gospel *covenant*.' It does more ; it is the act of apprehending the special promise of forgiveness of sin through Christ. 'God does in and by baptism incorporate the baptized person, as a living member, into Christ's mystical body.' Baptism does not incorporate into Christ's mystical body, the 'invisible' Church of Protestantism, but into the visible Church. 'Faith converts the simple washing into an efficacious sacrament, and turns the water into blood.' That is, it makes us capable of receiving the sacrament ; or in other words, it is not the direct means of receiving remission of sins, but of leading to the sacrament for that purpose. 'The time of baptism is the date from which our justification reckons. No man is ordinarily justified before baptism, and whoever receives baptism rightly is in baptism admitted into a state of justification.' 'If baptism is the instrument on God's part, faith is the instrument on ours. As baptism is the sole instrument in one sense, faith is the sole instrument in the other. Nor do we at all derogate from the doctrine that we are justified by faith only when we teach that faith *attains its end for the first time in baptism*. . . . St. Paul teaches the same doctrine when he refers to the time of baptism as the date at which their' (the Corinthians. See 1 Cor. vi. 11., which does not seem to the point) 'justification commenced.'—Heurtley, *B. L.*, Serm. vii. These last words disclose the result to which the whole tends. It is a modified form of the Romish doctrine—viz., that the office of faith is only to lead up to the sacrament in which justification is really conferred. This is faith in the sacrament, not directly in Christ. And it tends, too, to make justification not a declarative act of God assuring the soul directly of forgiveness, but an infused grace, as the schools and the Council of Trent teach. For if a *rite* justifies, how can it be otherwise than by an infusion of some sort ? Undue undervaluing of the sacraments is a danger to be avoided ; but into the sacred precincts of justification in the sight of God, either in its commencement or its continuance they must not, if the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith is to be maintained, be allowed to intrude.

Adult baptism, with its qualifications, repentance and faith, is that intended in these remarks. It is so because it is the normal case of Scripture; the one on which alone we can found any trustworthy conclusions respecting the relation of baptism to faith, or to regeneration with its subordinate divisions of conversion and justification. To commence with infant baptism, the ecclesiastical modification of the ordinance, and to reason on it as if it were the normal case of Scripture, can only lead to unwarranted assumptions, perhaps error. This exceptional form of baptism, however justly to be retained in the Churches, is deficient in the prerequisites for a complete baptism, and the defect must make us cautious in our assertions. The Lutheran doctrine of the *fides infantum* is an instance of the straits to which learned men are driven when they attempt to put infant baptism on all-fours with adult. The truth is, we know but little, because we are told but little, of the spiritual state of infants, or of the effects of their baptism. In Scripture justification presupposes a conscious subject, capable of repentance and faith; it presupposes not merely the remission of original sin, a matter enveloped in mystery, but of actual sins, of which infants are incapable. Whether repentance and faith may be dispensed with in the case of infants, or how far, or whether something analogous may be supposed in them, Scripture does not decide; they are interesting speculations, but can make no pretensions to dogmatical authority. Perhaps, then, it is better to avoid applying the term 'justification' to infants. There is no need of our so doing. Baptized, or even unbaptized, infants dying before actual sin, we may be persuaded, are saved, through the atonement of Christ applied to them in some way unknown to us.[1]

69. *Purgatory in Relation to Justification*

The Romish doctrine of purgatory must not be confounded with the belief of spiritual progress in the intermediate state, against which latter no objection from reason or Scripture can be urged. If the soul survives its separation from the body, and if it exists, not in a state of unconscious slumber (ψυχοπαννυχία) as some in ancient and modern times have held, but with its moral and intellectual faculties in activity, the inference seems to be that between death and the final judgment there must be progress, either in the one direction or the other.[1] But the doctrine of the Roman schools is of a different character. It is forensic in nature, and implies the payment of a debt not fully discharged in life. It rests on the distinction between mortal and venial sin. Mortal sin can only be remitted through the sacrament of penance, and if not thus remitted it consigns the sinner to everlasting punishment. Venial sin does not sever connection with Christ, nor destroy the grace of charity infused at baptism ; hence it does not involve eternal consequences ; but since it is sin, satisfaction must be made for it, either in this life by self-imposed acts of penance, or in case the account has not been fully squared, by temporary suffering in the intermediate state. This, however, may be shortened by placing to the credit of the suffering soul the superfluous merits of certain saints ; of which treasure the Pope possesses the key, and dispenses it, according as he thinks fit, under the name of indulgences.

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[1] [Litton's evaluation of infant baptism, here and later (§94), suffers from his failure to associate it with the position assigned to the children of God's people in the divine covenant of grace. As Hooker says, "the fruit of baptism dependeth only upon the covenant which God hath made" (*Eccl. Pol.*, V, lxii., 15). See Pierre Marcel, *The Biblical Doctrine of Infant Baptism* (London, 1953), John Murray, *Christian Baptism*, (Philadelphia, 1952), Oscar Cullman, *Baptism in the New Testament* (London, 1950), G. W. Bromiley, *The Baptism of Infants* (London, 1955), and Philip E. Hughes, *The Place and Purpose of the Sacraments*, in the March and June, 1959 issues of *The Churchman* (London). Editor.]

The distinction between mortal and venial sin (with one exception, the nature of which has never clearly been made out, Matt. xii. 32), the one being different *in nature* (*genere*) from the other, finds no warranty in Scripture. All sin is in itself a transgression of the law (*ἀνομία*, 1 John iii. 4), and the law makes no distinction, in the matter of justification, between the thought of the heart and the overt act (Matt. v. 28), between so-called sins of infirmity and deliberate sin. For even the former must not be regarded as casual acts, but as the consequence of that original corruption of nature which, until the guilt of it is removed, affects the whole position of the person in the sight of God. All the actings of this corrupt nature are sinful, though not equally so, and all need to be covered by the atoning blood of Christ. In this instance, as in others, Romanism looks more to the outward act than to the inward affection ; whereas we hold that concupiscence itself is of the nature of sin (Art. xi). The involuntary motions of this concupiscence are, in the case of the regenerate, put away from the sight of God, not because in themselves they do not deserve condemnation, but because, in answer to the prayer which our Lord has taught us to use, they are immediately forgiven for Christ's sake. The voluntary sins of the regenerate belong to another category ; unquestionably they tend towards a severance from Christ, or at least a forfeiture of Christian privileges. As regards the unregenerate, the absence of a personal interest in the work of Christ leaves them under condemnation, even for corrupt tendencies which may not pass into open breaches of the moral law. On the whole—if venial be taken in the sense of pardonable, all sin, whether of the regenerate or of the unregenerate (save the one mentioned above) is venial ; but if in the sense of not being itself liable to condemnation, no sin is venial : in either case, the distinction is untenable. All sin, if repented of, may be pardoned ; but no sin, in its own proper nature, apart from the atoning work of Christ, can lay claim to remission.

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[1] [This is an inference, however, which Litton fails to support by any scriptural evidence. Editor.]

The distinction is Pelagian in tendency, and like all forms of that heresy, it issues in fostering a low standard of Christian morality. If there are some sins which in themselves are venial, that is, which in the sight of God are not sin, the absolute requirements of the Divine law are lowered to meet the weakness of human nature ; a result which, as we have seen, also follows from the doctrine that the formal cause of justification is in ourselves, and not in Christ. The sense of sin, so invariable a feature of Christian piety, especially in its more advanced stages, gives place to acquiescence in present attainments ; the ideal of sanctity is lost ; and religious practice sinks to the level of civil morality, or even lower. Worse still, empirical classifications of sin, with a graduated scale of demerit and penalty, are framed ; as if it were in the power of man to draw lines of demarcation with certainty in matters which are in a state of continual flux. The circumstances of each action can be known only to Omniscience. The passage of Scripture which is sometimes cited as establishing a distinction between various kinds of sin (1 John v. 16) is not to the point. All sins, the Apostle says, may be made the subject of intercessory prayer ; all except one which is not clearly defined, but which seems to resemble that of Matt. xii. 32. Such classifications of sin tend to produce a corrupt casuistry in morals, and are intimately connected with the traffic in indulgences, which, more than anything else, was the occasion of the great division of the sixteenth century.

It by no means follows that if the Romish distinctions be disallowed all sins must be held equal—an inference which has been charged on some of Luther's expressions, but appears in none of the Protestant Confessions. It is plain from such passages as Matt. x 15, vii. 31, 32 ; Luke xii. 47, 48, that such a notion in untenable. Common sense dictates that the sins of David or Peter cannot be placed in the same category with the infirmities for which the just man daily seeks pardon. But it does not follow that these infirmities are not sins, but that graver transgressions, unrepented of, must expect a heavier penalty, as our Lord intimated when He declared that it would be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment than for

Chorazin and Bethsaida (Matt. xi. 22). Yet the sins of Chorazin and Bethsaida were not in their nature venial.

And as the distinction in the Romish sense is unscriptural, so the future purgatory provided for the full expiation of venial sin is 'a fond thing vainly invented' (Art. xxii). Both mortal and venial sin are in this life forgiven, if they are forgiven at all, on one only ground —viz., the sacrifice once offered on the cross; nor is the sinner required to complete the efficacy of this sacrifice by acts of penance, whether self-imposed or prescribed by the Church. The blood of Christ cleanses, where it cleanses at all, from all sin, and completely; not merely from the guilt of overt sin, but from that of the concupiscence whence it springs.

The theory is, that although the venial sins are repented of and the individual has never lost the grace of justification, the temporal satisfaction due to such sins as has not been exhausted. We reply that by the act of justifying faith all demands were met, and the believer passes into paradise absolved by the sentence of God Himself. No masses, no suffrages of the Church, are needed to shorten the duration of pains which in fact never were incurred, and the alleged necessity of which is founded only in inadequate views of the great atonement. To carry *penal* consequences of sin supposed to be here forgiven into a future state is to detract seriously from the sufficiency of Christ's atoning work, and rob the Christian of all peace in the prospect of dissolution.

It must be repeated that this question relates to justification, not to sanctification; or, in other words, that purgatory is considered not merely as a stage of purification, preparing the soul for the perfect bliss of heaven, but as a supplementary process, rendered necessary by the fact that the penal consequences of sin have not been wholly removed by faith in Christ. The two aspects of the question are sometimes confounded, but they should be kept distinct. God, the argument runs, does indeed on repentance and faith remit the eternal penalty of sin, but He still exacts temporal penalties, either in this world or the next. We see, for example, that the Christian's faith does not exempt him from death, the penalty of sin; and instances occur in Scripture, such as David and others, in which God, after pardoning the sin, nevertheless inflicted retributive sufferings in this world. The 'Lord hath put away thy sin, thou shalt not die. Howbeit, because by this deed thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, the child that is born to thee shall die' (2 Sam. xii. 13, 14). And it is matter of daily experience that the temporal consequences of sin committed in an unregenerate state are not always, on a spiritual change, reversed. Now, argues Bellarmine, since it may and does happen that the whole of this life is not sufficient to exhaust such temporal punishment, there must exist a future state or place in which the deficiency is supplied. But, even if it were allowed that the great atonement does not meet all demands, who can take it upon himself to say that the chastisements of this life have not been sufficient for the purpose ? What mortal can determine the more or less of a sin or the exact amount of retribution which it deserves ? What we do know from Scripture is that the souls of those who depart in the Lord pass into Abraham's bosom (Luke xvi. 22), or paradise (*ibid.*, xxiii. 43) ; that they rest from their labours (Rev. xiv. 13) ; that it is gain to them to die (Phil. i. 21) ; from which surely the inference is that death, the consummation of natural evil, discharges the last fraction, if there remain such, of the debt then unpaid.

But in truth, it is under a very different aspect that Scripture speaks of the temporal calamities of Christians. Not as a satisfaction for sin, but as the discipline of their heavenly Father to wean them from the world and to exercise faith and patience, is the light in which such trials are represented. The analogy, then, fails. There is nothing in the fact that in this life sin is frequently visited with chastisement to lead us to infer that so it must be with the blessed departed. Theirs is a state, as Romanists themselves teach, in which, the *fomes* or original sin being deposited with the body, temptation has no longer any material to work upon, and the progress, if such there be, is only from a lower to a higher stage of purity and bliss.

The tenet of purgatory is a particular application of the general doctrine of Rome on the nature of repentance. In early writers the words ‘ confession ’ and ‘ satisfaction ’ are connected with ecclesiastical discipline, and bear a scriptural meaning. Those who had been guilty of grave moral offences, or who in time of persecution had lapsed, were excluded from the Communion of the Church until they had been brought to repentance of their sin and desired readmission to Christian privileges. After a period of probation, if they continued of the same mind, the Church received them again with her pale, but marked the event by a public ceremony. Since they had caused open scandal it was proper that satisfaction should be made to the Church, both by a public confession of their sins and by restitution if wrong had been done. The beginning of Lent was the time usually appointed for the public reception of such penitents. But this penitential institute had reference to public discipline, and was merely an application of the rules laid down by our Lord Himself (Matt. xviii. 15–18) and His Apostles (1 Cor. v). In lapse of time public confession before the Church became private sacramental confession to the priest, and satisfaction assumed the character of a transaction between God and the soul. The forgiveness of sin in the sight of God depended no longer on internal affections of the heart, but on priestly absolution, with its enjoined acts of satisfaction ; hence the incongruous addition of confession and satisfaction to contrition to make up the idea of repentance. Since the present life might not be long enough to complete the tale, the future lent its aid ; and purgatory, with its attendant train of pardons, indulgences, and masses for the repose of the departed, became an acknowledged doctrine of the Church.

The Romish theologians are hard put to it to establish their doctrine on Scriptural evidence. Bellarmine has recourse to 2 Macc., c. 12, a book which the Jews never admitted into their Canon. He relies, too, on Matt. xii. 32 : ‘ It shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to come,’ whereas in purgatory sins are supposed to be forgiven, though after a certain amount of suffering. And on 1 Cor. iii. 13 : ‘ The fire shall try every man’s work,’ in which passage the Apostle is speaking not of sins, but of certain teachers, who on a good foundation had raised an edifice of questionable character. The fire, either of persecution in this life or of the final judgment, will determine which was the gold and which the dross. So scanty, indeed, is the Scripture proof, or, rather, so completely does it fail, that Möhler, the most distinguished modern controversialist on the Romish side, passes as lightly as he can over this delicate topic, contenting himself with the charge that ‘Protestants presumptuously reject the well-grounded tradition of a purgatorial fire.’ This able writer, as is not uncommon, confounds the two senses of future purification, which may mean either a growth in likeness to the Divine image or satisfaction for sin not completely discharged in this life. ‘ With some purification is in this life complete ’ (are they to be supposed sinless ?) ; ‘ with others it is only completed hereafter, the latter being such as, though in real fellowship with Christ, leave the world not wholly transformed into His image.’[1] The Protestant replies that, as regards the former case, no one in this life attains to sinlessness ; and as regards the latter, although, in the absence of direct Scripture statement, we dare not advance beyond conjecture, the presumption is that death removes all actual sin, while progression in a holy state is not at all improbable. He may ask, too, How are the millions who die on the eve of Christ’s coming to find time for their purgatorial satisfaction ? and especially, What substitute shall we assign to the living, who pass at once to perfect bliss without dying at all ?

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[1] *Symbolik*, § 23.

Part III

REGENERATION

70. *The Definition of the Term*

Regeneration in the sight of God, that is, in its essential aspect, is the union of conversion and justification in an individual. It implies a change of relation towards God in justification, and also a change of will and affections in reference to the demands of the Divine law, or what Scripture calls a new heart ; the person in whom these are combined is a regenerate person. Negatively it is the crucifixion of the flesh with its affections and lusts ; positively it is the new life in Christ. It follows that if the word is to be taken in its full Scriptural sense, it means more than a mere ecclesiastical change of position ; and more, too, than a mere mystical change, or one wrought, indeed, by the Spirit of God, but not necessarily involving moral renovation.

The word παλιγγενεσία, or regeneration, occurs but twice in the New Testament : once in connection with spiritual renewal (Tit. iii. 5), and once to denote the new state of things which the advent of Christ is to introduce (Matt. xix. 28). These passages do not throw much light on the meaning of the word ; but the equivalent terms which are employed in Scripture do. The most usual synonym is the metaphorical expression—new birth. To Nicodemus it was declared that no one, unless born again, can enter the kingdom of God, or be in a state of salvation ; and as to the Author of this change —it is directly referred to the Holy Spirit, being distinguished thereby from other changes which are within the powers of human nature. The distinction between ' born of the flesh ' and ' born of the Spirit ' is one not of degree, but of kind ; the natural man, however, adorned with moral graces, is flesh ; the spiritual man is from above (ἄνωθεν) (John ii. 3–6).

As an illustration of what is meant by the new birth, we may compare 2 Cor. v. 17, ' If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature ; old things are passed away, all things ' affections, aims, hopes, as well as ecclesiastical standing, ' have become new.' The change implies as great a miracle as if it were a bodily resurrection, ' You hath He quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins,' and quickened to a new life (Ephes. ii. 1 ; Rom. vi. 11). ' He that is born of God,' we are told, ' doth not commit sin ; he cannot sin ' (wilfully and habitually) ' because he is born of God ' (1 John iii. 9) ; and again, ' Whosoever is born of God sinneth not ' (*ibid*., v. 18). By St. Peter the Word of God is declared to be the, or an, instrument of regeneration (1 Pet. i. 23) ; and since the Word can only operate as a moral instrument, or one which appeals to the reason and conscience, its effect, when it is effectual, is of a moral nature, viz., repentance and faith ; which, therefore, must form constituent elements of regeneration. In short, an habitual sinful state, whether it exhibits itself openly or consists in the secret alienation of the heart from God, is inconsistent with the full Scriptural import of the term.

Further, Christians are described as the sons of God, children of God ; obviously because of their being born from above ; and if the new birth involves a moral change, not less so, it would seem, does this filial relation. It is replied, however, that this does not necessarily follow, because the term is sometimes predicated of those whom we cannot suppose to be all led by the Spirit of God. Thus, all men are said to be by creation the ' offspring of God ' (Acts xvii. 28), and the Jewish people collectively received the title of adoption, ' Israel is my son, my first-born ' (Exod. iv. 22). But the meaning of Scriptural terms varies with the dispensation to which they belong ; as may be seen in the instances of election, sanctification, temple, priesthood, sacrifice, etc., which bear one sense in the Jewish, and another, though an analogous one, in the Christian, dispensation. In general, the term child signifies in Scripture either similarity of some kind to a person or thing, or a relation of special privilege. Thus, men are the offspring of God, because they alone of the animal creation are endowed with reason and a moral sense, which of themselves are sufficient to lead them to see the folly and sin of idolatry. The children of Belial, or of the devil, are those who resemble Satan in disposition ; the children of light, or of darkness, are those whose lives are holy or sinful respectively. Zacchæus was a Jew by birth ; but when, on his conversion, he was described as ' a son of Abraham,' it was because he had become a follower of the patriarch in faith and newness of life. Under the typical dispensation, the Jewish nation was brought into covenant with God, and enjoyed remarkable privileges ; which entitled it to the designation ' son of God,' as contrasted with the heathens around it. But the term was national rather than individual, and partook of the inferiority of the preparatory economy. Like the dispensation itself, it was typical of good things to come ; a shadow of them, but not the very substance. So far, indeed, as it extended, it expressed a special relation to Jehovah, and the possession of real spiritual advantages ; to Israel belonged ' the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises' (Rom. ix. 4). But it did not imply individual regeneration.

Transferred to the Gospel dispensation it at once assumed a deeper meaning. The gift of the Holy Spirit, the fruit of Christ's atonement, *as the principle and basis* of a religious communion, was a new revelation (John vii. 39) ; and informed the typical language of the old covenant with substance and life. A child, or a son, of God is now one who is led by the Spirit of God, one who by the Spirit cries, 'Abba, Father' ; 'if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His.' Christ came, St. Paul says, 'to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons,' in a different and higher sense than was vouchsafed to the Jew (Gal. iv. 6). To sum up : It is impossible, under the Christian dispensation, that any one can be a child of God and a child of the devil at the same time.

From this some conclusions seem to follow. Regeneration, it is plain, does not consist merely in remission of sin, though it necessarily involves it so far as remission of sin is equivalent to justification. It implies also conversion, or a new heart, or by whatever name we choose to call the inward change denoted by the term, new birth. It is only in the order of ideas that these elements can be separated, and, in fact, they always go together. Whomsoever Christ justifies them He also renews. In the case of adults, the normal one of Scripture, this is evident, for no one was admitted to baptism except on the presumption of repentance, and faith.[1] That of infants presents greater difficulty. The validity of infant baptism, as a practice of the Church, being allowed, the only sin which can be therein remitted is original sin ; which, accordingly, is supposed to be the effect of the Sacrament in this case. What is there in infants which can correspond to the qualifications required in adults for baptism ? Nothing ; as is fully admitted by strenuous advocates of infant regeneration. It is obvious that infants cannot fulfil these conditions precedent ; but neither is it asserted that baptism infuses into them holy dispositions ; indeed, this is denied. Morally, therefore, they remain in a neutral condition, to be determined in one way or the other if they survive. Surely, their regeneration, if the term may be applied to them, is not what Scripture understands by it.

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[1] [To affirm that adult baptism is normal and without exception in Scripture begs the question. Naturally the first to respond to the preaching of the Gospel were adults. But what of their children ? Cf. Abraham to whom, an adult, circumcision was first given as the seal of the righteousness of his faith (Rom. iv. 11) ; but it does not follow that adult circumcision is normal in the Old Testament—on the contrary, it was normally, though not exclusively, infant circumcision. Do not the household baptisms of the New Testament correspond closely to the household circumcisions of the Old Testament ? And what of God's covenant of grace, which is certainly not abrogated in the New Testament ? See Note on p. 314 above. Editor.]

Again, regeneration is more than a change of state, with which change, as is evident, no spiritual renovation is necessarily connected. We must distinguish between a change of relation towards God, and a change of relation towards man or the visible Church. The latter takes place when, by the sacrament of baptism, a person, whether adult or infant, becomes a recognised member of a Christian society, and is severed from the mass of heathenism. It is a change, and an important one, of relative condition ; but is it of necessity one towards God ? If it were so, then every secret unbeliever who should receive baptism would thereby become a child of God and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven, that is, receive the gift of regeneration. In the case of a qualified candidate justification, received through faith and attested by the witness of the Spirit, has already changed his relation towards God ; and God does not need the Sacrament to assure Him of His own act. It is man who needs it, as a seal of the gift previously bestowed, and as the door of entrance to those other means of grace which Christ has committed to the administration of the visible Church. In the sight of God a mere ecclesiastical change of position, apart from the inward change of which the Holy Spirit is the Author, is of no value to justify, and, therefore, is not regeneration, which is always of salutary effect : so far is the former from being in itself salutary, it may be 'a savour of death unto death,' on the principle that privileges despised or neglected turn to condemnation.

Nor, again, does regeneration consist in a mystical grace of the Spirit, distinct from the qualifications required in adults for baptism, and from the effects which follow if the baptized person avails himself of his privileges—a mystical effect specially attached to baptism. It is variously described as 'the principle of a new life,' 'a special gift of the Spirit,' 'an initiatory gift or earnest of the Spirit,' 'the covenanted consignation of the Holy Ghost,' 'the infused virtue of the Holy Ghost,' 'a potential faculty of renovation,' and the like. Ordinarily it is conveyed only through one channel—baptism. But (and this is the point to be noticed) it does not imply, or necessarily lead to, habits of actual goodness. It occupies an intermediate position between the moral qualifications of repentance and faith and the moral effects to which the gift is intended to lead. That a grace of the Holy Spirit should be neutral in moral tendency seems like a contradiction in terms, and certainly finds no warrant in Scripture. Under the new dispensation the gifts of the Spirit are manifold (1 Cor. xii), but they are all intended for the edification of the Church, and their beneficial exercise rests on the presumption that their possessor is under the ordinary regenerating influence of the Holy Ghost.

To take one of the definitions above mentioned, that this gift is ' an earnest of the Spirit,' it is difficult to reconcile the notion of this earnest's being a mere mystical grace with such passages as these : ' We ourselves which have the first-fruits ' (or earnest) ' of the Spirit groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, the redemption of our body ' (Rom. viii. 23) ; ' we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened, not for that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life. Now He that hath wrought us for the self-same thing is God, who also hath given unto us the earnest of the Spirit ' (2 Cor. v. 4, 5) ; ' In whom after ye believed ye were sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance, until the redemption of the purchased possession ' (Ephes. i. 13, 14) ; ' Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby ye are sealed unto the day of redemption ' (*ibid.*, iv. 30). Again,—repentance, faith, and actual holiness, the preceding qualifications for, and subsequent effects of, the gift—in other words, ' circumcision of the heart ' —are the very fruits of the Holy Spirit, the very fruits which, if He be ' a principle of life '—of spiritual life, of course—He produces ; yet we are told that regenerating grace, which is also ' a principle of life,' is entirely distinct from them. This grace is an ' initiatory gift,' yet it has nothing in common with what follows—' an infused virtue,' which yet is not in itself virtue.

It is said to be exclusively conveyed in and by baptism, yet regeneration is in Scripture as often and as explicitly connected with the Word as an instrument as with baptism. ' Of His own will begat He us with the word of truth ' (Jas. i. 18) ; ' born again not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the Word of God ' (1 Pet. i. 23) ; ' ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus ' (Gal. iii. 26) ; but faith and the Word are correlative terms. It is attempted to evade the plain sense of these passages, that the Word (not excluding baptism in some sense) is an *instrument* of regeneration, by making them mean that ' the Word of God, joined with faith in that word, confers a saving efficacy on the waters of baptism, sanctifying them to this mystical washing away of sin and the mystical renewal of the human soul.' What a ' mystical,' apart from an actual, renewal of the soul may be, it is not easy to understand. If the Word be a proper instrument of regeneration, regeneration must be more than a mere mystical grace, because the Word operates by appealing to the conscience and affections, and produces a moral change, if any.

Such are the inconsistencies which learned men fall into when they attempt to reconcile the statements of Scripture with the scholastic theories of the middle ages. The fact is, that this notion of a special grace of baptism, neutral in character, a dormant principle determined neither to good nor to evil, is an adaptation to Protestant theology of the Romish doctrine of the 'impressed character.' Three of the sacraments of Romanism impress a character on the soul—baptism, confirmation, and orders; and this character is never obliterated, whence the ecclesiastical rule that baptism cannot be twice administered. In the Romish Catechism the sealing of the Spirit (2 Cor. i. 22) is interpreted of this sacramental character, just as we have seen it identified with the mystical grace of regeneration. But this character has no necessary connection with personal holiness. It conveys neither remission of sin nor infused grace; it is not *gratia gratum faciens*, but *gratia gratis data*; it is a gift which simply determines a man's position in the Church. The hypocrite in baptism receives it equally with the repentant believer, and a morally vicious priest equally with the most holy. To say the least, a grace of regeneration which is quite distinct from the antecedent qualifications for the normal case of baptism—viz., repentance and faith—and from the subsequent moral renovation of the true Christian, looks very like this impressed character of the Schoolmen and of the Romish Church.

The theory leads to startling conclusions. The same writer who described 'the gift of righteousness,' which is the formal cause of justification and the effect of baptism, as 'an inward yet not a moral gift, but a supernatural power or divine virtue,' gives the following account of regeneration: 'It is, I say, a new birth, or the giving of a new nature. Now, let it be observed, there is nothing impossible in the thing itself (though we do not believe it so), but nothing impossible in the very notion of a regeneration being accorded even to impenitent sinners. I do not say regeneration in its fulness, for that includes in it perfect happiness and holiness, to which it tends from the first, yet regeneration in a sufficient sense in its primary qualities. For the essence of regeneration is the communication of a higher and diviner nature; and sinners may have this gift, though it be a curse to them, and not a blessing. The devils have a nature thus higher and more divine than man, yet they are not preserved thereby from evil.' Here it is argued that regeneration in its root or essence may be of a different quality from the same grace in its fulness; that is, that the same root may produce good or evil indifferently. What determines it one way or the other? The exercise of free will? This lands us in Pelagianism. Scripture speaks of a tree which from its nature bears good fruit, and of another tree which from its nature bears evil fruit, and it was on this ground that Augustine met his opponent. ‘ Pelagius holds that we have a possibility implanted in us by God which, like a fruitful root, may develop in either direction, and at the will of the possessor issue either in the blossoms of virtue or the thorns of vice. He does not perceive that in making one and the same thing the root both of good and of evil he teaches contrary to evangelical truth. For the Lord says that a good tree cannot produce evil fruit, nor an evil tree good fruit. If, then, the two trees, the good and the evil, signify two men, a good and an evil one, what is a good man but a man of good will—that is, a tree of good root—and an evil man but a man of evil will—that is, a tree of evil root ? A regeneration supposed to be the work of the Holy Spirit, but belonging to the same category as the higher nature of devils, speaks for itself. At any rate, it is not that of the New Testament.’

Regeneration, again, is not a mere ‘ potential faculty ’ of renovation, by which expression is to be understood not actual renovation, but only the possibility of attaining thereto : the capacity of becoming holy. This means that it liberates the will so far as to place it in a state of equilibrium, but not so far as to incline it to goodness (see § 60) ; and it is by the exercise of free-will that the equilibrium is disturbed in one direction or the other. On this theory the covenant of grace is nothing but the covenant of Adam over again, notwithstanding the proof afforded by the fall that this latter covenant is not sufficient to secure to the Saviour ‘ the travail of His soul,’ a Church to share in His glory. A mere capacity for renovation is quite consistent with any amount of depravity short of the unpardonable sin, whatever that may be ; it is but saying, in other words, that the most hardened sinner may be brought to repentance, which no one contests. It is the ‘ state of salvation ’ according to the interpretation sometimes put upon these words in the Catechism, notwithstanding the explanation of them given afterwards—‘ who sanctifieth ’ (actually sanctifies) ‘ me and all the elect people of God.’ Such a conception of regeneration is altogether inadequate. If repentance and faith—faith as an apprehension under conviction of sin of the special promise of forgiveness—are present as necessary qualifications for the grace of baptism, the equilibrium is already disturbed in a saving direction, and by the direct influence of the Holy Spirit. Or is it maintained that these preparatory qualifications are the product of nature, and not of prevenient grace ?

It is hardly necessary to add that the work of regeneration is carried on with the co-operation of the human subject. The faith which procures justification antecedently to baptism is no dormant, or latent, principle, no gift bestowed on an unconscious subject, but an act which involves the stirring of our moral nature to its inmost depths, to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit ; it involves a quickening of the conscience to the evil of sin, alarm at the consequences of sin, desire to be delivered from its guilt and power, earnest appropriation of the Gospel-promise. Of this character, too, is the repentance which precedes baptism. The attempt to confine human co-operation to what follows baptism, in other words, to the sanctification of the Christian, while it is practically ignored in the preparatory qualifications, in order to make regenerating grace the sole act of God, excluding all notion of man's co-operation, is an arbitrary limitation, devised only in the interests of a theory. The throes of the new birth, the birth itself, the subsequent Christian life, all go to fill up the complex conception of regeneration. Baptism comes between the past and the future ; the completion of what has preceded, the symbol and pledge to the Church of what is to come ; but man's share in the process of salvation precedes the reception of that sacrament as well as follows it.[1]

That this conception of regeneration, as a mystical grace which does not in itself imply sanctification, has been framed to meet the case of infants is sufficiently plain. They cannot comply with the preliminary conditions of baptism, repentance and faith, nor are they capable of moral renovation until a subsequent period ; that is, the Word which Scripture declares to be an, if not the, instrument of regeneration of necessity cannot, in their case, discharge its office. Nothing remains but to suppose that baptism may convey a grace of a potential, dormant character, and to this the term of ' regeneration ' is applied. We may, of course, attach any arbitrary meaning we please to this term, but the question now before us is not whether infants may be baptized, or what the benefit is which they receive thereby, but what does Scripture teach respecting regeneration in itself, in the abstract, irrespectively of the proper subjects of baptism ? And a further question is, with what case of baptism it connects the term ? As regards the former point, there appears to be no doubt that it describes regeneration as a state of actual goodness ; and as regards the latter, we are met by the same difficulty as occurs in the matter of justification, that Scripture furnishes only the case of adults from which we can draw conclusions. Now, we must not lower the sense of a Scripture term so as to make it fit in with an exceptional case, respecting which Scripture leaves us very much in the dark ; but rather, retaining the full Scriptural sense, examine to what extent, and with what modifications, it may be applied to such a case. By what instrument, or instruments, regeneration is effected ? who are the proper subjects of baptism ? are questions to be debated on their own grounds ; and the meaning of the term 'new birth' in Scripture must also be determined on its own independent grounds. The conclusion may be, as in the matter of justification, that the term is not strictly applicable to infants. Happily, their *salvation* involves no such doubts ; and much useless controversy might have been avoided had this term been adhered to.

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[1] [Litton's precise meaning is not clearly stated here.His language, however, is definitely synergistic. Even if he intends no more than that God is dealing, not with a stock or stone, but with man, a sentient, moral, rational, human personality (cf. pp. 173ff., 252 above) his manner of expression here is inconsistent with what he has previously said on pp. 161f. concerning the deadness of the natural man in sin. Editor.]

71. *Unio Mystica*

By the Lutheran theologians it is held that regeneration, in the full sense of the term just described, issues in a mystical union of the regenerate person with the Holy Trinity, with God as regards the substance, with each Person in a manner peculiar to Himself, *salvo earum discrimine et ordine*. It is called mystical, as being a great mystery, and spiritual as being effected by the Holy Spirit, and after a spiritual, not a carnal fashion. It is defined as an act of grace whereby the substance of the Holy Trinity and of the human nature of Christ is brought into most intimate union with the substance of the regenerate man, by means of the word and the sacraments ; and its effect is a special presence and operation of God, certifying the believer of his adoption, and co-operating in the work of his sanctification.

That the presence of God in creation may be regarded as operating variously, according to the subject, has already been observed (§ 14) ; and that the members of Christ enjoy a special degree thereof is taught in Scripture. Christ is said to dwell in their hearts by faith (Ephes. iii. 17) ; Christians are temples of the Holy Ghost (1 Cor. iii. 16) ; the indwelling of the Father and the Son is promise to them (John xiv. 23) ; and in the performance of religious duties, especially in that of prayer, they are assisted by the Holy Spirit, as a Person, and as the Paraclete whom Christ promised to take His place, in a peculiar manner (Rom. viii. 26). This may with propriety be called a *concursus specialis*, a particular form and energy of the general attribute of omnipresence. And such passages as the above are incompatible with the Socinian tenet, which some Arminian writers seem disposed to adopt, that the Holy Spirit is present in Christians only by the effects which He produces, and the gifts which He confers.

Yet it is hardly safe to speak as the Lutherans do of this union. That the substance of God is in the Christian united to the substance of man has indeed been maintained by some mystical sects (Schwenkfeldians, etc.), but sober interpreters of Scripture will hesitate to endorse the assertion. Even with the caution that no coalescence into one substance, or transmutation of one nature into the other, is intended, the language is objectionable. Moreover, when we apply the term 'substance' to God, we speak improperly or analogically; the substance of God must be something very different from what is meant by the logical category that goes under the name.

Of still more doubtful tendency is the notion that the human nature of Christ becomes united to the human nature of the Christian. Indeed it is but an inference from the Lutheran doctrine of the Eucharist, and stands or falls therewith. It dates from a long time antecedent to the Lutheran Reformation. According to Leo, in and by baptism 'the body of the regenerate person becomes the flesh of the crucified One'; so soon did the doctrine of a physical connection with the manhood of Christ by means of the sacraments displace the Scriptural one of union with Christ by His Spirit dwelling in us.

The passages adduced by the Lutheran divines do not bear out their theory. 'We are members,' St. Paul says, 'of His body, His flesh, and His bones'; certainly, but in the same sense in which husband and wife are said to be 'one flesh.' 'That we might be partakers of the Divine nature' (2 Pet. i. 4); rather of *a* Divine nature (θείας, not τῆς θείας, φύσεως), that is, of the regenerating grace of the Holy Spirit with the holy dispositions which it produces. Not more to the point are the passages above cited. We are the temple of God, we have put on Christ (Gal. iii. 27), we have Christ in our hearts by faith, because His Spirit dwells in us.

The union with Christ, and through Christ with God, of which Scripture speaks, is of an ethical, not a metaphysical character; a union effected by faith, and moral in its nature; not of essences, whether Divine or human. Physical conceptions on the subject are an intrusion of the natural creation into the higher region of supernatural grace. 'Baptizing them into the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,' into that fellowship which is a fellowship with the Holy Trinity (Matt. xxviii. 19): 'the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all' (2 Cor. xiii. 14): this is the Christian's mystical union with God. No other is needed, for no other can exceed this in blessedness and dignity; and Scripture, properly understood, speaks of no other.

72. *Sanctification*

In regeneration, comprising conversion and justification, a child of Adam is born into a new state ; and this change, just as baptism cannot be repeated, takes place once for all, and no more admits of repetition than its counterpart in the natural world. But as natural birth, unless the process is prematurely arrested, is followed by successive stages of growth and development, bodily and mental, so the initial act of regeneration passes into a continuous act of dying to sin and rising again to righteousness, or sanctification. And with this accords the symbolism of the sacrament of regeneration ; signifying not only a death unto sin, as Christ by His death became free from any connection with sin, but also a resurrection to a new life, as Christ's resurrection implies a perpetual living to God (Rom. vi. 10).

The term sanctification in the Old Testament is applied to whatever was set apart to the service of God, including even inanimate things (Exod. xix. 23) ; and is used in a more general sense than under the Christian dispensation. That is justification and sanctification are not so clearly distinguished as afterwards. Israel was to be a holy people, cleansed symbolically from guilt by the sacrifices and purifications of the law, and separated from the heathen world by circumcision in the flesh ; but remission of sin and renovation of life indifferently receive the name of sanctification. This is not to be wondered at, considering that under the law neither was a perfect atonement accomplished, nor the special gift of the Holy Ghost, the fruit of Christ's ascension, vouchsafed. In this extended sense the term is sometimes found in the New Testament, an instant among many of transferred modes of expression : thus, in such passages as Acts xxvi. 18, 'among them that are sanctified by faith that is in me,' and Heb. ii. 11, 'He that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified are all of one,' sanctification seems used for the whole complex term redemption.[1] Elsewhere, however, as in 1 Cor. i. 30, Rom. viii. 30, the difference between it and justification is expressed. They differ as the foundation (justification) differs from the superstructure (sanctification), and as a process complete in itself from one admitting of degrees and progressive.

Justification must, indeed, be continuous, but it can be neither more nor less ; sanctification is always advancing towards perfection. The subject of sanctification is properly neither the 'new man' that is, the

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[1] Renovatio dicitur alias sanctificatio, quæ itidem vel late accipitur, ut ambitu suo vocationem, illuminationem, conversionem, regenerationem, justificationem, et renovationem complectatur ; vel stricte sumitur, prout cum renovatione stricte sic dictâ coincidit. Hollaz, P. iii., § 1, c. 10.

Divine seed implanted in regeneration, nor the 'old man,' or the corrupt nature derived from Adam. Not the 'new man,' for this is the ultimate result to which the process tends, and what it will eventually issue in, unless arrested, but as it is a result which is never in this life actually attained : not the 'old man,' for this cannot, and is not intended to, be sanctified, but rather crucified, with Christ and put to death. The moral improvement which discipline and education can, and often do produce in the natural man differs specially from the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit ; a truth which is sometimes lost sight of in modern speculations on this subject.

The central personality, the *ego*, occupying a middle position between nature and grace, and capable of connection with either, is the true seat of the sanctifying influences of the Spirit, as it is of the struggle between the flesh and the Spirit of which the Christian is conscious, and which he deplores. It is this central personality which St. Paul describes in Rom. vii as emancipated indeed from the undisputed dominion of sin, but still bearing the traces of its former servitude, and liable to oscillation between the forces which contend for the mastery, until the cure is complete. In a future state perfect moral freedom will be established, as the elect angels act freely yet with a moral necessity of choosing the good. Commencing from this central *ego*, sanctification radiates in all directions, drawing within its influence successively the spirit, the soul (or rather the inner man viewed in different relations, § 29), and finally the body with its members. The 'redemption of the body' is its final triumph ; whence St. Paul in Rom. viii. 30 passes over the link between justification and final glorification, viz., the resurrection of the body (' whom He justified them He also glorified '), because sanctification is this glory begun here, and manifested hereafter. Or, as he expresses it in verse 11, 'If the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, He that raised up Christ shall also quicken your mortal bodies because of His Spirit (*διὰ τὸ πνεῦμα*) that dwelleth in you.' This is sanctification as it belongs to all Christians. But inasmuch as each has an office to fulfil in the building up of the spiritual temple, and the extraordinary gifts of the Spirit are no longer vouchsafed, natural endowments, sanctified by Divine grace, become the instruments of this ministry in its various aspects ; and as, in a secondary sense, *χαρίσματα*, they contribute to the welfare of the body of Christ, until, collectively, Christians 'come unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ' (Ephes. iv. 13).

That in this life sanctification in Scripture is never supposed to be complete has been subject of remark in a preceding section (§ 64) ;

and experience proves that, whether the idea may be entertained or not, such grace is not ordinarily given. Is it ever, in fact, bestowed? We must distinguish between the removal of impediments to the attainment of such a state, and the mere fact of progression. As a progressive process sanctification knows no limit; the vision of God, which the holy angels enjoy and which will be vouchsafed to the Church made perfect, can to finite creatures only be imparted by degrees, one stage after another; and the full enjoyment of it can only be reached in an eternity of existence, that is, it never can be fully reached. In this sense, sanctification, at whatever stage, is capable of increase. But if certain hindrances belong to a certain state of being, by which the progress is checked or rendered irregular, we may suppose these to be at some point or other removed, and the soul so far set free to pursue its upward course. Now St. Paul does unquestionably connect the conflict of the flesh with the spirit with our present bodily organization. The law which warred against 'the law of his mind' was in his 'members'; he prayed to be delivered from 'the body of this death,' or 'this body of death,' the body which by reason of sin is subject to death; 'the body is dead' (liable to death) 'because of sin' (Rom. vii. 23, 24, viii. 10). The term 'flesh,' though implying more than mere carnal impulses, could hardly have been arbitrarily chosen by him to denote the sinful principle. What, then, is more likely than that death, which severs the bond between soul and body, severs also the connection between the soul and sin, and so far completes the Christian's sanctification?

It is true the Apostle would not be 'unclothed, but clothed upon'; he would prefer that, apart from the mortal stroke of the last enemy, 'mortality should be swallowed up of life'; but failing this privilege, still death, it seems, would be to him deliverance from the burden of a corrupt nature, and however imperfect in other respects the intermediate state might be, it would be undisturbed by the conflict between nature and grace. So much we may gather from his expressed anticipations, coupled with other hints of Scripture. To the Christian, then, death, though the penalty of sin, is in reality a deliverance and a blessing. The disembodied soul (if indeed ever quite disembodied, § 107) longs for reunion with the body which has been sown in corruption, in order to resume its activity in the service of God (*καρπὸς ἔργου*, Phil. i. 22); but meanwhile its sanctification is so far complete that the flesh no longer lusts against the spirit (Gal. v. 17). Möhler, arguing in favour of a purgatory, asks how Protestants can suppose that sin is finally expelled by a physical catastrophe[1]; but exposes himself to the reply that a purgatorial fire is an equally mechanical conception. On either side a difficulty exists.

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[1] *Symbolik*, § 23.

Although human co-operation is improperly excluded from the operations of Divine grace previously to the alleged mystical grace of baptism, it may be admitted that it is more conspicuous in the subsequent stage of sanctification. We may inquire here to what extent the relapses of the regenerate man interfere with his growth in grace. Involuntary sins, spring from the remaining infirmity of nature, are at once forgiven through the abiding habit of faith ; those of a graver character are made, as in Peter's case, the means of improving some Christian virtue which needed to be improved. Yet both the one and the other call for confession and prayer. Thus, sanctification can never dispense with the primary elements of religion ; as it began, so it lives, in the exercises of repentance and faith. Whether in the case of the regenerate such relapses may be final is a question considered in another place (§ 74).

How far the law is binding on Christians is a point much debated in ancient and modern times. A favourite topic with St. Paul is their freedom not from the law under every aspect, but from bondage to the law ; and not merely the ceremonial, but, as appears from the instance in Rom. vii, the moral. 'I through the law am dead to the law' ; 'Ye are become dead to the law by the body of Christ' ; 'Stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage' ;—such is the tenor of his teaching. It has been interpreted to mean that in no sense have Christians to do with the law, and grave injury has resulted therefrom ; either the law is supposed no longer to be useful in convincing of sin, this office being transferred to the Gospel ; or not to be necessary as a rule of life, the Christian being a law to himself. The ancient Manicheans proceeded still further, and rejected the law as proceeding from an inferior and evil principle.

To be under bondage to the law is not the same thing as to acknowledge its authority. When St. Paul describes Christians as emancipated from legal bondage, he means that through faith in Christ they are free from the law as a covenant of works, that its condemning sentence does not apply to them. This was exhausted in the person of their substitute and surety, so that in the matter of justification works have no place except as evidences of faith. The bondage of expecting salvation on the ground of merit has been exchanged for the liberty of the children of God, whose faith is counted unto them for righteousness. Yet even as regards Christians the law has its offices to discharge. When, as in the Galatian Church, reliance on human merit (our innate tendency) threatens to supersede the simplicity of the Gospel, the law resumes its function, and by conviction of sin leads to a fresh appropriation of the finished salvation of Christ (*usus elenchticus*). Or when the standard of Christian practice is, from various causes, in danger of being lowered, the law, by holding up the ideal, serves to check the process of decay. It is true the Christian is taught of God ; and on the whole is led by the Holy Spirit ; but he is only sanctified in part, and dare not exclusively trust the light within. Experience proves that conscience, however sensitive, and the best intentions, are no safeguard against obliquities of mental vision, and even grave failures in Christian duty. Sometimes the code of morality is relaxed, sometimes religion assumes a superstitious or fanatical character ; the latter being the common form of degradation in countries where the Bible is but little known and circulated. The danger can only be averted by such an exhibition of the Divine law, and especially of its embodiment in our great Exemplar, as shall from time to time recall the attention of the Church to the genuine fruits of the Spirit, as distinguished from spurious admixtures (*usus normativus*).[1]

73. *Good Works*

Good works, under that term being comprised not only overt acts, but the affections of the renewed heart, are the natural product of the sanctifying principle implanted in the Christian ; just as the living tree brings forth fruit, or the bodily organs perform their functions by virtue of the mysterious principle called life. They are inseparable from, but not identical with, what Scripture terms the new creature in Christ.

That good works, in this extended sense, are not an accident of a state of salvation, but a necessary concomitant thereof, is the common doctrine of Romanists and Protestants. 'Good works do spring out necessarily of a true and lively faith, insomuch that by them a lively faith may be as evidently known as a tree discerned by its fruits' (Art. xii). Notwithstanding, however, the repeated declarations of the Protestant Confessions on this point, no charge is more persistently urged by Romanists against their opponents than that of dispensing in their teaching with the necessity of good works. Not uncommonly the method is adopted of selecting passages from the private writings of the Reformers, especially Luther, which possess no symbolical authority ; and drawing inferences therefrom inconsistent with the plain statements of the public confessions.[1] Luther furnishes abundant material for this mode of controversy. Though to a candid mind, observing the context, his meaning is clear enough, his mode of expression is, no doubt, sometimes unguarded, and liable to misrepresentation. But what has this to do with the authentic symbols of the Protestant churches ? It is disingenuous, to say the least, of Bellarmine, after admitting that the Augsburg Confession and other public documents of the Reformation insist upon the necessity of good works, to cite Luther against them : ' Whatever may be the case with their professions, when their principles and many sayings of Luther are examined, they seem to hold that a man may be saved, even if he does no works nor keeps God's commandments.'[2]

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[1] By theologians three uses are ascribed to the law—(1) to restrain the outbreaks of crime, (2) to maintain conviction of sin, (3) to be a rule of life. Hollaz, P. iii., § 2, c. 1, 239. *Form. Concord.*, P. ii., c. 5. But the first belongs to civil polity, not to the Church. The two latter only are of dogmatical import.

The word ' necessary ' has here a twofold application, and advantage is taken of the ambiguity to insinuate the charge just mentioned ; it is an instance of the fallacy *a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*. When the Romanist urges the necessity of good works he means that they constitute a meritorious cause of justification, if not *de congruo* certainly *de condigno ;* and it is only the same notion under another form when love is made the formal cause of justification. When the Protestant admits that good works are necessary to salvation, as he does, his meaning is that no one is ultimately saved who has not proved that his faith is a saving one by the fruits which it has produced. The difference relates not to the necessary existence of good works, which on both sides is acknowledged, but to the place which they hold in the economy of grace ; which, according to the Romanist, is one of desert ; according to the Protestant, of invariable accompaniment.

The Council of Trent anathematizes those who deny that justification ' is increased by good works,' and also those who deny that by them a justified person merits increase of grace and *eternal life*.[3] There is a wide distinction between deserving the fulfilment of a gratuitous promise either of increase of grace or of a greater reward in the life to come, and deserving eternal life itself. As regards the latter, nothing can be allowed to co-operate with the meritorious work of Christ. Nor is it to the point to urge, that, after all, the whole is of grace, since it is only through the grace of Christ that good works can be performed ; the question relates not to the *origin* of good works, but to their ability to meet the demands of the Divine law, which the Protestant maintains they cannot do.

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[1] Möhler, *Symbolik*, §§ 22–24.

[2] *De Justif.*, bk. iv., c. 1. How far the charge is well founded may be judged from the following ' professions ' out of many : Bona opera tam non rejicimus ut prorsus negemus quenquam plene posse salvum fieri nisi huc per S. Christi evaserit ut nihil jam honorum operum in eo desideretur. *Conf. Tetrapol.*, cv. Ad salutem omnino necessaria esse (bona opera) agnoscimus, quamvis non ut causas justificationis aut salutis meritorias. *Decl. Thor.*, iv. 9. Quamvis doceamus cum Apostolo hominem gratis justificari per fidem in Christum, et non per ulla opera bona, non ideo tamen vilipendimus opera bona. Cum sciamus hominem nec conditum nec regenitum esse per fidem ut otietur ; sed potius ut indesinentur quæ bona et utilia sunt faciat. *Conf. Helv.*, c. 16. Docent nostri quod necesse sit bona opera facere, non ut confidamus per ea gratiam mereri, sed propter voluntatem Dei. *Conf. Augs.*, xx.

[3] Sess. vi., Canons 24 and 32.

Yet salvation is not attainable without good works. In the language of the schools, they are *in ordine*, the appointed way, to salvation. They are a condition *sine quâ non*, a very different thing from either the efficient or the meritorious cause. By the command of God ; by the nature of the case, for heaven itself could not be enjoyed without that change of heart of which good works are the fruit ; by the continued obligation of the law as a rule of life ; by the fact that the Author of the new birth is a Spirit of holiness, good works are indispensable to a state of salvation. God saves no man in his sins. The way to eternal life is not only narrow, but of a specific character, and only they who walk in it reach the goal. But the walking in it is not what gives a meritorious title to the reward. Thus, in one sense good works are necessary to salvation, and in another not ; and the senses should be carefully distinguished. Cases like that of the thief on the cross, in which, from lack of opportunity, it is not possible to give evidence of a spiritual change, stand on their own ground. Where opportunity is vouchsafed, good works cannot be absent from saving faith.

Early in the history of the Reformation a controversy arose respecting the use of this expression. The *Formula Concordiæ* (Lutheran) holds that it is not a safe mode of speaking to say, without explanations, that good works are necessary to salvation, still less to justification. In this it is followed by our own divine Davenant, whose remarks on the subject are worth quoting : ‘ In controversy with Romanists it is not wise to speak thus, for, however the propositions may be explained and reduced to a good sense, the Romanists, when they are nakedly propounded, always understand that works are necessary, as from their own intrinsic worth deserving of salvation ; which is most untrue. Moreover, the common people, hearing these statements, either with or without explanation, are likely to attach a false meaning to them.’[1] ‘ Good works,’ he proceeds, ‘ are not necessary to salvation if we understand by them either works perfectly and uninterruptedly good, such as the law requires ; or works considered under the notion of meritorious cause. If the former is the sense intended, no one could ever be justified, for the best works of the holiest men are neither perfect nor uninterrupted ; if the latter, it interferes with the doctrine of

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[1] *De Just. Act.*, c. xxxi.

Scripture that only the merits of Christ are the procuring cause of salvation '[1] Again : ' But good works *are* necessary under certain limitations. Not as if they ever can be so perfect as to take the place of Christ's merits, or so uniform in tenor as that the Christian may not occasionally falter in his course ; but because God has marked out a certain path to the kingdom of heaven—the path of holiness ; and by that path alone can the destination be reached. If one prescribed road leads to a city, and no other, all who wish to arrive there must keep this road ; and if any one wanders from it into forbidden paths (as may often happen), he will never succeed in his object unless he retraces his steps to the appointed road. If the Christian falls into sin he must repent and do the first works, for as long as he continues in a sinful state he is out of the narrow way that leads to life.[2]

None of the passages of Scripture quoted by Bellarmine avail for his purpose. ' If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments ' (Matt. xix. 17) ;—the context proves that it was our Lord's intention, not to explain how eternal life is to be merited, but, by unfolding the spirituality of the law, to bring to light the latent insincerity of the inquirer ; and besides, it is nothing but the fact that no one can enter into life except in the way of the commandments. ' Patience is necessary that after ye have done the will of God ye may receive the promise ' (Heb. x. 36) ; ' Work out your own salvation,' etc. (Phil. ii. 12) ; ' Godly sorrow worketh repentance unto salvation ' (2 Cor. vii. 10) ; ' If ye mortify the deeds of the body ye shall live ' (Rom. viii. 13) ; ' Come, ye blessed of My Father, inherit the kingdom ; for I was an hungered, and ye gave Me meat,' etc. ;—these and similar passages affirm, that there is a connection between good works and salvation ; nay, that in a certain sense, as a condition, *sine quâ non*, they are necessary ; but as to the meritorious cause of salvation, which is the point at issue, they convey no information. The sense in which St. James declares that a man is justified by works has been already explained (§ 65). Nor is it necessary again to notice the evasion that St. Paul, in excluding works from a meritorious virtue, means works of the ceremonial law, or those done before the infusion of grace—not works the fruit of the the Holy Spirit's operation (*Ibid*).

The topic of good works as necessary belongs rather to justification in its continuance than to the first reception of that gift. In whatever sense the preparatory steps (awakening, enlightening, etc.) may be called works, or good works, they are not so in the specific sense here intended, but rather such as our article describes as done ' before justification' (xiii), and which it pronounces, perhaps in too sweeping terms, as having 'the nature of sin.' How is a state of justification continued? According to the Council of Trent, by means of good works. This is, in effect, the doctrine of merit *ex condigno*; which means that there is a due proportion between the works and the reward, so that the latter may be claimed as a matter of right. There is thus introduced a distinction between the beginning of justification and its continuance; the former is a free gift, the latter depends on, or lives in, obedience. But St. Paul, in describing faith as the instrument of justification, makes no such distinction. From first to last the Christian, conscious of imperfection, is thrown back on the word of promise, and his justification lives not in obedience, but in a constantly renewed appropriation of the merits of Christ. If, however, by justification we mean the sense of it, or assurance, it may be admitted that this does live in obedience. Carelessness in the Christian walk, whether in the way of omission or commission, grieves the Holy Spirit, and renders the witness of that Divine Agent in the heart less energetic. But does this effect justification itself, or establish the doctrine of merit *ex condigno*? A cloud may pass over the sun and obscure its beams, but the sun is still behind it, and in its native glory.

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[1] *De Just. Act.*, c. xxxi.

[2] *Ibid.*

Are the good works which are the fruits of faith really good, or only sins in disguise? Strong expressions are found in the writings of Luther, Melanchthon, and other Reformers, to the effect that the best of good works are only venial sins, or even worse. The meaning, of course, is plain, and quite Scriptural. The best service which Christians can render is neither so free from admixture of human infirmity nor so uniform as to claim, on the footing of merit, a reward either here or hereafter. Weighed in the balances of the Divine law it is found wanting, and defect of this kind springs from sin, and is of the nature of sin. The statements referred to amount merely to this—that in itself, and without reference to the fact that it is rendered by a person accepted in Christ, the Christian's obedience condemns him, which is nothing but the fact. Nor is it more than what the prophet confesses, 'We are all as an unclean thing, and all our righteousnesses are as filthy rags' (Isa. lxiv. 6); or what St. John affirms, 'If we say we have no sin we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us' (1 John i. 8). The Romanist admits that venial sin cleaves, or may cleave, to our best performances: but since with him venial sin is, in fact, no sin, he can argue that the law may be perfectly fulfilled, and that justification, at least in its continuance, lives meritoriously in obedience. Those who hold that venial sin, however venial, is sin, are precluded from this conclusion.

Nevertheless, it may be well to avoid statements which seem paradoxical, and may give rise to misapprehension. However unable Christian obedience may be to claim, on the footing of strict justice, a reward, there is no reason why it should not be described as pleasing to God, and in a sense meritorious. Scripture uses such language : ‘ God is not unrighteousness, that He will forget your works, and labour that proceedeth from love ’ ; ‘ To do good and to distribute forget not, for with such sacrifices God is well pleased ’ (Heb. vi. 10 ; xiii. 16) ; ‘ Having received of Epaphroditus the things which were sent from you, an odour of a sweet smell, a sacrifice acceptable, well pleasing to God ’ (Phil. iv. 18) ; ‘ Come, ye blessed of my Father, for I was an hungered,’ etc. (Matt. xxv. 34, 35) ;—from these and similar passages nothing can be clearer than that good works are acceptable to God. Why should they not be ? They are in themselves such as He approves of ; they are prompted by His Holy Spirit ; they are performed by those whose persons are accepted ; their object is the edification of the Church and the glory of God. In these respects they differ from the good works of the unregenerate, which, though possessing a value of their own, do not spring from a supernatural source, and are not directed to the highest end.

The fruits of faith do not indeed, on account of their imperfection, possess a justifying efficacy ; but they cannot with any propriety of language be called sin. But they may even, in a certain sense, be called meritorious, so far as Scripture encourages Christians to expect a recognition of their services at the day of account. ‘ Rejoice and be exceeding glad, for great is your reward in heaven ’ (Matt. v. 12) ; ‘ Whosoever shall give to one of these little ones a cup of cold water, he shall in no wise lose his reward (*Ibid.*, x. 42) ; ‘ Knowing that of the Lord ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance ’ (Col. iii. 24) ; ‘ Behold I come quickly, and my reward is with me ’ (Rev. xxii. 12). Not only so ; but it is implied that this reward will be proportioned to the service rendered, or, in other words, that there will be degrees of glory in the life to come.

No doubt was entertained on this point in the Church, speaking generally, until Peter Martyr, though with some hesitation, questioned whether it could be proved from Scripture. And it must be admitted that some of the passages adduced in its support are hardly conclusive. Thus St. Paul’s illustration (1 Cor. xv. 41), ‘ There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars,’ cannot, in its primary application, establish more than the fundamental distinction between the natural and the spiritual body. Differences, the Apostle says, exist in terrestrial objects of the same class ; why may not the human body be supposed capable of existing in different states ? There are others, however, more to the point. Thus in Rev. xxii. 12, above quoted, Christ says not only that His reward is with Him, but that it will be bestowed on ' every man according as his works shall be.' And St. Paul declares that ' every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labour ' (1 Cor. iii. 8) ; and that ' He that soweth sparingly shall reap also sparingly, and he that soweth bountifully shall reap also bountifully ' (2 Cor. xi. 6). ' In My Father's house,' says Christ, ' are many mansions ' (John xiv. 6), which, among other interpretations, may mean that there will be differences of reward hereafter.

Theologians explain the matter thus : There is an essential bliss (the vision of God, etc.) which is common to all, but special rewards for special services—*omnibus una salus sanctis, sed gloria dispar*. There is nothing to be said against such a supposition, since even in this life we perceive different measures of grace bestowed, and, as a consequence, more or less inward peace and public usefulness. How much more may this be expected in a state in which sin, conflict and trial no longer exist ? Degrees, then, of glory, proportioned to the more or less faithful discharge of our stewardship here, is a Scriptural conception, and one which has been too much lost sight of in popular teaching. If objections are still entertained to it, as fostering a self-righteous temper, they may perhaps be removed by considering the secondary sense in which the word ' merit ' is used. In its strict meaning it signifies an equality between service and wages ; the reward is of debt, not of favour ; it is a matter of commutative justice. In this sense no merit can be pleaded before God. Even if the Christian's obedience were perfect, it would be only what he is bound as a creature to render, and could establish no claim upon the Divine favour.

The word ' merit,' however, is used by classical writers, and very commonly in the Fathers, in a less exact sense, to signify the earning of a gift or reward in the way prescribed by the donor. If a benevolent person offers food and raiment to a mendicant, provided the latter applies for them according to certain rules, the performance of the condition may be said to earn (*mereri*) the fulfilment of the promise ; yet the promise itself was gratuitous. Eternal life, in like manner, is promised to the faithful servants of God, and, further, special rewards to those whose devotion to their Master has been conspicuous ; but their claim rests on this promise of God, not upon the value of the service itself. It is just in God to fulfil His promise on the general principle that he who makes a promise places himself under an obligation to fulfil it, whence God is said to be just to forgive the sins of those who confess them (1 John i. 9), because He has promised to do so, though forensically He forgives them only for Christ's sake. If Scripture, then, connects reward with service, as it does, it is an instance of the exuberant goodness of God, who vouchsafes promises to those whom He had previously translated from a state of nature to a state of grace ; the promises are gratuitous, though, once made, they may be called binding on the giver. Thus are the heirs of glory stimulated to 'fill their odorous lamps with deeds of light,' though they are the last to put forward a meritorious claim on this ground. They know and feel that all is of grace, that they have nothing but what they have received, and that God rewards what He Himself has wrought in them—*dona coronat sua.* Such is the sentiment of Paul : he had laboured more abundantly than his fellow-Apostles, yet it was not he, but the grace of God which was with him (1 Cor. xv. 10) ; and therefore the crown of glory which he expected was not a matter of debt, but of grace.

The Romish doctrine of merit reaches its culminating point in that of works of supererogation. Modern Romish controversialists, after the example of the Council of Trent, commonly pass over this delicate topic *sicco pede*, or at any rate with a reserve which is creditable to their candour. The author of the *Symbolik* contents himself with observing that the Christian who realizes the infinite resources of Divine grace at his command must feel himself superior to the demands of the law, and endeavour to exceed them. His love knows, or ought to know, no limit, and is ever busy in inventing fresh modes of exhibiting itself ; whence it arises that such Christians not seldom appear to those who occupy a lower level as enthusiasts or worse. Only thus is the rise of the doctrine of works of supererogation to be accounted for. It was, though resting on a solid basis of tradition, naturally rejected by the Reformers. How could they who taught that the regenerate man never can become free from sin be expected to sympathize with the tender and elevated sentiment of this higher stage of religion ? The learned writer does well to say, ' Only thus ' ; that is, as appears to be his meaning, to abandon all attempts to prove the doctrine from Scripture. The gist of his argument is that the obedience required by the Divine law falls short of that which the Christian, by the aid of the Holy Spirit, may and ought to aspire to.

Bellarmine, as is his wont, is more explicit. His defence of the monkish institute rendered this necessary. For this rests on the distinction between precepts and counsels, between what is commanded and what is recommended in Scripture. Precepts and counsels differ in several particulars. In *matter* ; for the duty contained in a precept is easier than that contained in a counsel ; whence, where the matter is the same (*e.g.*, continence), the counsel is superior to the precept ; contains, in fact, the precept and something over and above. As regards the *subjects* ; for precepts are binding on all Christians, counsel not so. In *form* ; for precepts are absolutely binding, whereas counsels are left to each Christian's discretion. In *result* ; for precepts, when observed, earn a reward, when disobeyed, a penalty ; while disobedience to counsels incurs no penalty, and obedience ensures a superior reward. The three heads to which counsels belong are continence, obedience, and voluntary poverty.

The Scriptural evidence is of the scantiest. Omitting that drawn from the Old Testament or the Apocryphal books, we may confine our attention to the New Testament. Reference, then, is made to Matt. xix. 12, in which our Lord speaks of those who make themselves ' eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake ' ; to the case of the young ruler mentioned in the same chapter, to whom it was said, ' If thou wilt be perfect, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and follow me ' (verse 21) ; to 1 Cor. vii. i, where St. Paul affirms that ' it is good for a man not to touch a woman ' ; and to Apoc. xiv. 3, 4, in which they who sing the new song are described as such as ' were not defiled with women, being virgins.' The first of these passages contains neither precept nor counsel, being simply an answer to the remark of the Apostles, that if the marriage tie is so indissoluble as their Master pronounced it to be, ' it is not good to marry.' Since the Jews held the married state to be superior to the single, this objection might naturally occur to them. This does not follow, Christ replies, for unless there exists the gift of continency, the abridgment of liberty which, as contrasted with the Mosaic law, the Gospel enforces is as nothing compared with the evils which may arise from forced celibacy. When, indeed, that gift is bestowed, and the advancement of the kingdom of God seems to demand the sacrifice, the Christian may ' make himself a eunuch ' without injury to himself, and with a prospect of greater usefulness ; otherwise not. The same remarks apply to 1 Cor. vii. 1, which, indeed, is a comment on our Lord's words. It may be, under certain limitations, and with a reference to special circumstances, to ' the present necessity,' ' good for a man not to touch a woman ' ; but, the Apostle adds, where there is no gift of continency, it is ' better to marry ' (verse 9). The advice, therefore, is not applicable to all persons and to all times as a counsel is, but with this limitation it may well be that a single life, by enabling the Christian to attend without distraction to ' the things of the Lord,' is occasionally to be preferred. But the Apostle says nothing touching the meritoriousness of such a state as compared with the conjugal. As regards the test applied to the young ruler, it was nothing but a test. Thou sayest thou has kept the law from thy youth up. What law ? that of the first table, ‘ Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart ’ ? Prove it by selling all that thou hast at my command and following me. The symbolical nature of the Apocalypse renders it hazardous to found doctrines upon it ; and under any circumstances chap. xiv. 3, 4, must be reconciled with Heb. xiii. 4, ‘ Marriage is honourable in all, and the bed undefiled.’

If the two great heads of duty, to love God with all the heart and our neighbour as ourselves, are interpreted in their full extent and spirituality, no counsel can go beyond them. The standard is one which the Christian may and ought to aspire to, but which he never can reach ; and it is the same for all orders of men in the Church. As regards what we owe to God, there can be no such thing as a work of supererogation ; but in the employment of gifts or talents as evidences of love, questions of casuistry may arise, only to be determined by each individual on a careful review of his temperament or circumstances. And he may no doubt arrive at the conclusion that by foregoing certain modes of life (if he can do so without dangers of another sort), which otherwise he would be at liberty to adopt, he will best promote the interests of religion. But if he so decides, he is doing nothing over and above what he is commanded to do ; for the command is that he should be willing to sacrifice everything but his own spiritual welfare if the kingdom of God can be advanced thereby.

The error of the scholastic doctrine on this point, from which that of Rome is derived, consists in making what it calls counsels a means of more effectually securing eternal life, instead as a means of more effectually serving God in this life. Sacrifices for Christ’s sake will, He assures us, be rewarded a hundredfold in this life ; and though He makes no mention of a special future reward, we may conclude that such sacrifices will not then be forgotten of God. But if so, they will fall under the general rule that distinguished service, not as inherently meritorious, but by the gratuitous promise of God, will not fail hereafter of due recognition. The Schoolmen, even the Augustinian like Thomas Aquinas, as they made precepts—that is, obedience to the law—necessary, in the way of merit, to the attainment of life, so they made counsels a more direct and expeditious road to that end. This was to confound eternal life itself with different degrees of glory in that life—special gifts with the grace necessary to all. And the root of the system was the making the formal cause of justification to be an inherent quality, not the merits of Christ apprehended by faith.

Scripture contains no counsels, as distinguished from precepts, on such points as abstinence from marriage or the renouncing of private property, because, from want of a proper motive, obedience even to the precept may be absent. ‘Though I bestow all my goods,’ says St. Paul, ‘to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing’ (1 Cor. viii. 3). On the other hand, Scripture does not forbid such sacrifices if prompted by a right motive, the love of God, and not proceeding from ostentation, or as establishing a meritorious claim. The Romish theory errs in attaching an independent value to the outward act, as appears from its artificial classification of counsels under the three heads above mentioned. But the command itself is so comprehensive that nothing can be added to it. It includes counsels instead of counsels including it, and, in fact, is never perfectly fulfilled in this present state. As Thomas Aquinas rightly observes, the former is necessary, the latter optional; but he forgets to remark that what he calls counsels may indeed be proof of obedience to the precept, but can never comprehend more than it.

The practical results of this doctrine are written on the page of Church history. When a double standard of Christian sanctity was established —a higher one for those who submitted to the three monastic rules, and a lower one for the Christian commanlty—it was inevitable that the latter should claim the right to frame their rules of practice for themselves, and such as were more adapted to the suggestions of the unrenewed heart. The homely virtues of the domestic circle or the duties of public life sank in the scale as compared with the trivial round of ceremonial or the ecstatic raptures of the monastic life. Still worse, nature, outraged, avenged herself, and hidden vices of the gravest kind prevailed under the garb of outward sanctity. The state of the monasteries in Henry VIII’s time, which led to their dissolution, is proof sufficient of the pernicious effects which the system produced on the victims themselves of the illusion. The open profligacy of the world is less repulsive than that which may, and has been, engendered among a mass of human beings, with instincts forcibly kept down, but still festering, under the pressure of irrevocable vows.

Ecclesiastically, too, it was most detrimental. When Christians were taught that some of their number might exceed the requirements of the Divine law, why might not the redundant merits of these favoured few be applied to compensate for the deficiencies of their humbler brethren? Thus arose the idea of a treasury of superfluous good works, the key of which was in the hands of the ecclesiastical authorities, and out of which, for a consideration, they dispensed what was necessary to shorten either the penances imposed by the Church or the pains of Purgatory. The traffic in indulgences which was thus openly carried on is well known, and, indeed, was deplored by pious and influential voices in the medieval Church. But no effectual remedy was applied until the Reformation disinterred the buried Gospel and brought it to light. These scandals were the immediate cause of Luther's renunciation of the Papal system. The Council of Trent, alive to the exigency, endeavoured to put a check on the worst abuses, but left the root whence they sprang in the ground ; to produce a similar crop under more favourable circumstances.

74. *Final Perseverance of the Saints*

Can those who have been truly regenerated cease to be so ; that is revert to their former natural condition ? This question is the same as that touching the perseverance of the saints, but is commonly considered as one of the 'Five Points of Calvinism,' as if it were a necessary part of that system of theology, and could not be discussed on its own proper grounds. This has been of detriment to the inquiry, since to many minds the word 'Calvinism' carries a distasteful sound, and raises an antecedent prejudice to any doctrine supposed to be peculiarly connected with the name of the great French Reformer. In point of fact, the controversy is of ancient date, and in Augustine's anti-Pelagian treatise, it occupies a conspicuous place. It is on every account desirable to dissociate it from any system, Calvinistic or Arminian.

A moment's consideration will show that election, in the sense in which it was understood by most of the great theologians of former times, Romanist as well as Protestant, viz., election to eternal life, involves the doctrine of perseverance. For the elect in this sense are not merely those who have been favoured with external privileges, and who *may* be saved if they do their duty, but those who shall finally be saved ; and none such can or will perish. To say then that the elect may not persevere to the end is to say that they are not elect, except in a lower sense of the word. The elect are those who do persevere, and those who do not are not of the elect. Further, it is to be observed that the question is not about perseverance merely, but about *final* perseverance, or perseverance up to the moment when, at death, we lose sight of the persons concerned. It is possible, and generally admitted, that persons persevere, or seem to do so, for a time, and then draw back ; but it is endurance to the end, until the individual passes into the unseen world, that is intended in the Calvinistic controversy.

From these remarks it will be seen that the real question is not so much whether the elect persevere, as whether the elect and the regenerate are convertible terms ; or, as we have stated it, whether a true regeneration can be finally lost. The Lutheran divines, like Augustine, reply in the affirmative, the Reformed, following Calvin, in the negative. The Lutherans admit that though the elect may fall away the lapse is but temporary, it is certain that they will be recalled to repentance before they depart hence ; but the case is otherwise with the merely regenerate. The reformed divines hold that the regenerate cannot finally fall away, since in fact they are the elect. That our Church leans to this latter view seems implied in Art. xvii : ‘ They be made sons of God by adoption, they walk religiously in good works, and at length, by God’s mercy, they attain to everlasting life.’ No intimation is given that they may possibly come short of this destination.

The question is discussed with his usual depth and fullness by the great theologian of the Western Church, and it may be useful to see how he treats it. It occupies a large space in the books *De Correptione et Gratia* and *De Dono Perseverantiæ*. Augustine’s fundamental position is, that regeneration does not necessarily imply final perseverance. ‘ The elect,’ he says, ‘ are those who when they hear the Gospel believe, and in that faith working by love persevere unto the end ; and if occasionally they go astray, they are recovered ; and some by a premature death are delivered from the danger of falling away.’ But how came they to persevere, and others not ? ‘ Not through their own care and watchfulness (at least not in the last resort), but in consequence of a special gift superadded to the general gift of regeneration.’ And by regeneration he does not mean, as might be supposed, a mere initiatory grace of baptism, or incorporation into the visible church, but a real spiritual change with its evidences. ‘Who,’ he says, ‘can deny that some persons may be called elect, seeing they believe, are baptized, and live according to the will of God ? Yet if they do not persevere they are not elect in His sight who knows that they have not that’ (gift of) ‘perseverance which ensures eternal life, and though they stand now they will surely fall.’ ‘ It is indeed a mystery that to some of His sons whom God has regenerated in Christ, *to whom He has given faith, hope, and love*, he does not vouchsafe perseverance.’ ‘Let it not surprise us that upon certain of His sons God does not bestow that gift. This, indeed, would be inconceivable if they were of the number of those who by predestination are truly the sons of promise. As long as these persons live piously they are called sons of God ; but since they will lapse into a sinful life, and die in that state, they are not sons in the sight of God.’ And again : ‘ Of two pious persons, that to one should be granted the gift of final perseverance and to the other not, must be ascribed to the inscrutable judgments of God. Only that the one is of the number of the predestinated, while the other is not, is an unquestionable fact.' It is plain from these and similar passages that in Augustine's view a person may be regenerate for a time, and then cease to be so ; and further, that the cause of the failure is to be traced up ultimately to his not having received the special gift of perseverance. The Lutheran theologians, agreeing with him as regards the fact, hesitate to ascribe the difference between the elect and the regenerate to the Divine predestination, and seek the cause rather in the individuals themselves, as free agents whose salvation depends on their behaviour.

There is something repulsive in the notion that a real work of regeneration can ever finally come to nothing. Analogies between natural and spiritual things may, no doubt, be pressed too far ; but we cannot suppose it without significance that the spiritual change, apart from which no one can enter the kingdom of God, should be described in terms drawn from natural birth, or from creation. In neither of these cases can a relapse into nothingness be conceived. Once born into this world the personality of the individual is indestructible ; so at least, without presuming to define the limits of omnipotence, it appears in fact to us. Whatever changes the bodily organization may undergo, including even the last great change, we suppose the 'I' of personal identity to remain unaffected and no human soul to revert to annihilation. And as to creation ;—we can no more imagine the existing frame of the universe passing into nothing than we can understand how it first came into being out of nothing.

If the analogies are to hold good, it should seem that the new birth, the second creation, is irreversible, and that the old saying contains truth, Once regenerate, always regenerate ; to say nothing of the covenant of God with Christ by which, as the Calvinistic divines contend, it is secured. Certainly, it would seem that a second regeneration can no more be expected than a second natural birth ; according to the remark of Nicodemus, 'How can a man be born when he is old ? Can he enter the second time into his mother's womb and be born ? (John iii. 4).

But the ultimate appeal, is, of course, to Scripture. We are referred to numerous passages in which a final lapse from regenerating grace seems to be supposed possible ; to the parables of the sower, the vine, and the ten virgins[1] ; to the admonitions and warnings addressed to Christians as if their perseverance depended on themselves (which no doubt it does in a certain sense); to the incestuous Corinthian; to individual cases (Hymenæus, Philetus, Demas, etc.) of those who have been numbered among Christians, but failed to persevere. That a danger is contemplated, and a warning conveyed, in such passages is unquestionable; yet it may be doubted whether they establish the conclusion intended. Two general remarks are applicable to them; supposition is not position, and preparatory operations of the Holy Spirit are not to be confounded with regeneration (§§ 60–61).

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[1] A list of these passages will be found in Whitby, *Five Points* Dis. v.

The Apostle in Heb. vi. 4 declares that under certain circumstances (‘if they shall fall away,’ verse 6) the persons described cannot be again brought to repentance. Assuming that they were really regenerate, we certainly find a difficulty in supposing a second regeneration possible; but, after all, the case is only a supposititious one, ‘*if* they shall fall away.’ It may be said that unless it were possible, it would not have been employed as a warning; but to this it may be replied that no one contests the abstract possibility of its occurring, or denies that sin unchecked may issue in results little anticipated; the utmost we are warranted in believing is that provision is made, and means will be used to prevent a final catastrophe. Nothing but perseverance itself can be to us an evidence that we are really regenerate. Be this as it may, no dogmatical conclusions can be founded on hypothetical statements. On the assumption, then, that the persons intended were regenerate the conclusion is not certain; but even this is by no means the universal opinion of commentators. There were many in the Apostolic age (and the same holds true of every age) who may have been subjects of spiritual influence up to a certain point, without becoming new creatures in Christ; may have been ‘enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and the powers of the world to come, and been made partakers of the Holy Ghost’ (Heb. vi. 4, 5), and yet may not have had Christ formed in them, the hope of glory. It is no wonder if such converts, ‘having no root in time of temptation fall away,’ or permit the cares of this life to choke the good seed, so that it bears no fruit. ‘There is a sin unto death,’ the Apostle John tells us, but he does not specify wherein it consists, or whether any had been guilty of it; if it should appear in the church, intercessory prayer for the offender would be useless (1 John v. 16).

The warnings of Scripture, ‘Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall,’ etc., occupy a necessary place in the spiritual training of the Christian. Since no one can read his name in the book of life, nor is a revelation vouchsafed to any one that he shall persevere to the end, the assurance of hope, founded on the witness of the Spirit and the consciousness of a spiritual change, is the state of mind which befits the church militant on earth. The work of sanctification advances amidst opposition from within and without ; through many a fall inward, if not outward ; even, as in the cases of David and Peter, through overt sins of a deep dye.

Subjectively, therefore, or *a parte hominis*, nothing can be more appropriate than that the Christian should be admonished to watch and pray lest he fall into temptation, the spirit being willing but the flesh weak. Certainty of final salvation is not for those thus compassed with infirmity ; yet in the midst of trial and danger they may be persuaded, with St. Paul, that ‘ neither life nor death nor any other creature shall be able to separate them from the love of God ’ (God’s love towards them) ‘ which is in Christ Jesus ’ (Rom. viii. 38–39). Among other means which God employs to preserve them are these warnings with which Scripture abounds ; they are no mere economy, but expressive of the truth that the Christian, considered in himself, may at any moment yield to temptation ; and further, that he cannot certainly know what a downward course may eventually issue in.

But whether *objectively*, or *a parte Dei*, the new birth is reversible is another question. The general testimony of Scripture is rather against such a supposition. ‘ My sheep shall never perish ’ (John x. 28) ; we may not dilute such statements by the limitation, unless indeed they themselves leave me : let each passage speak for itself, and retain its full meaning, even if we cannot fully reconcile it with others. The parting prayer of Christ was that the Father would keep through His own name (His almighty power) those who had believed on Him (John xvii. 11) ; and we know that the Father always hears Him (*Ibid.*, xi. 42). St. John, who records these sayings of Christ, writes himself in a similar strain : ‘ He that is born of God doth not commit sin ’ (live contentedly in sin) ; ‘ he cannot do so because he is born of God, and his seed ’ (the holy principle of the new life) ‘ remaineth in him ’ (1 John iii. 9 ; comp. v. 18). If some who seemed to be the children of God had fallen away, he accounts for this fact not on the ground that such lapses may be expected in the regenerate, but that these professors never were really regenerate. ‘ They went out from us because they were not of us ; for if they had been of us, they would have continued with us ; but they went out that they might be made manifest that they were not all of us ’ (*Ibid.*, ii. 19). Their fall was only a manifestation of their hidden unsoundness, known to God all along.

The parables which seem to favour an adverse conclusion do not, with one exception, present much difficulty. That of the sower contains three cases of failure, with the first of which we have nothing to do. In the other two the seed did spring up, and gave promise of fruit ;

but in neither was the soil properly prepared for ultimate success. The work of the law convincing of sin had not been thorough and universal. Hence the seeming conversion of the one was but a temporary emotion, such as often occurs in the annals of revivalism, and which, though not to be despised, may disappear without permanent result. The same may be said of the persons compared to the seed falling among thorns. There is nothing in these instances inconsistent with the supposition that they represent certain preliminary operations of the Holy Ghost, which, however, fall short of a true regeneration. The foolish virgins had 'oil in their lamps,' a certain amount of religious feeling and profession ; but not 'oil in their vessels,' not the permanent indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Or, to vary the image, the spiritual water of which they had tasted was not 'in them a well of water springing up into everlasting life' (John iv. 14). The parable of the vine and the branches is the exception referred to. In almost every instance—indeed, we may say in all—the terms 'in Christ' or 'in union with Christ' signify not merely incorporation into a visible church, but personal saving connection with Christ Himself ; and that this is intended in the parable may be inferred from Christ's speaking of the fruitless branches as having, equally with the fruitful, partaken of the sap of the tree, and really grown upon it. They were not attached to the vine by external ligatures. The difference between them and the other branches consists not in the point of vital union, but in the absence of fruit ; as, in fact, such branches may be seen in the natural vine. These, our Lord says, are 'taken away' ; 'taken away,' though they derived life from the vine. The difficulty of supposing that a visible connection with a local church is all that is meant is so great, that it seems to follow from the parable that not all who are in vital union with Christ necessarily persevere to the end. We cannot, therefore, say more than that, *on the whole*, the evidence is in favour of the permanency of a real regeneration.

That the regenerate man, even if he does not finally perish, may sin grievously is plain from the instances of David and Peter, and indeed is matter of common experience. The question may be asked, Do such sins entirely obliterate the seal of God, so that, if the backslider is recovered, a second new birth virtually takes place ; or does the holy principle, however for the present overpowered, retain its vitality, and in the work of repentance reassert its dominion ? The Lutheran divines take the former view, the Reformed the latter : the former hold that a true faith may be totally lost ; the others that the 'habit of faith' continues even in the worst cases, and in due time will resume its activity. And the latter opinion seems, on the whole, most in accordance with Scripture. Practically, the difference is immaterial. Even the Canons of Dort admit that the sense of adoption is destroyed by wilful sin ; while the Lutherans can, in case of recovery, assign no other evidence thereof than that which was an evidence of conversion at the first—viz., repentance and faith.

75. *The Doctrine of Election*

Effectual calling, as has been observed (§ 60), presupposes that mankind, through Adam's fall, labours under a spiritual incapacity to respond to the invitations of the Gospel, even when the privilege of hearing it is enjoyed without sufficient—that is, special—grace ; and, further, that this special grace means more than a liberation of the enslaved will by some mystical grace of baptism, whereby the baptized person receives power to choose good or evil, or is replaced in the state of probation in which we may suppose Adam to have been before the fall. Where this special grace is vouchsafed, and issues in an advance from the enjoyment of outward privileges to a saving personal relation to Christ, Scripture refers it to the eternal purpose of God ; or, in other words, special is also electing grace : 'Many' may be 'called, but few are chosen' (Matt. xx. 16). It is only with this personal election to eternal life that dogmatic theology is properly concerned. The order of salvation includes salvation itself, which can be predicated of individuals only, not of masses or churches as such. The remark is necessary, since the notion of election, or rather selection, in an inferior sense, has a foundation in Scripture, and, as expounded by some writers, errs rather in defect than in principle.

Thus in the Old Testament election is national, and to temporal as well as spiritual privileges. The principle pervades the whole history, but is directed to a temporary object. Abraham is severed from his idolatrous connections to become the progenitor of an elect nation. Of Abraham's immediate descendants, Jacob was chosen, while Esau was set aside ; of the tribes of Israel, Judah was that from which the Messiah was to come. Israel was a holy nation, a peculiar people, chosen out of the nations of the earth to be the depositary of the oracles of God. But since nations as such have no existence beyond the grave, the election was not to eternal life, nor is it ever so described. In this point, as in others, the law was a shadow of good things to come, a typical figure of the heavenly reality. In the same sense some nations of the present day may be said to be elect as compared with the mass of mankind—elect to the reception and profession of Christianity. The greater part of the world is still not even nominally Christian, notwithstanding that contact with Christian nations and missionary effort ought apparently to have issued in a different result. Even national Christianity remains, after the lapse of so many centuries since the Christian era, the exception, not the rule. Why should this be so ? It may be replied that some races or nations are naturally more susceptible than others of Christian influences ; and this, no doubt, is the fact. Western civilization seems in this point to possess an advantage over Eastern. It can hardly be attributed to accident that the Roman Empire has, as a whole, accepted Christianity ; while Oriental nations, even those which have long enjoyed a measure of civilization, continue outside its pale. Prophecy forbids us to despair of the ultimate universal prevalence of the Gospel ; but an earlier or later reception of it may depend upon national peculiarities of civilization and temperament, for which we can assign no reason except the inscrutable purpose of God, Who, in conducting the government of the world, has so arranged it that some nations and races come to the front as depositaries of the light of revelation, while others remain behind.

Even in Scripture itself we find traces of this rule of Divine Providence. When the Apostles were intending to preach the Word in Asia, they were forbidden by the Holy Ghost to do so, and directed by the same Divine Agent rather to choose Macedonia as a field of action (Acts xvi. 6–10). What reason can be assigned, except that certain districts of Asia were not as yet so ripe for their ministrations as others of Greece ? Even among Christian nations differences exist in respect of the quality of their Christianity, and their religious influence in the world. Some, for example, have accepted the Reformation, with its beneficent results ; others have not. Some are leaders in the missionary field ; others have done little for the spread of the Gospel. It does not follow that those nations which have hitherto rejected the Gospel, or rejected it in its apostolic purity, will always do so, or that more advanced Christian nations will always retain their pre-eminence ; but it is plainly the method of the Divine Providential government that, for wise purposes unknown to us, the conversion or spiritual progress of some should be postponed, while others are more highly favoured. As in the case of the Jewish people, so here there is an election in time which we cannot but ascribe to the eternal purpose of God ; but it is not an election to eternal life. Many nations have been called, but few chosen ; not to mention that some have arisen and disappeared without ever having enjoyed the opportunity of hearing the Gospel. As nations, with merely a temporal existence, and not being subjects of prophecy like the Jewish people, these communities have passed into the abyss of time with their destination unfulfilled.

When a nation becomes professedly Christian, this implies that the Christian Church, under the form of a visible Christian society, has gained a footing in it. It implies that the Scriptures are accepted as the Word of God ; that the preaching of the Word and the administration of the sacraments, as well as other means of grace, are in operation ; that Christian instruction is given in families and schools. These are spiritual advantages which as far transcend those vouchsafed to the ancient chosen people of God as the promulgation of a completed redemption transcends a typical adumbration of it ; and they place the members of such a community in a very different position from that of the most polished nations of antiquity, or of those to whom the Gospel has come without having effected a national conversion. They are not merely under the rule of natural Providence, determining ‘ the times appointed and the bounds of their habitation ’ (Acts xvii. 26), and possibly training them for a future submission to the cross ; not merely under the pedagogical influences of the Logos, who has always been more or less ‘ the light of men ’ (John i. 4) ; but they are in immediate contact, so to speak, with the motions of the Holy Spirit, the special grace of the Christian dispensation. They live in an atmosphere of Christianity, insensibly pressing upon them in the laws, customs, the social standard, the accepted maxims of a Christian country ; all of which the Church, without identifying itself with the state, permeates and elevates. They are drawn not merely by the Father—God in his natural attributes—to the Son, but they are drawn by the Son—the incarnate and risen Saviour—to the Father.[1] On the supposition that infant baptism is in accordance with the mind of Christ, or even if it is allowable, it is a sign and seal of the Divine *intention* that in a Christian country no rank or age should be excluded from participation in the blessings of the Christian covenant and the approaches of Divine grace.

Yet experience proves that the enjoyment of these privileges does not necessarily, or in all cases, lead to saving union with Christ. That they should be vouchsafed is a distinguishing mark of grace ; but the election is not to salvation, but only to the possibility of attaining salvation—to the opportunity of using the means of grace. A considerable school of writers amongst ourselves stops short at this notion of election, affirming that no other is found in Scripture. All who are baptized, let us suppose in infancy, are the chosen of God (as, indeed, in one sense they are), and *the choice ends here* ; with the further inference that the subjects of election are rather nations or Christian societies than individuals. But how comes it that out of the mass of persons thus favoured it is only a comparatively small number that actually avail themselves of their privileges, and pass from the preparatory and often transitory approaches of the Holy Spirit to become subjects of His regenerating grace—regeneration being understood in its full Scriptural meaning ? If it be replied that it is owing to a proper exercise of free-will, we are on the confines of Pelagianism. The doctrine of effectual grace solves the difficulty ; but only to prompt the further question, Why should this or that person come under its influence, and not others ? The circumstance cannot be considered as a mere contingency, an after thought, occurring in time ; especially by those who believe, and rightly believe, that every event, whether as regards communities or individuals, is foreknown and ordered by a supreme intelligence.

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[1] ‘ No man cometh unto the Father,’ in a saving sense, as the First Person of the Trinity of redemption, ‘but by Me.’ John xiv. 6.

We are thus led step by step to the doctrine of election in its highest form, as ' predestination to *life*,' or ' the everlasting purpose of God, whereby (before the foundations of the world were laid) He hath constantly decreed by His counsel, secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those whom He hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation ' (not merely to the opportunity of securing it), ' as vessels made to honour ' (Act. xvii). This was the doctrine understood under the name by all the great theologians of the Church—Augustine, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, the Reformers, English and foreign (with some modifications), Bellarmine, Calvin, Luther himself—and we find it stated in our own Article on the subject. It is the doctrine, too, of our Catechism. The child presumed at baptism to be regenerate is supposed in this formulary never to have lost the gift or fallen from it : pious instruction and example having been made instrumental to carry on the work. He is regarded as a Christian child—a child of God really, and not merely ecclesiastically ; a member of Christ by vital union as well as by incorporation in a visible church. He declares that he is actually sanctified by the Holy Ghost, and that he trusts he is one of the elect as being thus sanctified. This is the ' state of salvation ' for being called to which he returns thanks, and which he prays he may continue in unto his life's end. Not, surely, a mere access to the means of grace, which may never be used, or a mere possibility of being saved, which may never be realized ; but an actual saving participation in Christ and His work. It would be strange if prayer were made for grace to continue in the former undetermined state.

The language of St. Paul, providentially raised up to be the chief inspired expounder of this doctrine, seems plain enough, except to those who have a theory to maintain. Israel, he explains, was as a nation chosen of God to the privileges of ' the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises ' (Rom. ix. 4) ; yet not all who enjoyed these advantages were the true Israel, the spiritual children of Abraham (verses 6, 7) ; ' for he is not a Jew who is one outwardly, neither is circumcision that which is outward in the flesh ; but he is a Jew which is one inwardly, and circumcision is of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter ' (chap. ii. 28, 29). Such spiritual Judaism was never co-extensive with the national. In the time of Elijah, for example, their number was reduced to seven thousand—an insignificant portion of the whole nation. So, he continues, it was in his own day ; the nation, as a whole, rejected Christ, but there was a ' remnant ' who believed, and this remnant owed its existence and its preservation ' to the election of grace ' ; not to any merit of its own. It was as gratuitous an act of grace as the distinction between Esau and Jacob which was made, ' the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil,' and was recorded that ' the purpose of God according to election might stand,' or be established —might be proved to be ' not of works, but of Him that calleth.' Thus ' God had not cast away His people which He foreknew '—that portion of the Jewish people for which, in consequence of this Divine foreknowledge, He intended salvation—' for whom He foreknew He predestinated,' not merely to privileges, but ' to be conformed to the image of His Son,' and effected His purpose in time by calling, justifying, and glorifying them ; the future consummation being regarded as certain, atlhough at present only the earnest was given (Rom. ix, xi).

With the general drift of this principal passage the Apostle's statements in other epistles is in agreement. Thus Christians are said to be ' chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world,' to be ' predestined unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ,' not on account of foreseen holiness, but that they might be ' holy and without blame before Him' (Ephes. i., 4, 5) ; to be ' chosen from the beginning to salvation ' (2 Thess. ii. 13) ; to be saved with an holy calling, according to God's own purpose and grace, given them in Christ Jesus before the world began (2 Tim. i. 9). Of himself, as an eminent example of Divine grace, the writer declares that he was called indeed in due season (*vocatio efficax*), but that before he came into the world he had been separated, in prescience and designation, to the work intended for him (Gal. i. 15). Light is thus thrown on the statements of Christ

Himself, which substantially agree with those of this chosen vessel. In one sense the Apostles officially were given Him ; a selection, however, which was not inconsistent with final perdition ; but in another and a higher one, as believers, they and those who should be effectually called by their word, are described as the Father's before they were Christ's : 'Thine they were, and Thou gavest them Me, and they have kept Thy word' (John xvii. 6).

Election, indeed, in the gospels, usually signifies the operation of Divine grace in time ; the elect are those who, as a matter of fact, have been severed from a sinful world, and this not externally only but inwardly. The eternal purpose is not so explicitly announced as afterwards by St. Paul ; but in one passage it is indirectly intimated. We read in Matt. xxiv. 24 that in the last days of tribulation false Christs and prophets shall be permitted to show such signs and wonders as, if it were possible (εἰ δυνατὸν), to deceive the very elect. It is not possible, because the elect, as such, are 'kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation' (1 Pet. i. 2). Such is the testimony of Christ and His Apostles, and it may be summed up in the following particulars :

Election must not be confounded with the Stoic, or any other form of fatalism. Philosophical speculations are foreign to the spirit of Scripture, and of little practical moment to the mass of mankind ; they should not be imported into this subject. It is not easy, for example, to refute apparent inferences from the theory of causation, according to which every event, and therefore the work of regeneration, must have a cause, and the latter again another cause, and so on until we pass beyond this sublunary region, and ascend to the first great Cause, on which the whole chain depends, and which directs its movements. Something, too, may be said for the pantheistic fatalism of Spinoza ; and, in truth, to meet it effectually, we must insist on the fact of an independent free-will in man, capable of resistance to the will of God, and this itself is an incomprehensible mystery. Whether true or false, such theories should not be mixed up with the Scriptural doctrine of predestination. According to it, the spiritual prerogatives of nations or of individuals are determined by a personal God of infinite wisdom and goodness, who, not without reasons, but for reasons only partially revealed to us, acts in this matter as He wills, yet not so as to destroy the concurrent action of the creature whom He has endowed with the mysterious attribute of free-will. And it cuts short philosophical objections with the practical appeal, which yet involves a reiteration of the doctrine of election according to grace, 'Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast Thou made me thus?' (Rom. ix. 20).

The terms 'predestination,' 'election,' 'saints,' 'effectual calling,' represent the same fact under different aspects. Predestination (πρόθεσις) signifies the general intention of God to provide a plan of salvation, and has no direct reference to the individuals comprised in the plan. It is otherwise with fore-knowledge (πρόγνωσις) and predetermination (προορισμός), the former of which implies distinct recognition[1] of the individuals who should believe; the latter, the providential arrangements leading to that result. These expressions relate to the Divine acts before time. Election is predestination carried into effect in time, and, whether national or individual, presupposes individuals as in existence; individual election comprising effectual calling (whence 'chosen' and 'called' are so often used synonymously), conversion, regeneration, etc. National election is one of the stages towards individual. But since the devout mind cannot but ascribe these saving operations to God, election comes to mean nearly the same as predestination—we infer the eternal purpose from what actually takes place in the present life.

Election is not merely to spiritual privileges, but, in its full sense, to eternal life. If churches are collectively called elect or holy, it is the language of presumption—viz., that the reality corresponds to the idea. Human discipline can only separate those who are visibly tares from the wheat, the rest are taken at their profession, which is to be real, not nominal, saints. They may not be so, in fact; but since we cannot read the heart, we are compelled to treat them collectively, as what they profess to be. The last day alone will disclose who have been real members of Christ and who not. The same conclusion follows even if, with some writers,[2] we confine the term election to the gathering of heathen converts into the visible church, for these converts are baptized on the presumption of saving repentance and faith, of being already inchoate members of Christ. But it is an error so to confine it. As appears from St. Paul's reasoning in Rom. ix. 11, there is also an election out of every visible church—necessarily so, because every visible church, however purged by discipline, remains a mixed body, and never can in this life perfectly correspond to its idea.

Election to eternal life is not conditional, in the sense of being *on account* of foreseen repentance and faith. The point here at issue should be borne in mind. It is not whether repentance and faith are not always found in the elect, as indispensable *qualifications* for salvation, nor whether God in election had not a reference to Christ as the indispensable channel of saving grace. No difference of opinion exists on these points. The most extreme Calvinist admits that the elect are chosen in Christ, and is so far from dispensing with holiness as a qualification for life, that he infallibly secures it by including it in the decree itself. Those whom God intends to save, He also intends to sanctify. The question is concerning the *ground* of election : whether it is *on account* of foreseen goodness, or goodness is the consequence of election ; and here the Lutheran and the Calvinist part company.

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[1] Primum omnium est, quod accurate observari oportet, discrimen esse inter præscientiam et predestinationem sive æternam electionem Dei. Præscientia simul *ad bonos et malos* pertinet: prædestinatio seu æterna Dei electio tantum ad bonos et dilectos Dei filios pertinet. *Form. Conc.*, P. i., c. ii. The πρόγνωσις in Rom. viii. 29 is more than a mere prescience.

[2] Ebrard, *Dogmatik*, §§ 556-561.

In their earlier writings, Luther and Melanchthon, like Calvin, held that election has no ground but the good pleasure of God ; but in later years they receded somewhat from this position, not so much in the way of negation, as in insisting on the counter-balancing statements of Scripture respecting the universality of redemption, and the guilt of those who refuse obedience to the invitation ; just as in our Article the two lines of Scripture-statement are placed in juxtaposition without an attempt to reconcile them. Some ' are chosen in Christ out of mankind, as vessels made to honour ' ; and yet ' that will of God is to be followed which we have expressly declared unto us,' viz., that all men should be saved. The Reformers just mentioned and their Lutheran successors adopted substantially the scholastic notion of a twofold will in God—one antecedent, *i.e.*, a general purpose to save mankind through Christ ; and the other consequent, *i.e.*, a particular purpose actually to save those who believe and continue in that faith ; and they did so, as the best mode of giving due effect to the whole testimony of Scripture. But, as thus stated, it does not touch the main difficulty, viz., why the antecedent will, if a serious one, fails to become efficacious ? If the reply be, because it meets in some cases with persistent resistance, this, no doubt, is true. But why does it not in other cases meet with such resistance ?

In truth, the Lutheran doctrine labours under inherent defects. If it be a matter of contingency, who out of the mass to whom the Gospel is preached will proceed to saving faith, election, except in the lower sense of national election or to privileges, cannot be predicated of any one. How can God be said to have an ' everlasting purpose ' to bring certain persons to ' everlasting salvation ' (Art. xvii) if, after all, there is no certainty of their being so brought ? The very idea of personal election to life is evacuated. Moreover, it is Pelagian in tendency. It is one thing to say that men may *resist* the motions of the Holy Spirit (an undoubted fact) and another to say that they can produce in themselves the foreseen faith (*prævisa fides*) of the Lutherans ; that they can ' turn and prepare themselves to faith and calling upon God ' (Art. x). Scripture declares that faith itself is the gift of God (Ephes. ii. 8). Election, therefore, on the ground of foreseen faith, unless the gift of faith is included in the decree, amounts to no more than saying that if men to whom the Gospel comes repent and believe, and continue to do so, they will be saved ; the idea of election disappears. If it be contended that even in the case of unqualified candidates for admission to the Church (*ficti*), the will is liberated by baptismal grace, the reply is that we know for a certainty of no grace bestowed in baptism on those destitute of the appointed qualifications. But, as we have seen, the tenor of Scripture language is against such a view, whether held by Lutherans or others. If Christians do good works, it is because they are ' created,' born again, to such works ; because God before ordained that such works should be wrought by them (Ephes. ii. 10). They are elect *unto* obedience, not because of it (1 Pet. i. 2). It may be added that the difficulty which in Rom. ix the Apostle cuts short with a reference to the inscrutability of God's ways (ver. 20) would not, on the Lutheran hypothesis, exist, for reason itself dictates that foreseen faith should be rewarded in some way or other.

Calvin's doctrine of reprobation (which is by no means adopted by all that are called Calvinists) finds no warrant in Scripture. It involves the further inference that the fall itself was predetermined—that is, that God was the Author of sin—in order to furnish material for an exhibition of the Divine justice ; as the salvation of the elect was decreed to manifest the Divine mercy. This, the *supralapsarian* hypothesis, is refuted by the simple statement, ' God is love.' Not less distinct are the statements of the whole world's being in some sense included in the appointment of a Saviour, and of the sufficiency of the great atonement for all who are willing to avail themselves of it (John iii. 16 ; 1 John ii. 2 ; 1 Tim. ii. 4). Even of the ' vessels of wrath fitted to destruction ' (Rom. ix. 22. Comp. 1 Pet. ii. 8) nothing is said respecting their eternal destiny. On the stage of history, the Apostle says, there appear from time to time men like Pharaoh, upon whom neither the long-suffering nor the judgments of God appear to make any impression : fitted to destruction because they fitted themselves. But the fact that long-suffering was shown them proves that no decree antecedent to time condemned them to perdition, either temporal or eternal. Their temporal destruction was a manifestation of God's wrath against sin ; this was sufficient for the Apostle's argument, and beyond it he does not advance.

It is true that sublapsarianism in its turn is logically defective, which may have given occasion to the philosophical mind of Calvin to complete the theory at all hazards. If all are equally guilty, and all equally under a fatal indisposition to sue for mercy, why should some be pardoned because they do thus sue ? It is sometimes argued that the substitution of preterition for reprobation unties the knot. The impenitent, it is argued, lie under no decree to remain so ; they are simply passed over, left to themselves. If several persons are in debt to us, we may sue as many as we like, and discharge the rest. 'Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own ?' (Matt. xx. 15). The analogy fails, because God is here regarded not as a creditor, but as a Judge and Sovereign combined, conducting the moral government of the world on the principle of punishing the guilty and absolving the innocent. As a Judge, He is bound to decide according to strict rules of justice, to condemn impartially all whose demerit is the same ; as a Sovereign, He is bound to carry out the legal decision unless, as regards some individuals, circumstances should come to light warranting on their behalf an exercise of the prerogative of mercy. To make a difference without any such reason, and of His own arbitrary choice, does not commend itself to our ideas of justice. And if the offer of mercy to the favoured ones is to be dependent on the fulfilment of a condition which it is known before hand they are indisposed and unable to fulfil, the difficulties are increased. This reluctance must be removed in some way or other if a salutary result is to be secured. If removed in some instances, why should it not be in all ? If it is not, those who are passed over are virtually excluded from the benefit, and preterition becomes only a milder name for reprobation. We can only bow our heads before the mystery. On the one hand we are assured that God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son for it, and with this an antecedent decree of reprobation cannot be reconciled ; on the other, Scripture affirms, and experience proves, that in carrying out this design the Divine Agency pursues a method of selection ; that the true Church, in the present dispensation of things, is evermore a remnant according to the election of grace.

In recent times the controversy has assumed another aspect, chiefly under the influence of Schleiermacher and his followers ; of whom on this point we may take Martensen as an example, though the Danish theologian in others differs materially from his German predecessor, and, indeed, is a professed Lutheran. But on the subject of predestination both these writers are nearly in agreement. According to them, predestination means the eternal purpose and intention of God, which can only be the salvation of all men. But as soon as the purpose passes into time and takes actual effect, it assumes the form of election (which, therefore, is not quite identical with predestination), and submits to the law of historical progress and of the natural government of the world, according to which both nations and individuals are successively gathered into the fold of Christ—the former in privilege, the latter really. The eternal purpose, in dealing with free agents, becomes subject to limitations. It cannot, and does not, work in the way of necessity ; it must attain its end as a history ; suffering many apparent failures ; now advancing, now receding ; resisted by free-will, but eventually gaining the victory ; and hence in each successive age it is only a few who yield themselves to the yoke of Christ. These are the elect for the time being ; but the rest are only postponed. Their time will come either in this world or the next, and then the predestinate and the elect will be convertible terms ; in short, election has only to do with them, predestination with eternity.[1]

As regards this verbal distinction, it may be doubted whether it has ground in Scripture. Both election and predestination date from eternity. Christians are chosen in Christ ' before the foundation of the world ' (Ephes. i. 4), ' from the beginning ' (2 Thess. ii. 13) ; indeed, every event in time must be ultimately referred not merely to the Divine foreknowledge, but to the Divine prearrangement. Nor would this be contested by these writers. But the view maintained by them rests on two postulates—a state of probation after death, and, to say the least, the possibility of a universal restoration of the fallen creature. This latter, indeed, is openly defended by Schleiermacher, and forms the corrective of his almost fatalistic doctrine respecting free-will. It is matter of fact that the majority of nominal Christians, to say nothing of the heathen, pass out of this life without saving union with Christ. Can we suppose that their destiny is then finally determined ? This life must surely only form a fragment of the great drama of redemption ; and in the ages to come those who have failed to obtain an entrance into the kingdom here may, by means unknown to us, succeed hereafter. The process of election is going on before our eyes ; why should it stop until it has effected its end ? Why should not the *voluntas antecedens* and the *voluntas consequens* ultimately coincide ? There is time enough for it to run its course, and as the first may be last, so the last may gain an entrance into the vineyard and receive a reward. Then will come the end, when God will be all in all (1 Cor. xv. 28). So Schleiermacher reasons. His Lutheran disciple is more cautious. Admitting that grace may be resisted unto the end, that a state may supervene analogous to that of those beings who say, ' Evil, be thou my good,' Martensen can only express a hope that no human being will in fact pass into such a state ; to the detriment, however, of the consistency of his theory. Since the assumptions here involved belong to the topic of Eschatology rather than to the present subject, it will be expedient to postpone the further consideration of them until that topic comes under discussion. If the restoration of all fallen creatures is the ultimate issue of redemption, it is obvious that election can only mean their earlier or later entrance into the kingdom of God.

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[1] That election is only concerned with time is not a novel doctrine. J. Gerhard alludes to Bucanus as having held it, but rejects it himself ; Quando de electione ad vitam usurpat Scriptura, semper de æterno Dei eligentis decreto accipitur. L. xii., c. 2, § 31.

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS*

'The visible Church of Christ is a congregation of faithful men in the which the pure Word of God is preached and the sacraments be duly ministered according to Christ's ordinance in all those things that of necessity are requisite to the same' (Art. xix).

'Sacraments ordained of Christ be not only badges or tokens of Christian men's profession, but rather they be certain sure witnesses and effectual signs of grace and God's goodwill towards us, by the which He doth work invisibly in us, and doth not only quicken, but also strengthen and confirm our faith in Him. There are two sacraments ordained of Christ our Lord in the Gospel, that is to say, Baptism and the Supper of the Lord. Those five commonly called sacraments—that is to say, Confirmation, Penance, Orders, Matrimony, and Extreme Unction—are not to be counted for sacraments of the Gospel. . . . The sacraments were not ordained of Christ to be gazed upon or to be carried about, but that we should duly use them. And in such only as worthily receive the same have they a wholesome effect or operation' (Art. xxv).

'Although in the visible Church the evil be ever mingled with the good, and sometimes the evil have chief authority in the ministration of the Word and sacraments, yet forasmuch as they do not the same in their own name, but in Christ's, and do minister by His permission and authority, we may use their ministry both in hearing the Word of God and in the receiving of the sacraments. Neither is the effect of Christ's ordinance taken away by their wickedness.' (Art. xxvi).

'Baptism is not only a sign of profession and mark of difference whereby Christian men are discerned from others that be not christened, but it is also a sign of regeneration or new birth, whereby, as by an instrument, they that receive baptism rightly are grafted into the Church; the promises of the forgiveness of sin and of our adoption to be the sons of God by the Holy Ghost are visibly signed and sealed; faith is confirmed, and grace increased by virtue of prayer to God. The baptism of young children is in any wise to be retained in the Church, as most agreeable to the institution of Christ (Art. xxvii).

'The supper of the Lord is not only a sign of the love that Christians ought to have one to another, but rather it is a sacrament of our redemption by Christ's death; inasmuch as to such as rightly, worthily, and with faith receive the same, the bread which we break is a partaking of the body of Christ, and likewise the cup is a partaking of the blood of Christ. Transubstantiation (or the change of the substance of bread and wine) in the supper of the Lord cannot be proved by holy writ, and is repugnant to the plain words of Scripture, overthroweth the nature of a sacrament, and hath given rise to many superstitions. The body of Christ is given, taken, and eaten in the supper, only after an heavenly and spiritual manner, and the means whereby the body of Christ is received and eaten in the supper is faith' (Art. xxviii).

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* It is well known that this clause of the Apostles' Creed is of later date than the rest (see Pearson, note, vol. ii., p. 473. Oxford Edit., 1833), and that it has been variously interpreted. By Luther and the earlier Reformers it was taken to be a definition of what the 'holy Catholic Church' is—viz., a society or congregation of saints. Thus *Conf. Augs.*: 'Item docent, quod una sancta ecclesia perpetuo mansura sit. Est autem ecclesia congregatio sanctorum.' The word κοινωνία will hardly bear this meaning; it means properly participation of some common benefit. But if the emphasis is laid on the word 'saints,' the clause may be understood as such a definition or description. 'What is the holy Catholic Church? Saints, or a communion of saints who have fellowship in certain particulars with each other.' In this sense it forms the heading of this part of the volume.

‘The wicked and such as be void of a lively faith, although they do carnally and visibly press with their teeth the sacrament, yet in no wise are they partakers of Christ’ (Art. xxix).

‘The cup of the Lord is not to be denied to the laity’ (Art. xxx).

‘The sacrifice of masses, in the which it was commonly said that the priest did offer Christ for the quick and the dead, to have remission of sins or guilt, were blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits.’ (Art. xxxi).

‘The Bishop of Rome hath no jurisdiction in this realm of England.’ ‘It is lawful for Christian men, at the command of the magistrate, to serve in the wars’ (Art. xxxvi).

‘Christian religion doth not prohibit but that a man may swear when the magistrate requireth’ (Art. xxxix).

‘Docent quod una sancta ecclesia perpetuo mansura sit. Est autem ecclesia congregatio sanctorum, in qua evangelium recte docetur, et recte administrantur sacramenta. . . . Quamquam ecclesia *proprie* sit congregatio sanctorum et vere credentium, tamen in hac vita multi hypocritæ et mali admixti sunt’ (Conf. Aug. vii., viii).

‘Ecclesia non est tantum societas externarum rerum et rituum, sicut aliæ politiæ, sed *principaliter* est societas fidei et Spiritus S. in cordibus’ (Apol. Conf., c. iv. 5).

‘Hæc ecclesia sola dicitur corpus Christi quod Christus Spiritu suo renovat, sanctificat, et gubernat’ (*Ibid.*).

‘Sic definit ecclesiam et articulus in symbolo, qui jubet nos credere quod sit *sancta* Catholica ecclesia. Impii vero non sunt sancti’ (*Ibid.*).

‘Ecclesia non potest ullum aliud habere caput quam Christum. Nam ut ecclesia est corpus spirituale, ita caput habeat sibi congruens spirituale utique opportet’ (Conf. Helv., Expos. Simp., c. 17).

‘Unde et ecclesia invisibilis appellari potest, non quod homines sint invisibles ex quibus ecclesia colligitur, sed quod oculis nostris absconsa. Deo autem soli nota, judicium humanum sæpe subterfugiat’ (*Ibid.*).

‘De baptismo docent quod sit necessarius saluti, quodque per baptismum offeratur gratia Dei’ (Conf. Aug., ix).

‘Baptismus nihil est aliud quam verbum Dei cum mersione in aquam secundum ipsius institutionem et mandatum’ (Art. Smal., v.)

‘In baptismo signum est elementum aquæ ablutioque illa visibilis quæ fit per ministrum. Res autem significata est regeneratio vel ablutio a peccatis.’ (Expos. Simp. xix).

‘De cœna Domini docent quod corpus et sanguis Christi vere adsint et distribuantur vescentibus in cœna Domini’ (Conf. Aug., x).

‘In cœna Domini signum est panis et vinum sumptum ex communi usu cibi et potus, res autem significata est ipsum traditum Domini corpus, et sanguis ejus effusus pro nobis, vel communio corporis et sanguinis Domini’ (Expos. Simp., xix).

‘Vera et Christiana est excommunicatio quæ manifestos et obstinatos peccatores non admittit ad sacramentum et communionem ecclesiæ donec emendentur et scelera vitent’ (Art. Smal., ix).

PART I

THE CHURCH

THAT Christ came into the world not only to reveal certain truths, or to establish an unseen fellowship between Himself and the believer, but to found, in the words of Butler, ' a visible church,' or rather visible churches, ' to be the repository of the oracles of God ; to hold up the light of revelation in aid to that of nature, and propagate it throughout all generations to the end of the world,'[1] lies on the surface of Scripture. Butler might have added, to satisfy the social instincts of human nature, and to promote mutual edification by the exercise of discipline, and of the various spiritual gifts of which the Holy Ghost is the Author. No complete form of ecclesiastical organization can be traced to Christ Himself ; but the foundations were laid by Him. He appointed two visible ordinances, one to make the admission of converts into the Christian society ; the other their continuance therein ; and by anticipation He committed to the society (that is, to each one) the powers of ' binding or loosing ' (whether by these terms we are to understand the promulgation of the Gospel, or framing and abrogating ecclesiastical regulations), with the power of discipline (Matt. xviii. 15–18). He attached a special blessing to social prayer (*Ibid.*, 19–20). After His departure from the world, the visible church, in the persons of the Apostles and first Christians, came into actual existence. They that received the message of salvation were baptized ; ' they continued steadfastly ' under the Apostles' teaching, in fellowship, in breaking of bread, and in prayer (Acts ii. 41–42) ; and thenceforth it was the rule of the Divine administration to ' add to the church the saved ' (*Ibid.*, 47). Every accession to converts was to an already existing body, and through the agency of that body ; and the Holy Ghost who united each believer to Christ united him at the same time to the community of those who had already been made temples of the Holy Ghost.

76. *Definition of the Term*

The name which a Christian society usually bears in the New Testament is ἐκκλησία (*ecclesia*), which is the LXX translation of the Hebrew word קָהָל, ' the congregation ' of Israel, that is, of the whole elect nation, not of any portion thereof. In Greek authors ἐκκλησία signifies a popular assembly convened by authority (Acts xix. 39), as distinguished from the βούλη, or senate. It is needless to say that in the New Testament it never means the building in which Christians assembled for worship. The term was adopted partly as expressing the fact that Christians are the called—called out of a sinful world; and partly to distinguish the Church from the Jewish synagogue. The latter term is occasionally used for the Church (Jas. ii. 2), but it gradually fell into disuse. Another name is founded on the transfer of the idea of the Jewish temple to a Christian application; Christians are individually spiritual stones in the new temple, and collectively the new temple itself in which God dwells (1 Pet. ii. 4–6). Hence the term κυριακὸν, or Lord's house, with its derivatives, church, kirk, kirche, etc. The nature and constitution of the Christian Church has now to be considered; and in the first place we have to ask, In what does its essential being consist, what is its true idea? Or in other words, how are we to define it?

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[1] *Anal.*, P. ii. c. 1.

The records of revealed religion, which alone are the sources of dogmatic theology, present us with two forms of ecclesiastical organization, intimately connected with each other, and yet distinct—the Mosaic and the Christian—the former standing to the latter in the relation of prophecy to fulfilment, but, as a religious institute, founded on a different principle. What God has thus joined together we may not separate; but we may and must distinguish between them, if the specific character of either is to be ascertained. What the Christian Church is in its idea cannot be understood without some remarks on its predecessor; on its mode of operation, its sanctions, its objects, and its results; what it naturally led to, and how it naturally passed into its fulfilment in Christ. We may add that Romanism, in its various phases and stages, is nothing but the literal re-introduction of the law of Moses under the Gospel.

Why more than four thousand years were permitted to elapse between the promise of a Saviour and its fulfilment must remain a difficulty; but one reason we may surmise to have been the necessity of mankind's passing through a process of preparation for the reception of the Gospel. The sacred history teaches that the corruption of man after the fall was speedy and universal; and it was consistent with the Divine wisdom to allow the evil to run its course until the effects were fully developed, as they were in the heathen world. In the latter case the preparation was negative. Enlightened heathens, at the coming of Christ, were ready for the Gospel, because every mythical system, and every school of philosophy, had proved its inability to curb the corrupt passions of human nature, or to meet its spiritual necessities. But it is obvious that something more than this was needed, viz., a positive historical basis, especially in the locality in which the Saviour was to appear, directly preparing the way for His Advent, and securing a footing for the Gospel whenever it should be promulgated. Such was the object of the Mosaic dispensation. It may be considered under a twofold aspect : as a school of discipline, and as a system of prophetic symbolism.

The law was a school of discipline. It presupposed in the subject a lack of spiritual insight and self-determination which needed the guidance and constraint of an external rule. Such, according to inspired authority, was the Jew, especially in the earlier portion of his history ; though an heir he differed nothing from a servant, and was under tutors and governors until the time appointed of the Father (Gal. iv. 2, 3). Now a system of education works mainly from without inwards, and by means of discipline and habituation. Innate capacities on which virtuous habits may be engrafted are all that the teacher expects to find at first ; the habits themselves he proposes to form by rules which necessarily wear an arbitrary aspect, and obedience to which is enforced by temporal sanctions. Such, according to the great philosopher of antiquity, is the object of law-givers in framing their codes ; they aim at educating the citizens by the force of habit.[1] The Jew was compelled to practise what was, at first, irksome, and the meaning of which he did not comprehend, until habit had wrought its effect, and he had learned to do a willing service. But many generations had to elapse before this result was attained, before the pious Jew could exclaim, ‘ Oh, how I love Thy law ! it is my meditation all the day ’ (Ps. cxix. 97). For centuries the wayward pupil rebelled against the yoke of Divine ordinances, and to the last the carnal part of the nation misunderstood them. Religion in such a stage was necessarily rather drastic than contemplative ; the act had a value in itself irrespective of the motive that prompted it. The undisciplined impulses of human nature were met and overcome by external authority ; acting, indeed, not capriciously, but still from without, in the way of positive enactment and sanctions appealing to sense. And it is evident that the more the enactments were multiplied, the less the pupil was left to his own discretion, the more efficacious the system would be for its appointed end.

But the Mosaic law, especially the ceremonial, was also a system of prophetic symbolism. Symbolism is the remedy dictated by nature for immaturity in the powers of reflection and abstraction ;

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[1] *’Εθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγάθους.* Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*, ii. i.

as young children are best instructed by pictorial representations. The didactic element of the law was scanty in proportion as the symbolism was rich and varied. And this symbolism had a prospective reference to the Christian dispensation ; it was nothing less than the place where the Lord lay (Heb. x). The elect nation, elect not to eternal life, but to be that from which the Author of life should come, typified the New Jerusalem, or mystical body of Christ ; the legal sacrifices pointed to the one all-sufficient atonement for sin ; the Levitical priesthood foreshadowed the incommunicable priesthood of the glorified Redeemer. But at the time of their institution this prospective reference was not revealed, and therefore it would not have been safe to leave the Jew at liberty either to curtail or to add to his ritual, still less to introduce changes into it. He could not know what might be a true prophetical symbol, and what the reverse. Therefore, as little scope as possible was allowed to human phantasy, and the worshipper found himself anticipated by a Divine law in all the essential parts of his religious service. And this law was enforced by temporal sanctions, which are out of place where religion exists in its essential character, as a service of ‘ spirit and of truth ’ (John iv. 23). Idolatry, properly a sin not a crime, was made a crime, an act of treason, against the Sovereign : in no other way, in the existing state of spiritual illumination, could it be effectually suppressed : the rights of conscience must have been, as with us, respected, and the punishment of the idolater transferred to a future state. The dispensation presented a perfect fusion of church and state ; the only one which has ever had Divine sanction. It is only in an improper sense that it can be termed a church ; for no church but the Jewish has been armed with sovereign power to secure at least external obedience to its ritual, and by penalties which properly belong to the state. The Jew found himself, as regards his religious duties, hemmed in on every side by a law which, by its incessant and importunate demands, placed him under a yoke of bondage, which he confessed it was difficult to bear (Acts xv. 10).

A system of this kind, however necessary in the infancy of religion, was manifestly unfitted for it in its maturer stage ; and, indeed, it tended, by a natural process, to its own dissolution. In proportion as the discipline of the law succeeded in its object, it prepared the way for a more spiritual system. The Jew, as he advanced in spiritual perspicacity, could not but perceive that the ordinances by which he was taught the elements of religion (στοιχεῖα, Gal. iv. 9), could only have a provisional use. By the application of the moral law to the conscience he gained ever deeper views of the nature of sin and of his own sinfulness ; and this must have led to the conviction that the legal expiations were insufficient—that the blood of bulls and goats could never take away sin (Heb. x. 4). He came to feel that a broken and contrite heart is better than sacrifice, and that a religion which consisted chiefly in a round of ritual observances could not be the ultimate object of the revelation of God. Yet the ideas of expiation, atonement, remission of sin through blood, so constantly pressed on him, must have inspired an expectation of some more perfect sacrifice to supersede the legal appointments, and to effect what they could not effect.

At this juncture prophecy came in, and confirmed every anticipation of the longing heart. It stamped with the Divine approval the dictate of an enlightened conscience, that moral duties are more acceptable than outward service ; it did not hesitate to speak of the Levitical ritual itself, compared with such duties, in the language of depreciation.[1] But further, it opened up the prospect of a better covenant, founded on better promises, of which the leading features should be, the plenary remission of sin through the vicarious sufferings of a Redeemer (Isa. liii) ; its expansion beyond the limits of Judea (Isa. lix, lx) ; its spiritual nature (John ii. 28) ; and its corresponding new worship (Mal. i. 11). Instead of the twilight of typical ordinances, the Sun of Righteousness Himself was to appear, and shed spiritual light upon the world. ‘ This,’ God declared through His prophet, ‘ is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel. After those days I will put My law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts ; and will be their God, and they shall be My people ; and they shall no more teach every man his neighbour and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord ; for they shall all know Me, from the least of them to the greatest of them, saith the Lord ; for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sins no more ’ (Jer. xxxi. 31–34). And thus, through these various influences, it came to pass that at the coming of Christ, there were many who were ‘ waiting for the consolation of Israel,’ and it only needed the joyful *εὑρήκαμεν* (‘we have found’) of a Philip to transform the Israelite without guile into a Christian believer (John i. 45).[2]

The progression was manifestly from a symbolical religion to one of spirit and truth ; from a religion working from without inwards to one working from within outwards ; from a coercive law to the liberty of a law of spirit and life. When the fulness of the time was come the Saviour appeared, but was preceded by one who should prepare

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[1] Isa. i. lxvi. ; Jer. vi. 20 ; Amos v. 21.

[2] Twesten, *Dog.*, § 22.

His way. The preaching of the Baptist was no enforcement of the existing ceremonial law nor the introduction of a new one ; but the recalling the attention of a people sunk in formalism to the lesson which their own prophets had inculcated—that religion is primarily a matter of the heart, and that mere natural descent from Abraham was of little value in God's sight. The entrance into the kingdom of heaven must be through repentance and a change of heart (Matt. iii. 2). When Christ commenced His ministry the Baptist's type of teaching was not exchanged for another. Christ was the end of the law, not merely as the fulfilment of its types, but as the Expositor of its inner meaning. His first considerable discourse is throughout occupied in enforcing the moral law in its full spiritual import, as distinguished from human glosses and immoral formalism. He chooses disciples (learners) to be instructed, not subjects to be ruled. A ministry of the Word is inaugurated, to be afterwards a vehicle for the ministration for the Spirit. The Christian church did not as yet exist, but so far as the Saviour laid the foundations of it, He proceeded on a method opposed to that of the Mosaic institute. No ceremonial law can be traced to Christ Himself ; still less a system intended to form habits by repetition, and working *ex opere operato*. The two sacraments which He appointed were not, as regards the symbols, new ordinances, but adaptations of already existing ones. Lustration by water was a prominent feature of the ceremonial law, and familiar to the Jew[1] ; so was the Passover, on which was engrafted the Lord's Supper ; and so was the synagogue, destined by Divine Providence to form the basis of the polity and worship of the visible church.

Above all, these ordinances were not appointed by Christ for His church, except on the presumption of a living faith in the recipients or celebrants. Not to produce, or vivify, faith, but to manifest it, when already produced by the ministry of the Word, was the office of the sacraments. They were, as the old writers say, a visible word, declaring the same truths as the Word, but after a peculiar manner and with a more individual application. Had Christ come as a lawgiver in the sense in which Moses was, He would, in instituting a visible church, have commenced by establishing a graduated heirarchy, liturgical formularies, and a prescribed ritual, apart from which the ordinances would have been invalid. Such, indeed, in after-times, was the mode of proceeding ascribed to Him ; but the New Testament knows nothing of it. Believers are to be baptized in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost ; baptized Christians are to eat the bread and drink the wine in remembrance of Christ's death ; this is all that is positively commanded : and the ordinances themselves were only invested with their full efficacy when the church was formally constituted by the descent of the Holy Spirit on the Day of Pentecost.

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[1] It is by no means certain, as is commonly assumed, that the baptism of proselytes was usual in our Lord's time. In the Old Testament no mention is made of any other ordinance for the reception of Gentiles into the covenant than circumcision, to which sacrifice was afterwards added. The same may be said of the Apocrypha, of the writings of Philo and Josephus, and of the older Targumists. The first allusion to proselyte-baptizing appears to be that in the Gemara, *Babyl. Jebamoth*, 46, 2, the date of which is uncertain. The practice appears first distinctly in the fourth century. But the various lustrations of the law, and the figurative language of prophecy (Isa. lii. 15, Ezek. xxxvi. 25) were sufficient to account for the question of the Pharisees to John, 'Why baptizest thou, if thou be not that Christ, nor Elias, neither that prophet ?' (John i. 25). See Fairbairn, *Herm. Man.*, p. 274 ; and Winer, *Real W. B.*, Proselyten.

This last-named event was, properly, the birthday of the Christian church. There is much truth in the observation that 'Christianity came into the world as an idea, rather than as an institution,'[1] if for the word 'idea' we substitute the presence of Christ by His Spirit in the hearts of believers. Christianity did come into the world much more as a spiritual influence than as a visible institution ; and still more so than as a training institution, working, like the Mosaic law, from without inwards. It came, not as a new ecclesiastical organization, having its essence in rites or polity ; but as the full realization of the predicted relations between God and His people. It appeared in the persons of the primitive 120 on the Day of Pentecost, as a company of men of whom nothing more is said in the way of description than that they were all filled with the Holy Spirit, and that they continued under the guidance and teaching of the Apostles (Acts ii. 42). There was the Church in its true idea, as distinguished from its subsequent developments in polity or ritual. And what it was in the first moment of its existence will for ever determine its definition to the end of time.

It is, in its true being and essence, the temple of the Holy Spirit, founded and built up on the doctrine of the Apostles, transmitted to us in the New Testament. Its progress was in accordance with this beginning ; it followed the law of all societies which have their true being within ; it developed itself from within outwards—not in the reverse direction. When it became necessary to organize visibly, but not until then, the Church threw itself out, under Apostolic guidance, into such forms as were suitable to its nature and age. These forms grew up gradually, and as need required ; the want was always allowed to be felt before it was supplied. Deacons were appointed to relieve the Apostles of secular duties, and Bishops (if, which is doubtful, Timothy and Titus may be considered as prototypes of the office), to preside in the absence of the Apostles. Not because a covenanted virtue was, by Divine appointment, attached to any particular form of organization, but on common practical grounds of necessity, or of order, the work proceeded. As long as the simpler arrangements sufficed, they were suffered to remain ; when they proved insufficient further steps were taken. Instead of passively receiving a superinduced stamp from without, the Christian society supplied its needs from within, and of itself ; that is, the invisible Church, as Protestants call it, preceded the visible. No doubt the arrangements proceeded under Apostolic sanction, or precedent ; and therefore possessed a *relative* fixedness of form and continuity ; but no Christian ceremonial law, taking the place of the old, is visible ; no independent and intrinsic virtue, as if the true being of the Church consisted therein—still less, any virtue *jure divino*—belongs to the external framework. This has its appropriate place and sanctions, but they are of another kind.

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[1] Newman, *Develop.*, p. 116.

The result is, that when we come to define the Church—when the question relates to its essence, not to its accidents—we must adopt the old explanatory addition of the Article in the Creed, and speak of it as ‘ the communion, or congregation, of saints ’ [1] ; of saints not merely by profession, or external dedication (though this, of course, is included), but in reality and truth. And now let us turn to the Romish doctrine on the subject. It is simply the degeneration of Christianity, by a retrograde movement, into Judaism. ‘ If any one,’ the Council of Trent declares, ‘ shall say that Jesus Christ was given to man as a Redeemer to trust in, and not as a Legislator to obey, let him be anathema.’ [2] At first sight there appears nothing remarkable in this—Christians, no doubt, are bound to obey Christ ; but on closer examination we perceive why the word ‘ Legislator ’ was used, and not, *e.g.*, ‘ Master.’ In fact, it was used of set purpose—to convey the notion that the Gospel is a ceremonial law like that of Moses, only freed from defects which unfitted the latter for a universal religion. It is the ‘ new law,’ [3] an unhappy expression with which the errors of many centuries are connected. The ‘ new law ’ is, like the old, a system of coercive discipline ;[1] with priests by ordination instead of priests by birth ; with the sacrifice of the Mass instead of the legal sacrifices ; with a corresponding ritual ; with episcopacy *jure divino* ; and a visible, infallible head of the Church, also *jure divino*. That is, the essence of the Church is made to lie, not in the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, but in the sacraments which work *ex opere operato*,[2] and an external succession, failing which the sacraments themselves are robbed, partially at least, of their efficacy.

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[1] ‘ The Holy Catholic Church, Communio Sanctorum : this part ’ (the latter clause) ‘ of the Art. in the creed hath a manifest relation to the former, in which we profess to believe in the Holy Catholic Church ; which church is therefore holy, because those persons are such, or ought to be, who are within it ; the church itself being nothing else but a collection of such persons.’ Pearson, *Creed*, A. ix. Comp. his observations on the clause in note A.

[2] Sess. vi., Can. xxi.

[3] *Sacramenta novæ legis*, Conc. Trid., Sess. vii.

The worship and polity of the Church became, not the expression of its inward life, but the instruments of forming that life, and forming it on the principle of the preparatory dispensation. Thus Christians are once more brought under the yoke of the law, or, as Luther expressed it, delivered into Babylonish captivity. And it is obvious that it is immaterial whether we stop short at an intermediate halting-place (the *via media*), or go on to the full development of the theory in the Papacy. Every definition of the Church which makes the dwelling of the Holy Spirit, in His quickening and sanctifying agency, a separable accident thereof, and places its true being in its ritual or visible organization, deviates so far from the sense of Scripture, and is inconsistent with the genuine doctrine of the Protestant Churches.

It does not follow, as the Romanist would have it,[3] that inasmuch as Christ the Incarnate Son was given to the Church from without, the true being of the Church consists in what is visible in it. It is true that the kingdom of God, so far as it was present in Christ, could not propagate itself amongst men save through the human nature of the Saviour—this is a self-evident truth ; but what the Saviour was, or what He came to do, did not reveal itself to all who came into external contact with Him. Multitudes saw and heard Him who never recognized that He was the Christ, the Son of the living God ; and of that Apostle who is especially mentioned as having arrived at this knowledge it is declared by Christ Himself that the conviction was grounded, not upon what was visible in the Saviour, but upon a special revelation from above (Matt. xvi. 17). Nor does the conclusion above mentioned follow, as the same author argues, from the fact that the ministry of man, first the Apostles, and then of their successors, was employed to found the Church. No doubt this was the method employed ; God does not, as a rule, implant religion in the heart by an invisible and immediate operation of grace : 'How shall they believe in Him of Whom they have not heard, and how shall they hear without a preacher ?' (Rom. x. 14). But the Apostles were not to execute their mission until a certain spiritual change had passed over them ; nor did they depart from Jerusalem until the event had occurred. Christ was first fully formed in them by the descent of the Holy Spirit, and then, but not until then, did they set forth to preach. And this relation of the inward gift to the outward commission established the rule for all succeeding ages : the visible Church, in its various manifestations, has ever proceeded from the invisible, not in the reverse order.

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[1] 'The church, as God's vicar upon earth, subjugates the whole energy of man which struggles against the will of God. By her inward discipline the will is once more enthroned supreme, and its energies united with the will of God. Obedience passes by little and little from deliberation and conscious effort to a ready and almost unconscious volition. We are brought under the discipline of childhood. And since to a law, if it is not to remain a dead letter, there must be added a living authority to enforce its provisions, God has constituted an order' (the clergy) 'which shall bear rule over His people, and shall bring them under the yoke of obedience to Himself.' Manning (Archdeacon), *Unity of the Church*, pp. 230-251. The writer was not then a Roman Catholic, but the passage is the more valuable, as showing the real tendency of the school to which he belonged. So another writer, whose career was similar : 'Catholic Christendom' (*i.e.*, the Church) 'is a vast assemblage of human beings with wilful intellects and wild passions, brought together into what may be called a large Reformatory or training school, for the melting, refining, and moulding, as in some moral factory, the raw material of human nature, so excellent, so dangerous, so capable of divine purposes.' Newman, *Apol.*, 391. As in the previous passage, the agent of this moulding process is not, as Scripture asserts, the Holy Ghost, but the clerical institute, of which the Papal infallibility is the crown. See pp. 389, etc.

[2] Ut aliquis dici possit absolute pars vera ecclesiæ, de quâ Scripturæ loquuntur, non putamus ullam requiri internam virtutem, sed tantum externam potissimum fidei et sacramentorum communionem, quæ sensu ipso percipitur. Bellarm., *De Eccl. Mil.*, iii. c. 2.

[3] Möhler, *Symbolik*, § 48.

The Church may, and must always, be viewed under a twofold aspect : as the manifestation and as the instrument of Christ's saving power ; it is both the evidence of the Holy Spirit's unseen operation, and the means whereby, from age to age, He gathers men into the visible enclosure, and thence into His mystical Body. But this proves nothing as to the precedence to be assigned to either aspect, any more than the fact that a man consists of body and soul decides which of the two is more properly the man. To the full idea of humanity both are necessary ; yet, while the body without the soul turns to corruption, the soul may exist, and perhaps be active, without the body. The Church came into being on the Day of Pentecost, antecedently to the visible organization which it afterwards assumed ; and, apart from the life within by which it was animated, the organization would not have advanced, or must have soon collapsed ; as the new-born child develops his bodily organs by force of the principle of life within, so in the Church all healthy expansion and outward activity proceed from the animating Spirit from heaven. And so, indeed, writes Möhler himself, who thereby undermines his own theory : 'It is not to be doubted that Christ maintains His Church in spiritual energy by means of those who live in the faith of Him, who are spiritually united to Him; that in these lives His truth, which otherwise would be forgotten, or degenerate into an empty form. Yes; these, who are transformed into His image, are the true supporters of the visible Church, whereas mere professors would not for a day maintain it even in its outward forms.'[1] Nothing can be more true. It is the members of Christ who are in Him as the living branches in the vine that are the true source of the visible activity of the Church, in public worship, in works of charity, in missionary effort; without these, the animating soul, the mechanism of polity and ritual would decay, and in time come to an end. But what is this but an admission, even on the part of the Romanist, that the specific difference of the Church, that which distinguishes it from earthly communities, and especially from its predecessor the Mosaic institute—that, therefore, which constitutes its true definition stripped of accidental adjuncts—is, that it is a company of men filled with the Holy Spirit (*congregatio sanctorum*)?

77. *The Visible and Invisible Church*

In the foregoing observations the expression 'visible Church' has been more than once used, and it may be proper to explain what is meant by it. In the Gospels by Christ Himself, and in the Apostolic epistles, especially those of St. Paul, the Church is spoken of under a twofold point of view—as a local society of Christians or the aggregate of such societies, and as one body under one head, Christ. Thus we read of a church in a single house (Rom. xvi. 5); of the churches of Ephesus, Rome, Philippi, etc.; of the churches of Asia (1 Cor. xvi. 19). There is no reason why we should not extend this mode of speaking, though Scripture seems to furnish no instance of it, to the aggregation of Christian churches throughout the world; which, therefore, may be termed the visible Catholic Church. It is however, not a strictly accurate term; for it is not one Church under one Head, but a collection of independent societies, that would be meant by it.

But we also read of a Church which is the Body of Christ, Christ bearing the same relation to it as the head does to the human body. 'We being many,' St. Paul says, 'are one body in Christ' (Rom. xii. 5); 'By one Spirit we are all baptized into one body' (1 Cor. xii. 13); 'There is one body and one Spirit' (Ephes. iv. 4). As regards Christ, He is said to be 'the Head over all things to the Church (Ephes. i. 22) —a Head of vital influence, and not merely of authority (*Ibid.*, iv. 15–16; Col. ii. 19); for enemies can be ruled by force, but this Church is in willing and loving subjection to Christ. Christ loved the Church and gave Himself for it that ‘ He might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the Word,’[1] so as to ‘ present it to Himself ’ as His bride, inchoatively at present, perfectly hereafter,’ a glorious Church, without spot or wrinkle, holy and without blemish ’ (Ephes. v. 26, 27). This bride of Christ is spoken of in the Apocalypse under another figure, as the new Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven (chap. xxi. 2).

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[1] *Symbolik*, § 49.

The other Apostles use similar language. By St. Peter Christians are said, from the analogy of the Jewish fabric, to form a spiritual temple, into which each Christian is built as a lively stone, and for the purpose of offering spiritual sacrifices ; the Church here intended being collectively a holy priesthood (1 Pet. ii. 5). In the Epistle to the Hebrews these Jewish converts are described as having been incorporated into ‘ the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, the general assembly and church of the firstborn, who are written in heaven ’ (Heb. xii. 22). The expressions of Christ Himself are anticipatory of this twofold aspect of the Church. He directs that an offending brother, who cannot otherwise be reclaimed, shall be reported to ‘ the church ’—that is, the local Christian society to which he belongs ; but to Peter He says that on the rock of the Apostle’s confession He will build a church, against which the gates of hell shall not prevail (Matt. xviii. 17 ; xvi. 18). He speaks of His sheep, which are to form one fold under one Shepherd, but who are also to be, under another aspect, a scattered flock (John x. 16). Of the prophecy of Caiaphas the beloved Apostle, who best knew the mind of his Master, says that it had a meaning unknown to the high-priest himself—viz., that Jesus should by His death be the means of gathering together the children of God, dispersed throughout the world, both Jew and Gentile, into one body (εἰς ἕν). In accordance with this view of the Church, the Apostles’ Creed teaches us to profess our faith in ‘ the ’—that is, the one—‘ Holy Catholic Church.’

If we attempt to identify these two applications of the word ‘ church ’ we shall find difficulties in the way. One attribute of the Church, as the body and bride of Christ, is that it is holy ; and Scripture will not allow us to understand thereby a mere external dedication to God, as the vessels of the tabernacle were called holy. The love of the bridegroom and the bride is reciprocal ; the sheep are not merely called so, but they hear the Shepherd’s voice and follow Him, and He gives unto them eternal life (John x. 27, 28), which cannot be said of mere professors. From the head descends a quickening influence to all the members, uniting them both to Him and to each other ; among the spiritual sacrifices offered in the spiritual temple is that one, so difficult to the unrenewed heart, the sacrifice of self to the glory and will of God (Rom. xii. 1). But the aspect of the visible Church—of the Church *as it appears*—is anything but this. While the general influence of Christianity may have banished from its precincts some gross vices which disfigured the best forms of heathenism ; while it has introduced milder sentiments and practices in many departments of national and social life ; vital religion, as proved by its fruits, is a rare thing in any local or national Church as such, to say nothing of the corruptions of doctrine which prevail in large portions of visible Christendom. That can hardly be the bride of Christ which exhibits no love towards Him, nor that the body, or any part of it, which manifestly does not derive life from the Head by vital union.

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[1] If the sacrament of baptism is here alluded to, it follows that the church which St. Paul calls the bride of Christ is cleansed by baptism ; not that all who receive baptism belong to it.

It may be urged that this discrepancy is but an accidental circumstance—the misfortune of a particular age, and not a necessary feature. There is no doubt that the visible Church may approximate more and more to its ideal, according to circumstances. To be baptized was, in the apostolic age, as now in heathen lands, a surer test of inward renewal than in later times ; it involved greater sacrifices, and furnished a greater presumption of sincerity. Times of persecution, too, are, as regards the visible Church, sifting and purifying. This explanation, however, is insufficient, because from our Lord's own statements the discrepancy is normal and inevitable. The visible Church, or any one such, is always, from the nature of the case, a mixed body—like the field sown with tares and wheat, and the net containing good and bad fishes (Matt. xiii. 24–27, 47–48). And it is not in human power perfectly to separate the one from the other. Discipline can be applied only to acts of overt delinquency, sins of the heart it cannot reach ; and the latter, if habitual, as effectually exclude from saving communion with Christ as do sins of the life. The hidden tares and wheat must both grow together until the harvest, when an unerring judgment will separate the one from the other.

The visible Church, therefore, never can be exactly co-extensive with the body of Christ ; or, in other words, the Church as it now appears is necessarily affected with imperfections which do not belong to the Church in its true idea. When the body of Christ becomes visible under the form of local Churches, some by external adhesion are connected with it who do not belong to it inwardly. Hence the error of sectarian movements, such as that of the Plymouth Brethren. Offended with the presence of sin in the Church in which he was born and baptized, the separatist endeavours to form a perfectly pure Church, only with the result of reproducing a mixed body ; on which a further schism takes place, and so on to the end of time. It is a vain attempt, because it ignores the conditions under which the body of Christ is at present compelled to exist in locally organized societies.

There is another reason, too, why the visible Church can never exactly correspond to the true Church—viz., that it furnishes only an approximation to the real position which each member of Christ's body occupies in it. The spiritual aristocracy of the Church, whether as regards personal holiness or special gifts, does not always occupy, as it ought to do, its true position. After every effort to secure its due recognition mistakes will occur : many are last who ought to be first; and a visible Church will never be, as regards its orders and offices, quite as it would be were Christ Himself to distribute them. Official position is not always a guarantee for sanctity or spiritual wisdom. In this respect, too, there is a hidden life of the Church which, in spite of attempts to ensure its manifestation, remains more or less a hidden one.

These remarks may be particularly illustrated by a reference to the attribute of unity which, as in the Creed, we assign to the body of Christ—not merely oneness, but organized unity.[1] It is obvious that there can be only one Holy Catholic Church, out of which, ordinarily, there is no salvation, two universal Churches being a contradiction in terms. This one Church is described in Scripture as being in organic unity with Christ, as the members of the human body are with the head, animated by one spirit, with a diversity of offices, but all governed and directed by a central source of influence. But this is not the aspect which the normal state of the visible Church presents. Unless we adopt the Romish theory of one supreme visible head, it is an aspect of division and independence. To say nothing of subordinate forms of schism, the only unity of which local churches, as such, are susceptible, is *sameness* of polity, faith, and sacraments, or brotherly recognition ; in no proper sense are they one society, one *respublica* which implies a central government ; they are independent communities, formed on common principles, and with the same object, and only so far are one : they are one as the monarchies of Europe are one.

The following remarks of a writer who at an earlier period of his career was the chief advocate of the Anglican, or Cyprianic, doctrine of unity, but who subsequently became sensible of its incompleteness, except as a stepping-stone to the Papacy, are deserving of attention : ' It may possibly be suggested that this universality which the Fathers ascribe to the Catholic Church lay in its apostolical descent, or again in its episcopacy, and that it was one, not as being one kingdom, or *civitas*, at unity with itself, with one and the same intelligence in every part, one sympathy, one ruling principle, one organization, one communion, but because, though consisting of a number of independent communities, at variance (if so be) with each other even to a breach of communion, nevertheless, all these were possessed of a legitimate succession of clergy, or all governed by bishops, priests, and deacons. But who will in seriousness maintain that relationship, or resemblance, makes two bodies one ? England and Prussia are both monarchical, are they, therefore, one kingdom ? ' England and the United States are from one stock, can they, therefore, be called one state ? England and Ireland are peopled by different races, yet are they one kingdom still. If unity lies in the apostolical succession, an act of schism is, from the nature of the case, impossible ; for as no one can reverse his natural birth, so no Church can undo the fact that its clergy have come by lineal descent from the Apostles. Either there is no such sin as schism, or unity does not lie in the episcopal form, or in episcopal ordination. Nothing more true was ever written. Now, Scripture *does* assign this organic unity under a single Head, with one sympathy, one ruling principle, to *some* Church, as appears from the passages already quoted. The ' body of Christ ' is described exactly in such terms as the above, as no mere aggregation of independent communities, but as one organism under one central authority. The Romish theory of the Papacy does really succeed in producing something like this ; those who reject that theory, and stop short at brotherly intercommunion of independent units, do, and must always, find themselves confronted with the difficulty which this writer states as having lain in his way.

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[1] By organic unity is meant a vital connection of the members of an organism with the head and with each other ; like that which prevails in the human body. It implies more than mere oneness in the sense of singularity, and more, too, than mere sameness.

The distinction, then, between the visible and the invisible Church is imposed upon us by facts, and is sanctioned in Scripture. The Romanist does not deny that within the visible Communion, to which alone he gives the name of the Church, there is an inner circle of those who are in saving union with Christ, and who are the real strength, the very soul, of the visible Church ; but he will not allow that in this inward life lies the true being of the Church, nor does he admit the propriety of applying the term ' Church ' to the aggregate of these true members of Christ. According to the teaching of Rome, a man is a member of Christ who has received baptism and acknowledges the supremacy of the Pope, whatever he may be inwardly ; and the Church itself is defined to be in its essence a visible body, as visible as the republic of Venice, or any other secular community. But if, as has been attempted to prove (preceding §) what is invisible in the Church, viz., the work of the Holy Spirit, constitutes its true being, we argue from the facts of experience and the notices of Scripture that the Church in its visibility never, in the present life, perfectly corresponds to the Church in its truth. That is, that the distinction between the Church visible and the Church invisible is a legitimate one, and deserving of the prominent place which it holds in all the Protestant Confessions.

In fact, next to the doctrine of justification by faith, it is one of the leading points of controversy between us and Rome. Our great divines of the Elizabethan age, and even later, were well aware of this (see the passage cited in the next section from Jeremy Taylor). As an example, let Hooker be heard : ‘ That Church of Christ, which we properly term His body mystical, can be but one ; neither can that one be sensibly discerned by any man, inasmuch as the parts thereof are some in heaven already with Christ, and the rest that are on earth (albeit, their natural persons be visible) we do not discern under this property whereby they are truly and infallibly of that body. Only our minds by intellectual conceit are able to apprehend that such a real body there is ; a body collective, because it containeth a huge multitude ; a body mystical, because the mystery of their conjunction is removed altogether from sense. Whatsoever we read in Scripture concerning the endless love and the saving mercy which God showeth towards His Church, the only proper subject thereof is this Church. Concerning this flock it is that our Lord and Saviour hath promised, “ I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish ” (John x. 28). They who are of this society have such marks and notes of distinction from all others as are not objects unto our sense ; only unto God, who seeth their hearts and understandeth all their secret cogitations, unto Him they are clear and manifest.’ And he adds, not without reason, ‘ For lack of diligent observing the difference between the Church of God mystical and visible, the oversights are neither few nor light that have been committed.’[1]

78. *Continuation*

Since the Protestant does not (as is sometimes alleged) make two Churches, or even a Church within a Church, it is necessary to point out how the invisible Church is connected with the visible. The persons who compose it are, of course, visible. It is not a Platonic republic, or a company of pure spirits ; it is not an idea, in the sense of having no actual existence. But it is invisible, to use the words of Bishop Jeremy Taylor, 'in respect of that quality and excellence by which Christians are constituted Christ's members, and distinguished from mere professors and outsides of Christians. All that really and heartily serve Christ *in abdito* do also profess to do so ; the invisible Church ordinarily and regularly is part of the visible, but yet that part only which is the true one ; and the rest but by denomination of law, and, in common speaking, are the Church—not in mystical union, not in proper relation to Christ. They are not the house of God, not the temple of the Holy Ghost, not the members of Christ ; and no man can deny this. Hypocrites are not Christ's servants, and therefore are not Christ's members, and therefore no part of the Church, but imperfectly and equivocally, as a dead man is a man ; all which is summed up in those words of St. Austin, saying, " that the body of Christ is not *bipartitum* ; it is not a double body. *Non enim revera Domini corpus est quod cum illo non erit in æternum* ; all that are Christ's body shall reign with Him for ever." '

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[1] *Eccles Pol.*, iii. 2, 9.

Nor, again, is it accurate to speak of two Churches, or, like some of our own divines,[1] of one society within another. It is one and the same Church, but considered from different points of view, according as we fix our attention on its external notes and its visible condition in this world, or on its true essential being. Thus Field *On the Church*, chap. x : 'Hence it cometh to pass that we say there is a visible and invisible Church ; not meaning to make two distinct Churches, as our adversaries falsely and maliciously charge us, though the form of words may seem to insinuate some such thing ; but to distinguish the divers considerations of the same Church ; which, though it be visible in respect of the profession of supernatural verities revealed in Christ, use of Holy Sacraments, order of ministry, and due obedience yielded thereto, and they discernible that do communicate therein ; yet in respect of those most precious effects and happy benefits of saving grace, wherein only the elect do communicate, it is invisible ; and they that in so happy and gracious and desirable things have communion among themselves, are not discernible from others to whom this fellowship is denied, but are known only to God. That Nathanael was an Israelite all men know ; that he was a true Israelite, in whom was no guile, Christ only knew.'

What, then, is the bond of connection between the two ? The means of grace ; that is, the preaching of the Word and the administration of the Sacraments ; which are the instruments whereby members of the visible Church are transferred into the invisible ; so that we must never go beyond the visible pale in search of the true Church. *Extra vocatorum cœtum non sunt quærendi electi.* The invisible Church is neither to be sought nor found except in local Christian societies ; it is not, indeed, co-extensive with those societies, but it cannot at present manifest itself except through them, and in the imperfect form of which they admit. That is to say, the true Church cannot at present manifest itself in its corporate capacity, as one body under one Head ; but only under the form of an aggregate of visible Churches. Of this aggregate, or of any portion of it, Christ is not the Head directly, not a Head of vital influence, but only indirectly, in so far as the Christian faith is professed by these Churches. Of the Church of England, for example, as a local Church, ecclesiastically the Archbishop of Canterbury, politically the King, is the head.

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[1] 'For because this visible church doth enfold the other, as one mass doth contain the good one and the base alloy,' etc. Barrow, *Unity of the Church*.

This imperfection, however, belongs to the invisible Church only during its earthly pilgrimage ; the time is coming—that of 'the manifestation of the sons of God' (Rom. viii. 9)—when it will appear in its proper unity, purged from the heterogeneous elements which here cleave to it. The Church militant will then become of one quality with the Church triumphant, which latter even now contains no admixture of evil ; and together they will form the full body of Christ. The Romish conception, and every kindred one, of the Church militant as a body containing good and bad, united merely by the external bonds of polity and Sacraments, fails to explain how the Church triumphant can eventually coalesce into one body with it ; for this conception is obviously consistent with the supposition that not a single member of the Church militant may be in saving union with Christ. Two bodies so essentially different in quality cannot form one Church.

Hence we may perceive the true meaning of the notes of the Church in Art. xix. They do not belong to that Church which is the mystical body of Christ, but to visible Churches. 'The' (or rather 'a,' for there is no one visible Church on earth) 'visible Church is a congregation of faithful men in which the pure Word of God is preached and the Sacraments be duly administered.' The word 'faithful' is here used for professing the Christian faith ; and for a visible Church to be a true one it is enough that in it the pure Word is preached and the Sacraments are administered 'according to Christ's ordinance' ; *i.e.*, in all essential points. That local Christian societies are here meant is plain from the mention of the 'Churches of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch' in the latter part of the Article. It is not said that any of these is the one Holy Catholic Church. What is laid down is that if any professing Christian society has within itself the pure preaching of the Word and the due administration of the Sacraments, it has a right, as against the pretensions of Rome, to the designation of a true branch of Christ's visible Church. But further, we may confidently assume that in every local society a portion of the invisible Church will be found, since the preaching of the Word and the Sacraments are the appointed means of gathering it in.

The connection, therefore, between the Church visible and the Church invisible is a necessary one ; the former administers the means of grace, the latter is the result of their saving operation. The two are indissolubly united, but they do not cover the same ground. It is on account of this connection that the attributes of the body of Christ, which really belong only to it, are transferred presumptively to a visible Church collectively ; as when St. Paul addresses the Ephesian Church as ' saints,' ' faithful brethren,' ' chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world,' etc. He did not, as is sometimes contended, use these expressions in a lower, but in their full and proper sense. He describes the whole Church according to its idea, which idea is to be found only in the Church considered as invisible. It must not be supposed that the Apostle was ignorant of the mixed character of every visible Church ; but since it was not given him to determine who were and who were not real Christians, he was compelled to assume that all were so. On no other ground could he proceed, as he does, to urge motives, reasonings, and exhortations, which his correspondents could not be conceived either to understand or admit unless they were led by the Spirit of God.

Nor does it affect this conclusion that he censures various members of the Church for errors of doctrine or inconsistencies of practice : for it only follows from this that, in his view, they were not perfect Christians, but babes in Christ ; and babes still are living beings. The Corinthians, with all their deficiencies, were presumed to be spiritually quickened ; otherwise the Apostle's admonitions would have been *unintelligible* to them. Even the incestuous person is supposed to have fallen from grace, as many saints have done ; and to be restored as they have been. It may be remarked that the question is not about the indefectibility of grace, but of grace existing at the time. The introduction of the Calvinistic controversy is irrelevant to the point here at issue.

It may be remarked, too, that liturgical formularies are, and must be, constructed on the same principle ; that is, on the presumption that those who are to join in them are real Christians. We cannot frame confessions of sin, prayers for pardon or spiritual blessings, and hymns of praise, avowedly for mere external professors. The forms must be made to express sentiments and desires which none but the spiritually regenerate do or can feel. It is not forgotten that there may be tares among the wheat ; but the necessity of the case compels us to take no account of the tares, and to treat them as non-existent. It is not the tares, but the wheat, who are supposed to be worshippers. We deal with the congregation, not as it may be it fact, but according to the idea—according to its *profession* ; which profession is to be an assemblage of real Christians, in various stages, it may be, of Christian proficiency. In like manner the visible Church is described in terms which really belong to the invisible ; for if we suppose the imperfections removed which prevent the full manifestation of the latter in its essential sanctity and its corporate unity, as they will be one day, the distinction disappears, and the visible and invisible Church become co-extensive and identical—the one body and bride of Christ.

79. *Christ as Head of the Church*

It is a common mode of speaking, and sanctioned by Scripture, to call Christ the Head of His mystical Body ; but, however He may stand in that relation to the Church triumphant, that part of the Church which is in paradise, in strict accuracy He, as the Incarnate Son, is not the Head of the Church militant on earth. For He is no longer upon earth Himself, nor will be until He returns in His proper person ; and in the meantime He has delegated the active administration of the Church militant to His divine Vicar, the Third Person of the Holy Trinity (John xiv. 16). It is, therefore, the Holy Spirit who is the active and operative Head of the Church upon earth ; though, by reason of the unity of Persons, where the Holy Spirit is Christ is : whence these terms are used interchangeably in Scripture for the Divine indwelling presence. Formally, however, the Head of the Church militant is a Spirit, and is invisible ; and to an invisible head an invisible body (invisible in the senses explained) corresponds.

It is only the Protestant who can really make the Church an article of faith. We believe in the one Holy Catholic Church because we cannot see it—see it in its true glory, its undivided unity, its sanctity, its perpetuity founded on Christ's promise. The Church of Romanism is an object of sight, and has no proper place in the Creed. According to it, the one Holy Catholic Church is an earthly polity, as conspicuous, as mixed, as destitute (in its idea) of living, sanctifying faith, as the kingdom of England is. Thus it is robbed of all that gives it value in a dogmatical point of view. Such is the aspect of the Body of Christ which the Romish Catechism presents us with.[1] What is it that we believe in respecting the Church? That, in spite of its apparent divisions, its apparent imperfections, its scandals, its errors, as it meets the eye under its present manifestation in the shape of particular visible Churches, it is still there in its essential being; invisible to the eye of man in its corporate unity, but known to God; the holy seed, hidden but indestructible; the true source of all fruitfulness and progress in the visible Church; the Church against which the gates of hell shall never prevail. In spite of sense, we believe all this; and so, with other spiritual verities which belong not to sight but to faith, it forms an article of the Creed.

It may be thought an improper use of the word 'church' to employ it in this sense, since a church, it is urged,[2] must consist not only of visible persons, but of some bonds of union, and modes of expressing that union, among its members; without which it becomes a mere union of opinion or sentiment, lacking local habitation or name. A Protestant theologian of reputation, Rothe, sides on this point with Bellarmine, and, admitting that the inward communion of saints is something real, asks, How can it be called a church, to the conception of which a visible manifestation is essential? The Reformers, he observes, found themselves in a difficulty; they held fast to the article of the Creed, the Holy Catholic Church, but could discover nothing, especially after the breaking up of the Romish Communion, in the visible state of Christendom corresponding to it; they were compelled, therefore, to transfer the unity of the Church, with other attributes, to an invisible body, which is a contradiction in terms.[3] It is unnecessary to ask how far the learned author's theory that the state is the form in which the Church must eventually lose its distinctive character may have influenced him in his opposition to a fundamental tenet of Protestantism; but the objections themselves do not seem of much weight. In the first place, the attribute even of corporate visibility is not absolutely denied to the invisible Church; it is only postponed. What is affirmed is that in its present imperfect state, in which neither the aggregate of visible churches nor any one visible church (did such exist) can be a perfect manifestation of it, its substantial and most real unity cannot be an object of sense ; an imperfection, however, which will in due time be supplied by the 'manifestation of the sons of God' under a visible head, Christ. But, further, it is a narrow and superficial view of the 'communion of saints' to suppose that it can only be manifested by joint use of sacraments, or joint submission to ecclesiastical authority.

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[1] Bonos igitur et improbos ecclesia complectitur. Hæc autem ecclesia nota est, urbique supra montem sitæ comparata, quæ undique conspicitur. Nam cum illi ab omnibus parendum sit, cognoscatur necesse est. Ecclesia est una; rector visibilis is est qui Romanam Cathedram Petri legitimus successor tenet. . . . Appellatur sancta quod Deo consecrata dedicataque sit. . . . Apostolica, Spiritus enim S. qui ecclesiæ præsidet eam non per aliud genus ministrorum quam per Apostolicum gubernat. *Cat. Trid.*, *De Symb.*, A ix.

[2] Non dici potest societas nisi in externis et visibilibus signis consistat; nam non est societas nisi se agnoscant ii qui dicuntur socii; non autem se possunt agnoscere nisi societatis vincula sint externa et visibilia. Bellarm., *De Eccl. Mil.*, L. iii., c. 12. The Protestant may admit this, and yet hold that there are other vincula besides the sacraments and the Papal hierarchy, and, generally, besides the external organization of a church.

[3] Rothe, *Anfänge der christlichen Kirche*, § 14.

Far deeper, far more real, are the spiritual ligatures which even now knit the body of Christ into a whole : one faith by which all its members depend on Christ ; one Holy Spirit by Whom they are all quickened and sanctified ; one hope which they all entertain ; one principle of love by which all are animated. The members of the body may be scattered here and there, in the various Churches which make up visible Christendom ; but the unity of the Spirit survives local separation, and wherever two or three real Christians are gathered together with Christ by His Spirit in the midst, whether to hear the Word, or to engage in prayer, or to join in the anthem of praise, or to form plans for the evangelization of the world, they know that all other real Christians are one with them—even those whom they have never seen or can see in the flesh. Compared with this spiritual communion, what would be, *e.g.*, the spread of episcopacy or of a liturgical ritual throughout the world? The chaff to the wheat. Such external bonds of union would, after all, possess value only as a manifestation of the unseen unity of the Spirit ; apart from it they would be a forced, artificial product, without power of growth and adaptation to circumstances. We may ask, too, how could the departed saints have fellowship with us if these external bonds of union are the only essential ones, since they are confessedly but provisional and temporary, and do not pass into the world of light and love beyond the grave ? Certainly *some* mode of manifesting its existence is essential to the Church invisible ; but the demand is abundantly satisfied by the fruits of the Spirit, active and contemplative, which make Christians the salt both of the visible Church and the world, the instruments of arresting decay in the mass of professors and of reviving spiritual life where, through adverse influences, it has lost its vigour.

80. *The Christian Ministry*

The Confession of Augsburg thus expresses itself on this subject : 'That we may attain to saving faith, the ministry of the Word and the Sacraments was instituted. For through the Word and the Sacraments as instruments, the Holy Spirit, the Author of faith is given. 'They' (*i.e.*, the Protestants) 'condemn the Anabaptists, whose opinion it is that the Holy Spirit is given to men apart from the external Word.'[1] And so the first Helvetic Confession: 'God has always employed ministers to establish and govern His Church. He employs them now, and will do so as long as there is a Church upon earth. The origin, therefore, institution, and office of Christian ministers are from God Himself. God, indeed, could by an immediate exercise of His power gather a Church out of mankind; but He chooses rather to deal with men through the ministry of men.'[2] Nor do the Romish formularies, in the abstract, speak otherwise.[3] All branches of the Christian Church then, agree in holding that the Christian ministry, whatever different notions may be entertained of its nature and constitution, is of Divine institution. This, however, is not sufficiently to the point. In a certain sense, all the natural relations of superior and inferior by which society is held together are of Divine origin; as, for example, those of parents and children, governors and subjects. 'The powers that be are ordained of God' (Rom. viii. 1). But it is not thus that we speak of the Christian ministry as of Divine appointment. It is a part of the special economy of grace—one of the supernatural provisions of the religion of redemption. It is the gift of Christ to the Church; and our present inquiry is, how far and in what sense it can be traced to the appointment of Christ. Everything in Christianity, really *jure divino*, must, directly or indirectly, be derived from this source.

On examining the New Testament we find that Christ appointed the ministry, in its outward form, no further than that He appointed Apostles for various functions and with special qualifications. He chose the twelve to be His constant associates, in order to receive at first hand the impress of that personality which stands alone in history, and which they have transmitted to us in the gospels; to be the chosen witnesses of His resurrection; to receive from His lips, after that event, such instruction in 'things pertaining to the kingdom of God,' its nature and ordinances, as they were able to receive (Acts i. 3); to be present at His ascension; and after His departure to exercise supreme authority in the Church when it should formally come into existence. Their properly ministerial function dates from an early period, but it was also the last charge committed to them by their

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[1] *Conf. Aug.*, Art. 5.
[2] *Expos. Simp.*, c. 18.
[3] *Conc. Trid.*, Sess. xxiii., c. 1.

Master. They were to go forth and preach the Gospel to every creature, to the Jew first, and then to the Gentile. The Sacrament of Christ's body and blood had already been instituted in their persons, and now they were commanded to admit disciples of all nations into the visible Church by baptism. Not merely a missionary, but a pastoral charge was laid upon them ; for we cannot suppose that the command to Peter to feed the sheep and the lambs of Christ's flock (John xxi. 15, 16) was given to him in a personal capacity, and not rather as a representative of the Apostolic college.[1]

The Apostles, may, in fact, be regarded under three aspects. On some occasions they represent the whole body of believers, as at the institution of the Lord's Supper. After the departure of Judas the Apostles were 'clean through the word' that Christ had spoken unto them (John xv. 3)—fit representatives of the blessed company of all faithful people to the end of time. To them, in this capacity, our Lord gave the symbols of His body broken and His blood shed, and in them, to His Church, until He should come again. Here their official character is merged in their Christian. Again, they were to be the special instruments of the Holy Spirit in founding and building up the Church ; the ultimate authority in matters of faith and practice ; for the discharge of which office they received, as no Christians have since received, the gift of inspiration. And, lastly, they were, as has been observed, ministers of Christ—prototypes, in their offices of preaching and pastoral work, of the ordinary Christian ministry, and as such a distinct order in the Church.

From this it will be seen in what sense they have successors. As inspired teachers and rulers of the Church they can have no successors. We are built upon 'the foundation of the Prophets and Apostles' (Ephes. ii. 20) ; but a foundation does not repeat itself. We may have ten thousand instructors in the faith, but we have not, and cannot have, many fathers (1 Cor. iv. 15). Nor is there any necessity for such a personal succession. For though the men were removed one after another, their place was taken, under a superintending Providence, by their writings, in which, though dead, they yet speak. The New Testament Scriptures are the only real Apostolate which the Church now possesses ; and, we may add, the only one which is suitable to the spiritual constitution of the Church, as the temple of the Holy Ghost. In every Christian society which is in a healthy state Matthew, John, Paul, Peter still decide points of doctrine, order its affairs, and preside in its councils with undisputed authority. As representatives of the mystical body of Christ, the Apostles have successors only in the sense that the true Church never can fail nor the gates of Hades prevail against it. But, as ministers of Christ, they are the predecessors of all Christian ministers ; their office stripped of its personal prerogatives, propagates itself ; the functions of preaching and teaching never can become obsolete. Their example, especially that of St. Paul, is that to which Christian ministers must evermore endeavour to conform. In this sense it is true that no ministry deserves the name of Christian which is not Apostolical or derived from the Apostles.

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[1] The passage (John xx. 21–23), usually understood to refer to the Apostles alone, has not been quoted in this connection, because the evidence is not clear that it does refer to them alone. In Luke xxiv. 36, we have evidently another account of the same transaction. On the evening of the day on which Christ rose, it is said by that Evangelist that the two disciples whom He accompanied to Emmaus returned to Jerusalem, and reported what had occurred to 'the eleven and them that were with them' (v. 33) ; that is, to the whole body of believers then present. To this body, then, the commission recorded in John xx. 21–23 was addressed. The Church is sent as Christ Himself was sent, and to the church it belongs to remit and retain sins (Comp. Matt. xviii. 18). It is thus that Augustine correctly understood the passage ; viz., as applying not to the Apostles only but to the whole Church. 'Deus habitat in templo suo, hoc est in sanctis suis fidelibus, in ecclesia sua : per eos dimittit peccata qui viva templa sunt.' Serm. xcix. 9. 'Ergo si ecclesiæ personam gerebant (Apostoli), et si hoc dictum est *tanquam ipsi ecclesiæ diceretur*, pax ecclesiæ dimittit peccata.' *De Bapt. Cont. Don.*, iii. 18.

What notion we are to form of this derivation from the Apostles is a matter of primary moment. There are but two theories on this point, substantially distinct. We may suppose either that the sacred office is constituted from without, and descends in a certain line, irrespectively of moral or spiritual qualifications ; or that it springs from within, and descends, it may be, in an ascertainable line of succession, but not without regard to the *fitness* of the possessor. The former is the mode peculiar to the Law of Moses ; the latter belongs to the Gospel. The Levitical priesthood was instituted *ab extra*—that is, a certain family was arbitrarily chosen to discharge the office—and the priesthood descended from father to son by natural birth, liable, no doubt, to forfeiture for misconduct as in his case, but otherwise independent of personal qualifications. This was quite in harmony with a system, typical in structure, and intended to operate on the subject from without inwards. Natural birth, the holy garments, anointing with oil, and typical sacrifices, consecrated the priest of the old covenant (Exod. xxviii, xxix). And this is the theory of Rome. Faithful to its fundamental principle of transmuting the Gospel into the law, it approximates in this point more closely to the legal institute. There is the same idea of a purely external succession with inherited powers, for the absence of which no fulness of natural or spiritual endowment can compensate ; only, instead of priests by natural, we have priests by spiritual descent ; the existing body of Bishops having the power, in and by the Sacrament of Orders, of spiritually generating pastors for the Church. If we ask, what is the gift transmitted ? the answer is, the sacramental grace of orders ; that is, not increase of sanctifying grace, not grace to use natural or acquired endowments aright, but a mystical grace of priesthood for the valid performance of holy functions ; which grace is quite separable from spiritual renovation. And as the priests of the law were always priests, no one having it in his power to reverse his natural birth, so in order to confer the same permanency of office on the priests of the new law, the doctrine of the 'impressed character,' or spiritual stamp, was invented ; which, conferred at ordination, for ever distinguishes him who receives it from his brethren in Christ.

The point in debate is not concerning an Apostolic succession of *doctrine*, which, as our article declares, is the test of the legitimacy of a visible Church. 'The pure Word of God preached' in any Christian society, whatever may be its history or its constitution, connects that society with the Apostolic Church. That is to say, the claim of that society to be a true portion of the visible Church depends not on episcopal succession, but on the correspondence of its professed doctrine with that of the Apostles, as found in Holy Scripture. Nor is it the question whether the ministerial commission is to descend from the existing body of ministers, or to be derived from the popular voice. Although the consent of the general body was always required to the appointment of ministers, we find no trace in Scripture of the rule that the delegated authority to preach or to rule proceeded from it.

The Apostles themselves received their commission from Christ, and from no lower authority. When it became necessary to appoint deacons the Church was directed to select qualified persons, but the Apostles formally set them apart to the new office by the imposition of hands (Acts vi. 6). When a further addition was made to the ministry the Apostles are said to have 'ordained elders in every church' (Acts xiv. 23) ; not, we may be sure, without the consent of each church, however expressed, but still reserving to themselves the formal act of investment. In the Apostolic epistles to churches we find no allusion to what, had it belonged to them, would surely have been one of the most important duties ; viz., the appointment or removal of their pastors. In the pastoral epistles it is to existing ministers—Timothy and Titus, Apostolic delegates—to whom directions on this point are given. But if so, the Apostles are the first link in the chain, and there is no reason why a succession, as regards the external commission, should not proceed from age to age, the existing body of ministers handing down the official authority to their successors, and these latter in turn to theirs. It is obvious that an important counterpoise would thus exist to popular influence, sure to make itself unduly felt wherever the minister is looked upon as a creature of the congregation. It is one of the many defects of the Independent, or Congregational, regimen that, in the point before us, it is not in harmony with Scripture precedent. The erroneous notion that a single congregation under its pastor, and that only, is a Church in the Scriptural sense of the word, not only reduces the Christian body in any locality to a collection of atoms, lacking in higher forms of unity, but excludes the idea of a ministerial devolution of office. On the removal of a pastor the congregation proceeds to elect a successor; but there is no recognized body of ministers to transmit the commission. An attempt is sometimes made to remedy the defect by inviting neighbouring pastors to assist in the setting apart of the new minister; but this is only regarded as an act of brotherly recognition. The qualifications of the candidate are not formally authenticated by any official college, and his call proceeds not from above, but from below.

It is with the inner constitution and origin of the ministry that we are at present concerned; and as against the Romish doctrine of a transmission of certain gifts and powers, mystical but nor moral, with its indelible character (this too mystical, nor moral), we gather from the New Testament that the Christian ministry is primarily a gift from above, not tied to any official act, but proceeding directly from the Holy Spirit, and only secondarily an office. It is founded on the spiritual priesthood of all Christians, as that principle was recovered and enunciated at the Reformation. Each Christian, and the whole Church, is a temple of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. vi. 19; 2 Cor. vi. 16); each Christian is empowered and exhorted to exercise priestly functions, to offer up spiritual sacrifices of praise and thanksgiving, and of the willing devotion of the heart. Invested with this privilege, he needs no earthly priesthood to intervene between himself and God; through the one incommunicable priesthood of the Redeemer he draws near to the throne of grace, in the full assurance of faith.

If it be suggested that the Jewish people was also called a kingdom of priests, and yet had earthly mediators, we reply that this dignity was indeed promised to the Jews, but on a condition, which condition never was or could be fulfilled by the Jew as such. 'If ye will obey My voice indeed, and keep My covenant, then shall ye be unto Me a kingdom of priests and an holy nation' (Exod. xix. 5, 6). The command stood over against the Jewish people, but it was never obeyed; and this because the law was not written on their heart. The privilege was conditional, and failed through the weakness of the flesh; and so they never collectively became a kingdom of priests.

And the Divine prescience had arranged for this defect, by providing from the first an earthly priesthood to mediate between a sinful nation and a holy God. The law issued requirements which unaided human nature could never satisfy, and therefore it only convinced of sin. The Levitical institute was a standing memorial that the ideal set before the typical Church could not be reached under that dispensation, and by it there was 'a remembrance of sins' daily and yearly (Heb. x. 3), sins not yet taken away. But the promise of the Gospel is that the law shall be written on the hearts of believers—they shall be all taught of God ; and the true Church, the mystical body of Christ, is really a holy priesthood, though not as yet perfect. Hence all priestly, all ministerial functions, reduced to their essence, belong to the whole Church, and to each member thereof. In the last resort the Christian ministry is constituted in the very being of the Church, and is no mere appendage *ab extra*.

Yet not every Christian is called to the exercise of special ministerial functions. For on the basis of the universal priesthood there was vouchsafed to the Church, as an essential feature of the New Dispensation, a vast variety of particular spiritual gifts, all manifestations of the same Spirit, and all intended for edification. 'As the human body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body, so also is Christ' (Christ and His Church). 'To one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom ; to another, the word of knowledge, by the same Spirit ; to another, faith ; to another, the gifts of healing ; to another, the working of miracles ; to another, prophecy ; to another, discerning of spirits ; to another, divers kinds of tongues ; to another, the interpretation of tongues. But all these worketh one and the self-same Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will '(1 Cor. xii. 8–11).

Some confusion of thought has arisen from supposing that St. Paul here intended to enumerate different *orders* of the ministry,[1] but no permanent orders (the Apostolate was not such), except presbyters and deacons, appear in the New Testament. What the Apostle is speaking of is not offices, but gifts, as appears from the fact that several of the functions named might be united in one person. Thus an Apostle might be an ' evangelist ' and a ' teacher ' ; and so might a deacon, as appears from the instance of Philip (Acts viii) ; a ' prophet ' might be a ' pastor,' and a ' pastor ' a ' prophet,' and both might be ' helpers ' and ' governors.' What we learn from these and similar passages is, that the ministry, as it comes directly from Christ, is a gift rather than an office ; and that it is the Holy Spirit who, in the last resort, gives overseers to the Church. The natural ministry—that is, persons gifted but not yet commissioned—exists before the formal ; the gift precedes the office ; the office is supposed to be conferred on those who possess the inward qualification ; and this latter comes from the Holy Spirit, who refuses to be tied in His operation, and distributes to every man severally as He wills.

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[1] 'To make us understand that we must not confound the functions in the Church with the gifts of the Spirit, much less mistake the one for the other, let us number the gifts of the Spirit that are noted in this one chapter (1 Cor. xii), and see whether the public functions of the Church can in any way be proportioned unto them. Here are nine gifts of the Holy Ghost mentioned ; and I trust there were not so many distinct offices in the Church. He (St. Paul) speaketh indeed (Rom. xii) of divers gifts and graces of the Holy Spirit ; of divers offices he speaketh not.' Bilson., *Perpet. Gov.* c. x. 'I beseech them, therefore, which have hitherto troubled the Church with questions about degrees and offices of ecclesiastical calling, because they principally ground themselves upon two places (1 Cor. xii. Ephes. iv), that, all partiality being laid aside, they would sincerely weigh and examine whether they have not misinterpreted both places; and all by surmising incompatible effects when nothing is meant but sundry graces, gifts, and abilities, which Christ bestowed.' Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.*, v., c. 78.

That these miraculous gifts have long ceased is true ; they were bestowed for a temporary purpose, and, having served it, gradually disappeared. The transition to the normal state is visible in St. Paul's pastoral epistles. In place of what we see in 1 Cor. xiv. when one member had ' a psalm,' another ' a tongue,' a third ' a revelation,' a fourth ' an interpretation,' a fifth ' a doctrine '—of none of which gifts does the Apostle discourage the exercise, only laying down the rule that ' all things be done decently and in order '—natural aptitude, moral qualifications, the habitual graces of ' power and love and of a sound mind,' are what St. Paul directs Timothy to require in presbyters and deacons. The gift of ' discerning spirits ' gives place to examination of candidates for the sacred office ; proved ability succeeds to miraculous ' helps and governments ' ; natural endowments, sanctified to holy purposes, are to be employed. But though circumstances may change, the principles of the new economy remain the same in every age; and these, on the point before us, are that even the permanent ministry is not given from without, but is inherent in the spiritual constitution of the Church : in its essence, or as it emanates directly from Christ, it is a gift rather than an office.

Yet due cautions are to be observed. Not every one who conceives he has a gift, and perhaps is not mistaken, is at liberty, without authority committed to him, to come forward as a teacher. In the earliest age great liberty prevailed on this point, as it did in the Jewish synagogue ; and the Apostle Paul, far from desiring to abridge this liberty, exhorts the Thessalonians ' not to quench the Spirit ' or ' despise prophesyings.'[1]

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[1] Had the Church of England always borne in mind this injunction, her history might have been a different, and in some respects, a more agreeable one.

With the cessation, however, of extraordinary gifts, as a counterpoise to which that of 'discerning spirits' existed in the Apostolic Church, other arrangements became necessary. False prophets and false spirits appeared in the Christian assemblies; doctrines not of heavenly origin began to be taught. It was no longer safe to trust to unpremeditated efforts, or to allow the natural ministry free scope; for experience had shown that it might not be really an endowment of the Holy Spirit. Rules, restrictions, the application of tests became necessary to ensure, as far as might be, that the gift was from above. And then was seen the wisdom of the apostolic usage, already mentioned, of reserving the formal investiture of office to persons specially qualified for that duty. And who so likely to be qualified as those already in office?

Christ bestows the gift, but it belongs to the Church, represented by her officers, to 'call and send ministers into the Lord's vineyard' (Art. xxiii): to examine into the validity of a spiritual call, to authenticate it, and by prayer and the imposition of hands to confer the external commission. 'It is not lawful for any man to take upon himself the office of public preaching, or ministering the sacraments, before he be lawfully called and sent to execute the same' (*Ibid.*); and by this appointed channel the natural ministry passes into the formal, and the persons gifted into an order. What is divine in the ministry is the gift; what is human in it is the commission, conveyed by fallible men, and therefore liable to the imperfection which cleaves to the Church in all its visible manifestations. And hence the formal ministry is never quite co-extensive with the natural, any more than the true Church is co-extensive with the visible Church. Mistakes may and do occur: not always does the gift find its way into formal exercise, nor is the external commission a certain guarantee of the possession of the inward qualification. The order and rule, as enunciated by our Church 'Do you trust that you are inwardly moved by the Holy Ghost to take upon you this office and ministration?' (Ord. Serv.); and yet, 'It is not lawful for any man to take upon him the office of public preaching before he is lawfully sent to execute the same' (Art. xxiii)—hold good to the end of time.

81. *The Polity of the Church*

It has been shown that the visible organization of the Church, unlike that of the Mosaic institute, proceeds from within outwards, and as need required; deacons being first appointed, then presbyters, while the apostolate, the only office which can be traced directly to Christ, passed away as soon as the volume of the canonical writings was completed and took its place. But it has not been explained why the particular form of polity (deacons and presbyters) should have been adopted by the Apostles. Why, for example, should they not have chosen—with, perhaps, modifications rendering it suitable to the Gospel Dispensation—the organization with which they were so familiar, viz., that of the temple, with its graduated hierarchy of high-priest, priests, and Levites ? It is asserted, indeed, that this was the pattern which they followed ; but with no warrant as far as the Scripture evidence is concerned.

The reply sometimes is, that the various offices mentioned in Scripture were formally included in that of apostle, and were by the Apostles shed off successively as they became necessary or expedient. That some of the *functions* discharged at first by the Apostles were delegated to others—such as attending to the poor, the local ministry of the Word, or the management of local ecclesiastical affairs—admits of no doubt ; this was the very reason of their appointing deacons and presbyters. But this is not enough to establish the theory. It must be shown that such subordinate offices were ever formally conferred on the Apostles—that is, that they were by Christ, at some time or other, formally created, first deacons, and then presbyters. For, however a person may devolve certain *functions* on others, he cannot transmit an office unless he has been first invested with it himself. But there is no trace in Scripture of any such formal institution of these orders in the persons of the Apostles. The twelve were chosen to be simply Apostles, the apostolate including all the *functions* which were afterwards distributed among the various orders of the ministry, and a great deal besides ; but they never were formally deacons, presbyters, or bishops.

The notion may be dismissed as a fanciful one, resting on no sufficient evidence. Nor is there any need to resort to it ; for, side by side with the legal hierarchy, there had grown up, and in the time of Christ come to maturity, an institution not directly of Divine origin, but providentially intended to become the cradle of the visible polity of the Christian Church—viz., the synagogue. To the synagogue, properly so called, a higher antiquity cannot be assigned than some period subsequent to the Babylonish Captivity ; and this event sufficiently accounts for its rise. The exiles ' by the waters of Babylon,' deprived of the temple services, endeavoured to supply the want by such religious exercises as remained within their reach. They came together as opportunity offered, to hear at the mouth of a prophet words of instruction and consolation (Ezek. xiv. 1). Restored to their native land, they continued these weekly assemblies, the homiletic services of which would be the more valued when the gift of prophecy was withdrawn. In the

Book of Nehemiah we have an account of a religious service closely resembling what afterwards became the stated worship of the synagogue : Ezra ascended a pulpit of wood ; read portions of Scripture, which, since the Hebrew tongue was no longer understood by the people, were interpreted by persons appointed for that purpose ; and the whole concluded with prayer and thanksgiving. The service on this occasion took place in the open air ; the first erection of buildings for the purpose is probably to be ascribed to the extra-Palestine Jews, whose example was speedily followed by their brethren in Judæa ; and synagogues so multiplied that in our Lord's time[1] there are said to have been hundreds in Jerusalem alone. The dispersion of the Jews after the Captivity produced a corresponding diffusion of the new mode of worship. The Jews of the dispersion maintained their connection with the temple by attendance at the principal feasts, while in the particular places in which they resided they were fain to content themselves with the simpler devotions of the synagogue. And thus in every considerable city of the Roman Empire synagogues, in the time of Christ, existed.

From the foregoing remarks the nature of the synagogical worship may be gathered. With the temple, or the Levitical worship, it had no immediate connection. The services were not sacrificial or symbolical, but homiletic ; a priest, as such, had no place in the synagogue. As to teaching, great latitude prevailed. While this office properly belonged to the rulers of the synagogue, and could not be exercised without their permission, it was commonly delegated to any qualified member of the assembly who might intimate his wish to discharge it. Thus it excited no surprise when our Lord, who was of the tribe of Judah, stood up in the synagogue at Nazareth 'for to read' (Luke iv. 16) ; and when Paul and Barnabas entered the synagogue in Pisidia, the rulers sent them a permissive message, 'if they had any word of exhortation to say on' (Acts viii. 14).

Such is a brief sketch of the institution which had, in the lapse of ages, gradually established itself wherever there were Jews—that is, everywhere ; and perhaps there is no circumstance in the history of the chosen people more strongly indicative of a superintending Providence, more clearly intended to prepare the way for the Gospel. Christianity was to embrace all nations within its pale ; but if the Jews had not, after their dispersion, adopted this form of worship, there would not have existed any religious centre to which the new faith could have appealed, as the Apostles in the exercise of their mission traversed the world. But in the synagogue exactly what was wanting was supplied. These places of worship could be multiplied indefinitely without affecting the unity of the temple, or the connection of the worshippers therewith; by them the Jewish mind became habituated to the offerings of prayer and praise instead of the legal sacrifices, and to a ministry of the Word instead of a ministry of types. Thus on their arrival at any new scene of labour the Christian missionaries, themselves Jews, had but to repair to the local synagogue to find, as far as regards external preparation, the way smoothed for the successful promulgation of the Gospel.

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[1] Vitringa, *De Syn. Vet.*, i., p. 2, c. 12.

With these two, and only these two, systems of worship, that of the temple and that of the synagogue, the Apostles were conversant; which were they likely to engraft on the Christian Church? Let it be remembered that, as long as the temple stood, no Jew, instructed in the principles of his religion, could ever have thought of setting up a counterpart of the temple in heathen lands; still less in close proximity to the sacred structure. It was a fixed maxim with this people that the Levitical ritual was to be confined to one spot, viz., Jerusalem: there alone, according to the law, God was to be approached with sacrifice. When Onias, driven from Judæa, and disappointed in his hope of succeeding to the high-priesthood, persuaded Ptolemy (B.C. 145–80) to permit the erection of a temple at Leontopolis, in Egypt, his greatest difficulty, as Prideaux observes, was to reconcile the Jews to this project, since they believed it sin to sacrifice to God anywhere but upon the altar at Jerusalem.[1] Nothing but a special revelation from heaven that the temple services were no longer to be confined to Jerusalem, or some providential catastrophe rendering these services impossible, could have overcome these objections.

Such a catastrophe, did, indeed, occur, viz., the destruction of the temple A.D. 70, by which Christianity was released to pursue its independent career; but at this time the elements of Christian worship were firmly established throughout the world. And, far from there being any command of Christ in this direction, He Himself, in the few prospective hints which He gave, contemplated the Christian societies as assuming the synagogical form; as when He promised His presence to two or three gathered in His name, and still more distinctly when He committed authority to such societies to bind and loose, and the power of excommunication—functions which belonged not to the temple but to the synagogue. There is, indeed, no fact more significant, or more important to notice, than the light in which the first Jewish converts regarded themselves, and were regarded by their unbelieving brethren.

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[1] Prideaux, *Connect.*, p. ii., 64. Josephus calls this attempt of Onias *ἁμαρτίαν καὶ τοῦ νόμου παράβασιν*, *Antiq. Jud.*, xiii. c. 3.

They did not admit, nor was the accusation ever brought against them (except in St. Pauls' instance), that they were separatists from the divinely appointed ritual of Moses. 'This way,' 'this sect,' was the usual title bestowed upon them. How could they entertain such a supposition when the temple and its ritual, which they believed to be of Divine origin, existed before their eyes, and no intimation was given of the immediate fulfilment of their Master's prophecy (Matt. xxiv. 2) ? At any rate, it is clear what their attitude was. They frequented the temple at the appointed hours of prayer (Acts iii.1) ; and it was the testimony of St. James, when advising his brother Apostle to make it clear that he was no subverter of the 'customs' of Moses by himself fulfilling a vow, that the believing Jews at Jerusalem were 'all zealous of the law' (Acts xxi. 20) ; and he mentions the fact without any mark of disapprobation. And the Apostle of the Gentiles, who so zealously vindicated the freedom of the Gentiles from the yoke of the law, thought it expedient for himself as a Jew to follow this advice. So far was the infant church of Jerusalem from assuming a hostile or even indifferent attitude towards the Jewish ordinances. It was regarded as a new sect among the many which existed side by side in the bosom of Judaism, the peculiarity of which was that its members believed Jesus of Nazareth to be the promised Messiah.[1] But to have established in the Christian Church a transcript of the temple and its sacrificial ritual, would have placed the new sect in direct opposition to the existing economy, and seriously impeded the progress of the Gospel. St. Paul could with truth challenge his accusers to gainsay his statement, that 'neither against the law of the Jews, nor against the temple' had he 'offended anything at all' (Acts xxv. 8).

Such is the antecedent probability in favour of the derivation of the polity of the Church from the synagogue ; and the facts convert it into certainty. The 'young men' who carried Ananias to his burial (Acts v. 6) do not seem to have occupied an official position; it was natural that the younger members of the society should undertake this office ; but it is otherwise with 'the seven' formerly chosen by the Church and set apart by the Apostles with the imposition of hands (Acts vi). These are justly considered as the prototypes of what afterwards became the diaconate. Vitringa, indeed, labours to prove that this was not so ; that their office was an extraordinary one, and in many respects did not correspond to that of the deacons who appear in St. Paul's epistles.[2] There is no doubt that such men as Stephen and Philip play a more important part in the history of the early Church than that which we commonly associate with the name of deacon, but this was because they were filled 'with the Holy Spirit, and with wisdom.' Such personal qualities would not be transmissible, but the duties to which they were appointed, such as distributing the alms of the Church, must have been permanent, and could be discharged by any trustworthy men. Once the office was established it gradually drew to itself other duties, such as those mentioned in 1 Tim. iii.; the deacons of St. Paul probably took an active part in the office of instruction, public and private.

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[1] This is exactly Gamaliel's view of them in Acts v. 34–39.

[2] *De Syn. Vet.*, L. iii. p. 2, c. v.

In the lapse of time the diaconate lost much of its original dignity, especially in the extra-Palestine Churches. The deacons attended to the poor and sick; but their main duty was to assist the bishop in the details of public worship; to see 'that all things were done decently and in order'; to look after the vestments; to select the portions of Scripture to be read; to assist at the distribution of the Eucharistic elements; and to convey them to those who through infirmity were unable to be present at the celebration. Now, the similarity between such an office and that of the Chazanim, or inferior ministers of the synagogue, as described by the Rabbinical writers, is obvious; and no doubt can be entertained that, with the necessary modifications, the latter, under the form of the diaconate, reappeared in the Christian, especially the Gentile-Christian, Churches.[1] It has, indeed, been objected that the analogy fails, because each synagogue, as a rule, had only one Chazan;[2] but this is by no means certain. The number seems to have varied according to the size and importance of the synagogue; and Vitringa quotes a passage which speaks at least of two, and his inference is justified that if there were two there might have been more.[3]

But whatever uncertainty may rest on the derivation of the Christian diaconate, none such can attach to the next order of ministers, the Presbyters, first mentioned in Acts xi. 30. From what other source but the synagogue could the Apostles, all Jews, have borrowed this class of ministers? There were no Presbyters, or elders, officially connected with the temple. But in the synagogue they were the ruling body, entrusted with the regulation of public worship, the care of the poor, and the administration of discipline. In the New Testament they sometimes bear the title of 'rulers,' or *Αρχισυνάγωγοι*, but their proper Jewish name was זְקֵנִים, or 'elders.' In the smaller synagogues one such elder presided ; in the larger there were several who formed a college (*πρεσβυτήριον*, 1 Tim. iv. 14) ; whence the varying statements of Scripture, which sometimes speaks of the 'ruler' (Luke xiii. 14), more commonly of 'the rulers' of the synagogue (Acts xiii. 15). The duties of Christian Presbyters, as described by St. Paul in 1 Tim. v. 17, correspond with those of the Jewish elders, only that labouring 'in the word and doctrine' is more particularly ascribed to and commended in the Christian office.[1] We may suppose, in short, that what took place on a certain occasion is a fair example of the formation of a Christian society. When St. Paul arrived at Corinth he repaired, as usual, to the synagogue, and claiming his right to speak, he endeavoured to convince his hearers that Jesus is the Christ. When he found that the majority refused to be convinced, he separated the believing Jews from their unbelieving brethren, and with the Gentiles who believed, formed them into a Christian synagogue, retaining as far as possible the features of the elder institution. It was the celebration of the Lord's Supper that formed the essential point of distinction between the two. This Christian synagogue was the nucleus of the visible Corinthian Church, but only the nucleus. As time went on, and the Church grew in numbers, other regulations became necessary ; Christianity, after A.D. 70, began to crystallize itself independently, as regards its polity ; the immediate occasion being the destruction of the Jewish temple. But not until a much later age did the Church quite lose sight of its synagogical parentage, as regards polity and ritual.

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[1] Although the first deacons are never afterwards so called in the book of Acts, but always 'the seven,' the name is implied in *διακονία τῇ καθημερινῇ*, and *διακονεῖν τραπέζαις*, Acts vi. 1, 2.

[2] Lightfoot, Phil.

[3] Synagogæ passim *unum* habuerunt ministrum (חזן), ut ex iis quæ supra disputavimus, abunde constat: majores tamen habere potuerunt et habuerunt etiam *plures*, ut ex testimonio supra ex Colbo producto liquet, 'locus ubi duos facere solent Chazanitas.' Si duos, ergo et plures habere potuerunt Synagogæ diaconas, prout circumstantiæ suadebant. L. iii., p. 2, c. 23.

With the institution of deacons and presbyters the inspired writings fail us, except in the way of indirect precedent. The synagogue had no office corresponding to that of Diocesan Bishop, nor does the New Testament furnish us with any instance of the office. The 'bishops' of St. Paul's epistles are, as is now universally acknowledged, the same persons who are elsewhere called presbyters.[2] Timothy and Titus, usually cited as bishops in our sense of the word, were never permanently fixed in one place ; at least, not during St. Paul's lifetime. They were Apostolic delegates, left for a time to 'set in order the things that were wanting' in certain churches (Tit. i. 5) ; to do what the

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[1] The notion that lay-elders, such as are found in the Calvinistic Churches, are mentioned in the New Testament, is conclusively refuted by Vitringa, L. 2, c. ii. The Apostolic Presbyters were both teachers and rulers ; though one or the other function predominated according to circumstances.

[2] *Πρεσβύτερος* was the Jewish title ; that of *ἐπίσκοπος* is of Gentile origin. The Athenians used to send public officers called *ἐπισκόποι* to inspect subject states.

Apostle himself would have done, had he not been detained elsewhere; but when their work was finished they rejoined their master, to be employed, no doubt, in the same way in other places.[1] The utmost that can be inferred from these instances is that it is not at variance with the mind of St. Paul that the chief management of a church, whether for a longer or a shorter time, should bevested in an individual; and so far as this favours the episcopal regimen, let it prevail. But no order of diocesan bishops appears in the New Testament.[2]

The evidence is in favour of the supposition that Episcopacy sprang from the Church itself, and by a natural process, and that it was sanctioned by St. John, the last survivor of the Apostles. The presbytery, when it assembled for consultation, would naturally elect a president to maintain order; at first temporarily, but in time with permanent authority; an office such as that which St. James appears to have exercised at Jerusalem. Thus it is probable that at an early period an informal episcopate had sprung up in each church. As the Apostles were one by one removed, and as local churches came to consist, not of one, but of several congregations, the office would assume increased importance and become invested with greater powers. Christianity, when not enfeebled by sectarian influences, tends to visible forms of unity, of continually expanding circumference. We need not refuse assent, with the necessary qualifications, to Möhler's remark, 'that the craving of the faithful in Christ for union cannot rest satisfied until it sees itself expressed in some type or representation. The Bishop is the visible expression of this longing—the personification of the mutual love of the Christians of a certain locality—the manifestation and the living centre of that Christian spirit which ever strives after unity.'[3] That is to say, Episcopacy, like the inferior orders, developed itself from within outwards, and we have no need of a Divine prescription to account for it.

With the departure of the living Apostolic authority, acknowledged by the whole Church, factions, and heresies, as Jerome remarks, began to prevail, and, in his view, the Episcopate was instituted as a remedy against these evils. 'When every man began to think those whom he had baptized to be his own, and not Christ's, it was decreed throughout the world that one chosen out of the presbyters should be set above the rest, to whom the care of the whole Church should appertain, that thus the seeds of division might be rooted out.[1] The Cyprianic idea of the Episcopate followed in due time. Each bishop came to be regarded not only as a centre of unity to his own Church, but as a means of communication with all other Christian Churches; the office assumed an ecumenical as well as a diocesan character. The universal episcopate formed a kind of corporation, of which each particular bishop was in his diocese the representative. 'As the one Church,' says Cyprian, 'has been divided by Christ into many members throughout the world, so the one episcopate is everywhere diffused by the multiplicity of many bishops.'[2] Thus the universal episcopate was supposed to have taken the place of the Apostolic College, and each bishop to enjoy a portion of the Apostolic grace and authority.

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[1] 'Do thy diligence to come shortly unto me,' 2 Tim. iv. 9. 'When I shall send Artemas unto thee, or Tychicus, be diligent to come unto me to Nicopolis,' Tit. iii. 12. The tradition that Timothy and Titus became, after St. Pauls' death, diocesan bishops of Ephesus and Crete, may be well founded; but it cannot be proved from the New Testament.

[2] It is a curious and characteristic circumstance, that of the three orders which have, for the most part, prevailed in the Church, that particular one which, as regards Scriptural evidence, has the least to say for itself, should, in certain quarters, be described as emphatically 'the divine element' of Church polity.

[3] *Einheit in der Kirche*, p. 187.

It is unnecessary to pursue the subject further. Bishops grew into metropolitans, metropolitans into patriarchs; and by the same law of natural expansion. It is easy to comment on the errors, doctrinal and practical, which disfigured the Christianity of those ages. None the less, it presents a remarkable phenomenon. A vast association, extending over the greater part of the Roman Empire, maintained its ground not only without the aid, but under the disfavour of the state; exhibiting everywhere the same general features, and pervaded throughout its parts by a common sympathy and a compactness of adhesion which to the heathen statesman or philosopher must have appeared inexplicable. It is easy, with the infidel historian, to ascribe the characteristic features of the the visible Church of those ages to priestly ambition or other evil tendencies. The Christian of larger views and greater candour will see in them a proof of the power of his religion, even when declined from the Apostolic standard, to knit men together in a bond of union far exceeding in depth and comprehensiveness any the world had yet seen.

82. *The Powers of the Clergy* (*The Keys*)

According to the Council of Trent, the government of the Church is a hierarchy, or the relation of the clerical order to the Christian people is that of secular rulers to subjects;[3] and, moreover, the clergy are a priesthood in the strict sense of the word—mediators between God and man. But the relation of magistrate to subject belongs to the state, not to the Church ; and the New Testament knows no other proper priesthood but that of Christ Himself.

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[1] Quoted by Bilson, *Perp. Gov.*, p. 268.

[2] Epist. 52, ad Anton. Comp. 'Episcopatus unus est, cujus a singulis in solidum pars tenetur.' *De Unit. Eccles.*

[3] Dominus noster Jesu Christus a terris ascensurus ad cœlos sacerdotes sui ipsius vicarios reliquit, tanquam præsides et judices. Sess. xiv., c. 5.

On the Romish theory, the laity are in a state of tutelage, under a paternal, but despotic government, to which has been committed ample means of subduing the refractory impulses of human nature, and enforcing implicit obedience ; viz., the power of the keys ; by which is understood, not the remitting and retaining of sins by the ministry of the Word, but the priestly prerogative of absolution, whereby the gate of heaven is opened or shut to the penitent. The priest has but to ‘ retain ’ sin by refusing absolution, and no pardon can be hoped for ; while excommunication is a complete severance from Christ. Not without reason is the *potestas jurisdictionis*, or power of government, assigned by Romish writers to the sacrament of penance : for in truth this one ‘ nerve of discipline,’ as the Council calls it, is sufficient, in all ordinary cases, to crush any symptoms of an insubordinate spirit.

It was not without expressions of dissent that the Tridentine Canons on this subject were promulgated. That Christian instinct, which has never been wholly extinguished in the Romish Church, even in its worst times, asserted itself against the despotic power claimed for the Pope over the bishops, for the bishops over the other clergy, and for the whole spirituality over the laity. The very name, it was remarked at the Council, carried with it an unchristian sound. The New Testament describes the clergy as the ministers, or servants, of the Christian people, and not as their rulers in a secular sense. But these protests were unavailing. The Gallican Church, indeed, as a whole, made a successful stand against the concentration of ecclesiastical power in the Papacy ; but to admit the laity to an effective share in the government of the Church would have been as strange a notion to Bossuet as to Bellarmine. The latter sums up the Romish doctrine thus : ‘It has always been believed in the Catholic Church that the bishops in their dioceses and the Roman Pontiff in the whole Church, are real ecclesiastical princes ; competent by their own authority, and without the consent of the people or advice of the presbyters, to enact laws binding on the conscience ; to judge in matters ecclesiastical, like other judges ; and, if need be to inflict punishment.’ The only popular element in the system, is that any one may become a member of the episcopate, or governing body.

The restoration—in theory, at least—of the laity to their proper place in the Church was an immediate result of the Reformation. The reassertion of the universal priesthood of Christians was inconsistent with any difference *in kind* between clergy and laity, and the doctrine of justification by faith robbed the confessional of its terrors. The lay members of the body of Christ emerged from the spiritual imbecility which they had been taught to consider as their natural state, and became free, not from the yoke of Christ, but from that of the priest. In some instances, as was natural, the recovered liberty of the Church ran into licence. In others, the rights of the laity, though acknowledged in treatises and confessions, were never fully restored, the secular government being made the depository of these powers which had formally been wielded by the Pope or his delegates. The proper adjustment of lay and clerical influence in the Church is a problem which yet remains to be solved by most of the Reformed Churches of Europe.

The distinction between clergy and laity, if considered one *of kind*, is at variance with Scripture. St. Peter speaks of the whole Church, and not any particular part of it, as the Lord's κλήρος or portion (1 Pet. v. 3) ; nor, in the view of any of the sacred writers, is the ministry more essential to the Church than the Church to the ministry. A distinction may, indeed, be founded on a diversity of spiritual gifts, but this is not one of kind. On the other hand, Scripture does assign an independent position to the ministers of Christ ; they are not mere organs of the congregation, but presidents and leaders (1 Thess. v. 12 ; Heb. xiii. 17). Titus is directed to 'rebuke sharply' certain members of the church (chap. i. 13), and the warning which St. Peter addresses to presbyters not to 'lord it over the flock' (1 Pet. v. 3) presupposes powers which they might be tempted to abuse. In short, the sovereignty of the Church resides neither in the people apart from their pastors nor in the pastors apart from the people, but in the whole body. There are three rules commended to us by Apostolic precedent, which, wherever they prevail, operate as a check to hierarchical despotism.

The first is the right of the laity to a voice in the councils of the Church. In the Council held at Jerusalem to consider the question of the obligation of the ceremonial law on Gentile converts, 'the whole Church' was present, and the decree ran in the name of 'the apostles, and elders, and brethren' (Acts xv. 22, 23). Whether the clergy and laity form one mixed assembly, or distinct ones, is not of primary importance ; though the latter seems the better arrangement. What is of moment is an effective vote, or veto, to be possessed by the lay assessors, or chamber ; otherwise their presence is of little use. It would be interesting, did space permit, to trace the steps by which the Apostolic model was gradually abandoned, until not only the laity, but the presbyters and deacons, were excluded from any real share in the government of the Church. The synodal system, in itself beneficial, was the proximate cause of the change. The diocesan synods long retained that popular element which is the proper counterpoise to sacerdotal influence. Cyprian himself, the chief assertor of Episcopal authority, declares it to have been his rule, from the time that he became bishop, to do nothing without the advice of his presbyters and the consent of the people. 'Common decency,' he writes to his clergy, 'as well as a rule of discipline and manner of (church) life, requires that we, the bishops, with the clergy, and in the presence of the steadfast laity, should settle all matters by piously consulting together.' But when diocesan synods expanded into provincial it became the practice for the bishops only, as representatives of their respective churches, to be summoned; the presbyters, if any, appearing merely as attendants on their bishops ; while the laity were excluded, or were present merely as spectators. At length, in the greater councils, whether provincial or general, the whole administrative power passed into the hands of the bishops ; they alone possessed the right of voting, and if a few presbyters or laymen attended it was only to discharge subordinate functions.

It is of little avail to urge that the bishop, being one with his people and the people with him, the laity were, in fact, represented at synods in and through their bishop :[1] considerations of this mystical character are not found in practice to be of much value. A clerical corporation, like every other, inevitably tends to its own aggrandisement, and this without being conscious of the motives which influence it. It would be unjust to ascribe to the bishops of the third and fourth centuries a deliberate design to exalt their own order at the expense of the others ; such, nevertheless, was the result. The circumstances of the times—especially the difficulty of keeping within bounds that singular class of persons, the 'confessors'—might be pleaded in excuse of Cyprian's assumptions ; but these became the ordinary style of his successors ; every contest between the presbyters or the laity and the bishop terminated in favour of the latter ; and thus, by continual accretions, the hierarchical system attained the proportions under which it presents itself in the middle ages.

No church can be in a healthy condition which excludes from the administration of its affairs any constituent part of the body ecclesiastic. Those who are thus excluded lapse into a state of indifference to the spiritual welfare of the community, as a limb never used perishes of atrophy ; or they secede to other religious bodies in which church-life is more active and diffused. The monarchical form into which the government of the English Church seems to have settled cannot be deemed favourable to the vitality or progress of that Church. The history of the disestablished Irish Church may read us some lessons, particularly as showing what can be accomplished by the cordial co-operation of the different orders of clergy and of the clergy and laity, each with recognized powers and duties, in the work of organization.

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[1] Möhler, Einheit in der Kirche, p. 211.

The second rule is that the laity should have a voice in the appointment of pastors. Such we gather to have been the mind of the Apostles. If on any occasion they might have claimed to act independently, the appointment of a successor to Judas Iscariot was such ; yet they did not so act. The case was brought by St. Peter before the whole company of believers, and at his request they selected two invividuals as best fitted for the vacant office ; all joined in prayers for Divine direction ; all 'gave forth their lots' (Acts i. 24–26). So it was in the appointment of deacons. The Apostles directed 'the multitude of the disciples' to choose from themselves whom they judged most competent. The persons thus selected were presented to the Apostles to be formally inducted into office (Acts vi. 5, 6). The mode of selecting presbyters is not so distinctly recorded ; but the natural meaning of the word used (χειροτονήσαντες, Acts xiv. 23) is that of appointing by suffrage, and we gather from it that Paul and Barnabas followed the precedent of the diaconate. This is confirmed by the testimony of Clement of Rome. 'Those,' he writes, 'whom either the Apostles or other distinguished men' (their delegates) 'placed in the ministry, with the consent of the whole Church (συνευδοκησάσης τῆς ἐκκλησίας πάσης), ought not to be deposed from their office.'[1] For several centuries after the Christian era the Apostolic rule was observed. 'The faithful laity,' says Cyprian, 'ought the rather to avoid communion with a delinquent bishop and sacrilegious priests, because it possesses the power both of choosing worthy priests and of rejecting unworthy.'[2]

The third and perhaps the most important of the rights of the laity is concerned with the exercise of discipline ; which by Christ Himself is vested in the whole Church, and not in the clerical body alone. 'Tell it unto the church,' is His command (Matt. xviii. 17) ; not to the rulers as a distinct class, but to the whole society, with which it rests, in the last resort, to inflict the penalty of excommunication. That the presiding bishop, or elders, should be the persons to pronounce the sentence may be admitted, but that the decision should rest with the community is clearly the sense of Scripture. When St. Paul, by virtue of his Apostolic authority, informs the Corinthians that, owing to their remissness, he had resolved to deliver a certain offender 'to

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[1] Epist. i., p. 44.

[2] Epist. lxviii. See also Apost. Const., viii., c. 4.

Satan for the destruction of the flesh,' he takes care to associate, as far as he could, the Church with himself, and to make it a joint act. Absent in body he would be present in spirit when the Church was 'gathered together' to carry out the sentence. And he afterwards speaks of it as a 'punishment inflicted of many' (1 Cor. v. 4, 2 Cor. ii. 6). Now of all ecclesiastical acts the expulsion of a member is the most sovereign; indeed, it is the only sovereign act which a church, as such, can perform, and corresponds to capital punishment by the State. Wherever the clergy possess an uncontrolled power of inflicting spiritual censures, it is next to impossible but that a spiritual despotism, of a peculiarly oppressive kind, will be the result. The two dogmas, that the sovereignty of the church resides in the clergy, and that the latter are proper priests, were sufficient to enslave the mind of Europe for a thousand years. Nor were they to become again dominant, would they be found to have lost aught of their potency. These spiritual weapons may be despised by the philosopher, but with the multitude, especially where the light of Scripture is not diffused, the case is different.

If the relation of pastors to people is not that of governors to subjects, still less is it that of a mediating priesthood, such as existed in the preparatory dispensation. What has been incidentally observed in the notices of the synagogue, and its offspring the earliest Christian societies, sufficiently proves that the sacrificial element except in an improper and figurative sense, formed no part of the first Christian worship. And the direct testimony of Scripture confirms this conclusion. In no single instance does it assign to Christian ministers the proper title of a sacrificing priest (ἱερευς, sacerdos). They are Presbyters (whence the word priest in our formularies), ministers, overseers, but never mediators between God and man. There are extant three epistles of St. Paul, addressed to Christian ministers, and directly on their duties; but among these duties we search in vain for any of a sacerdotal character. Timothy is directed to 'preach the word,' to 'give attendance to reading, exhortation and doctrine,' to exercise discipline, to ordain elders; but no instructions are given him touching the matter or ritual of the Christian sacrifice. Omissions of this kind in pastoral epistles are, on the supposition of the Christian ministry's being a proper priesthood, unaccountable. For wherever there exists a visible sacrifice and priesthood, they occupy a position of decided superiority to every other act of worship. So it was under the law of Moses, and so it is in the Church of Rome; in which latter the sacrifice of the Mass is the central feature of worship, around which everything else revolves. If St. Paul had regarded Timothy and Titus as priests, it is natural to suppose that directions concerning their sacerdotal duties would have filled as large a space in his epistles as they do in the Book of Leviticus.

But it may be urged that the question does not turn so much upon names as upon facts ; and, though it may be granted that neither the Apostles nor the two orders of the ministry traceable to them bear the name of priests, yet that sacerdotal functions are ascribed to them in Scripture. But the assumed fact is not a fact. Neither the Apostles, nor the presbyters, to say nothing of deacons, ever appear in Scripture as discharging such functions. When and where were the Apostles appointed priests ? The Council of Trent replies, when, in the institution of the Lord's Supper, Jesus spake the words, 'Do this in remembrance of Me.'[1] It is not easy to discover so momentous a doctrine in this simple direction. The words *Hoc facite*, which as spoken by Christ we hold to mean, Celebrate this ordinance, must, according to the Council, be translated, Perform the sacrifice of the Mass.[2] Which interpretation is the correct one let the terms of institution decide : 'When He had given thanks He brake it and said, *Take eat* ; after the same manner also He took the cup, saying, *As often as ye drink it*; this do ye in remembrance of Me' (1 Cor. xi. 24, 25). The eleven Apostles, Judas being separated from them, represented on this occasion the mystical body of Christ in every age, not a sacerdotal order. The remitting and retaining of sins, even if it had been a special Apostolic privilege, is sufficiently explained by such instances as those of Ananias and Sapphira, Simon Magus, and Elymas the sorcerer, in which a supernatural gift of spiritual discernment was exhibited ; but in fact, as has been observed, the commission was given, not to the Apostles alone, but to the whole company of assembled believers ; it is the Church, as the witness for Christ from age to age, that remits or retains sins, not a priestly caste by the power of absolution.

It is remarkable that the baptismal commission should not have been insisted on in this connection, for this does seem to have been addressed to the Apostles only ; but the fact is, it would not have been convenient to press the passage, for, as is well known, the Church of Rome not only admits the validity of lay baptism, but in cases of supreme necessity allows a midwife to baptize. The following words, 'Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world' (Matt. xxviii. 20), make it plain that the charge was given to the Apostles as representatives of the Christian ministry, not as inspired founders of the Church, for as such they were not to remain to the end of the world. The subsequent history also is silent on the point. They who on the Day of Pentecost received Peter's message were baptized ; by whom we are not informed (Acts ii. 41). Philip, though but a deacon, baptized the Eunuch. Peter, beholding the sealing of the Spirit vouchsafed to Cornelius and his friends, 'commanded them to be baptized' (Acts x. 48) ; whether by himself or others is not specified. Paul declares that Christ sent him not to baptize but to preach the Gospel, and congratulates himself that he had only baptized a few of the Corinthian Church (1 Cor. i. 14–17) ; which, to say the least, negatives the supposition that he considered it a special part of his office to administer this sacrament.

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[1] Si quis dixerit illis verbis, Hoc facite in meam commemorationem, Christum non instituisse Apostolos sacerdotes ; aut non ordinâsse ut ipsi, aliique sacerdotes offerent corpus et sanguinem suum ; anathema sit. Sess. xii., Can. 2.

[2] 'The plea from Hoc facite, when first set up, was abundantly answered by a learned Romanist, I mean the excellent Pickerell, who wrote about 1562. Protestants also have often confuted it ; and the Papists themselves, several of them, have long ago given it up.' Waterland, *Christian Sac. App.*, c. 3.

With respect to the Eucharist, the evidence is still more scanty. The first believers 'broke bread from house to house,' celebrating, probably, the Lord's Supper immediately after these love-feasts ; they came together on the first day of the week to break bread (Acts ii. 46 ; xx. 7) ; but whether any, or what, ritual was observed on the occasion ; what the form of consecration was, if any ; by whom the elements were distributed—on these, and such-like points, which on the sacerdotal theory we should expect to find minutely described, the record is silent. In one passage (1 Cor. xi. 23–26) St. Paul treats at some length on the Eucharist ; but on the question what is necessary to the validity of the ordinance he delivers no rule. 'The cup of blessing which we bless, the bread which we break' ; from whose lips the blessing proceeded we are not told. It will not be contended that the Apostles themselves could be present at all celebrations, and no mention is made of presbyters taking their place. To 'make the sacrament'[1] was, as far as appears, not the prerogative of a priestly caste, but of Him from whom all ordinances derive their virtue ; the true consecration was the living faith of the partakers. St. Paul describes himself and his fellow Apostles as 'stewards of the mysteries of God' ; that is, as is known to intelligent readers of Scripture, of doctrines hitherto hidden but now revealed, not of ordinances ;[2] stewards and dispensers of divine truth, as indeed the requirement that they should be 'faithful' sufficiently proves. He does indeed speak of discharging a priestly office, but it was the preaching of the Gospel (*ἱερουργοῦντα τὸ εὐαγγέλιον*), and the Gentile world was the sacrifice which he had to present to God (Rom. xv. 16). The Apostles had all their life been familiar with earthly priests and visible sacrifices ; how came they in their promulgation and exposition of the Gospel to abstain so entirely from such associations. ?

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[1] Conficere sacramentum—the usual expression employed by Romish writers.

[2] 'How that by revelation He made known unto me the mystery . . . that the Gentiles should be fellow-heirs,' etc. (Ephes. iii. 3–6).

The whole scope of the Epistle to the Hebrews is that the Levitical institute, still in existence when the author wrote, having served its purpose, was ' ready to vanish away ' (Heb. viii. 13) ; not because it was the Levitical institute, but because a human priesthood and corresponding sacrifices are incompatible with the eternal priesthood of Christ, and the sufficiency of His one sacrifice of Himself on the Cross ; and therefore may not, under whatever guise, find a place under the Gospel. An analogy exists, on the point before us, between the relation of the synagogue to the temple, and that of local churches to the one true, or as Protestants call it, the invisible, Church. However synagogues might be multiplied, there was but one temple, one altar, one priesthood ; and the synagogues, otherwise distinct societies, bore a common relation to the temple, and so were connected together. In like manner local churches, otherwise distinct, find their unity in the mystical Body of Christ, evermore offering spiritual sacrifices through its one High Priest ; that is, the sacerdotal elements of Judaism, its temple services, have passed into Christianity, not literally, but figuratively, or rather in the spiritual antitype ; while the synagogue, an institution which possessed nothing of a sacerdotal character, reappears literally and visibly under the form of local Christian Churches.

It must be observed that the question is not what the law of order may have dictated, or rendered necessary, but whether a divine law, affecting the validity of the sacraments, can be produced. The law of order gave rise to many changes of ritual which, so far as they are not unscriptural, rest on their own foundation : only this foundation is not *jure divino*, but *jure humano*. Transporting ourselves in imagination to the fifty century, the spectacle which we behold is very different from that which we find in Scripture. An organized episcopacy extends like a network over all Christendom, each bishop being at once the chief pastor in his own church, and the instrument of union between it and other churches ; the primitive upper chamber has given place to gorgeous structures : if we enter which, there will meet our eye, in the outer vestibule, the penitents and catechumens ; then, in the nave, the faithful to whom access to the Lord's Supper was permitted ; and at the upper end, divided by the chancel rail from the rest of the congregation, the bishop with his presbyters and deacons. Carefully-worked creeds test the orthodoxy of candidates for baptism ; formal liturgies lead the devotions of the people ; distinctions unknown to the Apostolic Church prevail, of inquirers from catechumens, of catechumens from the baptized, of the lapsed from the steadfast. The Eucharist, especially, is fenced round with restrictions, to guard it from profanation. In what light are we to regard these additions to the simple polity and worship of the first church ? As divine appointments ? or as corruptions, the offspring of superstition and priestcraft ? Strictly speaking, neither the one nor the other. If we cannot approve of all that we find in this age, if we cannot shut our eyes to the growth of superstitious doctrines and practices, a considerable part, nevertheless, of these external developments was the result of a natural and necessary effort of the Church to adapt herself to changing circumstances, and on this ground may be justified. A mixed multitude pressing into the sacred enclosure had to be handled otherwise than the primitive 120 upon whom the Holy Ghost fell ; external organization is the remedy which nature provides for a diminution of the animating spirit : when effervescence ceases, crystallization commences. And had the changes or additions been suffered to remain on this ground, they might, after the excisions necessary, have held their place.

But the temptation presented itself, as it has always done, to discover, if possible, a Divine sanction for what was the result of a natural law ; and to insinuate into Scripture conclusions which it does not warrant. No distinction was made between what is commanded and what is merely recommended by precedent and example, between the sacraments ordained by Christ Himself and Apostolic appointments, between the latter and those of the Church of after-ages, between the essential parts of ordinances and additions of human origin. The earlier dispensation had priests and sacrifices, therefore the Gospel must have something not merely analogous but similar ; and Scripture must be put to the question to yield a testimony thereto. That a believing deacon, for example should not, while an unbelieving presbyter should, have power to consecrate the elements ; is this of Divine or of human appointment ? Not of Divine, but of human ; and as long as this is acknowledged, as long as the restriction is considered a matter of order, the arrangement stands on its own sufficient grounds. The case is different when it is made a law of Christ Himself, or of the Apostles ; and when violence is done to Scripture to make it support the statement. ‘ There is no reason to establish the right of men without succession from the Apostles to administer the Holy Eucharist, which will not justify the taking away the cup from the laity ’ [1]—did the writer of these words find his theory in Scripture, or introduce into the sacred page what belongs to the age of Cyprian or later ? The law which has presided over the rise and progress of spurious Catholicism is to claim a divine origin, and a legally binding force, for developments in polity or ritual which can be clearly traced to natural causes ; and this with the result, if not the object, of transforming the Gospel into a new ceremonial law, and replacing Christians under a yoke of bondage from which Christ has set them free.

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[1] Manning, *Unity*, etc., p. 326.

By spurious Catholicism is meant that which, not content with being itself, with being what legitimate Catholicism is, an adaptation of Apostolic precedent to changing circumstances, lays claim to a direct enactment from heaven. Among these spurious assertions is that of the clergy's being a proper priesthood. The more reason is there to guard against its first advances. It is connected, for example, not remotely with the notion that the visible church is the representative of Christ on earth, or as Möhler expresses it, the perpetual incarnation of the Saviour.[1] For it is obvious that the whole Church cannot stand between itself and God, or be a representative of Christ to itself ; and so the Church comes to mean the clergy, and the clergy a priesthood whether we call them by that name or not. What is really meant by the Church's being the continued incarnation of Christ is that the Saviour, having completed the work of redemption, has withdrawn from the active administration of this dispensation in and by His Divine Vicar, the Holy Spirit : having previously delegated His powers, royal, priestly, and prophetical, to a certain order in the Church. But *vicarius est absentis, Christus est præsens* ; present not as the incarnate Son, but as the Comforter whom He promised to send, and who, as regards the Godhead, is one with Him. He does indeed exercise sacerdotal functions elsewhere, and, by His perpetual intercession in heaven as our High Priest has for ever superseded the necessity, and the existence, of human mediators between God and man.[2]

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[1] *Symbolik*, § 36.

[2] At the Council of Trent a candid Portuguese theologian (George d'Ataïde) counselled the Fathers not to attempt to prove the doctrine of a human priesthood from Scripture but from tradition. His observations are worth transcribing; Il dit d'abord ; qu'on ne pouvait pas douter que la messe ne fût un sacrifice, parceque les pères l'avoient ensiegné ouvertement. Il rapporta la témoignage des pères Grecs et Latins, et parcourant ensuite tous les siècles jusqu'au nôtre, il soutint qu'il n'y avait aucun écrivain chrétien qui n'eût appellé l'eucharistie un sacrifice (and therefore requiring a priest to celebrate it). Mais il ajouta : que c'était affaiblir ce fondement que de lui en joindre d'imaginaires ; et qu'en voulant trouver dans l'Ecriture ce qui n'y était pas, on donnait occasion de calomnier la vérité à ceux qui voyaient qu'on l'appuyait sur un sable aussi mouvant. De-là il passa à examiner l'un après l'autre les endroits de l'ancien et du nouveau Testament rapportés par les théologiens, et montra qu'il n'y en avait aucun dont on pût tirer une preuve claire du sacrifice. Sarpi, vol. ii., p. 384. The historian adds that this theologian's presence at the Council was thenceforward dispensed with.

83. *The Primacy of the Bishop of Rome*

What has been remarked concerning the visible organization of the Church in its earlier stages, that it proceeded by a natural law, and was engrafted on institutions already in existence holds good in all that followed. The destruction of the temple, about A.D. 70, relaxed the connection between Judaism and Christianity, and set the church free to pursue her own course. The first result, probably, was the episcopate, informal in its beginning, but afterwards consolidated into an order, and to all appearance either proposed or sanctioned by surviving apostles. From time to time it was natural for the bishops of a certain district to meet together for the purposes of mutual recognition and consultation ; on such occasions they were commonly accompanied by delegates of the presbyters and laity. This was the origin of synods. Nor did the centralizing process stop here. As the presbyters of each church formed a council presided over by the bishop, so the bishops developed from themselves centres of unity ; accidental circumstances, such as a church's having been founded by an Apostle, or its importance in a political point of view, determining where each centre should be. Thus it was that metropolitan sees, and provincial synods, came into being. The advantages were manifest, especially in the appointment of bishops to vacant sees. Popular election, even with the consent of the presbyters, had its dangers ; but these were mitigated by the rule that prevailed, that two or three, at least, of the neighbouring bishops, and always the metropolitan, should assist at the consecration, and that no appointment should be valid which had not received the approval of the other churches of the province.

Still more extensive combinations succeeded, as indeed there was no reason why they should not. Provinces coalesced into patriarchates, considerations partly ecclesiastical, partly political, determining the patriarchal sees to Rome, Antioch, and Alexandria. Later on, Rome, the capital of the ancient world, is seen taking the lead in the councils of Christendom, not by any formal delegation of authority, or by Divine right ; for no such claims were either advanced or acknowledged for many centuries after Christ ; but because the dignity of the capital shed a reflected light upon its bishop, and made him the natural centre of the Western church. Nor was this advantage materially affected by the transfer of the seat of government to Byzantium, with its attendant patriarchate. New Rome never succeeded in supplanting the ancient mistress of the world, nor could its patriarch, though the attempt was often made, succeed in prevailing on other churches to acknowledge his supremacy. The Roman bishops, displayed the same capacity for government which had distinguished civil Rome, and while the Orientals spent their strength in theological disputation, Leo and his successors were successfully employed in extending the practical supremacy of their see. Appeals to Rome from all quarters were encouraged, refugees from other dioceses were kindly received, and no opportunity was lost of making the influence of the Roman Church felt throughout Christendom. And thus by slow accretions the Papal power became what it was in the middle ages.

Such is what may be called the natural history of this remarkable institution. And as long as it was regarded merely as the topmost stone of the edifice of unity, it cannot be described as anti-Christian in character. If it was not unreasonable for the bishops of a province to evolve out of their body a metropolitan centre or the metropolitans a patriarchal, no more was it so, as long as the political conditions were favourable, for the whole Western Church to desire a visible symbol of unity. This is the position taken up by the philosophical school of modern Romanists. 'They,' says Möhler,[1] 'who demand before Cyprian's time incontrovertible proofs of the existence of the primacy demand what is unreasonable, the law of a true development not admitting of it ; and *vice versa*, the trouble which some have given themselves to discover, before the same epoch, the full idea of a pope, or the notion that they have discovered it, must be considered vain, and their conclusions untenable. As throughout the inferior organization of the Church, so in this point, the want must be felt before the supply could be found.' 'It is evident that during the first three centuries, and even at the close of them, the primacy is not visible save in its first lineaments ; it operates as yet but informally, and when the question is put, where and how did it practically manifest itself, we must confess that it never appears alone, but always in conjunction with other churches and bishops ; though it is true that a peculiar character is already seen to attach to the Roman see.'[2]

This view of the growth of the Papacy is not only historically true, but enables the author to dispense with the proofs from Scripture which his predecessors, *e.g.*, Bellarmine, are wont to allege, to the detriment rather than the advantage of their cause. Only a council which discovered that 'from the beginning of the Church seven orders of ministry and their names existed,' [3] could have authorized its catechism to declare that the Papacy was instituted when Christ said to Peter: 'Feed My sheep'; or, 'On this rock I will build My church,' that is (according to the older and better interpretation of the passage), on the living faith exhibited in the Apostle's confession; 'Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God' (Matt. xvi. 16); or, 'Unto Thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven,' which, if some personal prerogative may be thought intended, is explained by the fact that to Peter it was given to admit first the Jews and then the Gentiles into the Christian Church (Acts ii. x); or, 'Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven' (Matt. xvi. 19), an authority, whatever it may mean, which was afterwards conferred on all the Apostles (*Ibid.* xviii. 18). On no occasion in the sacred history is any pre-eminence assigned to this Apostle. The Apostle James has better claims to such precedence.

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[1] *Einheit in der Kirche*, A. 2, § 68.

[2] *Ibid.*, A. 2, § 71.

[3] Ab ipso ecclesiæ initio sequentum ordinum nomina, et unius cujusque eorum propria ministeria, subdiaconi, scil. acolyti, exorcistæ, lectores, et ostiarii, in usu fuisse cognoscuntur. Conc. Trid., Sess. xxiii., c. 2. The two remaining orders are, diaconi and sacerdotes (presbyters).

Uninspired history is equally silent. There is no proof that Peter was ever at Rome, or that he was Bishop of Rome, or that if he was bishop, he could transmit his personal prerogatives to his successors. The chronology of his history is against the supposition. From the 18th year of Tiberius, when Christ was crucified, to the 13th of Nero, when, according to Romish writers, Peter suffered martyrdom at Rome, there is a space of about thirty-six years. At the council held at Jerusalem (Acts xv) about A.D. 51, Peter was present, and the next notice is that he was at Antioch (Gal. ii. 11), about A.D. 58, where tradition reports that he resided some years. Little time remains for his alleged Roman episcopate. The Book of Acts, which narrates at length several important events in Peter's life, passes over his episcopacy and even his residence at Rome in silence. St. Paul, writing to Rome, and writing from Rome, makes no mention of him.

The view then which Möhler takes is the only one that has a semblance of historical truth. And, no doubt, there is some truth in it. In the writings of Cyprian the idea of a visible centre for Western Christendom is common, and already the see of Rome is invested with an undefined superiority. 'This,' (the evil of schism), he writes, 'arises from men's not recurring to the fountain head of truth, and the doctrine of our heavenly Master. There is no need of prolix argument; the proof is short, and easy of comprehension. The Lord says to Peter: "Thou art Peter," etc., and again: "Feed My sheep." Upon him alone He builds His church; to him He commits His sheep to be fed. And although after His resurrection He invests all the Apostles with equal power: "As the Father hath sent Me," etc., yet that He might exhibit the principle of unity, He, by His authority, so disposed matters, that that unity should take its beginning from one

(Peter). All the Apostles, indeed, were what Peter was, endowed with an equal share of honour and power ; but Christ begins with one, and the primacy is assigned to Peter that it may be shown that there is one church and one chair. . . . Of this church how can he be supposed to hold the faith who holds not the unity ? How can he who resists the Church (who deserts the chair of Peter upon whom the Church is founded) hope that he is in the Church ? '[1] 'Where, and by whom, remission of sins is given is plain. For to Peter first, upon whom the Lord founded the church, and from whom He derived the origin of unity, was committed a power of remitting on earth sins which should be remitted in heaven. And after His resurrection, He declared to all the Apostles : "As the Father hath sent Me," etc.'[2] 'In addition to their former misdeeds, they (the schismatics) having appointed a pseudo-bishop for themselves, dare to repair to Rome, and to the chair of Peter, the chief church whence the unity of the priesthood took its rise.'[3] 'Those who took their journey to you (Cornelius) we exhorted that they would acknowledge and hold fast by the root and mother of the Catholic Church. We directed letters to be sent throughout our province, exhorting all our colleagues to ratify your election, and steadfastly to maintain fellowship and union with you, that is, with the Catholic Church itself.'[4] Well may Möhler point to such passages as proof that so early as the third century 'the Pope was but waiting a summons to make his appearance.'[5]

And if his appearance had been ascribed to human causes, and the providential course of events, it might have been acquiesced in. To make it either of Divine or of Satanic origin is equally wide of the truth : human passions, human sins, and, we may add, the love of unity inherent in Christianity, all had a share in bringing it about. The successive Popes as much obeyed as they led the tendencies of their age : western Christendom was as ready to confer upon the Bishop of Rome the supremacy as he was to receive it. De Maistre has reminded Protestants that where there is on one side a voluntary surrender of inherited rights, it is idle to talk of usurpation on the other ; and that the medieval bishops of Rome only exercised powers which had been delegated to them by the free, or apparently free, consent of both churches and states. And this cannot be gainsaid. Moreover, a pious mind, contemplating the social disorders of the age, might well think that no remedy was likely to be so efficient as a central authority, feeble in a temporal point of view, but wielding spiritual powers of unlimited scope. A common Father to the half-civilised nations of Europe was no ignoble conception. The disapprobation which we must feel at the language and actions of certain Popes may be mitigated by bearing in mind that they were men, and that their position was one of difficulty and temptation. Who, in fact, will venture to ascribe to Leo the Great a deliberate design to erect a spiritual throne on the ruins of Apostolic Christianity ? The event, indeed, has proved that to no human hand can the sceptre of universal empire, temporal or spiritual, be safely confided ; but the evils which sprang from the Papacy were as yet in the womb of time, and unforeseen. In short, regarding the Papacy as a visible symbol of the unity of the whole Church ; as a sheltering enclosure for the fundamental truth of Christianity in periods of wild licence ; as a moderating influence amidst barbarism and anarchy ; we can neither feel surprise at its appearance, nor refuse to recognize therein the traces of a superintending providence bending human error and sin to its own purposes.

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[1] *De unit. eccles.* It is right to mention that the words enclosed in brackets are adjudged by Baluzius to be an interpolation.

[2] Epist. lxxiii.

[3] *Ibid.*, lv.

[4] *Ibid.*, xlv.

[5] *Einheit*, etc., p. 247.

It is worthy of note that at the commencement of the Reformation it was not the mere fact of the primacy of the Roman bishop to which its leaders took exception : they even declared that if the Bishop of Rome would acknowledge that his superiority to other bishops was but by *the custom of the Church*, they, on their part, would be willing to leave him in undisturbed possession of his Patriarchal relation to the churches of Europe. The passage of Melanchthon to that effect is well known : ‘ Concerning the Roman Pontiff, my opinion is that should he admit the Gospel, the precedence which he has hitherto enjoyed, as compared with other bishops, may, to preserve the peace and tranquillity of those Christians who acknowledge his jurisdiction, be by us also accorded to him ; *but only jure humano* ’ [1] Only *jure humano* ; the essence of the controversy lies in those words. It is the Tridentine dogma, not the fact, of the Primacy, which Protestantism repudiated, and must ever repudiate. The Bishop of Rome was asserted to be by *Divine appointment* the Vicar of Christ, and ruler of the whole Church ; the Papacy was made an essential constituent of Christianity.[2] In matters of faith infallibility has lately been ascribed to it.

It followed that no Church, however Scriptural in doctrine, or apostolic in polity, which did not acknowledge the supremacy of the

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[1] *Art. Smal.*, ad. fin.

[2] De quâ re agitur cum de primatu Pontificis agitur ? brevissime dicam ; de summâ rei Christianæ.’ Bellarmine, *Præf. ad Lib. de S.P.*

Pope *jure divino* could be a true Church : its members are out of the pale of salvation, except through the uncovenanted mercies of God. ‘He that reigneth on high,’ so runs the Bull of Pope Pius against Elizabeth, ‘to whom is given all power in heaven and earth, has committed the one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, out of which there is no salvation, to one alone on earth ; namely, to Peter, prince of the Apostles, and to the Roman Pontiff,’ successor of Peter ; ‘to be governed with a plenitude of power,’ [1] ‘We declare, define, and pronounce,’ says Boniface VIII., ‘that it is necessary to salvation that every human being should be subject to the Roman Pontiff.’ [2] To establish these claims, and invest them with the sanction of antiquity, pretended decretals of the early bishops of Rome were made to speak the language of later times ; just as in the so-called Apostolical constitutions, which were composed about the beginning of the third century, and which throughout favour the legal, hierarchical spirit which had begun to pervade the Church, the Apostles are introduced as laying down canons after the fashion of the age of Cyprian. In short, in the doctrine of the Papacy, as finally declared by the Council of Trent, we have a signal example of the principle on which spurious Catholicism, of every age and under all its forms, proceeds : viz., the transformation of ecclesiastical developments into Divine laws, of Christianity into a system of legal ordinances as essential to its being as those of Moses were to the Jewish economy.

And we may ask, Of what avail is it to expend time, labour, and learning, in disproving, the doctrine of the Papal supremacy, while we leave untouched the roots whence it sprang, and, which, if in its existing form it were abolished, would reproduce it or something like it ? The efflorescence of the disease has been mistaken for the seat of the disease. If any form of polity, Presbyterianism, Episcopacy, Metropolitanism, if the distinction in kind between clergy and laity, if the appointments of ritual and worship save in their first elements, are held to be *jure divino*, no defensible position can be taken up against the errors of Romanism on these points.

84. *Church and State*

There are points in which these two forms of social union seem to approximate to each other, and to aim at the same results. The State, not less than the Church, is of Divine origin, so far as it rests ultimately on the instincts implanted in man by his Creator, and on the providential government of the world. Like the family, it is natural to man, not the product of an imaginary social compact between governors and governed. It is not left to our choice whether our early life shall be passed under parental guidance, and the social influences of the family ; the question is by Divine Providence decided for us. Neither is it a matter of choice whether we shall be members of a state of not ; here, too, nature and Providence anticipate us. And, thus, in a real sense, the powers that be are ordained of God (Rom. xiii. 1).

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[1] Quoted by Barrow, *Supremacy*, etc., Introd.

[2] *Ibid.*

The State, too, has for its object, or one of its main objects, the moral training of its members. To regard it merely as an institution for the protection of life and property (one, no doubt, of its chief purposes), would be as imperfect a notion of it as it would be to consider the family as merely intended for the physical nurture of children. Heathen writers, such as Plato, entertained juster views. They looked upon the State as the greatest of schools of natural education ; and, in fact, in the absence of revelation, no higher or more comprehensive organization for that purpose presented itself to them.

The State, moreover, and the Church operate on the same material, viz., fallen human nature ; the former on man in his secular, the latter on man in his spiritual, capacity ; but both alike on man as he is actually found. The national life, in its complex relations, furnishes the matter on which the State operates ; and, like the Church, it has to contend against the ignorance and sin which it finds. Hence the Church is in Scripture described in terms derived from the two inferior but Divinely ordered institutions, the family and the State : sometimes it is called the family of God, and sometimes 'the city of the living God' (Heb. xii. 22), the new Jerusalem : an intimation that these subordinate forms of union, Family, State, and Church, will one day be merged in the higher unity of the consummated kingdom of God.

And yet the distinction between the State and the Church is an essential one. The State promotes morality under the form of compulsion ; the Church under the form of freedom. The State operates by the force of external law ; the Church aims at making every man a law to himself. It is not, indeed, correct to say that the function of the State is confined to repressing outward crime, and maintaining social order ; for laws possess a power of awakening and educating the slumbering conscience, by stamping the brand of criminality on practices which previously had been thought indifferent—or even praiseworthy ; as, for example, nations have been trained to abandon vices, or immoral customs, such as infanticide, which they had previously indulged in, with no sense of their being crimes. The effect of treating such things as crimes is gradually to produce a feeling that they are so.[1] Still it remains true that the State does not demand or anticipate free action : what it enjoins and prohibits, it does so from without ; it does not profess to furnish hidden springs of action, or to rectify the will.

With such a moral standard, or such obedience as this, the Church is not satisfied. The inner man is the direct subject of the renovating powers committed to her administration ; and spontaneous virtue is her aim. Hence the distinction between sin and crime. The State deals with crime, the Church with sin. Innumerable moral delinquencies, with which the State cannot interfere, are condemned by the Church, such as ingratitude, covetousness, selfishness in its various forms, and the like ; often more repulsive than those which the State visits with penalties. The Jewish theocracy, as became its preparatory function, treated sin, in certain cases, as crime, *e.g.*, idolatry ; and so formed an external barrier behind the shelter of which spiritual religion might expand its blossoms. And the State occupies a somewhat similar position towards the Church : it stands between Christianity and the impulses of unbridled human nature, which, were they permitted to act unchecked, would leave no place for the peculiar mode of operation of the Church. So far it possesses a pedagogical character. It secures, at any rate, a negative basis ; life and property are protected, selfish violence suppressed. On this basis the Church prosecutes her mission.

The weapons, too, which the Church employs are different from those of the State. The State secures obedience by temporal pains and penalties, which the Church is forbidden to use. To attempt to employ the temporal power, whether in the shape of positive penalty or civil disability, to produce religious conviction, or rather conformity, is a blunder as well as a crime ; it is an assumption by the State of what does not belong to it ; it is an interference with the rights of conscience ; and can only issue in hypocritical compliance, or religious indifference. Internal discipline, and, in the last resort, expulsion from the society, neither of which ought ever to be associated with temporal damage, are the only means which the Church possesses to secure obedience ; and if profanity bursts these tender meshes, she must beware of attempting to strengthen them by an appeal to the secular arm.

From this it follows that the State and the Church never can become formally one. Let us suppose that a material identity exists between them ; that is, that all the members of the body political are also members of the body ecclesiastical; still this would not affect the essential distinction between the one and the other. The same man might hold office in the State and in the Church; but in the one capacity he would have to act on one set of principles, in the other on another. As a civil magistrate it might be his duty to condemn a man to death, whom, on apparent repentance, he might, as a member of the Church, console with the promises of Divine forgiveness. Still less can the State be regarded as the ultimate form which the Church will assume, when the latter has accomplished its mission and served its purpose.[1] The State never can become an instrument of *redemption*, which is the very essence of the Church's office. States, as such, have no existence hereafter; but the Church, as the company of the redeemed, will exist for ever. The Church never can be conceived of, except as in spiritual union with its Head, Christ, that is, under the influence of His Spirit; as perpetuated and sustained (in its earthly condition) by the means of grace; modes of influence of which the State, as such, is not the depository.

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[1] *’Εθίζοντες (νομοθέται) ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθούς.* Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*, ii. 1.

Yet their common origin from above, and their common objects, forbid that they should be antagonistic the one towards the other. The State prepares the way for the Church; the Church leavens all departments of the State with a Christian spirit. Every citizen will perform his civil duties the better for being a Christian. Hence, on the one hand, the Christian will endeavour to further the interests of the State; to awaken sentiments of patriotism, to promote beneficial changes in the laws, to correct social evils; while the State, without infringing the rights of conscience, will lend the Church the protection of the civil power in securing its liberty of action, its endowments and its rights of appeal in matters which fall under the cognizance of the secular courts.

The term 'Church' in the foregoing remarks needs to be defined. It is obvious that when speaking of the connection of Church and State, we do not mean the Church in its essential being, the invisible Church of Scripture and of Protestantism; for this, as has been explained, is not yet manifested in its corporate capacity. As the State is a local body, so must the Church be, which is supposed to be in alliance with it. And yet the definition that a true visible Church is a society in which the pure Word is preached and the sacraments duly administered, is too narrow for our present purpose; for, however small the society, these notes may belong to it.

To understand the connection of Church and State we must realize the conception of a national Church. A national Church is the particular form which the Christianity of a nation assumes under the circumstances of race, temperament, and history, which have contributed to make the nation what it is. It matters not how this form has been produced ; whether spontaneously, or by the direction which the national history has taken, or by an impulse from the civil power ; it is sufficient if in the lapse of time it has settled down into a certain type. It may be difficult to analyse in what the difference between national Churches consists ; but it is none the less matter of observation. The Church of England seems suited to the genius of the English people, as a whole ; the Church of Scotland to that of the Scotch. Either is a Christian Church, and a valuable embodiment of Christianity ; but the one cannot be mistaken for the other, even setting aside external differences.

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[1] Rothe, *Anfänge der Christ. Kirch.*, § 18.

A really national Church is a great providential boon to any nation. It must be distinguished from a mere State-Church, the creature of conquest, or of law, or of choice for special purposes. For example, a Church which the government for the time being may select to hallow its public acts with the offices of religion, such as the coronation of a sovereign, or the inauguration of a president, thanksgivings for a victory or peace, humiliation in times of famine or pestilence; may, for the nonce, be called the National Church. Most Christian States would desire, as most heathen did, to add solemnity to such public events by associating religious services with them. But the Church thus selected may be the Church of the minority ; and, moreover, it may give place to another Church, in succession, for similar purposes. In such a case it is not really the national Church : much less can it be so called if it depends for existence on the civil power. Any Church may be forced on a conquered people ; but if it does not express on the whole the national religious sentiment, it will be an exotic, and remain so. This was the position of the Established Church in Ireland, not through its fault but its misfortune ; and this would have been the position of an Episcopal Church in Scotland had the injudicious attempt of Charles II and his advisers, at the close of the seventeenth century, succeeded. There can be no national Church of Ireland, for there is not, and never has been, a united Irish people ; in Scotland there was, and is, a really national Church, which has freely developed itself on the Presbyterian model[1] ; and if the scheme of establishing Episcopacy by the secular power had there succeeded, nothing could have averted a civil rupture and grievous injury to religion. The counsels of a wise king and wise statesmen averted the calamity. In all such cases, the test whether a State-Church is also a national one is easy of application : if the pressure of the civil power were removed, would the nation freely and spontaneously adopt the form of Christianity sought to be imposed upon it ?

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[1] There is no distinction on this point between the Established and the Free Church of Scotland.

Where a national Church, in the proper sense of the word, exists, the problem of reconciling the rights of the State with the rights of conscience scarcely arises, or is comparatively easy of solution. Were the nation and the Church materially one—as Hooker supposed they might be, and, in his time, not without show of reason—intolerance or persecution would be simply impossible. A man cannot persecute himself ; and, in the case supposed, ecclesiastical legislation would be nothing more than the nation's legislation for itself in its religious capacity, to which no objection could be made. Difficulties arise when either there is no national Church (as in the United States of America), or the dissentients from it are so numerous as to make it impossible to disregard the fact. In the former case the State must keep aloof from special connection with any religious body (as in the United States), in the latter great caution in religious legislation is needed. It must be accounted, therefore, a misfortune if, owing to unfavourable circumstances, the nation has not been able spontaneously to mould its Christianity into a national shape, with special characteristics and historical traditions. It may still, however, be a Christian nation ; as the United States justly claim that name. We may observe that of the United Kingdom as a whole there is no national Church, no one Church of the three kingdoms which are represented in the Imperial Parliament. England and Scotland have each their own Church, and if a national Church exists in Ireland, it must be confessed to be the Roman Catholic. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom is a Christian kingdom, and must be regarded as such.

One advantage of a truly national Church is the bulwark which it raises against Ultramontane Romanism, the deadly foe of national independence. 'The Bishop of Rome hath no jurisdiction in this realm of England' (Art. xxxvii) ; the day on which the principle here asserted should be abandoned or practically forgotten, would be fraught with momentous consequences to the country. Of Churches, only a national one, such as the Gallican Church in its palmy days, can effectually co-operate with the State in resisting the Papal pretension.

Judicial oaths, the subject of Article xxxix, prove the necessary connection of religion with the State, but not necessarily of the Christian Religion. All that the State requires for the administration of justice is a recognition of the fundamentals truths of natural religion, such as the existence of a God, and of a future state of reward and punishment [1]; if it finds Christianity accepted by the nation, so much the better; it is, as Coleridge expresses it,[2] 'a happy accident,' on which the State has reason to congratulate itself; but well-ordered states have existed without the enjoyment of the privilege. It might even be supposed that the tendency of Christianity is to deprive the State of this particular support in securing the ends of justice; for, interpreted literally, our Lord's prohibition seems to extend to oaths of every kind (Matt. v. 34). And the passage in St. James' epistle, which evidently alludes to the former, seems to confirm this interpretation (chap. v. 12). But we cannot suppose that the prohibition is to be taken in this extended sense. In the Old Testament oaths appear as in common use, and are not forbidden; on the contrary they are enjoined in certain cases (Exod. xxii. 11). The law sanctioned the practice, but guarded it from abuse. The Jew was not to swear falsely (Lev. xix. 12), nor to swear by false gods (Josh. xxiii. 7); when he took a vow or oath to the Lord, he was to take care to fulfil it (Numb. xxx. 2); but he was nowhere commanded not to swear at all. Our Lord Himself not unfrequently passed beyond a simple affirmation ('Verily, verily'), nor did He refuse to reply to the adjuration of the High Priest to declare whether He was the Son of God (Matt. xxvi. 63). The Apostle Paul in many passages of his epistles appeals to God for the truth of what he says (Rom. i. 9; 2 Cor. i. 23, xi. 10; Gal. i. 20); and there is nothing in the passages to lead to the conclusion that his correspondents would otherwise have doubted his word.

What, then, are we to understand by Christ's prohibition in the sermon on the mount? A system of immoral casuistry among the Jews had established distinctions between oaths in which the name of God occurred and those in which it did not, the former only they held to be absolutely binding. It was said to them of old time, 'Thou shalt not forswear thyself,' and thus, if His name is used, take His name in vain (Exod. xx. 7); all such vows thou shalt not fail to 'perform unto the Lord,' as a duty the violation of which He will visit;—such injunctions Christ did not mean to abrogate, but only to warn His hearers against a corrupt interpretation of them. He reminds them that to swear by any of the creatures is, in fact, to swear by God who created and sustains them, and thus exposes the sophistry of the distinction which the Scribes and Pharisees had introduced. But solemn judicial oaths He does not allude to, or condemn. Thou shalt perform what thou hast promised, whatever be the object by which thou hast sworn;

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[1] See Warburton, *Alliance of Church and State.*

[2] *Idea of Church and State*, p. 59. In Omichund *v.* Barker (Smith's leading cases) it was held that the depositions of a Pagan idolater, sworn according to the custom of his country, may be received in evidence.

this has nothing to do with oaths imposed by the State for the promotion of justice. A question, however, may arise, whether such voluntary oaths are in themselves permissible, and our Lord replies in the negative. If Christians were always what they ought to be, neither mistrustful of their brethren nor themselves liable to be tempted to mislead, their simple affirmation (Yea, yea ; Nay, nay) would be sufficient for all purposes of social intercourse. 'Whatsoever is more than these,' any strengthening of statement, whether by an oath or not, betrays a consciousness of the sin that still cleaves to the regenerate. In proportion as Christ is formed in us, the superfluity will disappear. Oaths in common life, like 'a writing of divorcement' (Matt. v. 31), were permitted, even sanctioned, under the law, because of the spiritual imbecility of those subject to it ; but both the one and the other, except in certain cases, are out of place under the Gospel ; and in this senes it is, but not as abrogating judicial oaths, that Christ has supplied what was wanting in the law.

In short, the prohibition seems to glance at needless, thoughtless, expletives, such as too frequently occur in common life, and not, at least directly, to oaths in a court of justice. What may be in the consummated kingdom of God we know not ; we do know that at present the ideal is far from being reached. Even in Christians the State has to deal with those liable to temptation and to lapses, and, therefore, needing every support which religion can furnish to keep them in the path of duty. Just, therefore, as the analogous commands touching the *lex talionis* (verse 38–42), cannot be understood literally without injury to society (what, *e.g.*, is of greater detriment than promiscuous and ill-regulated charity ?) ; nay, without going counter to the example of Christ Himself who did not turn His cheek to the smiter (John xviii. 23), and of the Apostle Paul, who did not hesitate to appeal to the law and the civil power for protection from popular violence (Acts xvi. 37, xxii, 25, xxv. 11) ; so the administration of judicial oaths is not forbidden in a Christian state. Required and taken in a proper spirit they serve to remind the parties concerned of their duty towards the Supreme Being, and their subjection to His authority. How the State is to proceed towards those who do not acknowledge any Supreme Being is a question for jurists to decide. Where oaths are retained they should be freed from unnecessary additions, particularly those which in any way resemble heathenish adjurations, or invoke spiritual or temporal vengeance from heaven on perjurers. The penalty for false swearing, so far as it reaches beyond this world, must be left to Him who alone can mete it out with accuracy. It is possible that the objections which some pious persons entertain to even judicial oaths would be abated, if the wording and the ceremonial of them were freed from such associations.

May the Christian, as a member of the State, lawfully engage in war ? Some of the ancient Fathers and some modern sects hold it unlawful, and, as they do on the question of oaths, allege certain passages of the Sermon on the Mount as justifying their opinion (Matt. v. 21, 38–41). And the foregoing remarks apply to this subject as well as to the other. When Christianity has gained complete dominion over the evil tendencies of human nature, whether in the millenium or afterwards, coercive laws will be no longer needed, and universal peace will prevail. And it is, no doubt, the duty of Christians to keep before their minds the ideal presented in this discourse of Christ. But the present state of things is an imperfect one, and Scripture recognizes the fact by never recommending violent attempts at reformation, content with enunciating principles which sooner or later work a change. Thus civil government, which involves the employment of force even in the extreme form of capital punishment, is not only left undisturbed, but commended as the appointment of God. Slavery is not denounced as inconsistent with Christian profession, while yet principles are enunciated which were sure in time to bring about its abolition. Still less is the division of mankind into nations, however the effect of sin and apparently unfavourable to the spread of the Gospel, interfered with, or the virtue of patriotism disparaged. This seems sufficient to establish the lawfulness of war. For if the normal state of mankind, under this dispensation, is one of separate political communities ; if a universal empire under one government is a dream which never can be realized ; then the judicial machinery, which in each particular state decides between the claims of individuals and controls, by force if need be, the undisciplined impulses of human nature, can as regards nations have no place. There is no external authority to which they are bound to render obedience.

International law, from which so much seems sometimes to be expected, is in reality no law at all, if by that term is to be understood a tribunal by the decision of which the litigant parties are compelled to abide. On certain points agreements or understandings may be entered into by nations ; but, on due notice given, they may be broken ; and, in the last resort, each nation must decide for itself what is or is not for its interests, or whether an aggression on the part of its neighbour is or is not justifiable. If the conclusion arrived at is that the national welfare, independence, or dignity is at stake, and may be compromised by yielding to what is demanded, resistance must be offered ; and if no compromise is possible, war becomes inevitable. No doubt the guilt of the rupture lies at the door of the nation which allows ambition or the lust of conquest to prevail over the dictates of justice and moderation, but considerations of this kind do not in practice operate very strongly. If the aggrieved party submits, the national honour may be compromised, if it does not, this means war.

Accordingly, Scripture contains no prohibition of war, and, indeed, furnishes examples of eminent piety in the military profession (Luke vii. 5 ; Acts x. 2). But although Christianity does not abrogate this ultimate arbitrament of nations, it has done a great deal in mitigation of its attendant horrors. As in every department of human agency, so in this, it has introduced a new spirit into what it does not forbid. The cruelties practised by conquerors in ancient times are not tolerated by Christian nations, and appliances in relief of suffering, never thought of by the polished nations of antiquity, now form a regular accompaniment of belligerent operations. Nor can it be doubted that the condemnation which the Gospel pronounces on wars undertaken from purely ambitious motives has done much to discredit frivolous and unnecessary appeals to arms.

PART II

THE MEANS OF GRACE

THE local churches, of which visible Christendom consists, have a bond of union in their relation to the one true Church, or body of Christ; but this latter is replenished and sustained by outward means, ordained by Christ Himself to be channels of His grace, and committed to each local Church to administer; viz., the pure teaching of the Word, the celebration of the Sacraments, and common prayer in the name of Christ. These means of grace, as they are usually called, may be considered under a threefold aspect; as (especially the Sacraments) signs of admission into, or continuance in, the Church (*tesseræ*); as pledges of the presence of Christ, by His Spirit in the Church (*pignora*); and as forming the material of visible Christian worship. In idea they may be thus distinguished, in fact, each, in a greater or less degree, combines these aspects. If the Church were purely invisible, a union of sentiment merely, or, as Schleiermacher terms it,[1] of operations (*wirkungen*) of the Holy Spirit, these outward means might be dispensed with; but since it is not only the effect but the instrument of Christ's saving work, and has a mission to fulfil as well as to promote its own edification; and, since man is to be approached as a complex being, consisting of body as well as soul; the means at the Church's disposal must be of a complex character, appealing to the senses in their application, but accompanied by invisible effects. As the Word Himself became man, in order to establish His Kingdom on earth, the Church too, without claiming to be the Incarnation of Christ, needs a system of external worship, and external means of edification and extension.

A—THE WORD

85. *Preaching*

It was the command of Christ that, after the descent of the Holy Ghost, the Apostles should preach the Gospel to every creature (Mark xvi. 15), for faith, the appointed condition of salvation, comes by hearing, and hearing by the Word of God (Rom. x. 17); and this they considered so essential a part of their office, that before long they declined other spiritual employments which they thought might be a hindrance to their ministry of the Word and of prayer (Acts vi. 4). St. Paul declares that Christ sent him not primarily to administer sacraments, or regulate the affairs of Christian societies, but to preach the Gospel to the heathen (1 Cor. i. 17) ; and it is obvious that by no other instrument but the Word could the heathen be gathered into the Christian fold. But this means of grace is not to be confined to missionary effort ; the work of edification in constituted Christian Churches is emphatically ascribed to it. The commission to teach all nations, with a view to Christian baptism, prescribes also the duty of instructing the converts thus made in the whole compass of Christian doctrine and practice (Matt. xxviii. 20) ; and accordingly we find that the first Christians, among other religious exercises, continued steadfastly under the teaching of the Apostles (Acts ii. 42). St. Paul commends the Ephesian elders, in view of impending dangers, ' to God and to the Word of His grace,' which Word was able to build them up in everything that concerned salvation (Acts xx. 32). And the extraordinary gifts of the Spirit, more immediately connected with the Word, are by the same Apostle said to have been given specially for the edification of the Church : if Christ ' gave some, apostles ; and some, prophets ; and some, evangelists ; and some, pastors and teachers '—it was ' for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ ' (Ephes. iv. 11, 12). As it is by the Word that the seed of eternal life is sown in the heart (1 Pet. i. 23), so it is by the same Word that the new-born spiritual babe is nourished, and grows into the measure of the stature of Christ.

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[1] *Christliche Glaube*, §§ 126, 127.

If any means of grace, therefore, is of direct institution by Christ, this may claim the character ; if any is essential to the well-being of the Church, the chief place must be assigned to this ; and hence in defining the notes of a true Church, our Article makes ' the pure preaching of the Word ' one of the two essential ones.

A sacramental character, too, belongs to the ordinance of preaching. It cannot, indeed, be said to have an ' outward and visible sign ' in the same sense in which the two sacraments have : the winged words of the preacher do, in fact, make themselves wings and fly away : the vehicle is spiritual, and appeals to the understanding rather than to the senses ; but unquestionably ' an inward spiritual grace ' accompanies it. It is the principal instrument of the Holy Spirit in the work both of regeneration and sanctification. Not the human agent, but Christ Himself by His Spirit speaks in His Word, and communicates to it its saving power. Hence it ought to constitute, and—in Christian assemblies conducted after the Apostolic model, in one shape or another, whether as oral teaching or as the reading of Scripture—ever has formed, an indispensable part of Christian worship.

But what is this Word of God, and where is it to be found ? Considered as immanent in God, it is the Divine plan of salvation through Christ ; the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος of Philo and his Christian disciples. Revealed, this Word becomes λόγος προφορικὸς, and addresses itself to man through human agency, in history, type, prophecy, inspired oral teaching ; and in so doing becomes affected with the limitations which attend every such outward vehicle. As the Trinitarian Word in becoming incarnate exhibited His Divine glory under a veil, so the Word of revelation, in accomplishing its end, adapts itself to human comprehension, and is no longer quite identical with the Word as it existed from eternity in the Divine Mind. Hence there is an element of truth in the statement that Scripture is not, but contains the Word of God ;[1] though it is sometimes employed to insinuate serious error.

In Scripture, or in the oral teaching of the Apostles, the Word clothes itself in an inadequate form of expression : no human language, only that which St. Paul heard in his rapture to the third heaven, and which he describes as ‘ unspeakable,’ and not lawful (or possible) for a man to utter (2 Cor. xii. 4), is capable of conveying it in its fulness ; not to mention that human speech can never quite dissociate itself from the peculiarities of the speaker or writer, his habits of thought, his mental culture, his personal history and surroundings, his particular spiritual experience. And this applies especially to instruction by type, or typical persons, such as the Old Testament abounds with.

One safeguard against error is to remember that the canon of Scripture consists not of one book but of a sacred library ; in each portion of which we have indeed the Word of God but not the whole of it. It is only, therefore, by a collation of one part of Scripture with another, and a comprehensive view of the whole, that we attain to such a measure of knowledge as we can in this life expect.

To us who live in these latter times, the inspired volume is the only authentic source of what the preacher has to deliver. Types are fulfilled in Christ ; inspired oral teaching in the Church has ceased ; but the record of what that teaching was is to be gathered from Scripture and from that alone. The preacher, therefore, ought to be, above all things, an expositor of Scripture.

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[1] It is found in the first sentence of the Homily on ‘ the reading and knowledge of the Scripture ’ : ‘ Unto a Christian man there can be nothing either more necessary or profitable than the knowledge of Holy Scripture ; forasmuch as in it is contained God’s true Word, setting forth His glory, and also man’s duty.’

86. *Prayer in the Name of Christ*

The essence of religion resides in the belief of a Supreme Being, distinct from the material universe, and of the possibility of establishing relations between this Being and the rational creature. When this belief is called out into active exercise, it expresses itself in prayer. Only to the atheist, who acknowledges no God, and to the pantheist, who identifies the universe, and himself as part of it, with God, can prayer seem superfluous or irrational. This converse of the soul with God, as it appears both in the Old and in the New Testament, presupposes on the part of the worshipper that he is addressing a personal God, and not the blind Fate of heathen mythology ; and further, that this personal God is accessible, and that the expressed feeling of dependence and the exercise of faith are pleasing to Him : 'He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.'

Our Lord recognized the duty and the importance of prayer, both by precept and by example ; and furnished to His disciples a model which the Christian Church in all ages has followed ; but it was not until towards the close of His ministry that He unfolded the essential idea of *Christian* prayer : 'Where two or three are gathered together in My Name, there am I in the midst of them' (Matt. xviii. 20) ; 'Whatsoever ye shall ask in My name, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son ; if ye shall ask anything in My Name, I will do it' (John xiv. 13, 14) ; 'Hitherto ye have asked nothing in My Name ; ask and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full' (*Ibid.*, xvi. 24). The Apostles, though accustomed to prayer, had not asked anything in the Name of Christ, because the work of atonement was not accomplished until the words 'It is finished' were uttered on the Cross ; and because the accomplishment was not publicly attested until Jesus, after His resurrection, proved that all power in heaven and earth was given to Him by the mission of the Holy Spirit, the Comforter, to take His place. Thenceforward, *Christian* prayer is to be offered through Him as the only Mediator between God and man ; and by the assistance of His Divine Vicar, the Holy Spirit, who prompts petitions acceptable to God : and to pray in the Name of Christ is not only to pray in reliance on His atoning sacrifice, but to pray under the guidance and suggestion of the Holy Spirit, Who is Christ, with and in us.

The best comment on these promises of Christ is Rom. viii. 26 : 'Likewise the Spirit, also, helpeth our infirmities ; for we know not what we should pray for as we ought ; but the Spirit Himself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered.' Christ in us, not without our own co-operation, but employing our natural faculties and quickening our spiritual desires, and yet the real Prompter of prayer—prays for us ; and since 'He that searcheth the hearts, knoweth what is the Mind of the Spirit making intercession for the saints,' all such prayer must surely be heard ; and therefore our Lord could say, 'If ye shall ask anything,' without exception, 'in My Name I will do it.' This implies that prayers may be offered which are not 'in the Name of Christ,' in the sense explained : and this need occasion no surprise when it is remembered that the Christian, though delivered from the dominion of sin, is by no means free from its approaches, and may prefer requests which are not according to the Will of God, or which, at least, for reasons hidden from us but known to Omniscience, would not, if granted, promote the spiritual benefit of the suppliant, or the advancement of Christ's kingdom, or not in the way marked out by Divine wisdom. Such prayers may be natural, but they are mistakes ; and to grant them might not be a real token of the Divine favour. Hence the example Christ Himself should ever be present to us : 'If it be possible, let this cup pass from Me ; nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt' (Matt. xxvi. 39). In every prayer, except those framed after the model of the Lord's Prayer, there must be a reservation of this kind ; there must be expressed or implied resignation to His Will, who alone knows the issue and determines the course of events. It is on this condition that Christians, as individuals, are encouraged 'in everything by prayer and thanksgiving to make known their requests unto God' (Phil. iv. 6).

But prayer, as a means of grace, is essentially common, or united, prayer ; prayer expressive of the common feeling of the Church, as distinguished from the circumstances of individuals. It is to it as such that the promises of Christ are attached. And to it as such the Lord's Prayer has a special reference. In the first three petitions, 'Hallowed be Thy Name, Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven,' Christians, noting the incomplete fulfilment of prophecy, pray that whatever hindrances stand in the way, social or political, may be removed [1] ; in the three last, the growth of each believer in grace is the subject of supplication, so that when Providence opens the way the Church may be prepared to seize the opportunity, and under a second Pentecostal effusion achieve spiritual victories of a magnitude unknown since the apostolic age. Prayer for these objects, expressing the common desire of Christians, never can be a mistake ; they cannot fail to be according to the mind of Christ and in His Name ; they aim at the same objects that Christ Himself is carrying forward ; and so can confidently plead the promise in its most unlimited extent. In fact, they are the necessary condition, on man's part, of the fulfilment of prophecy ; for since Christ works through the Church, the union of Christians in fervent prayer for an outpouring of the Spirit is itself a sign of the Church's becoming alive to her duty, and girding up her loins for the spiritual conflict.

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[1] 'Withal praying for us that God would open unto us a door of utterance, to speak the mystery of Christ, for which I am an ambassador in bonds' (Col. iv. 3). 'I exhort therefore that supplications, prayers, intercessions and giving of thanks be made for all men ; for kings, and all that are in authority, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty' (1 Tim. ii. 1, 2).

Public prayer, as a means of grace, assumes the form either of silent assent (with, as in our Church, occasional responses) to the officiating minister, or of psalmody, which is, in fact, the congregation praying aloud. Whether it finds expression in liturgical forms, or in the unwritten outpourings of the heart, is immaterial. Its connection with the solemn assemblies of Christians on the first day of the week is obvious. Those who on the plea that they can pray always and in all places neglect ' the assembling of themselves together ' (Heb. x. 25) on the stated occasions of public worship are likely not to pray at all ; they certainly cannot expect the special blessing which Christ has connected with this duty, and which, even if He had not done so, may be naturally anticipated from the joint action of Christians in the work of prayer and praise.

B—THE SACRAMENTS

87. *Definitions*

The derivation of the word Sacrament, by which the other class of Christian ordinances is commonly described, is doubtful. In classical usage *sacramentum* signifies either the sum of money which the plaintiff and defendant in a suit deposited with the authorities, the share of the defeated party being devoted to religious purposes,[1] or the military oath of allegiance. Tertullian seems first to have used the word to denote the Christian Sacraments ; he describes the Christian as enlisted in the service of Christ, and his baptismal vow as corresponding to the oath by which the Roman soldier bound himself to obedience.[2] From him it passed, in the Western Church, into the current language of theology, though at first in a very extended

[1] Either from *sacrare* to devote to the gods, or because the sum was placed *in loco sacro.* Varro, *De Ling. Lat.*, v. 36.

[2] Credimusne humanum sacramentum divino superduci licere, et in alium dominum respondere post Christum ? *De Cor.*, c. xi.

meaning. It was applied not only to the sacraments of the Gospel, but to any rite or ceremony which bore a symbolical character, and even to passages of Scripture which might be interpreted allegorically. Thus Augustine calls the additions to baptism, prevalent at that time, viz., exsufflation and exorcism, sacraments ; and he applies the term to the chrism at confirmation, to circumcision, ordination, marriage, the sabbath, and the water and blood which issued from the side of Christ.[1] Still, amidst this looseness of expression, baptism, and the Lord's Supper occupy in ancient writers a position peculiar to themselves. It was not before the twelfth century that the definition and number of the sacraments became fixed ; and particularly by Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas. In the Eastern Church the Greek word μυστήριον is used for the Latin *sacramentum*, but it conveys a different meaning. It is probably derived from the verb μυέω, to initiate into the mysteries (Eleusinian, etc.) ; and since the ceremony took place in secret, the word came to be applied to any ordinance or doctrine of a recondite meaning ; and, particularly in the Eastern liturgies, to the two sacraments.

By the schoolmen various definitions of a sacrament are given. They will be found enumerated by Bellarmine, and are essentially founded on Augustine's statements : 'A sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing,' instituted 'as a token of Christian fellowship,' 'a visible word,' for it is the word, not which is spoken, but which is believed, that 'transforms the element' (the material part) into a sacrament. 'A sacrament' (that is, the visible element) 'is so called because of its similitude to the thing signified ; for if this resemblance did not exist, the sacrament would not be entitled to the name ; and on account of it the signs commonly bear the name of the things signified' (as, *e.g.*, the bread and wine are called the body and blood of Christ).

The symbolical element of the sacraments, which Augustine thus so strongly enforces, did not commend itself to the founders of the scholastic theology, by whom the doctrine of an inherent virtue in the elements was generally held, and accordingly the necessary additions were made. By Hugo of St. Victor the symbolism of the ordinances is not denied, but the remark is appended that the sacraments, by virtue of consecration, 'contain a certain invisible and spiritual grace.' Or, as he expresses it in another work, 'The sacrament not only signifies, but also confers, that of which it is the sign.' And so, though more concisely, his contemporary Peter Lombard : 'A sacrament is in this sense a sign of invisible grace that it is both a representation and a *cause* thereof.' The theory was more fully worked out by Thomas Aquinas. 'Sacraments,' he says, 'are applied for the sanctification of men, their medicinal properties being proportioned to the twofold nature of man, body and soul. 'They are the cause of grace in the soul, not, however, the primary cause, for God alone is that, but the instrumental : the difference may be thus illustrated ; fire by virtue of its own form produces heat, and the effect is similar to the energy ; in this sense God is the Author of grace, and this grace is nothing but a communication of the Divine nature, according to 2 Pet. i. 4 ; whereas a mere instrumental cause does not operate by virtue of its own form, but only by the motion which it receives from the principal agent ; as, *e.g.*, the carpenter's axe does not cut from itself, nor is there a resemblance between it and the work produced. It is in this latter sense that the sacraments of the new law are the cause of grace.'

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[1] 'The holy Catholic Fathers have made mention, not only of seven, as M. Harding here accounteth them, but, also, of seventeen sundry sacraments.' Jewell, *Def. Ap.*, c. xi., div. 2.

If the question be asked, what is the grace of which the sacraments are the cause ? the answer is, not the increase of ordinary sanctifying grace, but a grace peculiar to each sacrament. 'There are three applications which the word grace admits of : abstractedly, *secundum se*, it perfects the essence of the soul so far forth as it communicates participation of the Divine nature ; and from this proceed various gifts and virtues which co-operate with the powers of the soul : but over and above these there is a sacramental grace, communicated only by the sacraments, which produces certain special effects necessary in the Christian life ; as, *e.g.*, the special grace of baptism is a kind of spiritual regeneration, and so as regards the other sacraments.' 'The sacraments of the new law *contain* grace, not merely as signs thereof, but as instrumental causes' (that is, grace is attached to them physically as distinguished from morally).

On the subject of the baptismal character, which is to be distinguished from the grace peculiar to each sacrament, Thomas Aquinas proceeds as follows : 'The sacraments are appointed for two ends, as a remedy against sin, and to perfect the soul in matters relating to the worship of God. But whoever is deputed to a certain secular function usually receives a visible sign thereof : as, *e.g.*, soldiers in former times were stamped in the body. For spiritual functions the stamp must, of course, be spiritual, or on the soul ; and on its powers as distinguished from its essence since it is conferred for spiritual actions. Upon those who receive the character the Divine bounty confers grace for the due performance of such actions. The character, being a participation of the priesthood of Christ, is indelible and unchangeable, unlike grace which is subject to variations. Only three of the seven sacraments impress the character, viz., baptism, confirmation, and orders, for they only are not repeated. The sin of the minister does not interfere with the efficacy of the sacrament, though he may thereby be himself guilty of mortal sin ; but the intention of the minister, strictly so called, may, if of a certain kind, be an effectual bar. The mere outward act, as, *e.g.*, in baptism the ablution of water, may be variously applied—to the cleansing of the body, or for sanitary purposes, or with a spiritual intention ; therefore it is necessary that it be determined to the specific effect which it is intended to produce. Hence there must be an intention on the part of the minister to baptize ; but if this be present, lesser defects, such as inattention to what he is saying, administration for sinister purposes, even absence of faith, especially if it be concealed, will not invalidate the ordinance. But a celebration in mere sport does so ; for in this case there is no intention of doing what the Church intends. A secret unbeliever may intend to do what the Church affirms ; and heretics may likewise so intend, because, however erroneously, they consider themselves to be the true Church, or part of it. They confer the *sacramentum* but not the *rem sacramenti*, viz., remission of sins and sanctifying grace.'[1] These concessions were intended to obviate the difficulty, that if the efficacy of the sacrament were made to depend on the intention of the minister in every sense, no one, however devout, could be sure of receiving sacramental grace.

Such was, on the doctrine of the Sacraments, the elaborate structure which had gradually grown up, attaining under the great schoolmen its full proportions and symmetry : Augustine laid the foundations, his successors carried it on, and the Aristotelian philosophy was applied by Thomas Aquinas with boundless ingenuity and great dialectical power to complete the edifice. The sacramental theories of the middle ages, sacerdotal throughout, fell in naturally with the hierarchical tendencies then coming to a head. Not, however, without opposition from various quarters. To say nothing of Berengar of Tours and Ratramnus, some of the earlier schoolmen endeavoured to rescue the symbolism of the Sacraments, or, at least, to purge the popular system from its worst excrescences.

Even at the Council of Trent great differences prevailed between the leading schools of thought on this subject ; and particularly on two points, the inherent causative power of the Sacraments (*continent gratiam*), and the intention of the minister, the Dominicans and Franciscans took opposite sides. Ambrose Catharinus, a leading theologian present, forcibly pointed out the inconveniences that might arise from an undue pressing of the doctrine of intention, nor did he conceal his opinions even after the decree of the Council on the subject had assumed its present shape.[1] The majority, however, favoured the Dominicans, and the Canons of the Council prove how exactly they were framed after the decisions of the schools. 'Since,' the Council says (Sess. vii), 'it is through the Sacrament that true justifying righteousness commences, or is increased, or, if lost, is restored ; it is important, especially since various heresies on the subject are prevalent, to lay down the following Canons : "If anyone shall affirm that the Sacraments of the new law do not contain the grace which they signify ; or do not confer this grace on those who interpose no bar,[2] as if they were merely signs of grace or justification already received, let him be anathema." (vi). "If anyone shall affirm that grace is not conferred by the Sacraments *ex opere operato*, but that faith in the divine promise suffices to obtain grace, let him," etc. (viii). "If anyone shall affirm that in the three Sacraments, Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders, there is not a character impressed on the soul which is indelible, let him," etc. (ix). "If anyone shall say that in celebrating the Sacrament an intention is not required of doing at least what the Church does, let him," etc.'[3] (xi). Thus the floating theories of individual writers, or schools of writers, were transformed into articles of faith, and the Sacraments of the Gospel, which were designed to be bonds of union among Christians, became the occasion of a rupture apparently irreconcilable.

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[1] *Sum. Theol.*, P. iii. QQ. lx.–lxiv.

Next to the doctrine of justification by faith, or rather as a consequence of it, that of the sacraments could not fail to claim the attention of the Reformers. Yet it was only by degrees that they freed themselves from the yoke of ecclesiastical tradition, and arrived at the conclusions which appear in the Protestant Confessions, particularly those of the reformed type. The Augsburg Confession merely lays it down that 'the sacraments were instituted not only to be notes of profession amongst men, but also to be signs and testimonies of the will of God towards us, for the purpose of stimulating and strengthening faith. To the right use of the sacraments that faith which accepts the promises is necessary. We condemn those who teach that the sacraments justify *ex opere operato*, and who do not teach that faith in the remission of sin is necessary.'[4] The Apology of the Confession (Melanchthon) adds that, 'As regards the number of the sacraments we do not attach much importance to it, especially since the ancients differ on this point. If we define sacraments to be rites appointed by God, and with a promise of grace attached, three such are found in Scripture, Baptism, the Supper of the Lord, and Absolution. We condemn the whole tribe of the schoolmen who teach that the sacraments are vehicles of grace *ex opere operato*, *sine bono motu utentis*, to those who interpose no bar to their operation.' [1] Here the doctrine of the *opus operatum* is condemned, but the number of the sacraments is not yet defined. In the articles of Smalcald and the two catechisms (minor and major) composed by Luther, the sacraments in general are not treated of, and baptism and the Eucharist but briefly ; and not without reason, for, in truth, Luther's own opinions on the subject had varied from time to time.

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[1] Sarpi, L. ii. § 66.

[2] The bar, or *obex*, is mortal sin ; if this be absent, the *bonus motus* of the recipient is immaterial.

[3] Conc. Trid., Sess. vii.

[4] *Conf. Augs.*, § 83.

It is seldom that a reaction against prevalent errors recognizes the particle of truth which they may contain, and the early history of the Reformation presents no exception to this remark, nor was the temperament of its leader likely in all cases to recommend moderation of statement. The revival of the doctrine of justification by faith, Luther's great work, was naturally accompanied by a protest against the scholastic doctrine of the infusion of justifying grace in and by the sacraments, with its kindred tenets, the *opus operatum* and the powers of the priesthood. The symbolical nature of the sacraments, which had been well nigh lost sight of for many ages, came to the front, and in insisting on this vital point, Luther and Melanchthon, to say nothing of the Swiss Reformers, at first lay under the temptation to consider these ordinances rather as signs and pledges of the remission of sin than as channels of grace. But Luther's controversy with Carlstadt and Zwingli, which at one time threatened to produce a rupture between the Saxon and the Swiss Protestant Churches, resulted in his modifying his earlier views, so far at least as regards the connection of the elements (*sacramentum*) with the grace conveyed (*res sacramenti*) : he retraced his steps in the direction of the system in which he had been nurtured on the subject of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist ; and finally enunciated a doctrine on the identity of the sign and the thing signified, to distinguish which from that of transubstantiation as taught by the Church of Rome, requires some dexterity.[2]

The doctrine of the Swiss reformers on the sacraments passed through a similar process of development, though it stopped short of the Lutheran in sundry material points. Zwingli's conception of the sacraments is that of their being signs of Christian profession, certifying to the Church that the recipient is a believer ; commemorative of a past redemption, but not channels of present grace.[1] But this exclusively symbolical view was not adopted by the Helvetic confessions. In the first of them, 1553, with which the others substantially agree, sacraments are described as 'mystical symbols, consisting of the Divine word (of promise), the signs, and the things signified ; by which God preserves in His Church the remembrance of Gospel blessings, and from time to time renews them ; by which also He seals His promises, and so strengthens and increases our faith.'[2]

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[1] C. vii.

[2] Confitemur quod in cœnâ Domini corpus et sanguis Christi vere et substantialiter sint præsentia et quod una cum pane et vino distribuantur atque sumantur. *Form. Concord.*, c. vii., B. i.

Calvin himself, whose position was that of a mediator between the earlier Swiss teaching as represented by Zwingli and Oecolampadius and the Lutheran, adds little of any moment to these statements, except in one point. A sacrament he defines to be 'an external symbol, by which God seals the promises of His goodwill towards us, in order to strengthen the weakness of our faith ; and we, in turn, testify before Him, the angels, and men, our devotion to His service.'[3] The point which he more prominently brings forward is the independence of the things signified of the sign : 'Augustine's distinction between the *sacramentum* and the *res sacramenti* not only implies that figure and reality there meet together, but that they are not so connected as to be inseparable. Hence that thou mayest receive not an empty sign but the thing signified with it, the Word which is therein included thou must receive by faith. Thus in proportion to thy communion with Christ will be the benefit which thou wilt receive with the sacraments.'[4] Whatever minor differences exist between the Reformed and the Lutheran churches, all Protestants agree in holding that the sacraments are not only symbols (*signa*), but seals (*sigilla*), or pledges (*pignora*), of what they symbolize. And thus we may the better understand the definition of our Church (which is of the Reformed, not of the Lutheran, family) : 'Sacraments are not only badges or tokens of Christian men's profession, but rather they be certain sure witnesses and effectual signs of grace and God's goodwill towards us ; by the which He doth work invisibly in us, and doth not only quicken but also confirm and strengthen our faith in Him . . . the promises of forgiveness of sin and of our adoption to be the sons of God are visibly signed and sealed ' (Articles xxv–xxvii).

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[1] Sunt sacramenta signa vel ceremoniæ quibus se homo probat aut candidatum aut militem esse Christi ; redduntque ecclesiam totam potius certiorem de tua fide quam te.' *De ver. et fals. rel.* Occasionally, however, he speaks otherwise. See Möhler, *Symb.*, § 31. Also see infra p. 523.

[2] Comp. the following confessions : Vanitatem eorum qui affirmant sacramenta nil aliud esse quam mera et nuda signa esse omnino damnamus. *Conf. Scot.*, A. xxi. Sunt sacramenta symbola et sigilla visibilia rei internæ et invisibilis, per quæ ceu media Deus virtute S. sancti in nobis operatur. *Conf. Belg.*, § xxxiii. Sacramenta sunt sacra et in oculos incurrentia signa et sigilla, ob eam causam a Deo instituta, ut per ea nobis promissionem Evangelii magis declaret et obsignet ; quod scilicet non universis tantum verum etiam singulis credentibus gratis donet remissionem peccatorum. *Cat. Heidelb.*, § lxv.

[3] *Inst.*, L. iv., c. 14.

[4] *Inst.*, L. iv. c. 14. s. 15.

88. *The Number of the Sacraments*

Melanchthon, in the passage already quoted, dismisses this question as of little importance, on the ground that the ancients differed on it. The ancients used the term sacrament in a looser sense than afterwards prevailed, but they did not define the number. This omission, like others, was supplied by the schoolmen. Thomas Aquinas lays it down that the sacraments are seven in number, viz., Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Orders, and Matrimony.[1] He is followed by the Council of Trent, which, under an anathema, pronounces them to be neither more nor less than seven. The same Canon ascribes them all to the institution of Christ Himself.[2] There is no doubt that both baptism and the Lord's Supper answer to this description, but as regards the other five, the evidence fails. Confirmation appeals to no higher sanction than the fact that the Apostles were accustomed to lay hands on persons recently baptized, that they might receive the extraordinary gifts of the Holy Ghost [3] ; ordination, as practised by the Apostles, can plead no institution by Christ ; nor can penance, nor extreme unction, still less matrimony. If it be urged that, at any rate, these latter are apostolic, and so far may be referred to Christ ; even in this modified sense two only fulfil the definition, viz., confirmation and ordination. For though an Apostle recommends anointing the sick with oil (Jas. v. 14), this was not as a sacramental ordinance cleansing the departing soul from venial sins here contracted, but with a view to *the patient's recovery* ; and on his recovery penance would be, according to the Church of Rome, the appropriate rite to obtain forgiveness of sin. The penitential institute itself, consisting of contrition, confession, and satisfaction on the part of the penitent, and absolution by the priest, is not of apostolic appointment, much less of Christ's.

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[1] *Sum. Theol.*, P. iii. Q. lxv.

[2] Si quis dixerit sacramenta novæ legis non fuisse omnia a Jesu Christo instituta; aut esse plura vel pauciora quam septem . . . anathema sit. Sess. vii., Can. 1.

[3] Acts viii. 17. That the spiritual gift here mentioned was an extraordinary one appears from verses 18, 19, and x. 44–46. Simon can hardly be supposed desirous of purchasing the ordinary gifts of confirming and strengthening ; the power of miraculous gifts (such as healing) he might have turned to profitable account.

The only passage which Bellarmine can allege in favour of his position, is that in which Christ is said to have breathed on the disciples, authorizing them to remit and retain sins (John xx. 22, 23), but the parallel passage in St. Luke's Gospel proves that the commission was not given to the Apostles alone, but to the *disciples* assembled. ‘ On the first day of the week at evening, the eleven being gathered together and *them that were with* them.’ Jesus appeared and said unto them, ‘ Peace be with you ’ (Luke xxiv. 33, 36). Whatever, then, the meaning of the commission may be, it is plain that it contains no power of absolution confined to a priestly caste : it is the whole Church that was addressed. All that can be traced—distinctly traced—to Christ is the power of discipline, conferred on the whole congregation (Matt. xviii. 18) ; the ministry of the word which proclaims forgiveness of sin on repentance and faith, and retention of it on persistent impenitence ; and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, in His manifold gifts, for the exercise of these functions. But no rite of ordination, of a sacramental character, can claim Christ as its author.

As regards matrimony—an institution which dates from creation can be a sacrament neither of the law nor of the Gospel. It probably never would have been regarded as such but for the use of the word *sacramentum* by the old Latin Version and the Vulgate as a translation of the Greek word *μυστήριον* ; which, however, never signifies an ordinance but a doctrine or interpretation before hidden but now revealed. Thus St. Paul speaks of ‘ the mystery of Christ which in other ages was not made known unto the sons of men, but is now revealed unto His holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit,’ viz., the extension of Gospel blessings to the Gentiles (Ephes. iii. 4–6) ; Christian ministers are described as stewards of ‘ the mysteries of God ’ (1 Cor. iv. 1), and the context proves that the Apostle is speaking not of sacraments but of the preaching of the Word. ‘ Great,’ he affirms in another place, ‘ is the mystery of godliness ’ ; but the mystery consisted in the facts of the Incarnation and Ascension, as expounded by him in their various relations (1 Tim. iii. 16). In the instance before us the ‘ great mystery ’ of Ephes. v. 32 is to be understood, not as a sacrament, but as a hidden truth which was now first brought to light, viz., that the marriage tie was intended to be a symbol of the union betwixt Christ and His Church.

It thus appears that three of the so-called sacraments of the Church of Rome, Penance, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony, cannot lay claim even to apostolic precedent ; but supposing they could do so, we may still ask whether Apostolic appointments can be placed on a level with those of Christ Himself. That the general promise that the

Apostles should be led by the Holy Spirit into the whole truth (John xvi. 13) includes their regulations as well as their teaching may with some limitations be admitted ; and, indeed, in one instance this is claimed by them (Acts xv. 28); but we do not find this claim advanced beyond matters of polity, or questions affecting the discipline of the Church, or decisions on important practical points, such as the obligation of the Mosaic law on Gentile converts. Apostolic decisions or appointments of this kind are not lightly to be set aside ; we are sure that they were the best for the time being, and the burden of proving that they are no longer necessary rests on those who would abrogate or alter them ; and in fact the greater part of them do remain to this day acknowledged by Christians. That is, they are *relatively* binding ; but when it is affirmed that they are absolutely binding, we appeal to the practice of the Church itself in disproof. Several undoubted apostolic appointments have been allowed to fall into abeyance ; as, for example, the prohibition of eating ‘ things strangled ’ or ‘ blood ’ which at the time was expedient, the anointing of the sick with oil, the kiss of charity, the love-feasts of the Apostolic Church, and the washing of the saints’ feet after the example of Christ (1 Tim. v. 10).

If every apostolical ordinance is to be held of Divine institution, it would seem that Christian Churches, our own included, have erred gravely in abandoning those just mentioned. But the Church has judged rightly in declining to place them in the same category with the positive institutions of Christ Himself, such as baptism and the Lord’s Supper ; partly because the latter do proceed directly from Christ, and partly because, in fact, they symbolize and seal the fundamental verities of the Gospel, the atonement of the Cross, and regeneration by the Holy Spirit. And the subsequent additions of ritual, such as in baptism exorcism, exsufflation, milk and honey ; in confirmation, anointing with oil, and the sign of the cross ; bear the same relation to the apostolical precedents as the latter do to the appointments of Christ. They may, or may not, have been devised in an apostolical spirit ; but, in any case, they are merely ecclesiastical additions, and have no claim to rank even with the apostolical appointments.

Christian polity and ritual are elastic as compared with those of the Mosaic economy ; and the Church is not debarred from expanding or modifying her outward forms according to circumstances, provided always that such changes are apostolical in spirit. But they must not be invested with an authority which they do not possess. And the peculiar danger to which Catholicism, in its various forms, is liable lies in this point. Instead of justifying itself on grounds of order, adaptation to circumstances, legitimate, if human, developments of the primitive arrangements, it has always been tempted to allege some secret tradition handed down by the Apostles ; or to assume that Christ's discourses during the great forty days must have been occupied with such matters ; or to appeal, in support of its claims, to spurious literature, such as the Apostolic Constitutions. A frail foundation, and as needless as it is frail ; for all such developments, if legitimate, can appeal to the Scriptural principle that 'where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty.'

A second alleged note of a sacrament is, that it is an instrument whereby justifying grace is infused into the recipient. With four of the seven, Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, and Extreme Unction, such grace may conceivably be connected, but, surely, not with orders and matrimony. The sacrament of orders, besides the impressed character, is said to confer grace ; but grace of what kind ? Not either justifying or sanctifying grace (which according to the doctrine of Rome are one), but a mystical grace of priesthood for the valid performance of holy functions. This grace contains nothing *moral* in it ; for the most immoral priest may possess it equally with the most holy ; it is a grace not *gratum faciens* but *gratis data.* This note, therefore, does not belong to orders. No more does it to matrimony. This natural union is indeed elevated to a special dignity by its being chosen as a figure of union with Christ, and, like all natural relations, needs grace for the due discharge of its duties ; but how can a special sacramental grace, and especially of a justifying nature, be ascribed to it ? The only Scriptural proof which the Council alleges is Ephes. v. 23, on which sufficient has been already said. Indeed, since the sacramental character of matrimony resides in its indissolubility, it is plain that actual holiness is not necessary to confer this character on it.

From another point of view the same conclusions follow. By the schoolmen each sacrament is held to consist of two parts, matter and form. For example, the matter in baptism is water, and the form is added by the recitation of the words : 'I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost' ; in the Eucharist the matter is bread and wine, and the determining form the words of institution, 'Take eat,' etc., pronounced by the priest in the act of consecration. The whole doctrine of transubstantiation, philosophically considered, rests on this distinction, which has no actual existence, and is merely a logical abstraction. But in the other five sacraments we can discover either no matter or no form, or neither matter nor form.

What, for example, is the matter in confirmation ? Not the laying on of hands, for that ceremony was used both by Christ and the

Apostles on a variety of occasions; by Christ in blessing little children (Mark x. 16), and performing miracles (*Ibid.*, viii. 23), by the Apostles in healing the sick (Acts xxviii. 8), in communicating the extraordinary gifts of the Spirit, and in ordaining ministers. A rite common to many spiritual acts loses its appropriation to any one of them. The chrism, and sign of the cross, have no Scriptural warrant. So that, to say nothing of the lack of an efficacious word impressing the 'form,' no specific 'matter' can be found for this alleged sacrament. The same remarks apply to orders. The oil in extreme unction may indeed supply the place of 'matter,' but here the 'form' is wanting, for nothing is mentioned by St. James in connection with the unction but prayer, and prayer differs essentially from a word endued with power. With respect to the sacraments of penance and matrimony the difficulty is still greater.

What can be the matter and form of penance? It has confessedly no symbol like the water in baptism, and the schoolmen were sore put to it to discover a matter of another kind. A distinction was drawn between those sacraments which convey some positive grace, and those which merely remove post-baptismal sin and its effects; in the former an external matter is necessary, in the latter the acts of the penitent himself (contrition, confession, satisfaction) constitute the matter. If it be objected that baptism itself comes under the latter class, the reply is that baptism confers not only a plenary remission of sin, but the gift of regeneration. By some writers the sins of the penitent, as the lignum or material for the consuming fire of the sacrament, were held to be the matter; but the other opinion was the more common one. As regards the 'form' it consists in the words of absolution, *absolvo te.* It is needless to observe that no institution by Christ, or precedent by the Apostles, could be pretended in this case.

That of matrimony was still more perplexing. Neither matter nor form, in any proper sense of the words, could be found here. Thomas Aquinas makes the consent of the parties the matter, and the words expressing this consent the form; while others consider the persons of the contracting parties the matter, and the words the form. Both the Council of Trent and the Cathechism observe a prudent silence on this point. Bellarmine's opinion, founded on a distinction between the sacrament as it becomes a sacrament, and the same sacrament afterwards, is that, under the former aspect, the words of consent are both matter and form, under the latter the persons are the matter, since their continued union is a symbol of that betwixt Christ and the Church.

Recourse was finally had to the mystical import of the number seven, and to analogies from nature. There are seven sins, or forms of sin, for each of which a particular remedy is needed; seven cardinal virtues;

seven gifts of the Spirit. The blood of the red heifer was to be sprinkled seven times (Numb. xix. 4); Naaman was told to wash in Jordan seven times. The correspondence between the natural and the spiritual life, as expounded by Thomas Aquinas, seems a favourite argument with Romish writers, from Bellarmine to Möhler.[1] In the natural life, Thomas observes, a person may be considered either as an individual or as a member of a community; and further, his progress towards perfection may be either positive or negative, either by natural growth, or by the removing of impediments thereto. We thus arrive at seven principal functions or epochs in the natural life. By birth we come into active existence, and to this the new birth by baptism corresponds. Strength to labour and repel enemies comes with growth; the counterpart of this is confirmation. For growth we need nourishment; the Eucharist furnishes the nourishment of the soul. We are liable to bodily infirmities, sickness, etc., which demand the aid of the physician; the sacrament of penance is for the healing of the soul that has sinned. We need proper diet for a complete restoration to health; in spiritual things extreme unction discharges this office. We are members of a community, which involves the exercise of authority and the discharge of public duties, with corresponding ability; the sacrament of orders qualifies for similar spiritual functions. By such membership the race is propagated; the sacrament of matrimony confers grace for the conjugal relation, and the due training of children, if any.

So runs the parallel; but it is far from being satisfactory. Confirmation, it is said, confers spiritual strength, the Eucharist spiritual nourishment; but nourishment and strength are so intimately connected with, and dependent on, each other, that they can hardly need two distinct sacraments to produce the effect. The Eucharist presupposes repentance for sin and seals to the penitent the promises of forgiveness; a special sacrament of penance seems superfluous. Confirmation, or some ordinance resembling it, has a necessary place in every church which practises infant baptism; the immaturity of the subject rendering it expedient that, before being admitted to the Holy Communion, he should give a public assurance to the Church of his intention to ratify the vows made for him in his baptism. But this does not constitute it a distinct sacrament. Men, as members of a State, need to be governed; but since the sacrament of orders applies only to the clergy, the civil magistrate receives no benefit from it. The duties of the matrimonial state need only the aid of common grace; and further, only those who enter that state receive the sacrament. But the sacraments of Christ are intended for all Christians. The dying Christian needs, indeed, special consolation ; but the Eucharist supplies all that is here needful. In short, as Nitzsch observes,[1] in the natural life birth admits only of one parallel, viz., growth ; the child is born into the world, the babe grows into a man, these are the two essential conditions of the discharge of the various duties of life. If there has been no birth, the functions of a human being have never been performed at all ; if the life, thus begun, is not maintained by the proper means, they cease to be performed. No subordinate differences of relation or function can be placed on a level with these essential conditions of existence, which are the same for all men, savage or civilized, governors or governed, married or single.

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[1] *De Sac.*, L. ii., c. 26. *Symbolik*, § 30.

The analogy, therefore, from nature confirms the Protestant position, that two, and only two, Christian rites are, in the proper sense, sacraments of Christ. Christ is the Author of sundry gifts and graces, but spiritual life, and the maintenance of spiritual life, lie at the foundation of their exercise, and are common to all Christians, private and official. Regeneration, and growth in grace, comprise every spiritual blessing. It was in an unhappy moment, therefore, that the Tridentine Council transformed what had been a speculation of the schools into an article of faith, and thereby added one more to the many differences which stand in the way of a reconciliation between the Romish and the Protestant churches.

The Council and the Romish theologians claim tradition in their favour. In point of fact, no fixed, certainly no authoritative doctrine touching the number of the sacraments appears before the Council of Florence, A.D. 1439. The leaders of the Reformation demanded, and rightly so, that when the question was concerning the covenanted means of grace, the seal of Christ Himself—His institution, His promise—should be produced ; and they proved that to only two out of the seven did this description apply. Indeed, if a sacred meaning is all that is necessary to constitute a sacrament, there are other observances better entitled to the name than several of those selected by the Council. Such, for example, as prayer, the sign of the cross, almsgiving, the Holy Scripture, the kiss of charity, the washing of the saints' feet recommended by the example of Christ Himself (John xiii. 5).[2] The selection seems an arbitrary one, resting on no consistent principle.

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[1] *Prot. Beant.*, Möhler's, p. 182.

[2] The washing of the disciples' feet by Christ causes embarrassment to the Romish theologians. It seems to possess greater claims to be a sacrament than Matrimony or Orders. As Bellarmine observes, it has a visible sign, a promise of grace ('If I wash thee not, thou hast no part with me '), a mysterious meaning (' What I do thou knowest not now,' etc.), a command ('I have given you an example,' etc.), and Patristic authority. His attempt to reply is not very successful. *De Sac.*, L. ii. c. 24.

89. *Opus Operatum*

The Council of Trent lays great emphasis on the efficacy of the sacraments *ex opere operato;* it is proper, therefore, that what this doctrine means should be understood, especially since the Council, perhaps from prudential motives, furnishes no explanation of it.[1] To suppose that it expresses nothing but what our Article does, when it declares that the 'unworthiness of the minister does not hinder the effect of the sacraments' (Art. xxvi) would leave unexplained why an anathema should be launched against those who deny it; for no Protestant Church does deny it in this sense. Möhler expends labour in vain in attempting to prove that *ex opere operato*, as understood in his Church, is equivalent to saying that the efficacy of the sacraments is owing to their institution by Christ, and not to any worthiness of the minister or meritorious co-operation on the part of the receiver.[2] Every Protestant Confession teaches that it is Christ's institution, Christ's word of promise, Christ's Spirit, that are the efficient causes of whatever grace the sacraments confer.

The real meaning of the term is to be sought in the distinction which the later schoolmen, and after them the Romish theologians, make between the sacraments of the old law (Circumcision and the Passover being assumed to be sacraments) and those of the new. The latter are said to be superior to the former, in that they confer grace *ex opere operato*, while the others conferred it *ex opere operante*, or rather, *operantis*; that is to say, to the efficacy of the Jewish sacraments a right disposition on the part of the receiver was necessary, and in proportion to his piety was the blessing received; but the Christian sacraments produce their effect irrespectively of the spiritual state of the receiver, by virtue of the *opus operatum*,[3] the mere act of receiving, provided only that no impediment (*obex*) of mortal sin is present. No positive preparation of repentance and faith (in the Protestant sense of faith) is required; only the negative one of the absence of the bar. It must be remembered that by mortal sin is meant gross delinquency, either existing or intended, as, *e.g.*, either living in adultery or an intention to do so.[4]

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[1] In fact, there was so much discussion on the subject when discussed at Trent, that it was thought safer, while retaining the term, to leave its meaning more or less an open question.

[2] *Symb.*, § 28.

[3] Another sense of *opus operatum* is found in the schoolmen, viz., the official power of the priest in the mass, as distinguished from the benefits which the *pious* priest may obtain for communicants by his prayers, etc.; which latter may be called *opus operantis.* But this is a secondary sense, and does not need further notice.

[4] Peccatum quod secundum se repugnat dilectioni mortale est ex genere; sive sit contra dilectionem Dei, sicut blasphemia, perjurium, et hujus modi; sive contra dilectionem proximi, sicut homicidium, adulterium, et similia. Thomas Aquinas, P. Sec., Q. lxxxviii., A. 2.

That this is the true meaning is plain from the explanation of Gabriel Biel, the last of the great schoolmen. 'Sacraments,' he says, 'are said to confer grace *ex opere operante* (*operantis*) when it is in the way of merit, that is, when the outward reception does not of itself benefit, but over and above this there is required in the receiver an inward good disposition, in proportion to which, after the manner of merit of condignity or congruity is the grace given ; to such grace nothing is added by the outward rite. But *ex opere operato* means that by the very act of receiving, grace is conferred, unless mortal sin stands in the way ; that beyond the outward participation no inward preparation of the heart (*bonus motus*) is necessary.'[1] It is true that, to conceal the obvious inconsistency of this doctrine with Scripture, it was added that, by the sacrament itself, an inward qualification is infused, viz., *fides formata* (faith actuated by love) ;[2] but the point at issue is, What is the antecedent condition of sacramental efficacy ? or, Is there any condition beyond the absence of mortal sin ? and the answer is in the negative.

Nor is its unscriptural character disproved by Bellarmine's rejoinder to the Protestant objection, that faith as a condition of beneficial reception is, on the Romish theory, dispensed with ; viz., that the Council does make faith a qualifiation ; for the faith meant by it is not the apprehensive faith of Protestantism, laying hold directly, under conviction of sin, on the promise of forgiveness through Christ, but a passive reception of the dogmas of the Church. The Romish doctrine of the *opus operatum* rests on the notion that the sacraments contain in themselves a physical virtue to heal the maladies of our nature as the medicines of the physician possess a power to heal those of the body ; an apprehensive faith being as little needed in the one case as in the other. The sacraments thus become, not signs of spiritual life already existing or means of spiritual growth, but, by an inherent virtue, the instruments of implanting that life.

90. *Intention of the Minister*

If the sacraments produce their effect *ex opere operato*, as above explained ; in general, no *bonus motus* on the part of the recipient, in private masses no recipient at all, in infant baptism no conscious one, being required—it is difficult to understand what can remain but a mere rite, destitute of any value in a spiritual point of view, or with no higher significance than the christening of a bell or other inanimate object. To obviate as far as might be this objection, the doctrine of the intention of the minister was devised. The fathers of the Council found themselves, in fact, in a difficulty. That the moral unworthiness of the priest or minister does not hinder the efficacy of the sacraments was admitted on all sides, Protestant as well as Romish : now, if in addition the sacraments work, *ex opere operato*, they seem in the celebration to be destitute of any vivifying principle raising them above mechanical acts of ritual. And this in a religion the main characteristic of which is that it is a religion ' of spirit and of truth ' (John iv. 23).

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[1] L. iv., Sent. dist., 1, 93. Quoted by J. Gerhard, *Loci*, xix., c. 7, § 86.

[2] In sacramentis novæ legis non per se requiritur quod homo se disponat, ergo per *ipsum sacramentum* disponitur. Peter de Palude. *Ibid.* It will be observed that here two questions are confounded : (1) Does man dispose himself ? —to assert which would be Pelagian ; (2) Does the *sacrament* confer the disposition, the latter being supposed not to exist antecedently to reception ?

The Protestant escapes the difficulty by transferring the validity of the sacraments from the minister, whether worthy or unworthy, to the recipient ; whose faith, the work of the Holy Spirit, is the condition of beneficial reception, and that which communicates life and meaning to the outward act. Questions touching the worthiness of the minister are thus dispensed with. But from this mode of explanation the Romanist is shut out by his doctrine of the *opus operatum*. Nothing remained for the Council, in order to secure to some extent the spiritual nature of the sacraments, but to attach to the priest an inward qualification, however inferior in nature to a believing reception ; he must, at least intend to do what the Church intends. Thus he became not only, by virtue of the impressed character, the indispensable consecrator of the Eucharist, but the depositary also of whatever preparation of the heart was still supposed necessary. The intention of the priest stands for the repentance and faith of the communicants. It is to the credit of Bellarmine, and some of his successors, that they endeavoured to soften down the scholastic doctrine of the *opus operatum*, and to present it in a more Scriptural form ; but whether in so doing they have delineated it in its real spirit may be a question.

91. *Effect of the Sacraments*

It has been a point of controversy whether the sacraments convey a special grace, different *in kind* from ordinary, and which, as a rule, cannot be obtained except through the sacraments. The question must be narrowed by setting aside what is admitted by all Christians. All agree that the sacraments are visible signs of church-membership ;

not until a catechumen is baptized is he a member of the Church, and not until he receives the Holy Communion is he a full member thereof. That they symbolize the two leading truths of the Gospel, regeneration by the Holy Spirit and the life of faith in the atonement, is beyond doubt. And, further, that they make over to individuals the Spiritual blessings which the Word proposes generally is not disputed.

But the question remains whether a special *inward* grace is attached to each sacrament, a grace *sui generis*. By the schoolmen two effects of this kind are alleged ; sacramental grace, and the impressed character ; the former belonging to all the seven sacraments, the latter to three only. Some remarks have been already made on the impressed character (§ 89) ; to which the following may be added. It is evident that it is not the same with sacramental grace, since only three sacraments convey it. The character is defined as ' an emanation from the priesthood of Christ, by virtue of which the faithful are qualified for certain acts of Divine service (*cultus*, etc.), and are distinguished from others upon whom it is not impressed.' It is of the nature of an internal sacrament. For example, in baptism the water is the outward sign (*sacramentum*), and the stamp on the soul (in part) the inward effect (*res sacramenti*) ; but although this effect is not justifying grace, but of a neutral character, existing equally in the faithful receiver and in the insincere (*fictus*), yet it is itself a kind of sacrament, that is, an *inward* sign of qualification for the discharge of certain ecclesiastical acts. Justification (infused) is the grace, or *res*, of the whole sacrament, of water and the impressed character together. The character is indelible, and this is the ground on which it is maintained that baptism cannot be repeated ; whereas the true order of things is that since baptism, as corresponding to natural birth, cannot be repeated, therefore the character is indelible.

The sacramental grace is a different thing : it is an effect of all the sacraments, which are said to ' contain ' it, that is, to convey, it *ex opere operato*. But, equally with the impressed character, it is morally neutral in nature, that is, it is not, nor is it a pledge of, *sanctifying* grace. The reasoning of Thomas Aquinas plainly proceeds on this supposition. He supposes a person to possess ordinary sanctifying grace, and, moreover, various gifts of grace ; and (such is his argument) since these may be present antecedently to the sacrament, if the latter conferred no special grace, it might be dispensed with altogether. Sacramental grace then, is something different in kind from ordinary ; a grace which, in the regular course of things comes only through the sacrament ; a grace which, since it is expressly distinguished from *gratia gratum faciens*, is morally indifferent. What, then, is it? Obviously no easy question to answer; which may be the reason why neither the Council nor its Catechism alludes to the subject. Thomas Aquinas lays it down that grace considered in itself affects the essence of the soul; considered as gifts and virtues, it directs the powers of the soul to their proper objects; and considered as sacramental grace, it crowns the whole with something peculiar to itself, so that it stands to gifts and virtues in the same relation as these do to grace *secundum se*. But what the ‘ something ’ is, what the special effect is of which sacramental grace is the cause, he does not explain.

The Protestant churches reject not only five of the seven Romish sacraments, but the whole doctrine of the impressed character. Möhler, the most adroit champion of his church in modern times, passes over the subject *sicco pede*. No trace of it can be found in Scripture. Bellarmine endeavours to account for this by remarking, that since the knowledge of grace is more important than the knowledge of the impressed character, it is no wonder that Scripture is comparatively silent on the latter topic. In fact, he can find only three passages which seem to bear upon it. St. Paul tells the Corinthians that God had ‘ sealed them, and given the earnest of the Spirit in their hearts ’ (2 Cor. i. 22); and he uses the same figure in Ephes. i. 13, and iv. 30. It is needless to observe that by the sealing or the earnest of the Spirit is meant, not a sacramental effect, but, what the same Apostle elsewhere describes as the witness of the Spirit, that we are the children of God, whereby we cry, ‘ Abba, Father ’ (Rom. viii. 15, 16),[1] and which is never possessed apart from sanctifying grace. ‘ Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby ye are sealed unto the day of redemption ’; this surely implies something different from a stamp on the soul, of which the subject is unconscious, and which has no necessary connection with moral renovation.

As regards sacramental grace, it is not easy to form a clear notion of it. An esteemed writer of our Church, in a work on baptism, devotes several chapters to prove that in Scripture, in the Fathers, and in the schoolmen, to say nothing of the divines of the Reformation, regeneration implies actual and not merely potential goodness; a state as well as a relation; one of real, however imperfect, holiness.[2] Nothing can be more cogent than his reasoning, more decisive than the authorities on which he relies. Regeneration, in its Scriptural-sense, is the union of conversion and justification ; and is inconsistent with the dominion of sin in the heart or life. But the same writer speaks of regeneration as ' the grace of baptism ' (chap. iii), as ' the *res sacramenti* of baptism ' (chap. iv), as ' unquestionably the grace of baptism ' (note 8). Does he, then, mean that the actual goodness which he had just proved regeneration to involve is by baptism infused into the baptized person, who was previously destitute of it ? But surely the repentance and faith which are the necessary conditions of an adult baptism, the normal one of Scripture, are also the essential elements of moral regeneration, regeneration as a state of actual goodness ; and since they exist antecedently to baptism, they cannot be the special grace of it. Thus, the writer, to be consistent with himself, can only understand by ' the grace of baptism ' a mystical grace, undefinable except as a something superadded to ordinary grace, which, as we have seen, is the description that Thomas Aquinas gives of it.

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[1] If, indeed, the extraordinary gifts of the Holy Ghost, communicated by the laying on of the Apostles' hands, be not rather meant. ‘ In whom, after that ye believed, ye were sealed with that holy spirit of promise ’ (Ephes. i. 13. Comp. Acts x. 45).

[2] Mozley, *Bapt. Cont.*, chaps. v. xi.

No such notion appears in our Article on baptism. By this sacrament they who receive it rightly ' are grafted into the Church ; the promises of forgiveness of sin and of our adoption to be the sons of God are visibly signed and sealed ; faith is confirmed, and grace increased by virtue of prayer unto God ' ; but no mention is made of a special grace conveyed by it. That existing faith is confirmed, and existing grace increased, is a different mode of expression from saying that a new and peculiar grace is the effect of the sacrament. Nor does Scripture give countenance to the notion. In fact, the Holy Ghost, the Author and Giver of all spiritual grace, is seldom mentioned in direct connection with either baptism or the Lord's Supper. That the worthy reception of these sacraments, depends upon a preliminary work of the Holy Spirit, and is accompanied with further measure of His grace, is unquestionable ; but wherever a distinct gift is mentioned, it is in connection with the laying on of the Apostles' hands. ' Repent,' says Peter, ' and be baptized, and ' (afterwards) ' ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost ' (Acts ii. 38). Of the disciples of Samaria it is said that ' the Holy Ghost was not yet fallen upon them ; only they were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus ' (*Ibid.*, viii. 16). Although in John iii. 5 it is said that a man must be born both of water and the Spirit, it is not said that the latter is the invariable accompaniment or consequence of the former.[1]

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[1] No inference to the contrary is to be drawn from the absence of the article (*ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ Πνεύματος*). See Westcott *in loc.* *ὕδατος* could not admit an article (comp. John i. 26, 33), and therefore *Πνεύματος* is without one. In ver 6. *Πνεύματος* has the article because it stands alone.

As regards the Eucharist, neither do the words of institution, nor any subsequent allusion to this sacrament, mention a special spiritual gift or grace of the Holy Ghost, as connected with it. 'The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ ; the bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ ?' (1 Cor. x. 16) ; however these words may be interpreted, they are not applicable to a *gift of grace*, to which physical conceptions are foreign. Let it be repeated that the question before us is not whether a spiritual blessing may not be expected from a devout reception of the sacraments ; who denies this ? We may rest assured that any ordinances of which Christ directly is the Author must be channels of grace. We must fear that they who from prejudice, or worse motives, neglect these appointed means of grace, deprive themselves, to what extent we know not, of what Christ intended for them. The present question is a very limited one ; whether some undefined grace, different *in kind* from ordinary, is or is not attached to the sacraments ?

92. *Circumcision and the Passover*

The Council of Trent pronounces an anathema on those who hold that the sacraments of 'the new law,' or the Gospel, differ from those of the old, only in respect of the external rite ; or, to put it otherwise, who deny that a difference exists in the mode of their operation. This difference, according to the Council, is, that the former produce their effect *ex opere operato*, the only condition being the absence of mortal sin, while the latter work *ex opere operantis*, in proportion to the faith and devotion of the receiver.[1] The anathema is directed against the Protestant theologians, who, for the most part, place circumcision and the Passover on a level with baptism and the Eucharist, both as regards the inward qualifications required, and the spiritual blessings attached ; differing only in the visible signs, and in the object to which they refer, in the case of the former a promised Saviour, in that of the latter a Saviour actually come.

That each covenant had its sacraments, in the strict sense of the word, is on either side assumed. And by Protestants circumcision and the Passover are held to be sacraments because they belonged to a dispensation, and were not merely occasional tokens such as the fleece of Gideon, or the sun-dial of Ahaz ; and, further, to a *remedial* dispensation, having a reference though under the form of type and prophecy, to the future salvation of Christ. The correspondence, indeed, of these legal appointments to the Christian sacraments is obvious ; of circumcision to baptism as being an initiatory rite introducing to the privileges of the Mosaic covenant, as baptism is the door into the Church visible ; of the Passover to the Lord's Supper, as being a perpetual commemoration of redemption from Egyptian bondage, as the Lord's Supper is a perpetual commemoration of redemption from spiritual bondage. The law, therefore, had its sacraments and yet they may differ from those of the Gospel, as the legal dispensation itself differs from the Christian.

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[1] Sess. vii., Can. 2.

The distinction, indeed, which the Council of Trent draws between the inward qualification in either case required (*ex opere operantis* and *ex opere operato*) is not tenable. Circumcision as the sign of the covenant with Abraham, previously to the giving of the law, was a token of the Divine approbation of the patriarch's faith and obedience, exercised under difficult circumstances ; the acceptance, or the counting righteous, of which it was the seal, implied no mere absence of mortal sin, but positive pious dispositions, such as operative reliance on the promise ; and this is precisely the condition on which the Christian sacraments are effectual, so far as they are effectual, to salvation. The rite was afterwards incorporated into the Mosaic law as a token of the national covenant with Jehovah, but there is no reason to suppose that its original office was thereby affected. It still remained the sacrament of faith in the promises of God, the seal of justification by faith, and the symbol of what the Jew ought to be and what he was, so far as he was of the spiritual seed of Abraham ; for ' he is not a Jew, which is one outwardly, neither is that circumcision which is outward in the flesh ; but he is a Jew which is one inwardly, and circumcision is that of the heart, in the Spirit ' (Rom. ii. 29). And so as regards the Passover. Appointed in Egypt, it was continued under the law, in perpetual memory of a deliverance effected by God Himself, under the shelter of blood sprinkled, and signalized by the destruction of the people's foes.

Grateful remembrance of these mercies, a sentiment of fraternal union and love, and possibly the dim hope of a future redemption founded on better promises, formed, we may suppose, the conditions of an acceptable celebration of the feast ; as they do of a worthy reception of the Eucharist. It is one thing, however, to reject the distinctions of the schools, and another to assert the identity of the legal and the Christian sacraments. Not to speak of the difference of outward sign, which excluded a moiety of mankind from one of the sacraments of the law, the object was not the same in either case, or only the same as type and antitype are the same ; and it is going beyond what is written to describe either circumcision or the Passover as channels of grace. Yet such is the common language of divines.

According to J. Gerhard, circumcision equally with baptism had a promise of grace, of which the proof alleged is Gen. xvii. 7, ‘I will establish My covenant between Me and thee, to be a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee.’ The meaning, he says, of this promise is, I will forgive you your sins, receive you unto the adoption of sons, give you the Holy Spirit, raise you from the dead to eternal life. ‘The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent’s head’ (Gen. iii. 15) ; ‘In thee shall all families of the earth be blessed’ (*Ibid.*, xxii. 18)—here, he continues, we have the same justifying God, the same justification, the same promise of grace, the same faith, the same righteousness, the same salvation, in Christ and through Christ, in the Old and in the New Testament ; only promised in the former, exhibited in the latter. ‘God will circumcise thine heart and the heart of thy seed’ (Deut. xxx. 6)—he here finds the doctrine of regeneration, and even the *fides infantum* of the Lutheran Church : ‘as baptism is the means of regeneration and salvation, so also is circumcision. But, “thy seed” means thy infants ; whence we see that not only adults but infants received by circumcision remission of original sin, and the implantation of faith.’ As regards the Passover, he quotes no passages, and for the best of reasons, because he could find none. Assertion takes the place of proof: ‘The passover was not only a type of Christ, but also a confirmation of the Divine promise of a Redeemer, a guide to the spiritual feeding on Christ, and consequently a salutary sacrament, whereby the faith of the Israelites was strengthened, and the benefits of Christ applied to believers. Therefore the sacraments of the Old Testament were efficacious means of spiritual benefits bestowed on believers.’[1] Thus does this eminent theologian persuade himself, and attempt to persuade his readers, that the Gospel was revealed and understood even in the earlier times of the Jewish dispensation, and not merely that the ancient Fathers did not look only for transitory promises, which may be quite true, but that little remained for the final revelation of Christ by the Holy Spirit to disclose.

Such errors might have been avoided had he and his followers in modern times borne in mind their own correct maxim, that the Mosaic economy had for its subject a Saviour promised, while the Gospel testifies of a Saviour come. For what does this amount to ? That during the preparatory dispensation the great Atonement was not an accomplished fact ; that the Holy Ghost was not yet given as the fruit of Christ’s ascension (John vii. 39) ; that the resurrection of the body had as yet no positive pledge. Could it be expected that the *revelation* of these Gospel facts, certain, indeed, in the counsels of God, but not yet accomplished, should be otherwise than fragmentary and incomplete ? So it was, in fact. It proceeded by gradual stages ; 'in many ways' ; *e.g.*, by type and prophecy (πολυτρόπως) ; in many partitions (πολυμέρως) ; as Divine wisdom thought proper to impart it (Heb. i. 1). It grew in fulness and clearness *pari passu* with the approach of the actual event. It is quite true that since the fall of man there has been no remission of sin except through Christ : He is the Lamb of God, 'slain from the foundation of the world' in the Divine purpose (Rev. xiii. 8) : this atonement was ever present to the mind of God, and availed, before it was actually made, for the justification of the ancient believers. The glory of the cross shed its rays backwards as well as forwards. It is also true that the Holy Spirit must have been operative wherever there were saints of God, whether patriarchs or apostles, for without His influence no true sanctification has ever existed. But anticipation is not fulfilment, and typical or prophetical adumbrations are not explicit revelation. The distinct offices of the Second and Third Persons of the Holy Trinity could not be clearly enunciated until the doctrine of the Trinity had been laid as a foundation: which was not the case, at least explicitly, until the advent of the Saviour.

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[1] *Loci*, xix., §§ 64-69.

The mistake, a natural one, of many Christian writers is that of unconsciously transferring *their* knowledge of the scheme of redemption to the Jews under the Mosaic law, and even to the first ages of the world. It is forgotten that although *hints* of a Redeemer were vouchsafed, and directly after the fall ; and the leading ideas of redemption, atonement by sacrifice, and a future gift of regeneration, were prefigured in the ceremonial law, and still more explicitly announced in prophecy ; the knowledge thus imparted fell vastly short of what every catechumen in the Christian Church is expected to possess. A greater among the ancient saints, both as regards knowledge and sanctity, had not arisen than John the Baptist ; yet, on the testimony of Christ Himself, the least in the kingdom of heaven (the new dispensation) is greater than he (Matt. xi. 11). In the caskets of the law and prophecy there were hidden treasures of spiritual knowledge, but the key was wanting to open them, and the Holy Ghost alone could, and in due time did, furnish a key. That the passages adduced by J. Gerhard are insufficient for his purpose is obvious. 'The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head'—in this prophecy, the first link of the chain, some one in human nature is promised Who, at the cost of personal suffering, should destroy the power of the serpent ; but who

He should be, and how He should reverse the effects of the fall, is not revealed; to say nothing of the mysteries of His Person, His atonement, and His resurrection from the dead. 'I will establish My covenant with thee, to be a God unto thee and to thy seed'—to Abraham an assurance is here given that God would stand in some special relation to him and his posterity; further than this the words do not carry us. 'I will circumcise thine heart and the heart of thy seed'—Israel, afflicted for its sins and repentant, is consoled with the promise of a more effectual Agent of renovation than the law of Moses could supply, a renovation of which circumcision was the figure; the other details are due to the pious fancy of the commentator. 'Abraham rejoiced to see My day, and he saw it and was glad' (John viii. 56); that some special revelation concerning the promised Saviour was vouchsafed to the Patriarch may be inferred from our Lord's words, whether it were a disclosure of the typical import of the commanded sacrifice of Isaac, or given on some other occasion; but the point is that no record of it is contained in the Book of Genesis: whatever it was, it was not incorporated into the public documents of the Church; it formed no addition to the existing stock of revealed knowledge; and, in fact, the memory of it had perished until the authoritative declaration of Christ made it known. In like manner, the inference which Christ drew from Exod. iii. 6, 'I am the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,' that there is a resurrection from the dead, however cogent it may be, when pointed out as it was by Christ, is no proof that it was so understood by Moses, to whom the words were originally addressed; it is plain, indeed, that not even by the Jews of our Lord's time was the truth latent in them perceived.

Thus was the scheme of salvation gradually unfolded, in separate portions, as the ages advanced towards the fulfilment of the first promise in Gen. iii. 15; in which, indeed, all was implicitly contained, but not wrought out into particulars. Nor is this any disparagement to the faith and piety of the ancient believers. Their faith in the immediate temporal promises was the same *in kind* as the faith of the Christian believer which appropriates the Gospel promises; for it is not clearness of knowledge but the state of the heart that is of value in the sight of God. As a profound writer remarks, 'When it was said to Abraham, "I am thy shield and thy exceeding great reward," that general promise of Divine favour was the sufficient bond and motive of obligation. The duty was perfect, though the Patriarch knew not the nature, or the manner, of the retribution secured to him.' But more than this; the Jew was not left without intimations that might well lead a reflective mind beyond Canaan, and the law under which he was placed. 'In thee shall all families of the earth be blessed'—if Philo and his school had pondered more deeply the import of this promise, they would never have supposed that it could be fulfilled by the submission of all nations to the law of Moses. To what purpose, the pious Jew might ask, was this complicated system of sacrifice and purification established ? It must surely point to something beyond itself. In a word, the surmises and hopes of the ancient believer were, far from being discouraged, stimulated by the law and prophecy combined. Still, they remained, for the most part, surmises and hopes.[1]

To apply these remarks to the subject before us—circumcision was the sacrament of Abraham's faith, but we cannot say that the *object* of his faith was explicitly Christ ; nor does St. Paul say so when using the passage in Genesis to illustrate his argument on justification. Herein it differs from Christian baptism. The same remark applies to the Passover. That the pious Jew in celebrating it had Christ and His atonement before his mind as distinctly as the Christian has in the Eucharist, is not told us in Scripture. Neither is it declared that either circumcision or the Passover were channels of grace ; further than that all acts of obedience to the Divine command must be supposed to bring a blessing with them. The grace of the Holy Spirit was not a purchased and covenanted gift of the Jewish dispensation. On still less evidence does the opinion, sometimes advanced, rest, that the sacraments of the law were *types* of the Christian. Scripture does not warrant the assertion. Circumcision and baptism correspond as initiatory rites ; but that the former is related to the latter as type to anti-type, or that baptism has taken the place of circumcision, we are not told. Col. ii. 11, 12, the passage usually quoted to prove that baptism is Christian circumcision, hardly bears out the conclusion. 'You are circumcised,' the Apostle says, 'with the circumcision made without hands,' ; that is, with an inward, spiritual circumcision, of which the Jewish rite was a figure ; 'in putting off,' he continues, 'the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ,' by the sanctifying grace of the Holy Spirit. In proof of this, and not as drawing a parallel between the two ordinances, he reminds his readers, as he does in Rom. vi, of the import of their baptism, a dying unto sin and a rising again to a new life. Baptism is a manual act, though not of the same kind as circumcision, and could hardly be described as 'a circumcision made without hands.'[1]

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[1] [The Epistle to the Hebrews assures us, however, that, though not themselves receiving (in their lifetime) the ultimate fulfilment of the promises, the patriarchs and other men and women of faith during the period of the Old Testament dispensation looked beyond this present life for a heavenly fulfilment (xi. 13–16, 35, 39f). Editor.]

93. *Baptism*

After his resurrection, and immediately before His ascension, our Lord instituted the initiatory sacrament of the Church, in the command given to the eleven Apostles to make disciples from all nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, and when thus incorporated into visible Christian societies, teaching them to observe whatever He had commanded (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20). The order then was this : by the preaching of the Word men were to be brought to repentance and the acknowledgement of Jesus as the promised Saviour, just as Christ had gathered to Himself out of the Jewish people a company of disciples (*μαθηταί*), before either the Christian Church or sacraments existed ; the converts thus made were to receive Christian baptism, and then to be placed under the ministry of the same Word, but not only as it proclaims the Gospel, but as it explains the mysteries, privileges, and duties of the new covenant. From the words of Christ it is obvious that baptism is more than a sign of Christian profession, and stands on a different footing from a mere ecclesiastical, or even apostolic, ordinance. Much, as regards worship and polity, was left to the Apostles to supply as need required, and their appointments are, if not absolutely, yet relatively, binding on the Church of all ages ; but two ordinances owe their institution to Christ Himself, and this alone places them in a category of their own. Nor does the language He uses in the institution of baptism convey the idea of its being a sign, or tessara, of Christian fellowship (though this doubtless is one of its uses), but rather of its being a means of introducing the recipient into new relations towards God, with corresponding duties.

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[1] [Litton seems to us to have an inadequate appreciation of the significance of circumcision and the Passover to the pious Jew. We feel bound to maintain that the circumstances of their institution and the nature of the promises attached to them clearly indicate that their nature was sacramental in a manner essentially similar to that of the sacraments of the New Testament, in that they were instituted by God Himself as pledges and seals of His promises and signs of His power, and as such were assuredly intended to be channels of grace. At the same time, it is not, of course, suggested that the Jew, who awaited the fulfilment of the promises, had as full a comprehension of their portent as the Christian, who looks back on their fulfilment. Moreover, the position we would defend is that which the Fathers and Reformers of the Church firmly held. Thus, for example, Augustine declares that " the sacraments of the Old Testament . . . were types of Christ who was to come " and that " when Christ fulfilled them by His advent they were done away, and were done away because they were fulfilled " (*Con. Faust.*, xix, 13) ; and Cranmer says that the Old Testament " fathers and prophets did eat Christ's body and drink His blood in promise of redemption to be wrought, and we eat and drink the same flesh and blood in confirmation of our faith in the redemption already wrought " (*Works*, Vol I, p. 75). Cf. Rom. iv. 11 ; 1 Cor. x. 1–4. No sane theologian disputes or minimizes the difference between anticipation and fulfilment. In our judgment, however, Litton fails to do justice to the spiritual perception of faith which the New Testament attributes to the believers of the old dispensation—so much so that he is in danger of introducing an element of discontinuity into the history of redemption. It is precisely the scriptural principle of continuity (in accordance with which there is but one covenant of grace and but one Saviour, though two dispensations) which leads to the postulation of a continuity, in essence though not in form, between circumcision and the Passover in the Old Testament and baptism and the Holy Communion in the New. Editor.]

To be baptized into the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost expresses an advance from Jewish monotheism to the Trinitarian revelation of God as the God of redemption ; and further, it implies fellowship with the triune God, and vows of service and obedience to Him. The simpler form which we find in the Book of Acts, baptized into the name, or on the foundation of the name (ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι) of the Lord Jesus,[1] is equivalent in sense to the fuller, and may have been employed by the Apostles ; but the Church has preferred to use Christ's own words in the celebration of the sacrament. Brought thus into new relations towards the Holy Trinity, the baptized person at the same time becomes a recognized member of the Christian Church ; not merely of the local society from which he has received the sacrament, but of the Church universal ; for it is the whole body of Christ that properly is the temple of the Holy Ghost ; as there is but 'one Lord, one faith, one God and Father of all,' so there is but 'one baptism of the Spirit,' of which the one visible sacrament is the sign (Ephes. iv. 4). His position now is a different one from that which he occupied as a catechumen. He is admitted to the means of grace of which the Church is the dispenser, and to the support and encouragement which the Christian society, with its variety of spiritual gifts, is calculated and is intended to furnish.

Baptism is the first and principal means by which the invisible Church becomes visible. Regeneration, as implying a change of heart, is presupposed in every complete baptism, but not until the sacrament is received is the believer, in the sight of man, a citizen of the new Jerusalem, as the Jew was not, before circumcision, formally initiated into the old covenant. Thus viewed, baptism is the last and crowning work of the Church in its missionary capacity. By the ministry of the Word the catechumen is conducted through the preliminary stages of conversion, etc. ; but the Divine signature, or seal, that the work has advanced to an individual appropriation of Christ, that the offers of mercy had been *accepted*, is still wanting, and the want is supplied by this ordinance of Christ. And hence it is, that the reception of it is regarded by Jews and heathens, and naturally so, as the overt act of becoming a Christian. The mere hearer, or inquirer, or even catechumen, is considered as not yet having passed the Rubicon ; but when he proceeds to baptism, the final decision is supposed to have taken place, and the opposition and persecution, which they who confess Christ before men are taught to expect (Matt. x. 34–6), commence.

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[1] That is, on the admission to Christ's claim to be the Messiah.

These remarks may explain why in Scripture baptism, not less than the Word, is connected with regeneration. Some of the passages, indeed, usually quoted in this connection, cannot be considered decisive. That John iii. 5 directly refers to Christian baptism is no more clear than that John vi. 53 directly refers to the Lord's Supper ; it is hardly consistent with the manner or object of our Lord's teaching that He should expound the nature of sacraments before they were instituted.[1] Nor can it be established that in every passage in which the words baptism, or baptized, occur they necessarily mean external baptism ; for there is no doubt that they are used figuratively to signify participation in the element which is the subject of the statement. Thus when Christ announced to James and John that with the baptism that He was baptized with they should be baptized (Mark x. 39), He can hardly be supposed to refer either to John's baptism or to the Christian sacrament, but to His own impending sufferings, of which these disciples should have a share. 'John truly baptized with water, but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost not many days hence' (Acts i. 5) ; the fulfilment of the promise proves that 'baptized' is to be taken figuratively, for no baptism with water is mentioned in connection with the effusion of the Holy Ghost which took place on the Day of Pentecost.[2] There is no reason, however, to question an allusion to baptism, as the sacrament of regeneration, in some passages, such as Ephes. v. 26, Tit. iii. 5, and perhaps John iii. 5. For it *is* the sacrament of regeneration, as the Eucharist is the sacrament of the atonement ; it is the instrument of our formally 'putting on Christ' (Gal. iii. 27), of our being figuratively 'buried with Christ' to a death unto sin, and figuratively rising with Him to newness of life (Rom. vi. 4); of our being invested with the privileges of Christian citizenship; of our being visibly sealed in anticipation of the future inheritance. Enough surely to account for the language of Scripture on the subject.

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[1] 'I hold it for a most infallible rule in exposition of Holy Scripture that where a literal construction will stand, the farthest from the letter is commonly the worst.' Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.*, v. 59. This rule requires limitation. The literal construction may 'stand'—that is, be admissible—and yet it may not be the best. They no doubt err who deny that Christ in John iii. 5 could have alluded to baptism, but it does not follow that other interpretations may not be preferable. See Lücke, on this passage.

[2] That the descent of the Holy Ghost was accompanied by visible signs, the rushing mighty wind and the cloven tongues of fire, has no bearing upon the present question ; viz., whether the word 'baptism' does not often in the New Testament bear a figurative sense. It may be observed that the threefold baptism of theologians—aquæ, sanguinis, flaminis—presents an instance of this figurative usage ; for the baptismus flaminis is nothing but the grace of the Holy Spirit, and it is expressly distinguished from baptismus aquæ. See Thomas Aquinas, P. iii., Q. lxvi., A. 12.

Only let it be remembered that the sacrament depends on the Word for its explanation, not the Word on the sacrament; and that to the Word more explicitly than to the sacrament is ascribed regeneration. It is not merely that the Word precedes, and prepares for, the reception of baptism in and by which the special grace of regeneration is supposed to be conferred; but that this grace itself is ascribed to the Word. 'Of His own will,' says St. James, 'begat He us with the word of truth' (chap. i. 18); and St. Peter reminds Christians that they were 'born again, not with corruptible seed but incorruptible, by the Word of God which liveth and abideth for ever' (1 Pet. i. 23). And how could it be otherwise, when, in its full sense, regeneration implies a moral change, and such changes can only be wrought by means which appeal to the conscience through the understanding?

As to the notion that by baptism we are brought into mystical union with Christ in His glorified body, and that this is the special grace of regeneration, it can plead no warranty of Scripture. Indeed, it is almost unintelligible. It can be defended only on the supposition that the baptismal water is by the Holy Ghost united mystically with Christ's glorified body, as the bread and wine are alleged to be in the other sacrament; and to this length theological speculation has not as yet advanced. That there is a presence of Christ in this sacrament, as in all means of grace, is unquestionable; but where is the *res sacramenti*, corresponding to the body and blood of the Eucharist, to be here found? Such expressions as the figurative one, 'buried with Christ' (by baptismal immersion), furnish no ground for the theory.

In common with the Eucharist, baptism serves the purpose of appropriating to the individual what the Word propounds only generally. The promises of Scripture are universal, and necessarily so; and though faith reduces them into saving possession, yet both the Church and the individual need something further: the Church a visible proof that the candidate for membership has personally apprehended Christ, the individual that forgiveness of sin is made over *to himself* as distinguished from others. It is one thing to say, Christ has died for sinners, and another to say, Christ has died for me. Since to the Church the dispensing of the sacraments is committed, and the Church cannot read the heart, and must take men at their profession, the outward reception of either sacrament is no positive proof that the grace thereof, whatever it be, is received ; if Christ were to administer the sacraments directly, no mistakes would be made ; baptism would always be a sure proof of regeneration, the Eucharist of abiding in Christ by faith ; administered by fallible men, who can only *presume* on the existence of the necessary qualifications, the proof is only presumptive, and the language of charity, with the necessary reservations, is the only language that is appropriate.

The visible element, to be used at baptism, is not mentioned in the words of institution ; whence we infer that our Lord adopted a well-known symbol, and transferred it to a Christian use. That the Apostles understood that water was to be used is plain from the instances in the Book of Acts, such as that of the eunuch (x. 47) ; but on what previously existing usages its employment was founded has been a question. The baptism of proselytes to the Jewish religion, which used formerly to be insisted on,[1] has had so much uncertainty thrown upon its date by the researches of later times that it is hardly safe to allege it : we have no clear evidence that it existed in the time of Christ, nor indeed before the fourth century of the Christian era. But John's baptism, and its relation to the Gospel, are facts of Scripture ; and it may be fairly argued that Christian baptism is, with the necessary modifications, an adaptation of this earlier ordinance ; especially since the disciples of Christ, doubtless by the command, or under the sanction, of their Master, baptized (John iv. 1, 2), and this baptism must be regarded as substantially of the same character as that of John.

But when an identity between John's and Christian baptism is asserted, the evidence does not support the assertion. The Baptist's own confession of the inferiority of his mission (Matt. iii. 11), which Christ endorses (*Ibid.*, xi. 11) ; and particularly the circumstance mentioned in Acts xix, that certain disciples who had only received John's baptism were, by Paul's command, baptized in the name of Christ ; sufficiently prove the contrary. According to St. Paul, John's baptism implied no mention of the Holy Ghost ; from which it may be inferred that the form prescribed in Matt. xxviii. 19 was in use at that time, though the fact is not mentioned ; and, further, that baptism in the name of the Holy Trinity was different from a baptism unto repentance. As to spiritual gifts, absent in the one and conveyed by the other, the narrative is silent.

94. *Infant Baptism*

At the time of the Reformation the connection of the Anabaptists with political movements of doubtful tendency raised a strong prejudice against this sect, and prevented an impartial discussion of the principal tenet from which it took its name. Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin, and the other leaders were anxious to dissociate themselves from men whose opinions on social and political questions seemed to reflect discredit on the movement ; and this they thought could not be better accomplished than by denouncing in no measured terms those who entertained doubts respecting the validity, or apostolicity, of infant baptism. Moreover, that infants could not be saved without baptism, was an accepted conclusion, dating from Augustine's day. The subject, therefore, did not at that time receive an unbiassed investigation ; [1] and it would be too much to say that the Protestant theologians of the following century supply the want. It is only in later times that the difficulties connected with the subject have been candidly recognized.

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[1] See Wall, i., p. 4.

The general result of modern research is, that no satisfactory proof of the prevalence of infant baptism in the Apostolic age can be gathered from Scripture. The traditionary arguments are either insufficient, or they seem to assume what has to be proved. *Assuming* that infant baptism then prevailed, it is not difficult to discover grounds for or allusions to it ; such as the command of Christ to baptize all nations, for infants (it is urged) are a part of nations ; the fact being that our Lord was speaking not of the proper *subjects* of baptism, but of the duty of gathering all men, Gentiles as well as Jews, into the Church, and that the command to teach such converts is inconsistent with their being infants. Or St. Peter's words (Acts. ii. 39), ' the promise is to you and your children,' in which a trace of infant baptism has been discovered ; whereas the context proves that the promise referred to (Joel ii. 28) is that of remission of sin and the gift of the Holy Ghost, and, moreover, ' you and your children,' according to Old Testament usage, can only mean, you and your posterity. The baptism of ' households ' is appealed to (Acts xvi. 15 ; 1 Cor. i. 16) ; but, unfortunately for the argument, the term household is similarly used in passages which can by no possibility be applied to infants ; as when the ' house of Stephanas ' (the very ' household ' which St. Paul baptized) is said to have addicted themselves to the ' ministry of the Saints ' (1 Cor. xvi. 15), and the jailer of Philippi to have believed ' with all his house ' (Acts xvi. 34).

Wall lays great stress on 1 Cor. vii. 14, arguing that the word ἅγια,

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[1] [That infants could not be saved without baptism was no tenet of the Reformers. Can it sincerely be maintained that the subject of infant baptism failed to receive unbiassed attention in their writings, and that they were moved to its defence by considerations of expediency and prejudice rather than by an earnest comparison of Scripture with Scripture ? A study of Calvin's careful treatment of the subject in *Institutes,* IV, xv and xvi. is sufficient to show how unsubstantial is such an accusation. Editor.]

"holy," there applied to children, must imply baptism, as, indeed, it usually does in St. Paul's salutations to the churches. In this passage, however, it can hardly do so, since the very same word, in its verbal form, is used of the unbelieving husband or wife; 'the unbelieving husband is sanctified (ἡγίασται) by the wife'; and no one will contend that an unbelieving adult could have received Christian baptism. In truth, the passage is rather against what it is quoted for; for if these children had been baptized, why should not the Apostle have used the proper word, and thereby strengthened his argument? The unbelieving husband was not to be abandoned by the believing wife, for as long as they lived together he was under religious influence, which might, it was to be hoped, in time issue in his own conversion; and *à fortiori* the children of the marriage enjoyed this advantage, and were, by providential circumstances, so far *ἅγια*. More than this cannot be inferred from the passage.

Nor does history come to our aid. A very learned and candid inquirer can find no express mention of children in connection with baptism before Irenæus (about A.D. 170), whose words are: 'Christ came to save all who by Him are regenerated to God, infants, little ones, etc. There is no reason to doubt that by the term 'regenerated' he may have meant baptism, or that infant baptism by that time had gained a footing; but the point at issue is whether it can be discovered in the New Testament, or in the earliest patristic remains. Later on, Tertullian's judgment is well known; dissuading from the practice, on the ground that it is better to wait until young persons could have some knowledge of what they were doing. Now the question is, not whether Tertullian was right in his view, but whether he would have ventured so to advise if it had been in his time a ruled point that infant baptism could be traced to the Apostles. That his discussion of the question shows that infant baptism was then common is a fair inference, and is in itself extremely probable. But it also proves that it was considered an open question. And that this was the case may also be argued from the many instances on record of persons, who, though born of Christian parents (as, *e.g.*, Augustine), were not baptized until of a ripe age. It is unnecessary to refer to later evidence: there is no doubt that in the fifth century pedobaptism had become the normal usage of the Church.

On general grounds of probabiltly it seems doubtful whether the Apostles would at once introduce infant baptism either in the Jewish or the Gentile Churches. As regards the former, it has already been observed (§ 18) that these converts neither considered themselves, nor were they considered by their Jewish brethren, as separatists from the theocracy ; but rather as one of the many Jewish sects existing at the time, that one whose peculiar tenet it was that Jesus of Nazareth was the promised Messiah. We may hence infer that the Apostles would not, unless expressly so commanded, interfere with the Divinely-appointed ordinance of circumcision ; and, in fact, that the Jewish converts continued to circumcise their children as the law commanded. And then the question arises, would these converts be likely to adopt, or the Apostles to enjoin, in the absence of any command by Christ, another mode of initiating their children into the Abrahamic covenant than that prescribed to the Patriarch himself ? It must be remembered that the Gospel claimed to be the spiritual fulfilment of the Abrahamic covenant—the covenant of faith (Gal. iii. 6, 7, 17) ; and that circumcision was the seal of that covenant, appointed to be so, long before the promulgation of the law.[1] The disciples of John were baptized, and the disciples of Christ baptized under their Master's sanction (John iv. 1, 2) ; but neither of these baptisms was the initiatory rite of a *new dispensation.* That a new dispensation had succeeded to the patriarchal and legal, though announced in the Epistle to the Hebrews, was not placed beyond doubt by any visible interposition of Providence until the destruction of the temple ; that event decided the question for ever.[2]

The Apostolic baptism, like that of John, and like that of Christ (probably of a similar character to that of John), was, as far as we read, confined to adults ; the reason, it may be presumed, being that while circumcision, the door of entrance into the covenant of Abraham and also into the legal dispensation, continued in force under an express Divine appointment, the Apostles hesitated to supersede it by a modification of adult baptism, which could plead no command of their Master, and which, however natural it may seem to us, may not have seemed so to them, who lived (most of them) under the legal dispensation, who were far from thinking themselves separatists from it, and to whom no signal from heaven was given of its dissolution. The argument, then, that *because* the Apostles were familiar with circumcision they must have baptized infants should be exchanged for another, viz., the production of proof that, *notwithstanding* their familiarity with circumcision, they introduced the baptisms of infants. For this reason it is to the Gentile Churches that we must probably look for the first adoption of pedobaptism.

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[1] [Nothing, then, could be more natural than that circumcision,the seal of the Abrahamic covenant, should in the new dispensation be superseded by baptism, the seal of the new covenant (in which the Abrahamic promises attain to their spiritual fulfilment), and that the latter, too, should be administered to infants as well as to adult converts. Editor.]

[2] [In an external sense this may be true, but doctrinally the question had been put beyond doubt by the preaching and teaching of the Apostles from the Day of Pentecost onwards. Editor.]

But here another difficulty meets us. Pedobaptism presumes that the child will be brought up ‘ agreeably to this beginning ’ ; and this presumes a certain maturity of Christian knowledge and practice in the parents and sponsors, and in the Church at large in which the child has been born. Hence, it may be a question whether in our missions it would be wise to introduce the practice before the native Churches have given evidence of their fitness for the trust ; and this must be a matter of time and experience. The Churches to which St. Paul addressed his Epistles appear (in several instances) to have been, as regards both doctrine and practice, in an imperfect and unsettled condition, as indeed might be expected in converts just gathered in from such cities as Corinth and other ancient communities. They had need to be instructed and set right in many fundamental points before they could be teachers. Heathenish associations clung to them, and produced a strange mixture of what was old and what was new. They were ‘ babes in Christ,’ ‘ spiritually quickened indeed, but far removed from spiritual manhood ; hardly as yet ‘ understanding what the will of the Lord ’ was. To infant Churches in such a condition St. Paul may well have hestitated to entrust baptized infants, to be brought up in the fear and admonition of the Lord, especially where no command of Christ indicated the duty. He may have left the question undetermined, as many other matters of polity and discipline were left, to be settled at a future time, at the discretion of the Church. And so may the other Apostles have acted.

Another circumstance, too, renders this conclusion probable. National Christianity, as distinguished from saving, does not occupy a place in the Apostolical Epistles ; for the obvious reason that the state of the world at that time did not admit of such a conception. The existing civil power was a heathen one ; the state, in its public religion and in the spirit of its institutions, was heathen ; and so the Church appears in the New Testament, not indeed as antagonistic to the powers that were, but as having little to do with them, and as absorbed in her heavenly mission. This, however, was not to continue. The eventual triumph of Christianity over Paganism brought with it a national recognition of the Christian religion ; and when the Roman empire broke up, national Churches came into existence. And so, no doubt, it was intended to be. National Christianity is not, indeed, saving, but it is of the highest importance and value. It gives promise that the Church is about to infuse a Christian spirit into the social customs, the institutions, the laws, the government of the nation which, as a nation, has received Christianity; and we have only to compare the standard on these points of Christian nations as compared with heathen to understand how powerful the influence is. In truth, Christianity has a mission for this world as well as for the next. National Christianity is not necessarily saving, but it is the vestibule, the outer court of the temple, to the inner circle which constitutes the true Church, or mystical body of Christ. How short-sighted, then, the policy of those who would destroy this invaluable outwork of the Gospel, under the plea of its being a corruption and inconsistent with the Apostolical model as we find it in the New Testament! The Apostles themselves, had they survived to see it, would have been the first to welcome the addition of national to saving Christianity.

That a national religion is in itself not unacceptable to the Most High, we may infer from the instance of the Jewish theocracy, though we must beware of introducing its types and shadows under the Gospel. Now, of all the visible symbols of national Christian faith, infant baptism seems the most suitable and expressive. In this point of view, circumcision, serving the same purpose, would naturally suggest it. Infant baptism, in short, may be regarded as the accompaniment of national Christianity. But it had to bide its time (so we may conclude) until empires and states became Christian empires and states, or the Providential direction of affairs manifestly tended in that direction. We need not, then, wonder that it does not appear in the Apostolic Church, nor attempt to introduce it prematurely into that Church by strained expositions of Scripture.[1] Still less need we wonder that, in due time, it made its appearance, and has, on the whole, held its place. Scripture is very far, indeed from discountenancing it; and the Church (as a whole), exercising the discretion which on this as on other points was left to her by her Divine Master, has acted wisely in 'retaining' it.

On the whole, it is consistent with the historical evidence, and with the nature of things, that pedobaptism is of ecclesiastical and not of apostolical origin; growing up gradually in the Church, and justifiable on its own grounds. And this conclusion seems confirmed by the parallel history of infant communion. It should not be forgotten that this, for a long time, prevailed in the Church as extensively as infant baptism, and the arguments in its favour were very similar ; and indeed *essentially* they seem to stand on the same footing. It was in use in the Western Church from about A.D. 400 to A.D. 1000, 600 years ; and it is practised in the Eastern Church to this day. And yet in the West it has been abandoned, as being merely an ecclesiastical custom, which the Church could abrogate without infringing any apostolical precedent or direction. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the baptism of infants grew up in a similar manner. That it has been retained while the other has fallen into disuse is due not to any difference of Scriptural authority between them, but from intrinsic considerations which are of force in the one case and not in the other.[1] The natural life of an infant, though real, differs materially from that of an adult ; and the new birth of the Spirit, though the earnest of spiritual growth, may be conceived of as a germ compared with the future development. But baptism is the sacrament of the new birth, as the Eucharist is of Christian manhood ; and here we have at once a distinction between the two sacraments. If regeneration (in a modified sense) may be predicated of infants, it may fairly be argued that baptism is a more appropriate sacrament for them than the Eucharist ; and this without approaching the question whether either should be administered to infants. We find, let it be supposed, in the Church the practice prevailing as regards both sacraments, and a debate arises whether this is justifiable ; obviously there is more to be said for the retention of infant baptism than for that of infant communion.

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[1] [It is noticeable that Litton, in contending for the validity of "national" Christianity, makes use of arguments similar to, but far less securely based than, those he has rejected in connection with pedobaptism. Analogies from the Old Testament are justified only when they answer to the doctrine of the New Testament. A study of the latter, however, leads us to conclude that the former nation of the chosen people corresponds to the present "nation" of all those who are one, throughout the world, through faith in Christ Jesus (cf. Gal. iii. 28f.; 1 Pet. ii. 9; Rev. i. 6). Editor.]

This, it is true, goes but a little way towards deciding the question ; still it clears the way for understanding why when the one practice was given up the other was retained ; and also for considerations of a more positive character, such as the following : By an act of Providence a child born in a Christian Church is at once placed in a different position from that of a child born in heathenism : he is placed from his birth under Christian influences, and grows up in an atmosphere of Christianity ; if not an election to eternal life, it may well be called, in a lower sense, an election. The Church acknowledges in such a child the germ of a corrupt nature leading, of itself, to a sinful career ; but also perceives him in possession of spiritual privileges which are intended to, and may issue in, a saving regeneration. Why should she not recognize the fact of Divine favour thus gratuitously bestowed, and interpret it as a warrant for receiving the infant into her fellowship, in faith and hope that in the use of the appointed means he will become a living member of Christ ? Here it is that the Scripture analogies and the statements of Christ, which are of no force to prove that the Apostles practised infant baptism, acquire argumentative value. Circumcision was at first instituted in an adult, but afterwards was extended to infants; this does not prove that baptism came in place of circumcision, still less that the command in the one case implies a command in the other ; but it does present an analogy which has force. Christ's blessing little children, and declaring that of such is the kingdom of heaven (Mark x. 15, 16), does not prove that He had their baptism in view ; but it does prove that He has a special love towards little children, and is pleased that they should be brought to Him in every way in which they can be brought ; and baptism surely is one way, and in the case of infants the only way, in which they can be visibly brought.

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[1] [We venture to submit, on the contrary, that the intrinsic considerations which led to the abandonment of infant communion and the retention of infant baptism were distinctively Scriptural, at least at the time of the Reformation, as a study of the writings of the Reformers serves to demonstrate. Editor.]

Moreover, we may ask the opponents of infant baptism, whether even they can fix empirically the moment of regeneration, or prevent mistakes in adult baptism ; and especially to note the fact that in the Apostolic administration of this sacrament to adults, it was not deferred until unquestionable proofs of the new birth (which only a consistent life of holiness can furnish) were exhibited, but was administered at once on an expression of desire for it (see the various instances in the Book of Acts). To the objection that the children of Christian parents already by birth possess the privilege of adoption, and therefore do not need the sacrament, it may be replied that if they do possess the privilege, the sacrament, the sign and seal of adoption, should not be denied them. The practice of the Baptist churches, in theory at least, keeps the Church perpetually in the state of being just gathered in from heathenism, and puts aside the fact that, besides representing the invisible church, each visible church is a school of training for its younger members, the duties connected with which can only be consistently discharged on the assumption that they are members, however imperfect, of the society. Private instruction may, no doubt, be, and probably is, given in families ; but the Church as such, as represented by its ministers, has no concern with its children, until they apply for baptism. It leads, too, to a depreciation of the sacraments, and to the custom, too prevalent in the early Church, of putting off the reception of baptism indefinitely : the worshipper is tempted to forget that as long as he is not baptized, though he may attend the ministry of the Word, he is merely in the position of a catechumen, and is not really a member of the Christian Church.

On such grounds as these it is better to rely than to put forward assumptions which cannot be sustained, and which, like all weak advocacy, do more injury than benefit to the cause to be defended. And this is the footing on which our Church places the matter. 'The baptism of young children is in any wise to be retained in the Church, as most agreeable to the institution of Christ' (Art. xxvii); whatever may be the meaning of 'agreeable to the institution of Christ,' the language seems purposely to avoid positive statements.[1] And, further, it is not said that infant baptism is to be *introduced* where it is not the usage, but to be *retained* where it is, a moderation of statement which presents a contrast to what has been sometimes written on the subject, particulary by the Lutheran divines. Regeneration implies justification (see § 70), and the dogma that every infant is by baptism regenerate necessarily involves the assumption that he is also in and by the sacrament justified. But how was this to be reconciled with the *articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiæ*, justification by faith? Luther felt the difficulty, and the mode in which he attempted to extricate himself from it furnishes an instructive warning against attempting to be wise above what is written. He did not hesitate to maintain that though infants could not understand the Word preached, yet the Holy Spirit in the act of regenerating them in baptism produces faith in their hearts; and not merely a habit of faith but faith in actual exercise. And this doctrine of the *fides infantum* continued for a long time to be taught by Lutheran writers.[2] As if the *salvation* of infants were in peril unless they could be brought under a certain ecclesiastical formula! As if infant regeneration or justification must not mean something different from what these terms signify in the case of an adult.

Infant baptism is a modification of the original ordinance; within the discretion of the Church and on general grounds justifiable; and as such it is an imperfect baptism, and needs a supplement. Confirmation in the reformed churches supplies this need. If this rite be regarded as a quasi-sacrament, conveying an independent grace of its own, infant baptism is left without its proper supplement. It will also be necessary to establish a difference between the two sacraments, as regards the conditions of beneficial reception, which Scripture does not warrant, and which our Church rejects. Sensible of this imperfection, our Church aims at placing the infant, as far as possible, in the position of an adult. She attributes no inherent efficacy to the sacrament, irrespectively of conditions ; but by a legal fiction attempts to supply the conditions. The infant is supposed to profess that he renounces sin and believes in Christ ; but he does this through his sureties, whose faith, or the faith of the Church, is treated as if it was his own. Whence does this arrangement spring but from a feeling that infant baptism, however to be ' retained,' fails to come up, *per se*, to the idea of a complete baptism ? It is therefore difficult to understand how Martensen can write : ' Baptism is according to its idea infant baptism. The Church in introducing infant baptism is so far from deviating from the original institution, that she presents baptism precisely in the form which most perfectly corresponds to its idea.'[1] In which he is followed by an English commentator on Mark x. 14 : ' Not only may infants be brought to Christ, but in order for us who are mature to come to Him, we must cast away all that wherein our maturity has caused us to differ from them, and become like them.' Most true ; and now for the application to baptism, concerning which there is no proof that our Lord had it especially in view. ' Not only is infant baptism justified but it is (abstractedly considered, not as to the preparation for it, which from the nature of the case must be exceptional), *the normal pattern of all baptism* ; none can enter into the kingdom of God but as an infant. In adult baptism (the exceptional case) we strive to secure that state of simplicity and childlikeness, which in the infant we have ready and undoubted to our hands.' This is not to interpret, but to impose an interpretation on, Scripture.

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[1] [Surely the statement that the baptism of young children is "most agreeable to the institution of Christ" is a distinctly positive statement, declaring the belief of the Church of England that it is *scriptural*, rather than, as Litton would seem to hold, merely agreeable to ecclesiastical requirements and "national" Christianity. Again, the assertion of the Article that it is to be *retained* implies, not, as Litton suggests in the next sentence, that it should not be *introduced* (how could the Article mean that of what it declares to be "most agreeable to the institution of Christ"?), but that it should not be *discarded*, as certain sects demanded. Editor.]

[2] [It was not, however, the teaching of the English Reformers or of Calvin and his successors. Lutheran aberrations cannot be allowed to sway our judgment, as though they were not counteracted by the body of Reformed doctrine. Editor.]

Since Augustine's time baptism has been generally held to be the remedy for the guilt of original sin ; and that Father appealed to the custom of infant baptism in his time, with great effect, against his Pelagian opponents. These denied, or explained away, the fact of original sin, but did not dispute the propriety of baptizing infants. Why, then, asks Augustine, do you baptize infants ? Baptism is for the remission of sin ; but since infants have no actual sin, what can they need the sacrament for but original ? It was an *argumentum ad hominem* of weight ; but it left the question of infant-baptism itself untouched. We can hardly argue that because we practise pedobaptism infants have original sin, and then that because they have original sin they need baptism. The latter fact must be established on other grounds. The particular connection of baptism with original sin is not very clear from Scripture. That a sinful nature is propagated from our first parents is matter of experience ; that this implicates infants in something which, for want of a better term, we call guilt is the doctrine of our Church (Art. ix), and appears to be taught in Scripture, however mysterious it may be, and to our reason unaccountable ; but the special relation of baptism to original sin is not so clearly revealed. In the instances of Scripture it is actual sin that is thus remitted. It may, indeed, be urged that since actual sin springs from original as from a root, both kinds of sin are implied where one is mentioned ; and this may be so ; still, there is no passage in which original sin and baptism are brought together as disease and remedy. That baptism remits in infants original sin is a hypothesis, not a doctrine.

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[1] *Dog.*, § 255.

Such being the state of the evidence on pedobaptism, some practical inferences may be drawn. There is no reason why we should not retain it ; no reason why the administration should not be accompanied by the language of faith and hope, seeing that we have no reason to doubt that Christ ' favourably allows the charitable work ' of thus presenting infants to Him, or to doubt that the prayers of the sponsors and of the congregation on their behalf will be heard : there is nothing, as in the case of an insincere adult, to rebut these presumptions. If we baptize infants at all, why should we not cherish expectations of a spiritual benefit ? But when the question is respecting *dogmatic* statements on the effects of infant baptism, our footing becomes less firm. We have no instances in Scripture to reason from ; no exposition of the theory of the case ; no assertion that what baptism conveys to a believing adult it also conveys to an infant ; no explanation how or why conditions required in an adult may in the other case be dispensed with, or how difficulties may be removed. In short, we have no certain data in Scripture on which to build conclusions.

Under such circumstances, it seems prudent to abstain from positive statements, as if they were revealed truth, and to content ourselves, as regards the *effects* of infant baptism, with the language of faith, hope, and charity. The controversies which have arisen on this subject are never-ending, for the combatants, for want of premisses to argue from, beat the air. Had this been acknowledged on all sides, and by all parties, the Church might have been spared much profitless theological strife. We know but little about the state of infants, except that they come into the world with a sinful nature. We know not what their regeneration, or justification, is : or rather, what these theological terms mean when applied to them, whether they are to be understood strictly or with modifications. Of one thing, however, we may feel sure, that if infants are removed before the dawn of reason, the atonement of Christ has been in some way applied to them, to ensure their safety. Beyond this, we see through a glass darkly. When the Apostolic origin of infant baptism is itself doubtful, how can we pronounce positively on its effects ? On this, as on many other points, Scripture leads us a certain way ; and then leaves us to make use of the fragmentary information as best we may.

95. *Institution of the Eucharist*

As a token of continuance in the Church, and of abiding in Christ by faith ; as a commemoration of the atonement as the Christian's sole ground of hope ; as a visible seal of the promises ; and as a pledge and means of Christian union ; Christ, shortly before His Passion, appointed the sacrament of the Lord's Supper ; to be continually celebrated, as St. Paul tells us, ' until He come again ' (1 Cor. xi. 26). It is the sacrament of spiritual growth, as baptism is the sacrament of spiritual birth.

We possess four accounts of the institution of the Lord's Supper : Matt. xxvi. 26–8 ; Mark xiv. 22–4 ; Luke xxii. 19, 20 ; and 1 Cor. xi. 23–26. Of these that of St. Paul is the earliest in date, and appeals to a direct revelation from Christ : ' I have received of the Lord that which I also delivered unto you.' The substance of this communication was that ' The Lord Jesus in the same night that He was betrayed took bread : and when He had given thanks He brake it, and said, Take eat, this is My body which is broken for you ; this do in remembrance of Me. After the same manner also He took the cup, when He had supped, saying, This cup is the New Testament in My blood : this do ye, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of Me. For as oft as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do show forth the Lord's death till He come.' The points in which St. Luke's account differs from those of the other Evangelists lead to the conclusion that he derived it from St. Paul. St. Matthew and St. Mark omit the words ' which is broken for you ' ; and the commemorative aspect of the ordinance is more strongly expressed in St. Paul's account, and also in that of St. Luke. But in other respects they all agree.

The occasion on which this sacrament was instituted has been from early times matter of debate, owing to the difficulty of reconciling the narratives of the synoptists with that of St. John. So much is plain : since Jesus rose on the first day of the week, and remained in the grave during the Jewish Sabbath, He must have been crucified on the preceding Friday ; and the supper mentioned by St. Matthew (xxvi. 20) must have been the last which He partook of with His disciples, for it was held on the same night that He was betrayed, and His betrayal led immediately to His crucifixion. This supper, then, appears to have taken place on the 13th of Nisan, the day before the celebration of the legal passover. The paschal lamb was to be slain on the 14th of Nisan, and 'between the evenings,' that is, as it was usually understood, between about three o'clock in the afternoon and the setting of the sun; but at that time Jesus had expired on the cross. And St. John's account seems to confirm this; according to which it was early in the morning of the 14th of Nisan (Friday) that Jesus was brought before Pilate, and the circumstance is added, that the Jews did not enter into the judgment hall 'lest they should be defiled, but that they might eat the passover' (xviii. 28), which implies that the passover had not yet been celebrated.

On the other hand, the synoptical narratives convey the impression that it was during the Paschal feast that the Lord's Supper was instituted. It is sufficient to refer to St. Luke, with whom the others are in substantial agreement: 'Then came the day of unleavened bread, when the passover must be killed. And He sent Peter and John, saying, Go and prepare us the passover that we may eat. And when the hour was come, He sat down, and the twelve Apostles with Him. And He said unto them, With desire have I desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer. And He took bread, and gave thanks and brake it, and gave unto them, saying, This is My body which is given for you; do this in remembrance of Me. Likewise also the cup after supper, saying, This cup is the New Testament in My blood which is shed for you' (xxii. 20). The attempts that have been made to reconcile this discrepancy, as that Jesus anticipated by a day the legal passover because He knew that He Himself would the next day be slain as the Antitype, or true Paschal Lamb; or that He celebrated a mere commemorative passover like the modern Jews; or that as by His Divine authority He was 'Lord of the Sabbath,' so by the same He could institute a passover of His own; cannot be deemed successful. Both St. Matthew and St. John were eye-witnesses of what they describe, so that on this point no preference can be given to either. On the whole, St. John's account seems the more accurate; and if it be preferred, the meal at which the Eucharist was instituted was not a Jewish passover, as indeed it is not so called by this Evangelist.[1]

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[1] [The reader who wishes to pursue the subject will find it fully discussed by Lücke on John xviii. 28; De Wette, *Kgf. Handbuch*, etc., John xiii. 1–20; and Winer, *Real Wöter-Buch*, 'Pascha.' It is to be noted that during the supper Judas departed on his errand, and Jesus and His disciples after it was finished proceeded to the Mount of Olives; whereas it was the Jewish custom not to leave the house or the city on the night of the Paschal feast. See Exod. xii. 22. [But see Edersheim, *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, for a masterly vindication of the consistency of the two accounts. Editor.]

As regards the meaning of the words used by Christ, there does not seem room for much difference of opinion. 'Take eat, this is My body which is broken for you': whether we interpret τοῦτο of the bread delivered, which is quite compatible with the rules of grammar, the neuter being frequently used as the subject when the predicate is of an inanimate object; or take it to refer to the whole transaction, This ordinance which I now appoint; is a matter of little moment. Since the word is repeated in the delivering of the cup, the latter seems the more natural construction. Nor does it signify whether we attach the words 'in My blood' to 'the cup' or to the 'New Covenant'; this cup by reason of what is (symbolically) contained in it, viz., My blood shed for you, is the New Covenant, or, this cup is the New Covenant, which covenant is founded in, sanctioned by, My blood, as the the Mosaic covenant was hallowed with the blood of burnt sacrifices (Exod. xxiv. 8): the meaning either way will be nearly the same.

Of more importance it is to determine the sense of the copula 'is,' which occurs, as regards the bread, in all the accounts, St. Luke alone omitting it in the delivery of the cup. Grammatically, as is acknowledged even by rigid Lutherans,[1] it may be taken either in a literal or figurative sense; the context determining which is to be adopted. Even if there were no Biblical examples of the figurative usage, the general laws of language would support it.[2] But, in fact, Scripture abounds with instances. Such are, I am the Vine, I am the Door, the Seed is the Word, This Rock was Christ, I am the Bread of Life, and others of similar character. The literal interpretation, then, not being forced on us, we examine the context.

Can we suppose that our Lord, sitting at the table, meant to deliver to the Apostles a duplicate of Himself, so that two bodies of Christ, in His proper humanity, were present there at the same time? This will hardly be maintained; only, perhaps, that an invisible spiritual body was so connected with the bread and wine by the words of Christ that though but one Christ could be seen, heard and handled, another Christ, who could not be perceived by the senses, was under the material elements delivered to the Apostles to be fed upon. But this is to introduce the theories of a later age, and to force upon the words of institution a sense which they do not necessarily convey. To which we may add that a docetic conception of this kind would be foreign to the habits of mind of the Apostles, men untrained in the schools of philosophy.

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[1] See *e.g.* Kahnis, *Lehre vom Abendmahle*, 41, quoted by Schenkel, *Dog.*, B. ii., p. 1125.

[2] Thus it is common to say, 'This picture is the person' whom it is intended to represent.

Moreover, the body and the blood distributed are said to be the one broken, the other shed ; neither of which was at the time fact, but the contrary ; so that it could never have occurred to the assembled guests to put a literal construction on their Master's words. Had they done so, we should have expected some such expression of surprise on their part as that of the men of Capernaum, John vi. 52, ' How can this Man give us His flesh to eat ? ' But they seem unconscious of any such miracle ; and if this impression was a false one, it was not rectified by Christ Himself. In short, they must have understood the word ' is ' as they were accustomed at each anniversary of the passover to understand (Exod. xii. 24–27 : ' Ye shall observe this thing for an ordinance to thee and to thy sons for ever. And it shall come to pass that when your children shall say unto you, What mean ye by this service ? that ye shall say, It is the sacrifice of the Lord's passover, who passed over the houses of the children of Israel when He smote the Egyptians.' It is not the very sacrifice of that memorable night, but a memorial of it ; and every Jew would understand that the word ' is ' was not to be taken literally.

It is to be observed, further, that no section of the Christian Church construes the words literally throughout. The Romish Church, which advances to the extreme limit in this direction, teaches indeed that the substance of the bread is changed into the body of Christ, but it leaves the accidents as they were ; and a substance, deprived of its accidents, is so far not what we mean literally by the object in question. Nor does, or can, any Church construe the words ' This cup is the New Testament, or covenant, in My blood ' literally : the cup was not the wine contained in it, nor was the wine a covenant. We arrive, then, at the conclusion that a literal interpretation of the words of institution is untenable ; and this, whether the transaction is to be considered as commemorative, or symbolical ; and whether, with Zwingli, we take the word ' is ' to be equivalent to ' signifies,' or, with Oecolampadius, attach the trope to the words ' body,' and ' blood,' as meaning ' figure of My body,' ' figure of My blood.'

The bread broken and the wine poured out were symbolical, as Christ Himself declares, of His body broken and His blood shed ; but there was another act to be performed, viz., the eating of the bread and the drinking of the wine, an actual participation of the elements, which we must suppose was also intended to convey a meaning. What this is no one can mistake : the atonement of Christ, in order to become beneficial, must be appropriated, just as bread and wine have no power to nourish until received into the system. The blessing intended, whatever it may be, must be spiritually assimilated by some spiritual organ, and so made over to the individual. We hence learn that the ordinance does not merely imply commemoration ; though the repeated injunction to 'do it in remembrance' of Christ proves that this aspect of it is, to say the least, a principal one ; but that it implies also an active appropriation of some spiritual benefit on the part of the receiver. What we therein 'show forth,' that is, commemorate, openly boast of, and trust in, is 'the death of Christ, till He come' ; but the eating and drinking signify, further, that the atonement must become ours by a personal and apprehensive faith.

It is difficult to understand how the idea of priestly consecration could have come to be connected with the simple words of Christ. The meal at which they were used was either the legal passover, or a substitute for it ; and it is well known that the ministration of a priest was not necessary at the celebration of the passover ; each family kept the feast in its own house, under the presidency of the head of the family. To him, and not to a priest, was assigned the duty of giving thanks over the unleavened cakes, which he afterwards broke and distributed ; and over the cups, said by some to be four in number, by others five, which in like manner were handed round. 'The cup of blessing which we bless, the bread which we brake' (1 Cor. x. 16) ; if the acts of blessing and breaking the bread were afterwards, as a matter of order, confined to the presbyters present, neither does this passage prescribe it, nor was the custom derived from the Jewish Paschal feast, at which Christ presided. Nor did the words, 'This is My body,' 'This is My blood' carry with them any consecrating virtue, or even separation from common to sacred purposes. Whether the meal was the legal passover, or merely a prophetic one, the bread and wine had already been set apart as constituents of the feast itself ; they had been already hallowed ; and Christ did nothing more than apply these substances, with the customary act of thanksgiving, to the purposes of the new covenant.

To explain this transfer and adaptation, not to introduce an element of liturgy, was the object of the Saviour ; and nothing else is contained in His words. Had He intended to establish a new priestly institute, to take the place of the old, and intended to attach it to the sacrament, He would have appointed a sacerdotal ritual and specific directions how the sacrifice was to be offered : He would have given a warning against the celebration of the mysteries by others than consecrated hands. These things, indeed, we find in abundance in later ages of the Church, but no trace of them appears in the original record of institution. The Lord's Supper there appears reduced to its barest elements—

eat the bread, drink the cup ; and appears instituted in the persons of the Apostles, not as priests or even ministers, but as representatives of the true Church to the end of time, and without a hint of devolution of sacerdotal powers to successors. Whether the prayer employed on this occasion was a silent or an uttered one ; whether the thanksgiving in use at the Jewish festival (' Praised be the Lord, who causes the fruit of the earth to grow, who creates the produce of the vine '), or some other, was employed ; how often the sacrament is to be celebrated ; at what particular time of the day, except so far as Christ Himself instituted it in the evening—on these, and such like points, the original narrative is silent : a proof that Christians have emerged from the region of type and shadow, to which a ritual worked out by law into a minute detail is appropriate, into that of the freedom of the Gospel, which, provided the substance is retained, leaves scope for differences of administration, according to varying circumstances of climate or social usage.

Nor, as has been observed (§ 82), does the later revelation vouchsafed to the Apostles supply the deficiency, as it did in many important points of doctrine and practice left by Christ Himself to be thus more fully explained or supplied. After the institution, the Eucharist is seldom referred to in the New Testament, and for the most part incidentally, to correct abuses which had sprung up in connection with it. If Acts ii. 42 alludes to it, nothing more is said than that the disciples contained in the breaking of bread. We read in Acts xx that, on the first day of the week, the disciples came together to eat bread, and nothing further. 1 Cor. x. 16 has been already considered.

So far as we gather from Scripture, the true consecrating element, that which gives ' validity ' to the sacrament and ensures the grace thereof, is not the person of the administrator but the faith of the recipient. In a secondary sense, indeed, the bread and wine may be said to be consecrated to holy uses. So was the tabernacle, and the vessels it continued. Things thus set apart contract a special relation to God, and a relative sanctity ; and to profane them by careless or indiscriminate use is a sin. Such was the sin of the Corinthian Church (1 Cor. xi). The bread and wine of celebration are, in this sense, no longer common bread and wine. But Christ, in instituting the supper, acted as Master of the feast, not as a priest ; and no physical transformation, the effect of a priestly word, however spiritually it may be interpreted, can be connected with the words He used. And the blessing which He intended to convey, and which in fact the Church does receive in this holy ordinance, belongs not to the elements as such, but to the worthy reception of them. Christ, or the Spirit of Christ, is to be sought, not in them, but in the proper use of them, that is, as used by those who are already in spiritual union with Him.[1]

'Do this in remembrance of Me': this is the only object of the Eucharist, which Christ Himself enunciates; a circumstance which may be commended to the attention of those who seem inclined to forget it. The words imply the impending departure of the Speaker in the flesh; and since we are apt to forget those who are absent, it is plain that the ordinance is specially intended to counteract this tendency. But there is to be a remembrance not merely of His person, but of His atoning work on the Cross; of His body broken and His blood shed for the remission of sin; and the subsequent history of the Church proves how important the sacrament is in this point of view. That history reads us a lesson how easily the all-sufficiency of this atonement may be forgotten, and its place supplied by reliance on human merit or the mediation of a human priesthood, to the detriment of that 'peace with God through Jesus Christ,' on which alone, as a foundation, the edifice of true sanctification and fruitful service can be raised. Do this, and as you do it, remember that by the death which it symbolizes, 'a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice and satisfaction was made for the sins of the whole world.' Simple and affecting memorial, which ought to have been the chief bond of union among Christians: and which yet, by a strange inconsistency, has been the innocent occasion of dissension and separation.

96. *Doctrine of the Real Presence*

That Christ is, in some sense, present in the Eucharist, follows from the promises which, before His departure, were given to the Church: 'Where two or three are gathered in My name, there I am in the midst'; 'Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world'; 'I will not leave you comfortless, I will come to you.' These are general statements, but they must surely apply with peculiar force to the occasions on which Christians assemble for public worship and the celebration of the sacrament. A Church from which Christ were, in every sense, absent, would be no Church, or only as a dead body is a man, an organization from which the animating spirit had fled. So much must on all sides be admitted; but differences of opinion exist as to the manner in which Christ is present with the Church, and especially in the celebration of the Eucharist.

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[1] 'The real presence of Christ's most blessed body and blood is not, therefore, to be sought in the sacrament, but in the worthy receiver of the sacrament.' Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.*, B. v., 6.

The term ‘ real presence ’ which, by the way, does not occur in our formularies, is ambiguous and misleading. If Christ is present at all, or in any sense, His presence must be a real one, and not a mere phantom of the imagination. But reality may be predicated of spirit as well as of body, and which form of existence is to be here understood the mere epithet ‘ real ’ does not determine ; in fact, however, the meaning in theological debate is not doubtful. It is, that Christ in His human nature, the Son incarnate, whether before or after His resurrection is immaterial—for in the latter case He could say of Himself, ‘ Behold My hands and My feet that it is I Myself ; handle Me and see ; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see Me have ’ (Luke xxiv. 39)—is present in the Eucharist. That He is so is argued from the words of institution : ‘ Take eat, this is My body ’ ; ‘ drink, this is My blood.’ Since these words give to the sacrament, in the language of the schools, its form, they never can be omitted ; and what can be plainer than their import ? Christ was present in His human nature when they were uttered ; He must, therefore, be present, and in His human nature, at every subsequent celebration, otherwise there would be no continuity of the ordinance, and the Apostles would have received a gift which has not been transmitted to succeeding generations of Christians. He gave Himself to the first communicants ; He must give Himself to their successors to the end of time and in the same sense as at first. Thus there is a real presence of the Incarnate Son wherever the Eucharist is duly celebrated.

This reasoning, however, cannot be accepted without examination. It is to be observed that the form of institution does not terminate, as it is often made to do, with the words ‘ body ’ or ‘ blood,’ but contains an addition of great importance. The full form is, ‘ This is My body, which is given for you ’ ;[1] ‘ this is My blood, which is shed for you ’ ; and in the original the mode of expression is more significant than can be gathered from our versions, authorized or revised. For the words ‘ which is given,’ etc., ‘ which is shed,’ etc., are not introduced by a relative and a verb (ὅ ἐστι), as if they were independent and additional clauses, but by the article and the participle (τὸ σῶμα τὸ διδόμενον, τὸ αἷμα τὸ ἐκχυνόμενον), in which construction the participles acquire a defining and limiting power. The meaning is, This is (represents or signifies) that body of Mine which is (or is about to be) given for you, this cup, that blood of Mine which is about to be shed for you ; and it may be supposed, without incurring the charge of extorting a sense, that the words contain an allusion to, not another body, but another stage of humanity not at the time existing. And, in fact, Christ, as regards His human nature, did pass through two conditions of it, which, though personal identity was preserved, differed essentially ; the state of His humiliation (*status exinanitionis*), and the state of His exaltation (*status gloriæ*). And the transition from the one to the other did not take place according to the course of nature ; as, for example, when the humanity of an infant passes into that of manhood or old age. It was such as required the miracle of the resurrection to effect it ; such a miracle as that by which the bodies of the saints will be raised, and they who shall be alive at the second coming of Christ will be changed. Personal identity will be preserved, but the body is ' sown in corruption, raised in incorruption ; sown in dishonour, raised in glory ; sown a natural body, raised a spiritual body ' (1 Cor. xv. 42–44). So it was with Christ Himself, the first fruits from the dead.

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[1] In 1 Cor. xi. 24, whether with most editors we reject the word κλώμενον or retain it, the sense remains the same.

Now it was only in the first stage of His humanity that He was capable of suffering and death, capable of having His body broken and His blood shed, of having the body and the blood separated from each other, the well-known cause and proof of death in the Jewish sacrifices. For the ideas of suffering and death cannot be connected with Christ in His glorified humanity. The stage of humiliation has passed away, never to recur. ' Though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we Him no more ' (in this condition of His humanity) (2 Cor. v. 16) ; ' Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more ' (Rom. vi. 9) ; He reigns in glory until all enemies are put under His feet (1 Cor. xv. 25).

We have thus two states of Christ's humanity, one of which has passed away by giving place to the other, and the latter of which, the glorified state, never can be exchanged for its predecessor or come to an end. And we have now to ask, in connection with which state does Scripture allude to the Eucharist ? Invariably with the state of humiliation. That the words of institution, when fully cited, do so is obvious. The only other passage of importance in this connection is 1 Cor. x. 16, and properly understood, it is a reminiscence, almost a repetition, of the words of institution. ' The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ ? the cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ ? ' here, in the twofold action of eating the bread and drinking the cup, as at the institution, that is, in the separation of the elements, the death of Christ, the separation of the body and the blood, is symbolized, and communion or participation of that death is the thing signified by the eating and drinking. The future meeting of Christ and His Church, to which He alludes in the words ' I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine until I drink it new with you in My Father's kingdom ' (Matt. xxvi. 29), whatever we are to understand by them—most probably the marriage supper of the Lamb (Apoc. xix. 7), to celebrate the completion of redemption—will, we may be sure, be one with which no associations of suffering and death can be connected.

Such, then, is the state of the Scripture evidence on this subject. Christ in His suffering humanity is not now present anywhere, for that state no longer exists ; Christ in His glorified humanity is never spoken of in connection with the Eucharist, either at the institution or afterwards ; nor could He be so, for the leading ideas of the sacrament are sacrifice, suffering, and atonement. We infer, then, that Christ, *as the incarnate Son*, is in no sense present in the Eucharist. He cannot be so in His state of humiliation, because He no longer exists in that state ; nor is His glorified state, for the body broken and the blood shed do not belong to that state, which is incompatible with the idea of His being made an offering for sin. As far as Christ in His human nature is concerned, what is present in the Eucharist is not Himself but the *fact*, future at the institution, but on the eve of its accomplishment, of the atonement effected by His death on the cross, and the *continued virtue* of that atonement to be appropriated by faith. It is a memorial of the fact, a special means of appropriating it, a channel of grace ; but Christ, in the humanity which now belongs to Him, is not to be sought in it.

Where He is to be sought, in that humanity, is in heaven ; discharging sacerdotal functions on behalf of His Church. His true real presence is before the throne of God, ever making intercession for us, as our High Priest, pleading the merits of the sacrifice once offered and never to be repeated, and reigning as head of His Church until all enemies are put under His feet. But He cannot be present in the body crucified and the blood separated from it, except by such a miracle as even the Romish Church has not openly ventured to defend, viz., the actual reincarnation of the Son in the body of His humiliation, such as He had before His resurrection and ascension. It may be mentioned, in passing, that by many divines it has been doubted whether the glorified humanity of Christ has any blood in it at all, referring as they do to our Lord's words, ' A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see Me have,' without any mention of blood. The point may be thought a speculative one ; but if there is any truth in it, it is an additional proof that the words of institution cannot be applied to Christ in His glorified body.

'He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation' (or, judgment) 'to himself, not discerning the Lord's body' (1 Cor. xi. 29). This verse has been cited in proof of the doctrine of the real presence in the sacrament of Christ in His humanity. The argument seems of the same character as that founded on the words, 'This is My body'; what follows about the sacrifice of the body being omitted. Isolated texts may be made to mean anything. Abuses in the celebration of the Lord's Supper had crept into the Corinthian Church demanding the Apostle's animadversion. He reminds the Church of what 'he had received,' that the sacrament is a memorial of Christ's death, 'of His body broken, His blood shed'; symbolized by the bread broken and the wine poured out; and proceeds to point out the danger of profaning an ordinance of such sacred import. 'Whosoever shall eat this bread and drink this cup of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord' (ver. 27); shall be held liable to punishment (not eternal) for thinking lightly of the death of Christ. This is the meaning in ver. 29, of 'not discerning the Lord's body'; the mention of the blood is omitted as unnecessary; and the eating and drinking unworthily is explained as making no distinction between the memorial of Christ's death and an ordinary banquet. It is still the sacrifice, not the presence, of Christ to which the Apostle alludes.

As to John vi. 51–63, it has never yet been satisfactorily made out that it refers directly to the Eucharist at all. Most modern commentators of note agree with the result of Waterland's exhaustive discussion, that, though it may be *applied* to the Eucharist, it cannot be *interpreted* thereof. It is not in itself likely that our Lord should have alluded, at so early a period of His ministry, to the *sacraments* of the Church; a remark which, notwithstanding Hooker's dictum,[1] may occasion doubt whether John iii. 5 is to be literally interpreted of Christian baptism. And yet there is more to be said for this latter passage than for that in John vi, for both John's and Christ's baptism had, from the identity of the visible symbol in either, to some extent anticipated the Christian rite, whereas no such anticipation of the Eucharist is to be discovered. In either case, the supposition of a direct reference to sacraments would involve the doctrine that no one can be saved without being baptized and partaking of the Lord's Supper; and in the case of the latter sacrament, that every one who does partake of it will be saved: 'Whosoever eateth my flesh and drinketh My blood hath eternal life' (ver. 54).

To escape from this conclusion, various exceptions are allowed, as of infants or idiots, of those who lived before the sacrament was instituted, of those who desired to receive it but were prevented by unavoidable circumstances. The necessity of such reservations shows that the words cannot be taken in their literal sense. Briefly, the leading truth unfolded in this discourse of Christ is not His presence in the Eucharist, or in any other rite of the Church, but His incarnation and death. In reply to the request of the Capernaites for material bread, He announces Himself as the Bread of Life, the bread which cometh down from heaven, of which, if ' any man eats, he shall live for ever.' This plainly contained a mystery ; and instead of expressing Himself more plainly, our Lord exchanges the term ' bread ' for ' flesh ' ; and, as if to increase the perplexity of His hearers, adds the word ' blood ' : ' Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of God and drink His blood, ye have no life in you ' ; an idea most repugnant to the Jewish mind.

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[1] *Eccl. Pol.*, bk. v.

Now His flesh and blood combined, considered in themselves simply, seem to signify what they do in the words of institution, viz., the body of His humiliation, and if it be asked why He should insist on the fact of the incarnation, we have only to remember that one of the most pernicious heresies of the early Church consisted in the denial of the fact. ' Flesh and blood ' signify what the eternal Son became when He entered the womb of the Virgin ; and to eat and drink of His flesh and His blood is to accept in faith that incomprehensible mystery. But the incarnation was with a view to the atonement, and our Lord completes His present disclosure of the mystery with a reference thereto : ' The bread that I will give is My flesh ' (with the blood), which I will give for the life of the world.' There is here clearly a gradation of thought : the Son becomes incarnate (σάρξ καὶ αἷμα) ; and then, in that human nature, gives Himself, in some unexplained sense, for the life of men. The full meaning is not disclosed, and yet the additional clause connects the passage with the Eucharist. For what is here obscurely hinted at is brought to light in the words of institution : the life of the world is to be purchased not merely by Christ's giving, in some sense, His flesh for it, but specifically by giving His body to be broken and His blood to be shed, by His passion and death, for the remission of sins ; and the sacrament is a perpetual memorial of that death. The ideas of incarnation and atonement are common, both to the discourse in John vi and to the Eucharist ; more dimly intimated in the one, more explicitly in the other ; and so far, but no further, the former is anticipatory of the latter.

The presence of the glorified humanity of Christ, alleged to be intended in the discourse and fulfilled in the appointment of the sacrament, and a quasi-physical incorporation of the recipient into that glorified humanity, are ideas foreign both to the passage in St. John and to the words of institution. 'There is one construction' (of John vi), says the writer already referred to, as distinguished for his learning as for his candour, 'which will completely answer in point of universality, and it is this: all that shall finally share in the death, passion, and atonement of Christ are safe, and all that have not a part in it are lost. All that are saved owe their salvation to the salutary passion of Christ; and their partaking thereof (which is feeding on His flesh and His blood) is their life. Our Lord's general doctrine in this chapter seems to abstract from all particularities and to resolve into this: that whether with faith, or without (explicit, he must mean), 'whether in the sacraments or out of the sacraments, whether before Christ or since, whether in covenant or out of covenant, whether here or hereafter—no man ever was, is, or will be accepted, but in and through the grand propitiation made by the blood of Christ.'[1] That this is the true meaning of the passage few will doubt: the only point in which the learned writer may be thought to have erred, is in introducing into the discourse what it needed the fuller revelation of Christ in the words of institution, and of the Apostles after the descent of the Holy Ghost, to explain.

It has been urged that the use of such unusual language (in the discourse at Capernaum) points to some great mystery expressed by it; something far deeper and more sublime than the incarnation and the atonement, which are comparatively simple doctrines, and could be expounded in simple and intelligible language.[2] We apprehend that these two doctrines, which form the very foundation of the Gospel, are quite as mysterious as a supposed presence of Christ in His glorified body, which presence is neither that of pure body nor of pure spirit, but something between the two, which, for want of a better term, we are to call 'sacramental'; which is incomprehensible because it cannot be comprehended, mysterious no doubt but only because it abounds with contradictions; and which cannot be proved from Scripture as necessary to the spiritual life, or (as the Fathers consistently held), to the resurrection of the body. The language, indeed, in which the incarnation and the atonement are stated is simple enough; but the facts themselves, in their various relations, no finite mind has comprehended, or can comprehend. When St. Paul speaks of 'the mystery of godliness' (1 Tim. iii. 16), the first particular of it which he mentioned is the manifestation of God in the flesh; on union with Christ's glorified body he is silent.

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[1] Waterland, *Eucharist*, c. vi.

[2] Bp. Browne on Art. xxviii.

So plainly incompatible are the words of institution with the glorified state of Christ, that a doubt might arise whether men of learning and ability can really mean that He is present in the Eucharist in His glorified humanity : and not rather tacitly conceive of Him as at each celebration reverting to the state of humiliation. And, in truth, this point was not cleared up in the ancient Church until about the twelfth century. About that time it came to be received that transubstantiation did not mean reproducing the Christ who walked on the shores of the sea of Galilee and expired on the Cross, with whom alone the notion of sacrifice could be connected, but the Christ who reigns in glory, to the manifest detriment of the sacrificial theory of the Mass. The Council of Trent avoids direct statements on the subject ; and the Romish Catechism briefly declares that ' the true body of Christ, the same which was born of the Virgin, and sits in heaven at the right hand of the Father, is contained in this sacrament.' Bellarmine's language, too, is not so clear as usual : ' What is offered to God are not the species of the bread (and the wine) but that which had been offered on the Cross.' However, it is clear that it is Christ in His glorified humanity Whom the schoolmen and the Romish Church suppose to be present in the sacrament ; only the sacrifice is an unbloody one as distinguished from that on the Cross ; in which distinction it is forgotten that not the nature of the sacrifice, but the idea of sacrifice at all is what is incompatible with our Lord's glorified state.

There is no doubt as to the meaning of the writers of our Church who hold the Real Presence. ' The immediate result ' (of the denial of a human priesthood and the necessity of consecration) ' was that, instead of any recognition of the present action of *our glorified Redeemer* the holy Eucharist was supposed to be a mere memorial of His season of humiliation ' ; and so another writer of the same school, ' Christ's body is now glorified, but still it is the same body, though in a glorified condition. It is not denied that we receive that body really, substantially, corporally ; for although the word " corporally " seems opposed to " spiritually," it is not so of necessity. When we come to explain ourselves, we may say that, though it be Christ's very body we receive in the Eucharist, and though we cannot deny even the word " corporal " concerning it, yet as Christ's body is now a spiritual body, so we expect a spiritual presence of that body. Certainly it is true that the faithful Christian lives by union to the glorified Divine humanity of His Lord.' It is to be feared that the explanation leaves the matter more dark than ever. The Rubric in the Communion for the Sick gives better instruction : ' If a man, by reason of extremity of sickness, or for want of warning in due time to the curate, or for lack of company to receive with him, or by any other just impediment, do not receive the sacrament of Christ's body and blood, the curate shall instruct him that if he do truly repent him of his sins and steadfastly believe that Jesus Christ hath suffered death on the Cross for his redemption, earnestly remembering the benefits he hath thereby, and giving him hearty thanks therefore, he doth eat and drink, the body and blood of our Saviour profitably to his soul's health, although he do not receive the sacrament with his mouth.'

And yet Christ must, as we have observed, in some sense be present in this as in every ordinance of the Gospel ; and the discussion would be incomplete if an attempt were not made to ascertain how He is so. The 14th, 15th and 16th chapters of St. John's Gospel furnish the explanation. 'I go,' said Christ to the disciples, 'to prepare a place for you ; but I will not leave you comfortless, I will come to you. Now I go My way to Him that sent Me ; a little while and ye shall not see Me, I leave the world and go to the Father ; I will see you again, and your heart shall rejoice ; if a man love Me he will keep My words, and My Father will love Him, and We will come to him and make Our abode with him ; ye have heard how I said unto you, I go away, and come again to you.' There is no positive contradiction in these statements, for Christ might depart to the Father, and by coming again, mean merely that at the last day He should be seen by the disciples. But, as we have seen, such promises as 'Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world,' and 'Where two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst,' can hardly be reconciled with His departure to the Father, not to return till He comes to judgment. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity harmonizes what otherwise might seem inconsistent. Immediately after the announcement which filled the disciples with sorrow, Christ tells them that He would pray the Father to send them another Comforter, who should abide with them for ever, and who should as fully, and even more fully, discharge the offices which He had Himself discharged while He was with them—teaching, enlightening, comforting ; that it was expedient for them He should depart, for otherwise this other Comforter would not come to them (John xvi. 7).

This Comforter was to exercise a much more important agency in the new dispensation than that of merely bringing down the incarnate Son from heaven to be present in the Eucharist or in Baptism : He was to be the active Administrator of the new dispensation, as it was founded on the work of redemption by Christ. We know who the promised Comforter is, 'even the Spirit of truth' (xiv. 17)—the third Person of the Trinity, who, as regards His Godhead, that wherein the

Divine personality resides, is one with Christ ; a Vicar indeed, to take the Saviour's place, but because He is a *Divine* Vicar, one with the Principal. And thus where Christ is there is the Holy Spirit, and where the Holy Spirit is there is Christ. In the language of the ancient Canon, 'opera Trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt' ; *i.e.*, in works outside itself, all the Persons of the Holy Trinity combine in producing the work. Such a work was creation, which is indiscriminately ascribed to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit ; and such another is the Divine indwelling in the Church. It is works in *ad intra*, in the internal relations of the three Persons towards each other, that the distinction of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit properly resides. Not that, even in the economy of redemption, we may 'confound the Persons,' and say that the offices of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are strictly one and the same ; whence the aforesaid Canon adds, 'Salvo tamen earum (Personarum) ordine et discrimine.' To the Father, election belongs ; to the Son, redemption ; to the Holy Ghost, sanctification. This is the great mystery of Christian Trinitarianism ; that in the work *ad extra* of restoring fallen man, it is the whole Trinity that is operative, while yet there is a distinction between the Persons : the second and the third Persons are, as regards the Godhead, one, and, notwithstanding, One of them is the Redeemer, the other the Sanctifier. And thus our Lord could, with perfect consistency, say that, in one sense, He would depart from His Church (to discharge sacerdotal functions in heaven) and in another that He would ever be with His Church ; or, in other words, Christ is really absent and really present—absent as the incarnate Son, present in and by His Divine Vicar, the Holy Ghost.

Through the indwelling of this Divine Vicar, Christ is in Christians and they in Him (John xvii. 23) ; holds inward fellowship with them (Rev. iii. 20) ; dwells in their hearts by faith (Ephes. iii. 17) ; is in them, the hope of glory (Col. i. 27) : not that Christ in His glorified humanity takes up His abode in us, which, if that humanity is not a phantom but a reality, is inconceivable ; but that the Comforter, Who takes His place, and Who is, in fact, Christ as regards the Godhead, performs these gracious offices. 'It is the Spirit that quickeneth ; the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life' (John vi. 63).

Thus in this as in other instances the doctrine of the Trinity supplies the key to the meaning of passages which otherwise seem not easy to reconcile ; a proof of this doctrine analogous to that on which the law of gravitation rests ; viz., that the Newtonian hypothesis, and it alone, has been found adequate to explain the motions of the heavenly bodies, even such as on their first discovery may have appeared exceptions to it.

To our faith Christ must ever be present, whether in the Eucharist or out of it ; His atonement on the Cross, never to be repeated, is the foundation of our hopes, and His intercession in heaven our warrant for drawing nigh to the mercy-seat ; and especially must He be present to our faith in view of the operation of the Holy Spirit, His Vicar on earth ; for the great gift of the Comforter was the particular fruit of His cross and passion : we feed upon His Person and work by faith ; He is in us by the indwelling of His Spirit ; beyond this it is not safe, because it is not Scriptural, to advance.

Where true views are entertained of the Holy Spirit's work under the Gospel dispensation ; that His are the offices of teaching, quickening, sanctifying, conferring gifts, and in general of actively administering the *application* of Christ's work ; such expressions as that ' the life ' of Christ in His glorified humanity is communicated to us in the Eucharist or elsewhere, might be spared. They are difficult to understand, and they are not needed. They savour of *physical* conceptions of our union with Christ. What more do we need than the great promise, ' He ' (the Comforter) ' dwelleth with you, and shall be in you ' (John xiv. 17) ? In truth, the doctrine of the real presence would be an otiose conception, of little practical moment, but for its connection with another doctrine far more influential in its results. The Church of the fourth and fifth centuries, and even earlier, began to regard the Christian ministry as a continuation of the Levitical priesthood, but priests without sacrifices to offer would be an incongruity, and where could there be a proper sacrifice without a victim ? To fill up the gap, Christ in His humanity was supposed to be present in the Eucharist by virtue of consecration ; and when the theory was fully worked out, to be sacrificed afresh at each celebration of the Mass. To the Romanist the doctrine of a real presence of Christ in His human nature is a necessity ;[1] to the Protestant, even to the Lutheran, it is not so. The Lutheran holds it as a truth of Scripture, but builds nothing of importance upon it. In any system of really Protestant theology it is a superfluity, which may be dispensed with.

97. *Ubiquity of a Glorified Body*

What the powers and properties of a glorified body may be is an interesting subject of speculation, but one on which Scripture throws little or no light. It has entered, however, into controversies about the Eucharist, and especially that touching the power of Christ to be present at various celebrations in His glorified humanity ; and although the inquiry may seem superfluous until it is proved that Christ, as the Incarnate Son, is present at all in that ordinance, it may, on historical grounds, claim some notice here.

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[1] As is candidly admitted by Bellarmine : Eucharistia potuisset vere et proprie sacramentum esse, etiamsi Christi corpus reipsa non contineret. Quæ igitur causa est cur debuerit *necessario*, Eucharistia Christi corpus reipsa continere, *nisi ut posset vere et proprie Deo patri a nobis offerri, et proinde sacrificium esse vere et proprie dictum. De Miss.*, L. i., c. 22.

That Christ, as God, is omnipresent all must admit ; but the general remark may be made that the abstract attributes of Deity belong rather to the topic of natural theism than to that of the economical Trinity, the Trinity of redemption. In other words, we cannot speak of the presence of Christ in the Church without bearing in mind that He is God manifest in the flesh (that is, under a veil), that He humbled Himself so as to become obedient to death, that He ascended to heaven in a proper, though glorified, humanity ; facts which render the problem of His omnipresence, as the Son incarnate, by no means so simple as it might at first sight appear. Such arguments as those of Luther in the Sacramentarian Controversy, that since God is omnipresent and the human nature can never be conceived of apart from the Divine, therefore the latter must also be omnipresent ; or that since Christ is at the right hand of God, and the right hand of God is everywhere, Christ is everywhere ; are far from conclusive. Can a real human nature, which could be touched and handled (Luke xxiv. 39), be ubiquitous ? Can even a glorified body be independent of space ? Can that be a body which can neither be seen nor touched ? Is it inconsistent, as the communion rubric declares, with the truth of Christ's ' natural ' (*i.e.*, His glorified) body to be at the same time in more places than one ? These, and similar questions, not easy of solution, arise in connection with the complex person of the Redeemer.

In a previous section (§ 51) some account was given of the attempts made by theologians to explain, and even to modify, the definitions of the Council of Chalcedon, which laid down that in Christ there is one Divine Person (ἓν πρόσωπον, μὶα ὑπόστασις), consisting of two natures, the Divine and the human, which, though combining to form the one Person, did so, not in the way of fusion (ἀσυγχύτως), nor by alteration of the essential properties of either (ἀτρέπτως), but of union under one hypostasis ; to which the statements of the Athanasian Creed correspond : ' Although He be God and man, yet He is not two but one Christ. One not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the manhood into God. One altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of Person. It was shown that these attempts, as they assumed a final shape in the writings of John of Damascus, failed to bring the natures into any real union. Neither did his perichoresis (*circumcessio*), or interpenetration of the natures, nor his theosis, or deification of the human nature, solve the difficulty : though the latter may be thought an approximation thereto.

All through medieval theology a monothelite tendency is visible : Christ and man are kept apart, as the infinite from the finite : the Saviour dwells in incommunicable glory ; and we have no longer a High Priest who can be touched with the feeling of our infirmities because He was in all points tempted as we are : He is removed from human sympathy and pity, and becomes not the Propitiator but the Being to be propitiated. This appears most strongly in the Romish Church where Christ practically disappears as the Mediator between God and man, His place being taken by other mediators. The cult of the Holy Virgin in that Church is only the natural result of this tendency, and proves that the instincts of sinful and suffering man, if not satisfied by the Scriptural exhibition of the Redeemer, are sure to seek their gratification in forbidden ways. The schoolmen advanced little beyond the point at which John of Damascus had left off.

Soon after the commencement of the Reformation disputes arose between the Lutheran and the Swiss Reformers on the subject of the Eucharist, and particularly on the mode of the presence of Christ in that sacrament. Luther's early views, before his attention had been drawn to the subject, seem to have fluctuated between the extremes of Romanism and Zwinglianism ; at least, his language is ambiguous, and admits of various interpretation. It was not until A. Carlstadt, at one time a friend and coadjutor of the great Reformer, appeared publicly at Wittemberg about the year 1526, as an opponent of the doctrine of the real presence, that the controversy assumed an embittered aspect. Luther classed Carlstadt with the enthusiasts of the inner light (*Schwarmgeister*) whose extravagances had raised a prejudice against the Reformation ; but, in fact, his opinions seem to have differed little from those of Zwingli, Oecolampadius, and Bullinger, to say nothing of Calvin. The Lutheran doctrine may be summed up in the words of the *Formula Concordiæ*, which, though composed after Luther's death, represents his sentiments : 'We believe and confess that in the Lord's Supper the body and blood of Christ' (tantamount, it is assumed, to the whole Christ) 'are truly and substantially present, and are received along with' (*in*, *cum*, *sub*) 'the bread and wine' (P. i., c. 7). From which it follows not only that Christ's manhood is practically ubiquitous, but that the unworthy are equally with the worthy partakers of Christ.

Of Scripture proof Luther adduces but little, except the words of institution. He avows, in a letter to the Reformers of Strasbourg (1524) that five years previously he would have been only too glad to be able to accept the tropological sense of the words, ‘This is My body,’ for that it would have placed in his hands a weapon of great force against the Papacy, but that he could not get over ‘the powerful letter of Scripture.’ On this point insufficient has been said in the preceding section. His doctrine is that of the *communicatio idiomatum* (see § 51) applied particularly to the question of Christ's presence in the Eucharist, and the later schoolmen, chiefly Occam and Biel, are the authorities which he follows. According to these writers a thing or person may be present in three ways, *circumscriptive*, *definitive*, and *repletive*. *Circumscriptive*, when a body which we see and can touch, occupies a certain portion of space ; it is circumscribed by space. In this sense Christ on earth was present ; He could be seen and touched, and filled a portion of space. *Definitive* when a body is not locally present, or an object of sense, yet can, when it pleases, be here or there, as, for example, the angels and spirits. The presence of Christ in the Eucharist is of this nature, and may be illustrated by the power which He exercised after the resurrection of passing through the closed doors of the place where the disciples were assembled (John xx. 19). It resembles, too, the presence of the soul in the body of man ; the soul dwells in the whole body, but also, and as completely, in each part thereof. It may be called an illocal presence, a presence independent of space. *Repletive* signifies the Divine omnipresence in the strict sense of the word, all things being present to God and He to them. Such were the speculations of the schools, which it is unnecessary to pursue further.

Luther and his followers, adopting the scholastic terms, attributed to Christ in His glorified humanity a presence in the Eucharist both ‘definitive’ and ‘repletive.’ Since the human nature, they argued, exists in inseparable union with the Divine, and the Divine is omnipresent, the human nature, too, must be omnipresent ; from which it would logically follow that Christ is present in every particle of matter throughout the universe as God is, in every stone, every tree, every animal. Well might the Swiss theologians ask, was it really intended that Christ is present in the Eucharistic elements only as He is present in the materials of every common meal, as He undoubtedly is, when considered merely as God ? The difficulty was pressing, and Luther could only meet it by maintaining that Christ may be present, not only ‘repletive’ in the full sense of omnipresence, but also, in certain cases, ‘definitive,’ by virtue of a special appointment and promise. The Eucharist, he holds, is an example. ‘Although Christ is in all creatures, and I might find Him in a stone, fire, water, etc., as assuredly He is there, yet it is not His will that, without His word, I should seek Him there. He is omnipresent, but thou art not *to feel after Him* everywhere, but only where the promise is, there thou properly apprehendest Him.' 'If His glorified body passed through doors, and if even upon earth He could say that He was in heaven (John iii. 13), He must be omnipresent now, for in every stage of His humanity personal identity remained. He was omnipresent as the babe in the manger, He was so on the cross, and is so now in His glorified state. Why, then, is He present *in the Eucharist particularly* and after a special manner? Because it is one thing that God is there, and another that He is there *to thee*. And to thee He is there when He pledges His word for it, and says, Here thou shalt find Me.'

Such is the Lutheran doctrine, especially as it was fully worked out by J. Brenz, of Wurtemberg, 1555. It differs from that of the early Church in predicating of the body of Christ, the human nature, what the Fathers ascribe to the whole person, in the union of the two natures. It did not receive the sanction of Melanchthon, who, in his later years, inclined to Calvin's view, nor of Chemnitz, one of the authors of the *Formula Concordiæ*, and in other respects a decided Lutheran. This eminent theologian's labours were very properly directed to confining the controversy within the limits of Scripture as much as possible, and avoiding philosophical speculations, which, in his opinion, seldom lead to profitable results. It is the presence of Christ, he observes, not in the abstract, *but in the Church*, that Christians have to do with. Accordingly instead of the physical conceptions of Luther and Brenz (and it may be added of the Fathers), who united the natures as metal and heat are united in a mass of glowing iron, Chemnitz insisted rather on the ethical aspect. The human nature is present in the Eucharist, not of natural necessity, but as the Logos wills that it should be; for the term ubiquity, he says, let us substitute multivolipresence, a presence which, however multiplied, results from particular acts of the Divine will. 'Let us be content with this, that Christ in His humanity can be present everywhere, whensoever, and in whatever manner He pleases, but as to what His will is, let us judge from His revealed word.'

On the whole it may be said that these subtle definitions and distinctions amount to little more than a confession of ignorance, and lost themselves at last in mystery. What conception can we form of an illocal presence? Or of a presence not strictly ubiquitous, yet capable of being, at will, in various places at once? What do we know of the relation of a glorified body to space, or of its powers, or of the connection, antecedently to the incarnation, of the Logos with the Man Christ Jesus? How can an angel, or a (created) spirit, the examples which the schoolmen employ of a presence definitive, be present not merely in various places successively, but in various places at once, which is the thing predicated of Christ in the Eucharist ? The ‘ natural ’ body of Christ, it is admitted even by Romanists, is in heaven ; if it is present in the Eucharist, it is so as regards the ‘ substance.’ But substance is a mere category, an abstraction, never existing by itself, but always in the concrete. The logical substance of a man is in no proper sense of the words a man. Of these difficulties the defenders of a real presence of Christ in the Eucharist seem conscious, for it is chiefly by negatives that they define it. It is not local, it is not natural, it is not an object of sense, it is not ubiquitous as God is, but only as Christ wills. What, then, is its mode ? ‘ It is sacramental ’ ; which seems little more than saying that Christ’s presence in the sacrament is a sacramental one ; which, however true, does not add much to our knowledge. It is to be observed that the Romish Church can dispense with speculation on this subject, since by the miracle of transubstantiation, wrought by consecration, the elements are, at each celebration, changed into Christ in His glorified humanity. Hence Bellarmine can, and does, contend against the essential ubiquity of Christ’s human nature, by the *communicatio idiomatum*, as strongly as Zwingli and Oecolampadius themselves. The Lutheran doctrine renders consecration unnecessary.

But from another quarter, too, a difficulty arises. According to Luther, the ubiquity of Christ’s human nature dates from the *unio personalis* in the womb of the Virgin, but during the state of humiliation it was only in possession, not in use, or not always in use ; it was restrained in its exercise. But on the ascension, the human nature entered into the full exercise of the Divine attributes, omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience ; *finitum* became not merely *capax infiniti* but actually *infinitum*. Now there is no doubt that the session at the right hand of God is described in terms which seem to approach to a deification of the whole Christ : ‘ We see Jesus who suffered on the cross crowned with glory and honour ’ (Heb. ii. 9) ; ‘ God has exalted Him, and given Him a name above every name ’ (Phil. ii. 9) ; ‘ all power is given ’ unto Him ‘ in heaven and in earth ’ (Matt. xxviii. 18) ; prayer is made to Him (Acts vii. 59). Yet, on the other hand, in 1 Cor. xv. 24–28, Christ is said to reign only until He has put all enemies under His feet ; that a time is coming when His mediatorial offices shall cease, and the kingdom shall be delivered up to God, even the Father ; when the Son Himself (in our nature) shall be subject unto Him that put all things under Him, that God may be all in all. The passage is one the full meaning of which commentators have as yet failed to discover ; but the impression conveyed is that

Christ, even after the close of this dispensation, will, as touching His manhood, still be in a state of subordination to the Father.

Since the Church holds that the human and the Divine natures never can be separated, a question arises whether this relative subordination shall ever cease. If not, the Divine attribute of ubiquity cannot be predicated of Christ either now or hereafter ; and the Lutheran doctrine, that eventually the human nature will be really deified, demands revision. We may put the question in another form : does the κένωσις (emptying) spoken of in Phil. ii. 7 cease with the ταπείνωσις (humbling) of the following verse ? In this passage two distinct stages in the incarnation seem to be indicated, one ending with ver. 7, the other with ver. 8. 'He did not think it a thing to be grasped at to remain equal with God, but emptied Himself (ἐκένωσε), so as to be in the likeness of men' ; the incarnation itself was a kenosis or relative emptying of the Divine nature, in that a real human nature cannot be conceived of as possessing the abstract Divine attributes. But further : being thus incarnate, He grasped not at eathly riches or splendour, but humbled Himself (ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτὸν) to a life of suffering, and to the death of the cross. This latter tapeinosis ceased with the ascension ; Christ is highly exalted, with a name above every name ; but as long as He is really man, does the former kenosis entirely cease ? The answer may affect the question whether ubiquity is to be predicated, either now or at any time, of the incarnate Son ?

98. *Transubstantiation*

This dogma, on which the sacrifice of the Mass depends, passed, like most of those established at the Council of Trent, through many stages before it assumed its final shape. The earliest Patristic mention of the Eucharist occurs in the epistle of Ignatius to the Smyrnæans. There are some, Ignatius observes, who abstain from eucharistia and prayer, 'because they do not admit that the Eucharist is the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ which suffered for us.' This is little more than a repetition of the words of institution, 'This is My body, broken for you' ; and whether Ignatius interprets the words literally or tropologically is not clear. Nor can more be inferred from the passage of Justin, *Apol.* I., 66 : 'We receive the elements not as common bread and wine ; for as our Saviour Christ assumed for our sake flesh and blood, so we have been taught that the eucharistic food is the body and blood of the incarnate Jesus.' No change in the elements is here asserted, and, indeed, the comparison of the incarnation excludes such a supposition, for when the Word became man He did not convert either the Godhead into flesh, or the manhood into

Deity. ‘As the bread,’ says Irenæus, ‘when it receives the invocation of God, is no longer common bread but the Eucharist, consisting of two things, an earthly and a heavenly, so our bodies through the Eucharist are no longer corruptible, but partakers of the hope of the resurrection.’

The distinction here indicated between an earthly and a heavenly element in the sacrament seems an anticipation of that of the schoolmen between the *sacramentum* (the bread and wine) and the *res sacramenti*, the body and blood of Christ ; and particularly the supposed effect of the sacrament on the body, a doctrine which occupies a conspicuous place in later writers, but which has no warrant in Scripture, is to be noted ; but nothing is said of a change of the substance of the bread and wine. By the Alexandrian School, as represented by Clement, Origen, Eusebius of Cæsarea, and even Athanasius, the symbolism of the elements is insisted on ; which, if not absolutely inconsistent with a change of substance, does not favour it ; and no less is it so by the leaders of the African Church, Tertullian, Cyprian, and Augustine. ‘Christ,’ says Tertullian, ‘in taking and distributing the bread to His disciples, made it His body, when He said, “This is My body” ; that is, a figure of My body.’ Cyprian : ‘Let the Divine tradition touching the offering of the cup be followed ; and let us not deviate from the example of Christ, but mix wine in the cup which is offered in remembrance of Him.’ The commemorative aspect of the ordinance here retains its place, and this again does not favour the notion of a presence of Christ in and under the elements.

The figurative interpretation finds a strong defender in Augustine. A question had arisen in the diocese of Boniface, Augustine’s friend, whether it was proper to use language which seemed to imply that Christ was offered afresh at each celebration, particularly on Good Friday ; and it was referred to the Bishop of Hippo for consideration. The answer of Augustine is that as we commonly say on Easter Sunday, ‘Christ rose to-day,’ so, by a similar figure, we say at the Eucharist, whether it be the daily celebration or those of the great festivals, ‘Christ is sacrificed for us,’ whereas we know that He died once for all for sin. ‘For if sacraments,’ he continues, ‘had not some similitude to those things of which they are sacraments, they would not be sacraments at all. But from this similitude they commonly receive the names of the things themselves. As therefore, after a certain manner (*secundum quendam modum*), the sacrament of the body of Christ is the body of Christ, the sacrament of the blood of Christ is the blood of Christ ; so the sacrament of faith is faith.’[1] Still more distinctly : ‘The Lord did not hesitate to say, “This is My body,” when it was the sign of His body which He gave'[1]; 'Behold, we believe in Christ when we receive that supper in faith. Prepare not your mouth but your heart. In receiving it, we know what we are thinking of. We receive a morsel, and in heart are feasted. Not therefore what is seen, but what is believed, nourishes.'[2]

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[1] Epist. xcviii.

It is not to be denied that all these writers, particularly Cyprian and Augustine, connect the idea of sacrifice with the Lord's Supper; not in the primitive sense in which the offerings of the faithful presented at the Holy Table were so called, but that in the sacrament there is a representation to God, by sacerdotal hands, of Christ's sacrifice. By the Holy Spirit, as in baptism, some undefined change was supposed to be wrought in the elements, the bread being no longer *κοινὸς ἄρτος* (mere bread); and Augustine in particular, by an ambiguous use of the term 'body of Christ,' which may mean either Christ's own body or His mystical body the Church, assigns to the sacrament a power of incorporating the worthy recipient into this mystical body. Superstitious practices, as the driving out of demons by the Eucharist, and celebrating it in prayers for the dead, to say nothing of infant communion, had already become prevalent. But no formal statement as yet appears of the mode in which either the Holy Spirit or Christ in His humanity, is present in the sacrament.

The influence of Augustine made itself felt for a long time in the Western Church, with the result that the symbolical view of the sacraments held its place along with tendencies of an opposite kind. Even Gregory the Great (A.D. 600), although he maintains that in the Eucharist an offering of Christ is repeated, adds that 'it is a sacrifice which *imitates* the passion of the only begotten Son on our behalf.'[3] Passages may be cited from the works of Ambrose which seem to reach transubstantiation; and indeed Paschasius Radbert, held to be the real author of this doctrine, refers to Ambrose as his principal authority; but it is not the fully developed Romish tenet. Ambrose argues from the Divine omnipotence: if by a miracle the Son became incarnate, why may not the body of Christ be present in the Eucharist by a corresponding miracle? 'Before consecration, the element (species) is bread, but when the words of Christ are added, it is the body of the Lord. And before the words of Christ the cup is full of wine and water; when the words of Christ have operated, it is made the blood of Christ. What the tongue confesses, let the heart embrace.'[4] Here, no doubt, a change is taught, effected by Divine power, but it is undefined : the substance of the bread and wine is not said to disappear by virtue of priestly consecration.

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[1] *Adv. Adimant.*, xii. 3.

[2] *Sermo* cxii., 5.

[3] Hom. 37, in *Evang. Dial.*, iv. 58. See Steitz, article 'Mass' in Herzog.

[4] *De Sac.*, L. iv., c. 5.

In the eighth century, John of Damascus, the representative of Greek orthodoxy, made important advances in this direction. Taking his stand on the Scriptural doctrine of the first and second Adam, he observes that the new birth and the new nutrition which we need, must both be spiritual. Also, since we are compounded of soul and body, the birth and the nutrition (or rather the instruments thereof, baptism and the Eucharist) must be of a compound nature ; water and the Spirit in the former, bread and wine and Christ Himself in the latter. Take, eat, this is My body ; drink this, it is My blood : by these words of power, the elements become transformed (μεταποιοῦνται) into the body and blood of God ; the body becomes united to Deity, not however by the descent of the glorified Body from heaven (*adductione corporis*), but by the changing of the elements into the body that was born of the Virgin (*conversione elementorum*). ‘ Do you ask how this can be ? Learn that it is by the invocation and descent of the Holy Spirit, the same Holy Ghost who created the human nature out of the spotless womb of the Virgin. As natural bread and wine are assimilated by the bodily organs of the receiver—and not two bodies, but one, is the result—so, through the power of the Holy Spirit, the elements are changed supernaturally into the body and blood of Christ, and one spiritual body remains. So then, the bread and wine are not types of the body and blood of Christ (God forbid), but the very body itself deified. If some (*e.g.*, the divine Basil) have called them symbols (ἀντίτυπα), it was before consecration, not after. The celebration is called participation (μετάληψις), because in it we participate of the Deity of Christ, and are made one with Him and His Church.’[1] It is obvious that this approaches closely to the Romish doctrine, although the mode of transformation is not defined ; for if only one body remains after the change, viz., the body of Christ, it seems that the bread no longer retains its substance but only its accidents. Not so much stress is laid on consecration as would be by a writer of the Western Church of the same date, and more upon the invocation of the Holy Spirit ; a trait this of Eastern theology, as appears from the fact that in the Roman liturgy no such invocation appears.

The Patristic testimony may be thus summed up : a real presence of Christ in His human nature is taught by all the Fathers ; and this presence is connected with the species of bread and wine, irrespectively of the faith of the receiver, so closely as to amount practically to a doctrine of transubstantiation. Ambrose, Theodoret, and John of Damascus can hardly be understood otherwise. The statements that, in the Eucharist, Christ in His whole Person is participated of, though a gross physical union is disclaimed, and that the body receives therein the seed of immortality, are sufficient to show in what direction thought was tending. Yet, side by side with these theories, the figurative interpretation, at least in the Western Church, never wholly disappears ; and the result is that authorities may be quoted on either side, and that it is very difficult to frame a consistent system out of the materials at hand. In the East it was different : the second Nicene Council (A.D. 787) taking John of Damascus as its guide, declares that the consecrated elements are not symbols of the body and blood of Christ, but the very things themselves. The later Greek Church teaches, under the name of μετουσίωσις (change of essence), a doctrine substantially identical with that of Rome.

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[1] *De Fid. Orth.*, L. iv., c. 13.

So matters remained until the beginning of the ninth century, when the disputes occasioned by the writings of Paschasius Radbert, monk and afterwards Abbot of Corbie, issued in more precise statements. Radbert, a disciple of Augustine, endeavoured, in his treatise *De Corpore et Sanguine Christi*, to reconcile the symbolism of his master with the teaching which had become current in the Church, but only with partial success. With Augustine he insists on the spiritual nature of the sacramental grace, and the necessity of faith to its beneficial reception ; only they who belong to the mystical body of Christ, who walk by faith not by sight, receive the blessing. ‘ Sancta sanctorum sunt ; non nisi electorum cibus est.’ The unworthy partake indeed of the *sacramentum*, but not of the *virtus sacramenti* ; they eat and drink to their own condemnation. But do they receive the *res sacramenti*, the body and blood of Christ ? No ; they receive nothing but bread and wine. ‘ What do the guests partake of but the mere elements, unless through faith they mount into the higher regions of spiritual perception ? ’[1] Yet he asserts in the strongest manner the presence in the sacrament of the very body of Christ that was born of the Virgin ; and to the question, how this can be ? he answers, that the same Word which called the world into being, changes, when spoken over the elements by the priest, the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, yet so that their figure, colour, and taste (the accidents of the schoolmen) remain ; which is, substantially, the Romish doctrine of transubstantiation. The consecrating power of the priest assumes in this writer a new importance. His treatise formed an epoch in the controversy, and materially influenced the decisions of the fourth Lateran council.

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[1] C. viii. 2. Quoted by Radbert, Steitz, Herzog, vol. xii.

It is proof, however, of the unsettled state of the controversy that Radbert's work met with opposition from influential quarters. The best known to us of his opponents are Ratramn,[1] also a monk of Corbie and a contemporary of Radbert, and Berengar of Tours. Ratramn received a commission from Charles the Bald to review Radbert's treatise, which had just come into the emperor's hands; and particularly to discuss the question whether what the faithful receive in the sacrament is the very body and blood of Christ, or only in a figure or mystery. This obviously is the point at issue. Ratramn's work is interesting in itself, but particularly so as having been the means of convincing our Reformers of the errors of the faith in which they had been nurtured.[2] The view maintained in it is a near approach to that of Calvin. 'What lies on the altar,' Ratramn says, 'is not the real body of Christ, which is in heaven, but the symbol of it, just as it is the symbol of His mystical body, the blessed company of all faithful people: it is *secundum quendam modum* the body of Christ, and that mode is in a figure or image, as when in the Lord's Prayer we ask for a supply of our daily bread, spiritual as well as natural. The elements remind us of that death which was once undergone for us, and we shall no longer need them when we hold the Saviour in His glory.' Here we might suppose ourselves listening to Zwingli. He proceeds, however, to explain that he is far from denying an objective spiritual presence, which the communicant feeds on by faith: and this is the point in which Calvin differs from the Reformer of Zurich. Ratramn, like his successor, Calvin, is not clear on the point whether it is faith that makes Christ present; we may say that when we meditate on a thing it is present to us; or whether faith is exercised on an object already by other means present. His comparison of the Eucharist with Baptism leads to the latter conclusion. In baptism, he observes, the visible element of water is one thing, the spiritual grace another; the water itself can only cleanse the body, but by consecration it receives from the Holy Ghost a supernatural power to cleanse the soul, and then is rightly called the laver of regeneration. A similar operation of the Holy Ghost must be supposed in the other sacrament, whereby the bread and wine become endued with life-giving power. It may be inferred, then, that Ratramn was not, as regards this point, superior to the current notion of his time, and held a physical change in the elements not the less real because not perceptible to the senses.

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[1] Sometimes called Bertram, but probably it is a mistake of the scribes.

[2] 'This Bertram was the first that pulled me by the ear, and that first brought me from the common error of the Romish Church, and caused me to search more diligently and exactly both the Scriptures and the old ecclesiastical Fathers in this matter.' Ridley, Disputation at Oxford.

The influence of Berengar of Tours (died 1088) was not so great or so lasting as that of Ratramn ; partly because his attention was not concentrated on this particular question, and partly because the recantations to which he submitted throw a shade on his character. Otherwise, his protest against Radbert's teaching leaves nothing to be desired. The senses, he argues, which God has given us must be relied on in a matter of this kind ; and moreover, it is contrary to reason that substance and accidents should be divorced from each other. Scripture does not stand in our way ; for John vi does not refer to the Eucharist at all, but to the appropriating by faith of the death of Christ and the atonement thereby effected ; and the words of institution must be understood figuratively. With Augustine we must distinguish between the sacrament and what is represented thereby ; and if we suppose the actual body and blood of Christ to be on the altar, the nature of a sacrament is destroyed. Christ Himself is in heaven ; and it is an unworthy notion that at every consecration He should be brought down thence and sacrificed afresh. His principal opponents were, Guitmund, Archbishop of Aversa, Lanfranc and Anselm, of whom the first was chiefly instrumental in the formation of the Romish dogma. To him it owes the distinction between substance and accidents, which the schoolmen are wrongly supposed to have first propounded ; and particularly the additions, that the unworthy equally with the worthy partake of Christ (without which no real doctrine of transubstantiation can hold its ground) ; and that the whole Christ, body, soul, and deity, is contained under other species, on which the withholding of the cup from the laity rests. Not the mere substance of Christ's body, but the glorified Saviour Himself descends from heaven, and is present in the Eucharist ; the whole Christ is in each portion of the host as perfectly as in the whole (' totus in toto, et totus in qualibet parte ') ; in every Mass throughout the world Christ is present, and undivided in each. Such were Guitmund's positions : and it only needed the imprimatur of the Lateran Council under Innocent III. (1215) to render them the understood doctrine of the Church.

The Eucharist was a subject well suited to the theology of the schools, and accordingly it was taken up with peculiar zest by the leading schoolmen. Yet their labours consisted rather in supplementing and rounding off the theories which had established themselves in the Church than in substantial additions thereto. Some points had not been sufficiently determined. The *matter* was now confined to wheaten bread, preferably unleavened, the *form* to the words, ‘ This is My body,’ pronounced by the priest, on which transubstantiation immediately follows ; a certain amount of water is to be mixed with the wine.[1] But how was the change itself of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ to be described ? Thomas Aquinas treats of this subject at length in P. iii. of his *Summa Theologiæ*, Q. 75. There are various modes in which a substance previously absent may become present. By creation, in which something is made out of nothing ; or by change of place, as when Christ in His glorified body is supposed to descend from heaven and become present in the sacrament ; or by conversion, one present substance being converted into another. It is in this last mode that transubstantiation takes place. The substance of the bread and wine, by the word of consecration, or, as some hold, by the power of God accompanying the word,[2] is converted into the substance of Christ’s body and blood ; the accidents only remaining. The substance of the bread and wine is not annihilated after consecration, for, in that case, no proper conversion of one substance into the other could take place, the *terminus a quo* of annihilation being nothing.

To the difficulty of conceiving how one substance can be changed into another, since the changes with which we are conversant are merely formal ; *e.g.*, when air is changed into fire, the same matter of air receives the new form of fire ; the only answer which Thomas supplies is that the sacramental conversion must not be compared with the natural, the one being effected by Divine power, which can convert the whole substance into another substance, whereas conversion by created power can affect only the form.

A more difficult class of questions is concerned with the mode in which Christ is present in the sacrament. It has been remarked that, by Guitmund, the presence of the whole Christ in the elements, and in each portion of them, was asserted ; it was the task of the schoolmen to explain how this could be. The decision of Thomas Aquinas is that transubstantiation ‘ terminates ’ indeed in the conversion of the substance of the bread and wine into the substance of Christ’s body and blood ; this is all that is directly effected *vi sacramenti*, by virtue of consecration ; but that *vi concomitantiæ*, owing to the inseparable union of the Deity with the human nature, and of a soul with a body to make up a perfect man, the whole Christ becomes present, and the Christ in the sacrament is the same as the Christ at the right hand of

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[1] Thomas Aquinas, P. iii., Q. 74.

[2] Thomas is in favour of the former, Bonaventure and G. Biel of the latter, hypothesis.

God.[1] But what of Christ during the three days' sojourn in Hades, when the soul was separated from the body ? If the sacrament had been celebrated in that interval, Thomas argues, the soul could not have been present either *vi sacramenti* or *vi concomitantiæ*, and in fact the sacrament would have wanted validity (Q. lxxvi., A. 1). After the resurrection this difficulty disappeared. The principle of concomitance is also applied to explain how the whole Christ is present in either species : ' although *vi sacramenti*, only the substance of the bread is changed into that of the body, and the substance of the wine into that of the blood, yet *vi concomitantiæ* ' (*i.e.*, that where the body is there must be the blood, and *vice versâ ;* and with the body and blood there must be the soul and Deity) ; ' the whole Christ is present under either the bread or the wine ' (*Ibid.*, A. 2).

But now arose a difficulty. Christ in His glorified body is in space circumscriptive : ' His body is a real one, and occupies a definite portion of space, and each member of it its own portion : but if the sacramental and the glorified body are identical, must not Christ be also in the former circumscriptive,' in His proper dimensions and figure ; which, yet, our senses tell us is not the fact ? The schools were equal to the occasion. The direct object of transubstantiation, it was replied, being only the substance of Christ's body, its local dimensions (which from its identity with the glorified body it must have) assume a subordinate place ; they exist only *per accidens* and *vi concomitantiæ* ; just as the dimensions of the bread remain the same after consecration, although the substance has passed away. Now the substance, or, rather, the nature of the substance (Thomas Aquinas confounds the two), of any body is as completely in the smallest specimen of it as in the largest ; the whole nature of air is contained in the least portion thereof, the whole nature of man in a dwarf not less than in a giant ; now, Christ is present, not after the manner of quantity, but after the manner of substance, which renders Him independent of quantitative dimension : the latter, it is true, remains, but not after its proper manner, but after that peculiar to substance.[2] However minute, therefore, the division of the bread, each fragment possessing the whole substance of the body possesses also its measurable dimensions, but after a mode of its own, invisible to the senses.

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[1] The identity of the two is a ruled point with the schoolmen and their immediate predecessors. The only difference is that the glorified Christ is impassible and immortal—properties which did not belong to the state of humiliation. Strange that they did not perceive that these properties of Christ glorified are the very ones which render the words of institution inapplicable to Him as glorified.

[2] Corpus Christi est in hoc sacramento per modum substantiæ et non per modum quantitatis. Q. lxxxvi., A. 1.

Thus the realism of the older schoolmen, which assigned to quantity an independent existence, midway between substance and quality, enabled them, at pleasure, to attach it as an accident to substance, or to detach it therefrom ; at the expense of any proper idea of a body. A material thing which has no quantitative existence cannot be conceived of as possessing figure or organization ; it is a mathematical point : hence it cannot be the same body as the glorified one, which was the original hypothesis. The nominalist school, represented by Occam and Biel, came by another path to the same conclusion. Quantity, they properly agreed, cannot be separated, except in thought, from a material substance ; but the substance may shrink into a state of non-extension. The natural process of condensation, whereby a thing which filled a larger space comes to fill a smaller, presents an analogy ; who can tell but that this may be the case with the body of Christ ? But the residuum, as before, is a mathematical point, without form or organization ; and the relation of the body to space is that of a mathematical point. This is the true meaning of the Lutheran ' illocal ' presence in the sacrament, a presence filling no definite portion of space ; whence there is no absurdity in supposing that it may be in heaven circumscriptive and on each altar definitive ; or that it may be on many altars at once. On this point, of an illocal presence the Lutherans and the schoolmen, whether realists or nominalists, occupy common ground.[1]

The Romish doctrine, as laid down by the Council of Trent, the catechism of the Council, and the great writers of their Church, is entirely derived from the scholastic theology. The rule of inquiry, indeed, prescribed to the Council was that it should confine its proofs to the Fathers and the councils, which the Italian theologians objected to, as not allowing sufficient weight to the schoolmen, with whom they were better acquainted. Their objection was over-ruled, and the discussion professed to proceed on the lines stated ; it soon, however, appeared that the schools, though nominally put aside, were in the ascendant.[2] The Dominicans and Franciscans, as usual took opposite sides, but the theories on either side were scholastic. Both held a real doctrine of transubstantiation. The Dominicans (Thomists) denied that the presence of Christ in the sacrament is produced by a change of place, by the migration of Christ from heaven to the altar ; the substance of the species being instantaneously converted into the substance of the body and blood. The Franciscans (Scotists) contended for a transitive movement, whereby the one substance comes into being where it did not previously exist, yet without interfering with the identity of Christ in heaven and Christ in the sacrament ; Christ, by an exercise of Divine power, is present in heaven, and also on the altar. According to the Dominicans, Christ exists in a twofold mode of being, one which may be called natural, because though in a glorified body this body like any other has its dimensions and occupies space, the other sacramental, as being peculiar to this sacrament, and a pure object of faith. The Franciscans held that there is no difference between the body in heaven and that upon the altar, except that the former retains its proper quantity and relation to space, while the latter possesses dimensions only after the manner of (the nature of) a substance. These are the speculations which we have already become acquainted with in Thomas, Duns Scotus, Occam and Biel.

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[1] Corpus Christi non est in hoc sacramento secundum proprium motum quantitatis dimensivæ, sed magis secundum modum substantiæ. Omne autem corpus locatum est in loco secundum modum quantitatis dimensivæ, in quantum scil. commensuratur loco secundum suam quantitatem dimensivam. Unde relinquitur quod corpus Christi non est in hoc sacramento sicut in loco., sed per modum substantiæ ; eo scil, modo quo substantia continetur a dimensionibus : succedit enim substantia corp. Christi in hoc sacramento substantiæ panis ; unde sicut substantia panis non erat sub suis dimensionibus localiter, sed per modum substantiæ, item nec substantia corp. Christi. Thomas Aquinas, P. iii. Q. lxxvi., A. 5. Hence the disfavour with which, in later times, the Cartesian philosophy, which made three dimensions essential to a body, was received by the Church.

[2] Sarpi, L. iv., 10.

The Council endeavoured, by using general expressions, and as few definitions as possible, to avoid giving umbrage to either party. It sided with the Dominicans in the distinction between the natural glorified body of Christ and the sacramental body : ‘ Christ is really, truly, and substantially contained under the sensible species of bread and wine ; for there is no inconsistency in our Saviour's being at the right hand of God according to His natural mode of subsistence, and also substantially present on many altars sacramentally, according to a mode of subsistence which we cannot explain, but which is possible to God. ‘ The peculiar excellence of this sacrament is that in the other six Christ is only present virtually in the actual use of them, but in this He is present Himself, in His whole Person, and independently of the use. By the consecration of the bread and wine a conversion is effected of the whole substance of these species into the whole substance of Christ's body and blood ; and this is what is properly meant by transubstantiation.’ These statements reappear with greater precision in the anathematizing canons : ‘ If any one shall deny that the whole body and blood, together with the soul and deity, of Christ, the whole Christ is not really and substantially contained in the sacrament but only as a sign and figure, or virtually ; or that the substance of the bread and wine remains therein together with the body and the blood, denying the conversion of the whole substance of the one into the whole substance of the other ; or that in either species, or any portion thereof, the whole Christ is not contained ; or that after consecration the body is not in the sacrament but only while it is used ; or that the chief or only fruit of the sacrament is remission of sin ; or that Christ therein is eaten only spiritually, and not sacramentally and really ; or that faith alone is a sufficient preparation for a due reception—let him be anathema.'

The Cathechism adds some further explanations. The accidents of the bread and wine, it says, remain, in a marvellous manner, perceptible to the senses, yet without any subject to inhere in ; for their proper substance ceases to exist. If the true body of Christ is, after consecration, under the species of bread and wine, since it was not there previously, it must be so either by change of place, or by creation, or by conversion of something not the body into the body. Not by change of place, for then Christ would be absent from heaven, since nothing moves without leaving the place whence it moves. Not by creation, which is inconceivable. Conversion only remains, which is, in fact, the mode. No substance of the bread is left (after consecration). Since with the body and the blood the soul and the Deity are inseparably united, all these things are in the sacrament ; not by virtue of consecration, but by concomitance ; so that the whole Christ is in the sacrament. And He is so, not merely under either species, but, after fraction, in each particle of the bread, however small ; for consecration affects the whole mass, and it is not necessary to repeat it over each fragment. It will be seen that while by the Council many practical abuses were reformed, the doctrine of Rome in the Eucharist is substantially that of the schoolmen ; almost in the letter, and certainly in the spirit. And the same may be said of some recent treatises in our own Church on the subject. They are simply an exposition of the scholastic, that is, the Romish doctrine, as will be evident to every one who compares the two. The foregoing somewhat dry and thorny discussion may be useful, if it serves to exhibit the sources, character, and object of these treatises.

The practical results of the doctrine of transubstantiation, as taught by the Church of Rome, are such as might be expected. Since Christ is present in the Eucharist, independently of the use, it follows that *all who eat the bread, whether worthy or unworthy, are equally partakers of Christ*, though not of the spiritual benefit ; they receive the *res* though not the virtue of the sacrament. Though destitute of the Spirit of Christ, and with sin reigning in the heart, they are brought into union with Christ ; than which a more unscriptural notion can hardly be conceived. The union becomes a physical one, of neutral effect, supernatural but not sanctifying. It reminds us of the corresponding tenet, that regeneration may exist, even in an adult, without a moral change. The Anglican Church teaches otherwise: 'They that are void of a lively faith,' however they may 'press with their teeth' the consecrated bread, 'are in no wise partakers of Christ' (Art. xxix). On the supposition that John vi refers to the Eucharist, Christ's words are inconsistent with such a notion: 'He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath eternal life'; but of the wicked and unbelieving it cannot be said that they have eternal life.

The adoration of the host is another consequence of transubstantiation. If Christ is present under the elements, worship is due to Him in that state; and not merely the hyperdulia of the Virgin, or the dulia of the angels and saints, but Latreia, the highest form of worship, due to God alone. Thomas Aquinas argues that the substance of bread and wine cannot remain after consecration, because 'this would be inconsistent with the adoration of Latreia,' which the Church prescribes (III. Q. lxxv., A. 2). The Council of Trent endorses and expands this statement: 'No doubt remains that the faithful, according to the custom always prevalent in the Church, are bound to show their veneration towards this sacrament by the worship of Latreia.' Especially should they do so at the annual festival (*corpus Christi*) which is celebrated in its honour, and in processions in which it is borne through the public streets. The concluding act of the Romish ritual is to elevate the host in what is called a monstrance, a small receptacle surrounded by a glass or crystal image of the sun with rays; at the moment of elevation the worshippers bow the head, and if military men are in the church they present arms.

The *reservation of the host* stands in a similar connection. Justin Martyr, describing Christian worship in his day, informs us that the deacons carried portions of the bread to those who from sickness or other causes could not attend. They were considered as virtually a part of the congregation. In this there was nothing superstitious. But it appears from Cyprian's account of a miraculous cure connected therewith that it was common to carry home a portion of the consecrated bread, not for the use of the sick, but for solitary communion, or as an amulet against spiritual and bodily danger. Penitents, in danger of death, received the viaticum, brought to them, no doubt, from some neighbouring church where the host was preserved for this purpose. The Council of Trent sanctions this kind of reservation. It anathematizes those who hold it unlawful to reserve the host *in sacrario* (a vessel on the high altar), and who maintain that it should be distributed immediately after consecration to those present; or who forbid its being carried with due honour to the sick. It is obvious that the practice rests on the supposition that Christ is in the element, independently of the use. The excessive scrupulosity shown lest any portion of the bread or wine should fall to the ground is founded on the same supposition.

The *withdrawal of the cup from the laity*, of all Romish usages the most plainly repugnant to Scripture, and unwarranted by antiquity, is traceable directly to the doctrine of concomitance, which is itself a part of transubstantiation. Since the communicant under one species loses nothing by the withdrawal of the other, the question became one of order and expediency. There was more danger of spilling the wine than of dropping the bread ; and accordingly, in some churches the bread was steeped in the wine, in others the wine was conveyed into the mouth through a pipe. So late, however, as the eleventh century communion under both kinds was the practice. Alexander of Hales seems to have been the first who openly maintained that it should be left free to the laity to receive or decline the cup. He was followed by the schoolmen. Thomas Aquinas decides in favour of what he calls 'the usage of many churches,' on the ground that thereby profanation of the sacrament is more likely to be avoided. To the objection that the sacrament is thus mutilated he replies that its perfection consists not in the use but in the consecration ; and, moreover, that the priest who is bound to communicate under both kinds does so in the name, and as the representative, of the whole body of communicants. The Council of Constance (1415) decreed formally that the cup should be denied to the laity. Yet, conscious, apparently, of the lack of either Scripture or Patristic authority, the Tridentine Fathers declined any positive decision on the subject, recommending that it be referred to the Pope for settlement. Modern Romish theologians, such as Möhler, do not hesitate to express a wish that the laity should be permitted an option in the matter. All the Reformed Churches agree with our own that the 'cup of the Lord is not to be denied to the lay people ; for both parts of the Lord's sacrament, by ordinance and commandment, ought to be ministered to all Christian men alike' (Art. xxx).

It is almost unnecessary to observe that none but a priest can consecrate, and by consecration change the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. Hence he is said *conficere sacramentum*. His lips alone can pronounce the mystic form, 'This is My body,' one which the change follows ; he alone can offer up Christ for the sins of the living and the dead. This power, coupled with that of the keys, or absolution, are the two pillars on which the sacerdotal system of

Rome rests. What a mass of error they can and do sustain the history of that Church furnishes abundant proof.

99. *The Sacrifice of the Mass*

According to the Council of Trent, the Eucharist is not merely a sacrament, to be partaken of by the faithful, but a propitiatory sacrifice which the priest offers up on behalf of the living and the dead. Our Lord, it is alleged, agreeably to the prediction that He should be a Priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec (Ps. cx. 4), since a priest must have a sacrifice to offer, instituted, at His last passover with His disciples, a perpetual sacrifice, to be a representation of that offered on the cross, and a repetition of it too, so far as an unbloody sacrifice can be of a bloody one. At the supper He offered Himself under the species of bread and wine ; a sacrifice which did not supersede that about to be offered on Calvary, and yet was to continue in the Church to the end of time, and to be of propitiatory virtue. On the same occasion, He who was Himself on that occasion both Priest and Sacrifice, delegated the office of priesthood to the Apostles and their successors, by the words 'Do this' (*Hoc facite*). This is that new Passover which takes the place of the old, of which the sacrifices of the law were the types, and which the prophet Malachi predicts should be celebrated in every place among the heathen (Mal. i. 11). More explicitly : the same Christ is therein contained, and sacrificed *incruente* (bloodlessly), who sacrificed Himself on the cross *cruente* (with shedding of blood) ; and they who approach with due preparation of heart thereby obtain mercy from God ; who, appeased by this propitiation, forgives venial sins, and confers that grace and gift of penitence which leads to the sacrament of penance, whereby mortal sin, as distinguished from venial, is forgiven. It is one and the same Victim that was offered on the cross and is offered in the Mass, one and the same Priest who officiates, but in the latter through a human priesthood ; only in the mode of sacrifice a difference exists. The sacrifice is available for the sins not only of the living but of the dead in Purgatory, as Apostolic tradition teaches. As regards the departed saints, Masses may be said in memory and honour of them, but no sacrifice is offered *to* them ; the priest does not say, I offer this sacrifice to thee, Peter or Paul, but while he give thanks for their final victory, he implores their patronage, and their intercession on our behalf.

It has already been pointed out that the first Jewish converts whether Apostles or others, were not likely, as long as the temple stood, to set up a propitiatory sacrifice as part of Christian worship ; and, in fact, that the synagogical form of worship, providentially appointed to receive into itself the Christian, excluded all such offerings, as it did a human priesthood. The Levitical ritual, in actual possession of the ground, and not yet abrogated by any act of Providence, must have indisposed such converts to establish anything resembling it in their Christian synagogues. Yet, as time went on, and the teaching especially of St. Paul began to exercise a predominance in the Church, the question might occur to the Jewish Christians whether, if the legal sacrifices should come to an end, it would be proper or allowable to supply the deficiency by something corresponding, in the Christian Church.

The Epistle to the Hebrews is a summary of Divine instruction on this point, evidently intended to prepare the way for the impending dissolution of the Mosaic economy. The Hebrew Christians were warned that the ceremonial law, having served its purpose, though still in existence, was 'decaying and waxing old,' and might be expected, before long, 'to vanish away' (Heb. viii. 13). It was no longer needed, because its appointments, in themselves only typical, had been fulfilled in the Antitype. The Priesthood of Christ, after the order of Melchisedec, was not merely to have no connection with the Aaronic priesthood (Heb, vii. 13), but it was not to be exercised on earth either personally or by delegates (viii. 4) ; but in heaven, in the presence of God, for us (ix. 24). And as regards sacrifice : the expiatory *death* of Christ, suffered once for us all, is never to be repeated. 'Every' (human) 'priest standeth daily ministering and offering oftentimes the same sacrifices which can never take away sins : but this Man, after he had offered one Sacrifice for sins for ever, sat down on the right hand of God' (x. 11, 12). If the Levitical sacrifices had been thus perfect, 'would they not have ceased to be offered ?' (*Ibid.*, 2). The other and the proper function of the priesthood, viz., to sprinkle the blood on the mercy-seat, is actually discharged by our great High Priest, and will never cease : He ever liveth to make intercession for us (ix. 24 ; vii. 25).

Whatever be the meaning of the passage Heb. ix. 11–14, the office described is not that of slaying the victim, but of presenting the blood. The word 'offer' may apply to either function ; an ambiguity which has sometimes been taken advantage of, to establish the doctrine of a perpetual *sacrifice* in the Church. Christ perpetually pleads, and in this sense offers, the virtue of His atonement ; but the sacrifice on Calvary, whether in a bloody or an unbloody form, is not to be repeated. Inasmuch, however, as sacrifice is an act, on the part of the offerer, either of surrender or of thanksgiving, the Apostles do employ terms borrowed from the typical dispensation, but in a purely figurative sense. Christians are ‘ a holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices ’ (1 Pet. ii. 5) ; such as the presenting of their bodies ‘ as a living sacrifice, a reasonable service ’ (Rom. xii. 1), or the sacrifices of praise and thanksgiving, and of Christian benevolence (Heb. xiii. 15, 16). St. Paul calls his self-surrender to the service of Christ a drink-offering poured out (Phil. ii. 17) ; the gift of the Philippians ‘ an acceptable sacrifice ’ (Phil. vi. 18) ; the conversion of the Gentiles an ‘ offering up ’ of them pleasing to God (Rom. xv. 16). In no instance, even in this figurative sense, are these terms applied to the Eucharist.

Heb. xiii. 10 is not an exception. To discuss the meaning of this difficult passage at length would be out of place here ; it may be observed, briefly, that to establish an allusion in it to the Eucharist it would be necessary to prove that the word ‘ altar ’ or an equivalent term, is applied in this Epistle, or in the New Testament, to the sacrament ; that the doctrine of later times, not fully recognized in the Church till the twelfth century, viz., that Christ is offered up afresh at each celebration, can be traced to the Apostolic age ; and that there is no other satisfactory explanation to be given, which is by no means the case. As the sin-offerings on the great day of atonement were not to be eaten by the priests, but to be burnt without the camp, so, conversely, since Jesus, our sin-offering, ‘ suffered without the gate,’ the beneficial participation of the atonement effected by that sacrifice belongs not to those who, rejecting the Gospel seek to be justified by the law of Moses. Such appears to be the design of the passage.

And for some time this figurative sense of the word ‘ sacrifice ’ was that intended by the early writers when they employed it. Barnabas (if the epistle bearing this name is that of the companion of St. Paul) speaks of the ‘ new law of Jesus Christ ’ as enjoining ‘ a human oblation ’ ; which, as Waterland observes, can only be understood of the offering of themselves by Christians, in St. Paul’s sense (Rom. xii. 1), as distinguished from the legal offerings. Clement of Rome (A.D. 96) recommends due order, both as regards seasons and persons, in dedicating the offerings (*προσφορὰς*) and gifts (*δῶρα*) which the faithful laity presented at the Eucharist ; and censures the deposition of bishops who had duly discharged this office. To understand this language, we must remember that in the Apostolic Church the Eucharist was celebrated in connection with love-feasts, the materials for which were provided by the joint contributions of the congregations. When the Agape fell into disuse, the custom was continued of presenting oblations, as they were called, that is, bread and wine and the firstfruits of creation, out of which the portion needed for the celebration of the sacrament was taken, while the remainder was applied to charitable purposes. They were received by the bishop, or other ministrant, and set apart with prayer and thanksgiving, in the name of the assembled worshippers. These were the ' offerings ' and ' gifts ' to which Clement alludes ; and (which is to be noted) they were presented previously to the act of dedication, called in later times consecration, by which the bread and wine of the sacrament were set apart.

It is, to say the least, doubtful whether Ignatius, when he uses the word ' altar ' means the Lord's Table ; but if so, it was not Christ whom he supposed to be offered on it, but the gifts of the faithful, which in St. Paul's sense were a sacrifice, or, rather, the piety which offered them was so. In process of time, not merely these offerings, but the whole service, including as well the prayer of consecration as that of thanksgiving (εὐχαριστία), the breaking of the bread, the pouring out of the wine, and the distribution came to be called a sacrifice ; and as long as the prominent idea expressed there in was the thankfulness of the communicants for the mercies of redemption, and the surrender of themselves to the service of God, there was nothing unscriptural in it.

A gradual change, however, was the consequence of these incautious expressions. To the service itself an inherent value began to be attached ; it was held to be the pure offering of which Malachi had prophesied ; it received the name of the unbloody sacrifice, not merely as distinguished from that of the cross, but from the bloody sacrifices of the law ; the bread and wine of Melchisedec were declared to be types of the sacramental elements. The sacrificial character of the rite, as distinguished from the sacramental, assumed a prominence which is very visible in the writings of Irenæus and Tertullian, and still more so in those of their successors. Yet, in Tertullian especially, the figurative sense on the whole maintained its ground.

By Cyprian the foundation of the sacrificial character of the Eucharist, viz., the proper priesthood of Christian ministers, as distinguished from the priesthood of all Christians, was laid, and the indeterminate statements of his predecessors reduced to a consistent theory. According to this Father, the ministers of Christ discharge the same offices, and are invested with the same privileges, as the Jewish priesthood under the older economy. Let the following passages suffice. Alluding to the schism in his see, which resulted in the appointment of a rival bishop, Cyprian observes that ' there can be but one altar, and one bishop ' ; and asks, ' How can they escape the judgment of an avenging God who heap reproaches not only on their brethren but upon the priests (*sacerdotes*), upon whom God ' (under the law) ' was pleased to bestow such honour, that whoseover refused obedience to the priest for the time being should be put to death ?' 'Heresies,' he continues, 'spring from not recollecting that in a Church there can be but one priest (*sacerdos*), and one judge, who for the time being is the Vicar of Christ. Can that man think that he has communion with Christ who separates himself from the communion of Christ's clergy and people ? He wages war against the Church, against the ordinance of God . . . . not knowing that he who thus opposes himself to the Divine ordinance shall experience the Divine chastisement of his temerity. Thus it was that Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, intruding themselves into the priest's offices, receive the just reward of their deed. Thus, too, King Uzziah, attempting, contrary to the Divine law, to burn incense upon the altar, was struck with leprosy.'

Since priesthood and sacrifice are correlative terms, if the Aaronic priesthood is continued in the Christian Church so must some real sacrifice be found in it : and since the legal sacrifices, not even excepting the peace-offerings, were propitiatory, of this character must the Christian sacrifice be. In the Eucharist this sacrifice was discovered by all the great writers of the Church after Cyprian's time until the Reformation. But where was the victim ? 'behold the fire and the wood, but where is the lamb for a burnt offering ?' (Gen. xxii. 7). There was a gap in the theory ; and it was filled up by the doctrine of the real presence of Christ in His body, and, by virtue or concomitance, His soul and Deity—that is, the whole Christ—in the sacrament. In proportion as transubstantiation was worked out to its final results in the eleventh century, under the treatment of Anselm and his contemporaries, so did the doctrines of a human priesthood and a propitiatory sacrifice in the Mass advance *pari passu*, until they appeared in their full proportions and connection in the decisions of the Council of Trent.

An esteemed writer of our Church (Waterland) has done his best to explain the strong statements which abound in the Fathers on this subject. He has proved that they occasionally employ the term sacrifice, as the New Testament does, in a figurative sense, but not that in connection with the Eucharist they do not use the word literally ; still less does he explain why they should speak of this sacrament as they do, in language so unwarranted by Scripture, and so liable to misconstruction. Can Cyprian be supposed to mean nothing more than the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, or the oblations of the faithful, or the surrender of the heart to God, when he prescribed that no presbyter should take the office of guardian to the children of a deceased brother, under the penalty, in case of disobedience, that 'no offering should be made for him ' (the deceased transgressor), ' nor any sacrifices offered for his repose ? ' Or Ambrose, when he remarks that though Christ Himself does not now seem to offer, yet on earth He is offered when His body is offered ; and again, ' When we sacrifice ' (celebrate the Eucharist) ' Christ is present, Christ is slain ? ' Or Augustine himself, when after arguing truly that the one sacrifice of Christ has taken the place of all the sacrifices of the Old Testament, he goes on to say that ' this sacrifice is His body which is offered ' (in the Eucharist) ' and ministered to the communicants ? '

Nothing is gained to the cause of truth by attempting to impose a sense on the Fathers, which only partially represents their real meaning, a meaning which is confirmed, if confirmation be needed, by the language of the ancient liturgies, even the earliest that have come down to us, such as the Clementine and that of St. James. Whatever they may have suffered from interpolation of a later date, these remains sufficiently indicate the popular view of the Eucharistic service in the third and fourth centuries. It can hardly have been a recent innovation when the Clementine Liturgy habitually calls the Eucharist ' the holy mysteries,' a ' sacrifice,' and the celebrant bishop a ' high priest.' Nor can the still stronger expressions that occur in that of St. James be regarded otherwise than as a superstructure on an ancient foundation ; *e.g.*, when the priest proclaims silence and holy dread, ' while Christ our God is brought in to be slain and given for food to the faithful,' or implores the Divine favour while ' with fear and trembling he approaches the holy altar to offer up this awful unbloody sacrifice for his own and the people's sins.'

As soon as the sacrificial, as distinguished from the sacramental, character of the Eucharist was established, the practice of private masses gained ground in the Church. Traces of a doctrine of purgatory are found in Augustine, and he does not hesitate to console the friends of those who had died in communion with Christ and the Church, with the hope that prayer, and especially the celebration of the Eucharist, on their behalf might be beneficial to them ; and this, not merely as augmenting their bliss, but as inducing God to deal with their sins more leniently than they deserved. Since the dead cannot communicate, except in spirit, it was plainly the sacrificial virtue of the ordinance which Augustine had in view, as, indeed, appears from his connecting with it the remission, in part or wholly, of the sins committed in this life. Similar celebrations, and with the same object, were customary at the anniversaries of the death of the martyrs, which were observed with great solemnity. At first it was the martyrs themselves who were supposed to receive benefit therefrom ; but since this seemed to compromise their dignity, in process of time they were invested with the office of intercessors with God, that the offerings of the worshippers, especially that of the Eucharist, might be accepted.

The multiplicity of occasions on which the Eucharist was celebrated, the erection in the churches of private shrines or altars dedicated to some apostle or saint, the magical character which the ordinance assumed (it was a μύησις or initiation into the Christian mysteries, a solemnity to be shuddered at, φοβερὰ θυσία), all combined to deter the laity from communicating, except as spectators. It was too formidable a service for ordinary Christians to take a part in, and was the privilege of those only who had reached an extraordinary degree of sanctity. Consequently the number of spectators, especially at the daily celebrations, began to fall off. Chrysostom, in a well-known passage, complains of the scanty attendance in his time : ‘ In vain is the sacrifice daily offered, in vain we stand at the altar. Nobody takes part in it.’ But for a sacrifice, as distinguished from communion, it was sufficient if the priest alone officiated, and this eventually became the custom. This is the origin of private masses. An effort was made to save the idea of communion by representing that the priest was acting as a public person, and offering on behalf of the whole Church, but on the popular mind so refined a conception would have little effect. It is not improbable that in the Church of Rome there would be few, if any, lay communicants were it not for the ecclesiastical injunction that once a year at least the laity should actually communicate. Practically, it may be said, the Apostolic conception of the Eucharist as a coming together of Christians to break bread, in commemoration of the death of Christ, has in that Church disappeared.

It was the work of the schoolmen to frame a scientific basis for the popular system of the Church, as it existed in their day. Materially they had little to add to this system. According to Thomas Aquinas, the priest is constituted a mediator between God and man, and alone has power to consecrate the elements, and by consecration to transubstantiate them into the body and blood of Christ (*perficere sacramentum*). This power he receives at ordination, which, as a sacrament, impresses an indelible character on his soul ; which character, however, is a mystical, not a moral, grace ; it is one which the immorality of the priest does not affect, because his office is not personal but ministerial ; he acts merely as the representative of Christ. The Eucharist is both a sacrifice and a sacrament ; a sacrifice inasmuch as Christ is therein offered, a sacrament inasmuch as Christ is therein received ; as a sacrifice it is propitiatory (*habet vim satisfactivam*). As a sacrifice, too, it can profit those who do not partake of it (the absent and the departed), since it can be and is offered for their spiritual benefit. If it be objected that such a celebration is only an imperfect one, it must be remembered that the perfection of the Eucharist depends on consecration, not, as in baptism, on the use of the sacrament, a privilege which belongs to the Eucharist alone. Thomas Aquinas, however, retains the distinction between representation and fact ; the Eucharist, he observes, is a representative image of the passion of Christ, and Christ therein is sacrificed in the same sense in which the altar is an image of the cross, and the celebrating priest an image of Christ ; that is, we do not speak literally when we say Christ is therein slain, but in a figure, as when, looking at the pictures of Cicero or Sallust, we say : This is Cicero, that is Sallust. The inconsistency of making the same transaction both an image and a reality is obvious ; the picture of Cicero never can be really Cicero ; but it does not seem to have been noticed by Thomas, for in immediate juxtaposition to the representative view occurs the statement : 'As often as the commemoration of the passion of Christ is celebrated, the work of our redemption is carried on' ; that is, a real propitiatory sacrifice for sin is offered.

The question of private Masses, that is, those in which the priest alone celebrated, Thomas passes over in silence,; nor, indeed, was there any necessity for him to discuss it. If it be once granted that the Eucharist is a propitiatory sacrifice, offered to God, the lawfulness of private Masses follows ; for, as Bellarmine remarks, 'to a sacrifice, as such, it is of no moment whether few or many, or none, are present and communicate, since it is a matter between the priest and God ; the priest can offer for the people in the absence of every one but himself.' Incidentally, however, Thomas Aquinas, by his admissions, must rather have promoted than dissuaded from the practice. He accepts Augustine's distinction between a mere sacramental partaking, such as that of Judas Iscariot, and a profitable reception, which only the pious enjoy ; and not less so, that Father's maxim : *Crede et manducasti* (' Believe, and thou hast eaten '). Two things, he observes, in the reception are to be distinguished, the sacrament itself and its beneficial effect. It is most perfectly received when both are combined. It may happen, however, that there may exist an impediment (*e.g.*, mortal sin), to this effect, and thus an oral manducation may not be a spiritual one ; just as in baptism some receive only the sacrament (water), others that and also the inward benefit. Since the Eucharist is not, like baptism, of absolute necessity, and impresses no character, the outward reception may, in extreme cases, be supplied by the intention and desire, as is the case even in baptism (*baptismus flaminis*). The distinction is in itself just and valuable as a counterpoise to the doctrine of the *opus operatum* prevalent at the time in the Church ; but coupled with the exaggerated language of the liturgies on the awful character of the Eucharist, it may have given encouragement to the abstention of the laity from communicating, and so to the introduction of private Masses. Nor would this tendency be effectually counteracted by the admission that such an intended Eucharist, or baptism, is inferior in effect to an actual reception.

The decrees of the Council of Trent, which merely reproduce the doctrine of the schools on this subject, present many difficulties. We are assured, over and over again, that the sacrifice of the cross and that of the Mass are one and the same ; it is the same victim (*hostia*) that is offered, the same priest that officiates ; only in the Mass it is an unbloody sacrifice, and Christ who offered Himself on the cross now does so through the agency of human priests. But if in either case the sacrifice is really propitiatory, to which form of it are we to ascribe the atonement for the sins of the world of which Scripture makes mention ? The question is not an easy one to answer, and Bellarmine is sensible of this, for after laying down that the sacrifice is the same, he proceeds to specify some points of inferiority in that of the Mass as compared with that of the cross. The former is propitiatory only in the sense of *impetration* ; for Christ in it cannot, and does not, now suffer as He did on the cross, or make a full satisfaction for sin ; he *impetrates* from God spiritual gifts on behalf of His Church.[1] He therein *applies* to believers the benefits of the sacrifice of Calvary.[2] Secondly, from its impetratory character, in which it resembles prayer, it requires worthiness, though not of the priest yet of the offerer who presents it through the priest ; with the sacrifice of the cross it was otherwise (Bellarmine does not explain how this observation applies to private Masses). Thirdly, and principally, the sacrifice of the Mass is of finite value, as appears from its being often repeated : whereas that of the cross is of infinite value, and being so is not literally repeated (Heb. x. 2).

Why this difference of value should exist Bellarmine confesses is not easy to discover. He attempts to account for it by observing that on the cross Christ was offered in His natural humanity (*esse naturale*), in the Mass only in His 'sacramental body,' and that in the former He Himself was the offerer, while in the latter He acts through the priest.[3]

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[1] Sacrificium Missæ dicitur propitiatorium quia *impetrat* remissionem culpæ, satisfactorium quia *impetrat* remissionem pœnæ ; meritorium quia *impetrat* gratiam benefaciendi et merita acquirendi. *De Miss.*, ii., 4.

[2] *Ibid.* Comp. Wilberforce, *Euch.*, c. 11 : 'That acceptance which Christ purchased through the sacrifice of the cross He applies through the sacrifice of the altar.'

[3] *De Miss.* ii, 4.

Such are the straits to which this acute defender of his Church is reduced in his attempt to reconcile the alleged identity of the two sacrifices with a distinction between them. As regards that favourite mode of explanation, that the sacrifice of the Mass is a means of *applying* that of the cross to individuals, we may surely ask, how can one sacrifice *apply* another, especially that with which it is substantially identical ? A sacrament may, in some sense, apply a sacrifice, but a sacrifice cannot apply itself. The truth is, as has been already observed, a fallacy lurks in the word ' offering ' as used by Bellarmine, and other writers of similar views : it is made to signify both sacrifice and intercession.[1] What does ' impetration ' or ' application ' mean as applied to the *sacrifice* of the Mass, but that it is not really a sacrifice ; it is not the sacrifice, but the priest that impetrates or applies, he pleads the merit of the sacrifice as a ground for expecting favours from heaven, but the sacrifice, an act of a different character, does not plead its own efficacy.

The Epistle to the Hebrews establishes the essential distinction between the two things, the sacrifice and the application of it. The High Priest slew the victim on the day of atonement, but the impetration, or application, began when he brought the blood into the holy of holies and sprinkled it on the mercy-seat. It was in discharging this office that he acted as the real mediator between the sinful people and God ; for though on this occasion the slaying of the victims was deputed to him, this was an exception, and as a rule the act of sacrifice was performed not by the priest but by the offerer. So in the antitype, the sacrifice was offered on the cross, but the impetration belongs to Christ not suffering, but risen and ascended, our advocate with the Father, ever living, not to offer a continual sacrifice (*juge sacrificium*) in heaven, however spiritually interpreted, but to make intercession for us. If all that is meant by propitiation is impetration, as Bellarmine asserts, the Protestant insists on the latter as strongly as the Roman Catholic does ; only, with the Epistle to the Hebrews and the whole of the New Testament, he refers the impetration not to an ordinance of the Church, as if any ordinance had an inherent virtue to remit sin ; nor to a human priest, the representative of Christ ; but to Christ Himself, whose one sacrifice the Church pleads not only in the Eucharist but in every prayer offered up through Christ to God ; to Christ Himself, who impetrates, as our ever living High Priest, that the ordinances may be channels of grace to us, and that those prayers may be heard. And it is Christ Himself, and not any human mediator, who conveys to the suppliant the assurance that His confession of sin and prayer for forgiveness are heard ; Christ Himself by His Divine vicar, the Holy Spirit, who by the spirit of adoption certifies to the believer that his iniquity is taken away, and his sin covered.

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[1] Such is the principle upon which the Holy Eucharist is called a sacrifice. It rests upon the necessity of *our Lord's intercession :* upon the truth that the Church's services cannot be effectual unless they are *presented* by its Head : that His *intervention* is essential, not only because He communicates graces to His members, but because His members cannot be accepted save through the *sacrifice* of Himself.' Wilberforce, *Euch*, c. 11. The confusion here is evident between ' sacrifice ' and ' intercession,' or intervention : the words are used interchangeably. Yet they differ as the slaying of the victim by the high priest on the day of atonement differed from the sprinkling of the blood on the mercy-seat.

The doctrine of the Mass, that the sacrifice of the cross is applied only through the Church and not by the apprehensive faith of the communicant or the suppliant, is but an instance of the principle that lies at the root of Roman Catholicism and its kindred systems, viz., that Christ has retired from the active personal administration of this dispensation, delegating His offices, priestly, prophetical, and regal, to the visible Church, *i.e.*, the priesthood, through which, and through which alone, He operates. Christ Himself is ever impetrating for us ; Christ (as His Divine vicar the Holy Spirit) is ever assuring us of the fruits of His impetration. But, according to Romish teaching, Christ not merely regenerates, impetrates, absolves, teaches, through the Church, but sacrifices Himself *de novo* for the remission of sin, and in private Masses for the sins of individuals, living or departed, through the Church, that is, through its priesthood. Thus, at every step, the Church intervenes between the soul and the Saviour.

It is to be regretted that some of our divines have used incautious language on this subject. Thus Bishop Cosin writes : ‘ Neither is the sacrifice of the cross, as it was once offered up there, *modo cruento*, so much remembered in the Eucharist (though it be commemorated) as regard is had to the perpetual and daily offering of it by Christ in heaven in His everlasting priesthood ; and thereupon was, and should be still, the *juge sacrificium* observed here on earth, as it is in heaven, the reason which the ancient Fathers had for their daily sacrifice.’[1] The language is ambiguous ; does the Bishop mean by the term ‘ offering ’ sacrifice, or intercession ? It is to be presumed that he does not mean that Christ is perpetually offering Himself as a sacrifice in heaven ; but only that He devotes Himself continually to God to be offered on earth by the hands of the priest ; that the *juge sacrificium* is not an actual but a consenting one. Even so, the assertion is without Scripture warrant. Where does Scripture give the slightest hint of any such perpetual sacrifice, even in intent, going on in heaven ?

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[1] Quoted by Wilberforce (c. xi.) as from Cosin ; but it is ascribed by others to Bishop Overall.

Rather we may ask, where does it not emphatically repudiate the notion ? Christ appears in the presence of God for us ; that is the sum and substance of the revelation. No other sacerdotal function is He ever spoken of as discharging, no other is needed.

By some, indeed it may be said by many, writers a middle course is adopted on this subject. The sacrifice of the Mass is rejected, as well it may be, as unscriptural, but the Eucharist is held to differ from other ordinances of the Gospel as being a special ' representation ' to God of the sacrifice of the cross, and so to contract a sacrificial character. If by this is meant merely that every private prayer, every act of public worship, is offered through the merits and mediation of Christ, it is nothing but the truth ; but it is so obviously nothing but the truth that a doubt arises why it should be insisted on. No Christian ventures to approach the throne of grace except through Christ. But the fact is that representation insensibly passes into presentation, and what is intended is that in this sacrament a special presentation of the sacrifice on Calvary is made. The question at once occurs, By whom is it made ? By the whole congregation or the celebrating minister ? If by the latter alone, then the minister becomes invested with a sacerdotal character, and we have one half of the Romish doctrine without the other half. We have no sacrifice, but we have a mediating, impetrating priest. He ' presents ' on behalf of the congregation what the congregation only presents through him. That is, the perfection of the sacrifice once offered for sin is not, as it is in the Mass, invaded, but the intercessory function of Christ is so ; it is transferred to the human celebrant, who, not as the mouthpiece of the congregation, but as an official mediator, stands between the worshippers and God. The priest is there, but there is no sacrifice ; and the theory is not merely an unscriptural but a mutilated one.

It is worthy of remark that in the Greek Church, however it may agree with the Romish in holding the Eucharist to be a sacrifice, private Masses are unknown. Each principal church has but one altar, with a kind of credence table on which to make the necessary preparations ; and if the Mass is to be celebrated in neighbouring chapels, a consecrated cloth is used for an altar. On Sundays and festivals no more than one celebration of the Mass is permitted.

100. *The Benefits of the Eucharist*

We must here set aside the particular instances in which the Eucharist is alleged, rightly or wrongly, to have been the means of procuring special mercies or averting special calamities. The Fathers quote many cases of magical or miraculous efficacy of this kind. Augustine tells us of a landed proprietor in his diocese whose house was infested with evil spirits, to the great injury of his servants and cattle. He summoned one of the presbyters to pray that they might be expelled. The presbyter 'offered there the sacrifice of the body of Christ, praying as earnestly as he could that the plague might cease; forthwith, through the mercy of God, it did cease.'[1] The Eucharist was held to be a charm against apprehended dangers, temporal and spiritual.[2] It was resorted to in times of public calamity—war, famine, pestilence, etc. It may be asked how it came to be regarded in this light, so entirely without precedent or warrant from Scripture? What has been observed in the last section supplies the answer. The Mass, Bellarmine says, is a propitiatory sacrifice rather in the sense of moving God to grant what the offerer prays for than as atoning for sin; it is a sacrifice of *impetration*, whereby benefits of all kinds are to be obtained.[3] In fact, he makes impetration the specific property of this sacrament.[4] Hence it is that the Council of Trent does not ascribe to it the remission of all sin, but only of venial; atonement for mortal sin and absolution from it belong to the sacrament of penance; which might be thought superfluous if the Eucharist had the same power.

Hence, too, it is that, under this aspect of the Mass, the *opus operantis*, the piety and devotion, of the minister comes into account; whereas as regard the *opus operantum* of transubstantiation, with its attendant sacrifice, no such qualification is needed. Since the sacrifice is here a prayer (*oratio realis non verbalis*—Bellarmine), its efficacy presupposes the worthiness of the offerer; which is not the case if it is regarded as purely propitiatory. Thus the Eucharist, in itself and apart from the prayers of intercession which usually accompanied the celebration, became an act of intercession with God, and the celebrant a priest. These prayers were natural and appropriate. The ancient liturgies contain intercessions for all sorts and conditions of men; prayers that the celebrant may be accepted, that the worshippers may find favour, that the whole service may be blessed; some before, some after consecration; but these are the petitions of the congregation, and the minister is only the organ of its addresses to God. In process of time the unbloody sacrifice, not the attendant prayers, become the prevailing plea with God, and the intercession of the priest superseded that of Christ.[1]

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[1] *De Civit. Dei*, xxii, 8.

[2] Quos excitamus et hortamur ad prælium, non ut inermes et nudos relinquamus, sed protectione sanguinis et corporis Christi muniamus; et cum ad hoc fiat Eucharistia ut possit accipientibus esse tutela, quos tutos esse contra adversarium volumus, munimento dominiæ saturitatis armemus. Cyprian, Epist. bk. iv.

[3] Jam vero, non solum propitiatorium sacrificium esse, ac pro peccatorum remissione offerri posse corpus Dominicum, sed etiam esse impetratorium omnis generis beneficiorum, ac pro iis etiam recte offerri, facile probari potest testimoniis Scripturæ et Patrum. *De Miss.*, L. ii., c. 3.

[4] Impetratio propria est hujus sacrifici vis, et efficientia. *Ibid.*, c. 4.

In the remains of antiquity statements are frequently found that since Christ in this sacrament is present in His glorified humanity, our *bodies* in particular receive from that humanity a vivifying influence, the seed of immortality.[2] This, if it means anything, must mean that in some mysterious manner we are actually made 'members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones' (Ephes. v. 30) ; and this, although the spiritual nature of the union in the Apostle's mind is placed beyond doubt by the illustration which he draws from the union of husband and wife ; this relation is the closest of earthly ones, but it is in no sense physical : and although the resurrection of the body is ascribed by St. Paul, not to union with Christ's glorified body, but to the presence of the Holy Spirit in us (Rom. viii. 11). Or again, the Church is said to be the body of Christ because Christ in His humanity is really present in the Eucharist, and the Church therein partakes of His humanity ; so that His body mystical (the Church) is 'the extension of His body natural,'[3] or, in the incautious language of Hooker, 'God frameth the Church out of the very flesh, the very wounded and bleeding side of the Son of Man. So that in Him, according to our heavenly being, we are as branches in that Root out of which they grow.'[4]

Surely it is but a play upon words to argue that because by a figure the Church is called in Scripture the body of Christ in reference to *Christ the Head*, therefore it is an emanation from His humanity. The Church is His body because from Him, *as the Head*, vital energy, the quickening and sanctifying grace of the Holy Spirit, proceeds, and brings each member into union with Him ; not because sacraments are 'an extension of the incarnation,' and the partaking of them engrafts us into the incarnation. 'Christ is our life' (Col. iii. 4) ; on such passages as this is founded the inference that, especially in the Eucharist, the present life of Christ as the incarnate Son passes into the believer, and becomes the life of the latter ; whereas all that is meant is that He is the Purchaser and Giver of spiritual life. The 'life' of Christ in His state of humiliation did not communicate itself to His disciples ; nor does it, as far as we are told, communicate itself now, *simply as His life*, to those who are His ; yet He is our life, because unless He had risen and ascended the gift of the Spirit could not have been ours.

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[1] It is in solitary masses that the true spirit of the Romish system is best seen.

[2] Wilberforce, *Euch.*, c. xii. It is to be regretted that in one passage of our communion service countenance seems to be given to this notion : 'that our sinful bodies may be made clean by His body, and our souls washed through His most precious blood.' How can the body of Christ, a real though a spiritual one, affect our bodies, except by a quasi-physical union ? How can the blood, a material substance, affect the soul ? If body and soul are taken for the whole man, and the body and blood of Christ for the virtue of the atonement, it is most true that every believer is cleansed and washed by the death of Christ ; but the language is peculiar, and may give rise to erroneous theories.

[3] Wilberforce, c. xii.

[4] *Eccl. Pol.* v., c. 56, 7.

Such are specimens of what the noble figures of Scripture have to suffer at the hands of mystical interpreters.[1] But the theory proceeds even further. Since in the Eucharist we are brought into union with Christ's humanity, and, by concomitance, His humanity is inseparably united to Deity, we, in fact, through union with Him, 'are engrafted into the Divine nature,'[2] we become gods. Such is the ultimate result of these speculations. They begin with a real presence of the incarnate Son in the Eucharist, the effect of consecration ; partaking of the bread and wine, we are incorporated into the humanity of Christ ; through the humanity we are engrafted into the Divine nature. The commemoration of the atonement, the real subject of this sacrament, is well-nigh lost sight of. Salvation comes through the incarnation, not through the atonement. And the faith which is necessary to a beneficial reception is not that which apprehends the promise of forgiveness through the atonement, but either a passive acquiescence in the articles of the creed, or the belief of a real presence which because it eludes the senses, but in no other sense, must necessarily be an object of faith.[1]

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[1] It is to be regretted that the notion of the Jewish high priest's carrying to the mercy-seat, on the day of atonement, 'a life' in the blood instead of a symbol of death, has been in modern times revived. Thus, in an otherwise useful essay on the atonement in *Lux Mundi*, it is said that 'the passages which speak of our salvation by virtue of Christ's blood refer, according to the Jewish conception of the "blood which is the life," not only, or even chiefly, to the blood-shedding in death, but to the heavenly "sprinkling" of the principle of life' ; that is, the communication of spiritual life (quickening and sanctifying) by virtue of Christ's presentation of His blood in heaven. The leading passage in Leviticus xvii. 10, 11, does not contain the expression 'the blood which is the life,' but 'the life of *the flesh* is in the blood.' The blood circulating in the veins (*sanguis*) is, popularly speaking, 'the life' ; the life of the animal may be said to be in the blood thus circulating ; but when the blood is shed, becoming thereby not *sanguis* but *cruor*, no idea but that of death can be, or ever was, associated with it. What the high priest carried into the Holy of Holies—viz., a vessel of *shed* blood (*cruor*, not *sanguis*)—neither contained life nor was a symbol thereof, but was the evidence and symbol of a violent death which had been suffered ; and the sprinkling of the blood was the *application* of that (typical) death to cover the sin of the people. The atonement consists of two parts : the death of Christ, and the presentation of that death by Christ in heaven to silence the accusation of the law ; as the typical sprinkling silenced (typically) the condemning sentence of the two tables beneath the mercy-seat (Heb. ix. 4). 'Life' in this sense was, no doubt, the effect of the atonement, but not 'life' in the sense of quickening and sanctifying. The theory confuses the offices of the incarnate Son and of the Third Person (the Holy Spirit) in the economy of redemption.

[2] Wilberforce, *Euch.* c. xii. Comp. John of Damascus : *μετάληψις δὲ λέγεται' δι' αὐτῆς γὰρ τῆς 'Ιησοῦ θεότητος μεταλαμβάνομεν. Κοινωνία δὲ λέγεταί τε καὶ ἔστιν ἀληθῶς διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὐτοῦ τῆς σαρκός τε καὶ τῆς θεότητος De Fid Orth.*, iv., 13. In the University of Oxford many years ago a sermon was preached on, 'I have said, Ye are gods' (Ps. lxxxii. 6) ; the argument being that through the Eucharist our mortal nature is deified.

The question remains whether any, and if so what spiritual benefits of a general kind are connected with the Eucharist. It is impossible to suppose that ordinances emanating from Christ Himself, and therefore of permanent obligation in the Church, can be mere symbols of spiritual truths : they stand on a different footing from Apostolical, or post-Apostolical, appointments, or adjuncts to the main service of human origin. Yet, as has been observed (§ 91), Scripture is reticent as to any special *grace* attached to either sacrament. The two main privileges of the Gospel are remission of sin and sanctifying grace ; and it is doubtful whether, except as regards baptism, Scripture connects either of these great gifts of our Lord's Passion with sacraments. There are passages which associate baptism, though not exclusive of the Word and its operation, with ' washing away sin,' but none which make it a channel of sanctifying grace, however existing grace may be sealed, or strengthened, or perfected, by it. Sanctification is a gradual process, and therefore baptism, which can only be administered once, is not a fitting instrument of this operation of the Spirit ; which, accordingly, in Scripture is usually connected with the ministration of the Word, which is a constantly recurring means of grace. So is the Eucharist capable of repetition ; but no language is applied to it resembling that of St. Paul to the Ephesian elders, ' I commend you to God, and to the word of His grace, which is able to build you up '[2] (Acts xx. 32) ; while, as regards remission of sin, this gift is never attributed to it. The reason, surely, is not far to seek. Baptism is the sacrament of the *process* of regeneration, of the *application* of the work of Christ to individuals, under its twofold aspect of conversion and justification ; the Eucharist is the sacrament of *that work itself*, of the atonement on which as a foundation the saving application rests, and without which it would be impossible. This sacrament, therefore, presupposes remission of sin as already (potentially) effected by the death of Christ, and already in actual possession on the part of the faithful receiver.

The very name Eucharist explains its object. It is neither a prayer for, nor a means of, forgiveness, but a thanksgiving for the blessing in actual enjoyment, and received by faith. It is a ' thankful remembrance of Christ's death and of the benefits we receive thereby.'

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[1] ' The benefit of this sacrament cannot be obtained without faith ; seeing that it is only through faith that the inward part, the res sacramenti, can be apprehended by the mind.' Wilberforce, c. xii. This is faith in the sacrament, not the justifying faith which apprehends Christ.

[2] Comp. ' Christ gave some Apostles,' etc. (all gifts or offices connected with the ministry of the Word) ' for the edifying of the body of Christ ' (Ephes. iv. 1, 12). ' Desire the sincere milk of the Word, that ye may grow thereby ' (1 Pet. ii. 2).

And on this hypothesis our communion service is constructed. The worshippers are supposed to be real Christians, in covenant with God, pardoned and accepted ; but to be sensible of those daily shortcomings which every Christian must confess and deplore. They are exhorted to confess these sins of infirmity, and, as in the Lord's prayer, to pray to God as children to a father for forgiveness. They are assured, after confession and presumed repentance, by the citation of certain 'comfortable words' of Scripture, of complete forgiveness. With the minister they are exhorted to give thanks unto God for the promises of the Gospel, which they profess it is meet and right to do. They draw near, then, as forgiven and reconciled children of God. *Sancta sanctis*, as the deacon in the ancient Church exclaimed when the celebration commended. Either their faith in the promise does not convey full remission of sin (which no Protestant admits), and the Eucharist is necessary to supply the defect, or the Eucharist (that is, the reception) finds no unforgiven sin to remit. It seems impossible to escape from this alternative. If the communicant approaches with the consciousness of sin (whether venial or mortal is immaterial), unrepented of and therefore unforgiven, he is not a worthy communicant, and receives no benefit ; if through repentance and faith in the promises attached to faith, his sins, of whatever kind, are covered by the atoning blood, he does receive a benefit, but it cannot be remission of sin, which has already, and in the fullest measure, been vouchsafed.

Although the object of Bellarmine, in treating of this point, is to prove the necessity of the sacrament of penance as a preparation for the Eucharist, his arguments are in themselves unanswerable. Baptism and penance, he observes, are directly connected with remission of sin, as the symbols themselves teach. The water in baptism signifies the removal of spiritual disqualification, the form in penance, *absolvo te*, though not in its nature material like water, yet operates as a kind of plaster, inferior to baptism in that it does not completely cleanse from all past sin, but, as it were, hiding and healing the scars and sores of post-baptismal sins ; whereas the symbol of the Eucharist is nutrition and growth, and these presuppose a healthy state of the organs whether bodily or spiritual.[1] The same acute controversialist, in answer to Chemnitz, urging the expression ' for the remission of sins ' in the words of institution, remarks very properly that this expression belongs not to the *receiving* of the elements, but to the body broken and the blood shed on the cross ; it was by these that remission was procured, not by the personal appropriation of this blessing in the sacrament. If, he continues, remission of sin is in any sense conveyed by the

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[1] *De Euch.*, iv., 18, 19.

Eucharist, it can only be in the sense in which food expels bodily disease, viz., by strengthening the vital organs. The Eucharist, by infusing grace (*gratiam gratum facientem*) *debilitates* the noxious effect of venial sin, and obliterated *unknown* mortal sin, and so renders the recipient more acceptable to God. But nothing of a *forensic* nature (which Protestants always connect with remission of sin), is conveyed by the Eucharist.[1] The suffrage of any adversary, when he is on the side of truth, is valuable.

The Eucharist, therefore, does not convey, but presupposes, forgiveness of sin, and yet there is no ordinance of the Gospel which more directly refers to this gift. It is the very sacrament of the atoning blood of Christ. Again we endorse the Roman Catholic theologian's statement. 'If the Eucharist is said to be the New Testament, because it is a sign of the will of the testator, there remains no difficulty. For because it is a sign and representation of the death of Christ, it is also a sign of the will of the testator and of all the benefits promised to us; and so also of the remission of sins, so far as through it is represented the shedding of the blood of the Lord, on account of which all sins are remitted.'[2] So the case is, exactly. It is not a channel through which remission of sin is conveyed, but a representation of the fact which renders remission possible. It is the *verbum visibile* which proclaims the same atonement which the word does, but in a peculiar and impressive manner. The worshipper having received through faith in the word of promise forgiveness, and the witness thereof in his heart by the Holy Spirit, draws near and receives this holy sacrament to his comfort. What additional benefit comes to him thereby? He draws near because it is the command of Christ that he should do so; because therein he 'shows forth the Lord's death,' testifies to the Church that his hope of salvation rests on the atonement, and to the world that he is not ashamed of the cross of Christ; because this *verbum visibile* is also a making over to him individually what the word preached declares in general terms; because the ordinance is specially adapted to stimulate his love to the Saviour and increase his faith; because therein he realizes, as he does in no other Christian rite, his unity with all who love Christ. These are the benefits which he expects to receive, and does receive, from a worthy reception, but not incorporation into Christ's humanity, nor remission, in and by the act of reception, of forgiveness of sin.

It is true that through the minister the communicants also pray that they 'may eat the flesh of God's dear Son Jesus Christ and drink His blood' that they 'may be partakers of His most precious body and blood,'[1] figurative expressions, which some may interpret in one way and some in another. But there is nothing said of remission of sin by the act of reception. In a subsequent part of the service this expression does occur (' we humbly beseech Thee to grant that by the merits and death of Thy Son Jesus Christ, and through faith in His blood, we and all Thy whole Church may obtain remission of our sins '), but with no particular reference to the sacrament. The prayer is no other than that in the Lord's prayer, ' Forgive us our trespasses,' no other than what the Christian, apart from the sacrament, puts up daily. If it be asked, why should the worshipper, before communicating, express himself as forgiven through faith in Christ, and shortly afterwards offer up a prayer for remission of sin, we reply that nothing is more common than such repetitions in prayer, and moreover, that the worshipper may be conscious of fresh sins of infirmity, in the very act of communicating or after it, which need renewed confession and forgiveness.

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[1] *De Euch.*, c. 19.
[2] *Ibid.* c. 19.

Waterland, to establish his argument that remission of sin is *conveyed* through the Eucharist,[2] has recourse to inferential modes of reasoning. It is natural, he observes, to ask, why should Scripture make a distinction in this point between the two sacraments ?[3] If it teaches that baptism conveys this gift, why should not the other sacrament do so which, more explicitly than baptism, is the sacrament of the atonement and why is Scripture comparatively silent as to this effect of the Eucharist ? He assigns various reasons for the fact, but they are drawn rather from the writings of the ' ancients ' than from Scripture. He has a long chapter on 1 Cor. x. 16, etc. (' the cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ ? the bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ ? '), the object of which is to prove that the Apostle's expressions imply more than partaking of the visible elements, viz., a participation of what is meant by them, the passion and death of Christ and ' the reconcilement therein made.' Whoever doubted that ? But the meaning of the sacrament or its symbolism does not determine the point, whether in and by the act of reception remission of sin is *conveyed*. We feed by faith on the body broken and the blood shed ; we cannot, especially in this sacrament, help doing so ; but whether the sacrament is a *channel* of remission, and not rather, as Protestants hold, the faith which lays hold of the promise, is another question.

[1] Communion Service.

[2] *Euch.*, c. 9.

[3] This argument may be commended to the attention of those who do not hold that the Eucharist conveys remission of sin. If it does not, why should baptism be supposed to possess the privilege ? May not the passages which, no doubt, do speak of forgiveness in connection with baptism be so explained as to place the two sacraments on a level as regards this point ?

'If any one,' Waterland continues, 'should ask for a catalogue of those spiritual privileges, which St. Paul in this place (1 Cor. x. 16) has omitted, our Lord Himself may supply that omission by what He has said in John vi. For since we have proved that there is a spiritual manducation in the Eucharist with all worthy receivers, it now follows, of course, that what our Lord says in John vi of spiritual manducation in general is strictly applicable to this particular manner of spiritual feeding, and is the best explication we can anywhere have of what it includes or contains. It contains : 1. A title to a happy resurrection for such as spiritually feed on Christ, Christ will raise up at the last day. 2. A title to eternal life ; for our Lord expressly says : " Whoso eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood, hath eternal life." 3. A mystical union with Christ in His whole person ; or, more particularly, a presential union with Him in His Divine nature " he that eateth My flesh," etc., " dwelleth in Me, and I in him."' But these are the *fruits* of Christ's atonement ; the atonement gives us a ' title ' to them, and nothing is said about the instrument of appropriation. In fact, the statement is nothing but an expansion of the language of our Church in the ' exhortation ' ; ' the benefit is great if with a true penitent heart and lively faith we receive that holy sacrament, for *then* we spiritually eat the flesh of Christ and drink His blood ; then we dwell in Christ and Christ in us ; we are one with Christ and Christ with us.' Then, but not thereby. At last Waterland comes to remission of sin, and here he is compelled to have recourse to inference. ' 4. In these are *implied* (though not directly expressed by our Lord in that discourse) remission of sins, and sanctification of the Holy Spirit.' Remission of, sin may be (must be) *in* the Eucharist ; sealed by it, symbolized by it even conveyed by it in the same sense in which the preached word conveys it ; but it does not follow that *by the act of reception* absolution is conveyed.

The truth is, that this valuable writer is uncertain on two points of doctrine, and the uncertainty is reflected in his discussion. He does not hesitate, contrary to every Protestant confession, to make justification capable of increase, and progressive ; at least his language tends in that direction. At the close of chap. ix we read : ' The true answer (to the objection that the worthy communicant comes to the table already pardoned) ' is, that the grace of remission or justification, is progressive, and may be always improving.' If, indeed, the writer merely means that our *assurance* of justification is capable of increase or confirmation, and not that a special gift of increase is infused in the Eucharist, he is in the right ; but the expressions are, to say the least, incautious. The other source of uncertainty is more latent. The Romish Church, in this point in agreement with Scripture, does not connect remission of sin directly with the Eucharist, and there is no necessity for her doing so, for in the sacrament of Penance she possesses the means of presenting her communicants fully cleansed from sin and prepared to receive the Holy Communion worthily. The absolution which the Protestant hopes for from the appropriation by faith of the 'comfortable words' of Scripture spoken by the minister (the so-called 'absolution' of the latter *precedes* in our service the act of communion), the Romanist assigns to a special ordinance, appointed, it is alleged, for this very purpose.

So difficult was it for the leaders of the Reformation at once to free themselves from the bondage of ecclesiastical tradition that Luther, and even Melanchthon, in their earlier writings, treated the *number* of the sacraments as a matter of subordinate importance, and in the apology for the Augsburg Confession Melanchthon enumerates three: baptism, the supper of the Lord, and absolution[1] as a preparation for the Eucharist. As clearer light dawned upon them, absolution with the other four sacraments of Romanism was rejected, and in the *Cat. Maj.* of Luther only baptism and the supper of the Lord are held to be sacraments in the strict sense of the word.[2] In the Reformed confessions, our own included, no others appear. In our article on 'sin after baptism,' no ordinance of the Church is mentioned as a necessary channel of remission. Waterland, with all his merits, seems not to have fully grasped the import of the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith and its inconsistency with sacramental justification, and, like some writers of our own day,[3] to have been unable to understand how post-baptismal sin, especially of a grave nature, could be fully remitted without the intervention of the Church, sacerdotal and sacramental. As a minister of our Church, he could recognize no sacramental rite for this purpose after baptism but the Eucharist ; which, accordingly, he invests with a power of remission.[1]

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[1] 'Vere sunt igitur sacramenta, baptismus, cæna Domini, absolutio quæ est sacramentum pœnitentiæ.' *Apol. Conf.*, c. vii.

[2] 'Superest ut de duobus quoque sacramentis ab ipso Christo institutis disseramus.' P. iv.

[3] 'The Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith is incompatible with any real belief in the validity of sacraments.' Wilberforce, *Euch.*, c. v. We are not surprised to meet with, in a following chapter (xii.), such statements as these: 'There would be no such cure for this evil' (post-baptismal deadly sin) 'as the analogy of the Christian covenant requires, unless God had left power to his Church to absolve all sinners. For by the Church's office, by the ministry of absolution and the power of the keys, the relation of man to Christ is renewed, even as it was originally bestowed in holy baptism. It was understood, of course, that repentance and faith, as well as confession, were needed on the part of the offender, but the idea that after the commission of deadly sin men might restore themselves to their position in the body of Christ by an act of their own minds' (lively faith) 'is wholly at variance with the belief of the ancient Church. This right cannot be regained by those who fall into deadly sin after baptism except through that authority which it has pleased God to entrust to His Church, and which is exercised through priestly absolution.' As the writer could find in the church to which he then belonged no sacrament of penance, and no rule that persons guilty of deadly sin should confess to the priest and be officially absolved by him (though in certain cases it recommends the penitent to seek from his minister 'ghostly counsel and advice,' and absolution 'through the ministry of God's word'), it is not to be wondered at that he transferred his allegiance to another church in which he found both.

As regards the other great Gospel gift, that of sanctifying grace, we cannot doubt but that the Holy Spirit makes use of the sacraments as of the Word to carry on His gracious work. Even if the sacraments were to us arbitrary appointments, if they were not a *verbum visibile* and full of meaning ; yet since they are enjoined by Christ, obedience to the command must be in itself acceptable and warrant a blessing. But the question is whether Scripture connects *special* sanctifying grace with these ordinances, instructive and consolatory as they are, and especially with the Eucharist. None of the passages cited by Waterland (John iii. 5 ; 1 Cor. vi. 11 ; Ephes. v. 26 ; Tit. iii. 5) bear out his statement that ‘ they speak directly of the sanctification of the Spirit conferred in baptism.’ They may contain allusions to baptism, and establish some connection of the Holy Spirit with that sacrament ; but not (as indeed is evident) a continuous and progressive work of the Spirit, which cannot belong to an ordinance which occurs but once in the Christian’s life.

As regards the Eucharist in particular, John vi and 1 Cor. xii. 13 (‘ we have all been made to drink into one spirit ’) are too doubtful in their reference and their meaning to establish the conclusion. Even if they refer to the Eucharist, they do not prove that *special* grace *is* conveyed by it. So much, indeed, is at length acknowledged by the learned writer who cites them : ‘ We do not confine God’s grace to the sacraments, neither do we assert any *peculiar* grace, as appropriate to them only ; but what we assert is, some peculiar *degree* of the same graces, or some peculiar certainty, or constancy, as to the effect, in the due use of those means ’ ;[2] all which may be admitted, if by the word ‘ peculiar ’ is meant an increase of grace, such as in prayer also we ask and expect. But if this is all that is intended, viz., that an increase of sanctifying grace may be expected in the due use of the sacrament, we may ask why the writer should have devoted a long chapter to enforce a point which all Christians acknowledge ? Seeing that the Eucharist is not a mere rite of the Church but the appointment of Christ Himself, who can doubt but that it is a seal and token of spiritual union with Him, and an eminent means of ordinary sanctifying grace ?

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[1] ‘ Notwithstanding what I here said with respect to *Eucharistical absolution*,’ etc. *Euch.*, c. ix.

[2] *Euch.*, c. x.

The interests of the Church require that from time to time the Christian should testify his continuance in the mystical body of Christ, and especially, whatever measure of sanctity he may have attained, his continued dependence on the atonement as the ground of justification before God. The symbolism, even more than in baptism, appeals to the imagination, and reminds us of what we owe to the Saviour and to our Christian brethren. We transfer ourselves in thought to the passover-chamber ; the communicating church represents the assembled Apostles ; Christ, by His vicar the Holy Ghost, is present, according to promise, with His guests ; we hear, the same words which He used in announcing His approaching death ; we break the bread and drink the wine in memory of that death ; we rekindle the consciousness of brotherly union with all the members of His mystical body ; the 'exceeding great love of our Master and only Saviour' is brought home to our minds with greater power than by any exposition of the Word ; we publicly glory in the cross, and renew our vows of obedience. Since the Holy Spirit bears witness to our adoption 'with our spirit' (Rom. viii. 16), that is, employs the various faculties of the soul—reason, conscience, the affections—to carry on His work, we need no elaborate Scriptural proof that we have in this sacrament an extraordinary means of sanctification, the sacrament speaks for itself. Unquestionably grace is therein increased and faith confirmed. More is not told us ; more we do not need. 'Why should any cogitation possess the mind of a faithful communicant but this : O my God, Thou art true ! O my soul, thou art happy !'[1]

101. *Controversy of the Reformers on the Real Presence*

The controversy of Luther with Carlstadt on the real presence (see § 97) spread from Saxony to Switzerland, and Zwingli the Luther, and Oecolampadius the Melanchthon, of the Helvetic churches, took an active part in it. A war of pamphlets between Zwingli and Luther ensued ; the former denying, the latter asserting, a corporal presence, and came to an end in 1528, with the ordinary result that neither was convinced by the arguments of the other. One consequence, however, was that Zurich thenceforward assumed an independent and important place in the history of the Reformation, and the distinction between the Reformed and the Lutheran doctrine became fixed with greater precision.

With respect to Zwingli, justice has not always been done to this

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[1] Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.*, v., c. lxvii., 12.

Reformer.[1] A man of action rather than of speculation, in whom intellect predominated over sentiment and imagination, he is not to be compared with Luther in power to sway the minds of men. His merits, however, are very great. If not the first to suggest, he was the first to bring out into clear light the figurative sense of the copula in the words of institution; and Martensen, Lutheran as he is, only renders due domage to the Swiss Reformer when he says: 'The whole Protestant Church unites in accepting Zwingli's "this signifies," not "this is"; adding very truly, 'that his merits in establishing the symbolical view of the elements have not as yet received due recognition.'[2] As compared with Luther, too, and even Calvin, his exegetical tact led him to perceive that the words of institution can only refer to Christ in the state of humiliation while on earth, not to Christ in His glorified body. It must be acknowledged that his view of the sacraments seldom rises above their being signs of spiritual blessings and tokens of Christian fellowship; their use, he argues, is rather for the Church than for the receiver. 'The sacraments are signs or ceremonies, I take leave to say, whereby a man proves to the Church that he is either a candidate for Christ's service, or an enlisted soldier, and their end is rather to satisfy the Church concerning thy faith than thyself. For if thy faith needs a ceremonial sign to confirm it, it is not faith.'[3]

Elsewhere, however, he speaks of them as signs of inward grace. 'As baptism signifies that Christ washed us in His blood, and that we ought, as Paul teaches, to put Him on; that is, live according to His example; so the Eucharist also signifies both that we embrace all the blessings which through Christ have been bestowed upon us, and that we ought to cultivate towards our brethren the same love which Christ has shown towards us.'[4] It is possible that his premature death on the field of battle, 1531, prevented a revision of views, defective rather than erroneous. As he left them they are defective in recognizing the offices of the sacraments in making over the common objective salvation to individuals, and in conveying, not special, but ordinary sanctifying grace. Union with Christ, an expression in itself scriptural though sometimes associated with erroneous theories, is not mentioned by this Reformer in connection with either baptism or the Eucharist.

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[1] [Litton himself seems hardly to have done justice to Zwingli on pp. 438 f. above and in the concluding part of this present paragraph. Zwingli was intent on denying, not the presence, but the *bodily* presence of Christ in the sacrament. In a strong controversy such as he engaged in with Luther it is only too easy for extreme and unbalanced statements to be made on either side. Editor.]

[2] *Dogmatik*, § 262.

[3] *De Vera et Falsa Rel.*

[4] *De Fide Eccles. Expos.* Quoted by Möhler, *Symb.*, § 31.

At the other extreme of Protestantism stands Luther. Towards the close of his career he defended a doctrine as regards the real presence which it requires some dexterity to distinguish from that of Rome ; but (and this is an essential point of difference) he did not make the change in the elements depend on sacerdotal consecration, but on the words of Christ Himself, This is My body, etc., repeated at each celebration. Nor, though he holds a corporal presence, does he define it exactly as the Council of Trent does. He does not teach a change of the substance of the bread and wine into that of the body of Christ (transubstantiation) ; nor consubstantiation, if by that term is to be understood either a mixture of the substance of the elements with the substance of Christ's humanity, or a local and natural juxtaposition of the two substances ; nor impanation, or a local inclusion of the body in the bread and of the blood in the wine, as in receptacles.[1] What union, then, remains ? A sacramental one ; which (as we have seen, § 96) amounts to a confession of ignorance as to the particular mode of union. Christ's humanity is in union with the bread and wine really, but sacramentally ; and so as that all who partake of the elements, whether worthy or not, partake by oral manducation of the body and blood. With the bread and wine the body and blood are offered to, and are received by, those who eat and drink unworthily, though to their own condemnation. Such are the statements of the *Formula Concordiæ*, the authentic exposition of Lutheran doctrine, so far as it possesses any such. It differs from that of the Reformed confessions in that it makes the elements and the body and blood of Christ (that is, Christ Himself) identical. *Manducatio oralis* and *manducatio impiorum* are the distinctive tenets of Lutheranism.

It may be observed that this whole debate about reception by the unworthy is one that has no meaning, and ought never to have been introduced. The Eucharist was instituted only for the worthy, only for those who trust in and love the Saviour ; none others have any right to it, none others were contemplated by Christ in the appointment.

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[1] The Lutheran theologians repudiate the terms 'consubstantiation' and 'impanation.' 'Monemus autem denuo propter calumnias adversæ partis nos nec impanationem nec consubstantiationem nec ullam aliam physicam vel localem præsentiam statuere.' J. Gerhard, *Loci*, xxii., c. 11, § 98. Comp. Cotta's note : 'Nec consubstantiationem, quam vocant, admittendam esse censent. Diversimode quidem vocabulum hoc accipi solet. Interdum enim *συσσωμάτικον*, seu localem duorum corporum conjunctionem, interdum autem utriusque, corporis commixtionem, denotat, quâ panis cum corpore et vinum cum sanguine in unam substantiam seu massam coalescere fingitur. Sed in neutra significatione ecclesiæ nostræ tribui potest monstrosum consubstantiationis dogma, cum nec localem istam duorum corporum conjunctionem, nec commixtionem quandam panis et corporis Christi vinique et sanguinis Christi statuant Lutherani.' On impanation, see also Cotta.

By St. Paul the idea of any one's partaking of Christ in this sacrament without lively faith would have been treated as a monstrosity. The Corinthians (1 Cor. xi) are supposed to be real Christians; but Christians who failed in rendering due respect to so sacred an ordinance.

In the year 1509, at Noyon in Picardy, was born Jean Cauvin, or Caulvin, in Latin Calvinus, a theologian who in after-years exercised a paramount influence over the churches of the Reformed family, our own included.[1] While pastor and professor at Strasbourg, about the year 1540, Calvin published a tract on the Lord's Supper which contains substantially the view from which he never departed; but it was not until the disputes between the adherents of Luther on the one side, and Zwingli on the other, grew to a height, that he took an active part in the controversy. The position which he assumed was that of a mediator between the contending parties; an office for which he was eminently fitted both from the structure of his mind and from his public reputation. He did not succeed in uniting the two great branches of the Protestant communion on the question in debate; but he proposed a view which was accepted generally by the Swiss churches, and which from them passed, in the main, into the confessions of the Reformed churches throughout Europe.

Since it is by no means easy to understand, it will be proper to let him describe it in his own words. The *Institutes*, Calvin's replies to Westphal and Hesshus, and the Genevan Catechism, will furnish the materials. 'A twofold error is to be avoided, the divorcing of the symbols from the mystery attached to them, and the making them all in all so as to destroy or obscure the mystery. That Christ is the Bread of life all admit, but all are not agreed as to the mode of participating of Him. There are some who consider eating His flesh and drinking His blood as merely believing upon Him; my own opinion is that something more mysterious is intended thereby, viz., that we are spiritually quickened by a real partaking of Himself, and not merely by an act of the mind. For just as not the looking at, but the eating of, bread supports the body, so must the soul, in order to be spiritually nourished, be fully and truly partaker of Christ. No doubt this is practically the eating of faith, for we can imagine no other ; but there is a difference between their and my mode of expression. To them to eat is merely to believe, whereas I say that by faith the flesh of Christ is eaten, because by faith He becomes ours, and this eating is the effect of faith ; or if you would have it more plainly expressed, they think that the eating is faith, I that it results from faith. The verbal difference is indeed slight, but as regards the matter it is considerable. For example, when Christ is said to " dwell in our hearts by faith,' no one imagines that nothing but faith is meant, but rather an excellent effect of faith.'[1]

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[1] Attempts have been made, notably by Archbishop Laurence in his Bampton Lectures (1804), to extenuate this influence, and to ascribe a Lutheran origin to our formularies; but the fact is, that if we except the topic of the Lord's Supper and Calvin's tenet of reprobation, little difference existed between the German and the Swiss Reformers in matters of doctrine. On election, free-will, preventing grace, justification, etc., Lutherans and Reformed were agreed. It is significant that the Archbishop of Cashel does not touch upon the doctrine of the Eucharist, the real point of difference. To have done so would have refuted his theory; for our Articles on that subject are decidedly Calvinistic. That our formulary belongs, not to the Lutheran, but to the Reformed type, appears from two characteristics generally found in the latter: the exclusion of the apocrypha from the rule of faith, and an enumeration of the books of canonical Scripture.

Again : 'Christ, as the Word of God, existed indeed from all eternity, and as such is the source of life to all creatures ; but in condescension to sinners He became flesh, and thus brought Himself into close proximity to us. Nay, the flesh which he took He renders life-giving, that by it we may enjoy the gift of immortality. " The bread which I will give is My flesh, which I will give for the life of the world " ; in these words we are taught not merely that He is life in that He is the eternal Word, but that by assuming our nature He communicates to His flesh a virtue which from it flows over into us. Thus the Apostle declares the Church to be the body of Christ, He being the Head from which all the members derive life (Ephes. i. 23) ; and, in still more striking language, that we are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones.'[2] Further on : 'To sum up, our souls are fed by the flesh and blood of Christ, as bread and wine sustain our bodily life ; and although it may seem incredible that at such a distance (of heaven from earth) the flesh of Christ should come down to us so as to become spiritual food, let us remember how vastly the secret virtue of His Holy Spirit surpasses our comprehension. What our minds, then, cannot compass, let faith accept, viz., that the Holy Spirit unites things which are locally separate. Now, the sacred communication of His flesh and His blood, whereby Christ transfuses His life into us not otherwise than as if it penetrated to the bones and marrow, He witnesses to and seals in the sacrament, and not by an empty sign, but by the energy of the Holy Spirit, fulfilling what He promises As regards transubstantiation, we reject it because we believe that the natural body of Christ is in heaven, to remain there until He comes again ; nor do we need it, because by the agency of the Holy Spirit, the bond of our union with Christ, we become partakers of the body and blood of Christ, that is, Christ Himself, as St. Paul teaches in Rom. viii.'[1]

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[1] *Inst. IV.*, cxvii, 3–5.

[2] *Ibid.*, § 9.

Once more: 'We reject consubstantiation which involves the ubiquity of Christ's natural body, bringing it down from heaven, to be enclosed in the bread and wine wherever the sacrament is duly celebrated. We, on the contrary, hold such a presence of Christ as neither derogates from His glory by circumscribing Him in earthly elements, nor is inconsistent with the attributes of a real natural body, of which it is plain that ubiquity cannot be predicated. They are in error who can conceive no presence of Christ except in the bread; for so they leave no place for the secret operation of the Holy Spirit, which unites us to Christ, not by bringing Him down from heaven, but by raising us up to Him where He is.'[2] To Westphal he writes: 'I have always maintained that the body of Christ is exhibited to us in the sacrament efficaciously but not naturally, as regards its virtue, but not as regards its natural substance. I affirm that by that body which hung upon the cross our souls are spiritually fed, no less than our bodies are by the bread and wine. The difficulty touching local absence I thus solve: Christ indeed does not change His local habitation, but He descends to us virtually (*vi*, *virtute*, *efficacia*). I leave Christ in possession of His heavenly throne, and am content with the secret operation of His Spirit whereby He feeds us with His flesh. As regards the unworthy, Christ's body was never intended *canibus et porcis*.' And to Hesshus: 'They' (the Lutherans) 'accuse us of rationalism. What can be greater miracle than that our immortal souls should derive life from flesh in itself mortal? that the flesh of Christ should transmit its virtue from heaven to us? If it be asked whether we enjoy this benefit apart from the sacrament, we reply, undoubtedly. By faith, too, we feed on the body and blood of Christ, but in the sacrament, we have a visible pledge of the blessing, and it may be a fuller enjoyment of it. Are we not in like manner cleansed by the blood of Christ apart from baptism? But the sign was added to confirm our faith.'

Once more, in the Genevan Catechism we read: '*M.* Are we, then, in the sacrament fed with the body and blood of Christ? *P.* That is my opinion. For since in Him is our salvation, it is necessary that He Himself should become our own. *M.* Did He not give Himself to us when He died for our sins? *P.* Certainly, but that is not enough; what we want is to receive Him now. *M.* What special advantage have we in the sacrament, over and above what we receive by faith? *P.* This, that the participation by faith is here confirmed and increased. *M*. What do the bread and wine represent ? *P*. The body of Christ once offered, and His blood once shed, and now spiritually received. *M*. The Supper, then, was not instituted to repeat the sacrifice of Christ ? *P*. No, only that we may feed on the body and blood once offered. *M*. To sum up, then, you say there are two things in this sacrament : the visible signs, and Christ who invisibly feeds our souls ? *P*. Exactly so ; and not only that, but that our bodies too receive a pledge of their resurrection, since they partake of the symbols of life.'

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[1] *Inst. IV.*, cxvii, 10–12.

[2] *Ibid.*, §§ 16–33.

What Calvin rejects may be hence gathered without difficulty. In common with all Protestants, he says nothing about the necessity of consecration, that term being understood to imply sacerdotal intervention ; the words of Christ at the institution ought to be used, and by them the bread and wine are set apart to holy uses, but they do not effect any inward change in these elements. That is, he rejects transubstantiation and the sacrifice of the Mass. Nor does he, with the Lutherans, hold that Christ's natural body is, through the *communicatio idiomatum*, ubiquitous ; it is, and remains, in heaven. Nor is it so conjoined with the bread and wine as to be partaken of equally by the worthy and the unworthy. Nor is there any physical admixture or transfusion of the body and blood into either our souls and bodies.

But when he comes to explain what his own view is, considerable obscurity rests on his statements. The elements, he says, are not mere signs or tokens, as Zwingli, at least in his earlier teaching, maintained ; but signs which convey what they signify, viz., the body and blood of Christ. Yet they do not convey it independently of the faith of the receiver ; and, moreover, they do not convey it independently of the act of reception, it is in the *use* of the sacrament that the gift is conveyed. Not by oral manducation, as if it were inherent in the elements, does the gift pass ; the bread and wine remain bread and wine throughout ; but *simultaneously* with the *worthy* reception of the symbols Christ, and Christ in His humanity, is received as the food of the soul.

This is the real point of difference between the Reformed and Lutheran doctrine on the subject. According to the former, Christ does not communicate Himself until the moment of reception, and only if lively faith is found in the receiver ; according to the latter, Christ is immanent in the elements, and is partaken of by all the communicants, whether with or without lively faith. This spiritual union with Christ is effected, Calvin continues, by the mysterious operation of the Holy Spirit, and not by mechanical manducation ; which, of itself, proves that the unworthy do not enjoy it, for in none but Christ's living members (according to Calvin, the elect) does the Holy Spirit dwell. Faith is the *sine quâ non* of a beneficial reception, and yet faith is not exactly the same as the sacramental feeding on Christ ; the latter is the effect of the former. In the extract above quoted from the reply to Hesshus, Calvin admits that by faith, too, we feed on Christ, and apart from the sacrament ; but still not mystically, as we do in the sacrament.

And now comes the main difficulty. If Christ in His glorified body never leaves heaven, how is He present at each celebration ? How does He feed us sacramentally with His flesh ? The answer is, either that the Holy Spirit, by His almighty power, raises our souls to feed on Christ in heaven, or that by the same power an emanation of virtue from Christ's body above, a kind of sacramental duplicate, is brought down to us on earth. Calvin does not express himself uniformly on this point ; but on the whole he prefers the former alternative, the ascent of the soul to heaven to feed on Christ there. Anyhow, it is, we see, the soul that feeds on Christ ; the manducation is not oral, but spiritual ; and yet the body shares in the blessing ; Christ's flesh is life-giving, and His life communicated to us becomes the seed of immortality.

Calvin's exegetical tact seems for once to have here deserted him.[1] He indulges in something like the paralogism which some modern writers employ, that because Christ's body is mentioned in the words of institution, and His Church is termed His mystical body, there must be a quasi-physical connection between the two, effected in and by the sacrament. Again, the Christ whom he supposes the believer to feed upon in the Lord's Supper is the glorified Christ ; whereas the Eucharist is never spoken of in Scripture except in connection with Christ in His stage of humiliation. He is compelled to adopt the scholastic doctrine of concomitance, in order to make Christ's body and blood equivalent to the whole Christ, soul and Deity as well as body ; whereas in the words of institution nothing appears but the separation of the two constituent elements of the physical organization, body and blood, that is, the approaching death of the Speaker. He speaks of the 'flesh' of Christ as life-giving, in spite of our Lord's warning that 'the flesh,' whether the body of His humiliation or His glorified body, 'profiteth nothing,' and His explanation that the strong figure which He had used in speaking to the Capernaites was to be understood as 'spirit and life,' that is, figuratively (John vi. 63). Calvin might possibly have replied that he, too, uses the word 'flesh' figuratively ; but how can a figure give life, and especially to the body of the recipient ? The resurrection of the body is in Scripture assigned, not to union with Christ's humanity, but to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit (Rom. viii. 11). Nor does 1 Cor. xv. 45, 'The last Adam became a quickening spirit,' lead to a different conclusion. The Saviour, on His ascension, if not immediately after His resurrection, became in His human nature fully glorified, the type and pattern of what the Church will be at the resurrection of the dead ; and became, too, and not previously, the Author and Giver of the Holy Spirit, whose office it is to quicken the spiritually dead, and raise Christians when the 'voice of the Son of God' shall give the signal (John v. 25). In this sense it is true that 'as the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself' (*Ibid.*, v. 26) ; but it is not affirmed that Christ's humanity in the sacrament, and imparted therein, is the elixir of immortality. Christ in His glorified humanity, Calvin tells us, is not present in the bread and wine by any word of priestly consecration, but, at the moment of reception, the Holy Spirit raises the believing soul to heaven to feed on Christ there. As we cannot suppose that the soul leaves the body and is locally transferred to where Christ is, and then returns to the body again, what is this but expressing in figurative language the same truth which those whom Calvin opposes as holding that 'eating His flesh and drinking His blood is merely believing on Him' (Zwingli and Oecolampadius) would have cordially accepted, viz., that to faith Christ in His atonement is in the sacrament present, and is spiritually appropriated by the faithful receiver ?

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[1] [It is not for us to attempt to discuss Litton's strictures in the concluding paragraphs of this section against the eucharistic doctrine of Calvin and also, in part, of our English Prayer Book. Let it suffice to suggest that a careful reading of Calvin's masterly survey of " the Lord's Supper and the benefits conferred by it " (*Institutes*, IV, xvii) and of the Communion Service in the Book of Common Prayer—a liturgy without equal—is likely to indicate that it is not in these but, at this point, in Litton that there is a misapprehension of the true scriptural significance of the sacramental symbols of the Gospel. Editor.]

The usually clear intellect of the Genevan reformer moves, on this subject, in a cloudy and mystical atmosphere, and the speculations of the schools, as described in former sections, manifestly revive in him. Such, however, was his authority that the Reformed Churches acquiesced in this middle position, or rather phraseology, between Luther and Zwingli. Thus the Scottish Confession expresses itself in language almost identical with that of Calvin : 'Although there is a vast interval of space between Christ's body in heaven and us on earth, nevertheless we firmly believe that the bread which we break is the communion of His body, and the cup the communion of His blood ; and that He dwells in us and we in Him, so that we become flesh of His flesh and bone of His bone, and that as the Deity communicated life and immortality to the flesh of Christ, so His flesh and blood partaken of confer the same prerogatives on us. This union is effected by the operation of the Holy Ghost, who translates us above all terrestrial things that we may feed on the body and blood of Christ now in heaven.'[1]

It may be thought that our own formularies are, to some extent, framed after the same model. They certainly are so rather than after the Lutheran. We are reminded of Calvin when we read, 'Then we spiritually eat the flesh of Christ and drink His blood; we dwell in Christ and Christ in us; we are one with Christ and Christ with us'; or, 'Grant us so to eat the flesh of Christ and drink His blood that our sinful bodies may be made clean by His body and our souls washed through His most precious blood'; or, 'What is the inward part and thing signified? The body and blood of Christ, which are verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful in the Lord's Supper.' Yet the influence of Bucer and Ecolampadius is also visible. Art. xxii takes care to add that 'the body of Christ is given, taken, and eaten only after a heavenly, spiritual manner; and the means whereby the body of Christ is received and taken in the Supper is faith'; which last statement is exactly that which Calvin professes himself not quite in accordance with. To feed on Christ in the Supper by faith—what can this mean, divested of figure, but to believe that Christ became incarnate, died for our sins, and made thereby a perfect atonement for them; and in the sacrament to appropriate by faith these benefits?

Fortunately for the peace of our Church, what is meant by 'the body and blood of Christ taken and received' is not defined; nor is the distinction between the 'natural' and the 'sacramental' presence stated; nor does the expression 'real presence' occur in either Articles or Liturgy. Nor do we meet there with any such physical conception as that of Calvin, that 'by a true communication of Himself in the sacrament the life of Christ,' as the incarnate Son, 'passes into us and becomes ours.' Upon this statement some remarks have been made in the last section. If it is not a mystical mode of expressing the Scriptural faith, that the Holy Spirit, 'the Author and Giver of (spiritual) life, 'the active Administrator of this dispensation, proceeds from the Son as well as the Father, it amounts to a transfer of the special functions of the Third Person of the Holy Trinity in the economy of grace to the Second, and is not only without warrant of Scripture, but of dangerous dogmatical tendency. It virtually reduces the operation of the Holy Spirit to the incarnation, and to the miracle of the bread and wine becoming Christ's body and blood in the Eucharist.[1] Christ in the Eucharist becomes the 'Giver of Life,' the Quickener, Sanctifier, Teacher of Christians; the Holy Spirit retires from the place and offices which our Lord Himself assigns to Him, and becomes but a subordinate Agent in the economy of grace; or, to express it more accurately, He dwells indeed in the Church, but only indirectly, viz., so far as He co-operated in the incarnation, and co-operates in the real presence in the Eucharist of the incarnate Son, from which presence life directly proceeds. But the first truths which a Christian child is taught to confess are, 'I believe in God the Son, who hath redeemed me and all mankind; and in God the Holy Ghost, who sanctifieth me and all the elect people of God.' If the lesson is forgotten, or thrust aside by unauthorized theories, nothing but damage to the Church can ensue. The language of some parts of our Communion Service and of the Cathechism, though, with Waterland, it may receive a Scriptural interpretation, seems to require revision.

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[1] Art. xxi, Augusti. Comp. *Conf. Helv.*, i, c. 21; *Conf. Gall.*, xxxvii; *Conf. Tetrap.*, xviii; *Decl. Thorun, De sac. cœn.*

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[1] See the theory fully developed in Wilberforce, *Euch.*, c. x. It is argued that because relations of the Holy Trinity *ad intra* exist antecedently to any work *ad extra*, the Son and the Holy Spirit are both concerned, in different ways, in the work of communicating spiritual life. Rather, it may be inferred from these internal relations, that *different* offices in the work of man's restoration belong to each Person. The schoolmen were better theologians when they laid down (1) that *opera Trinitatis ad extra indivisa sunt*, but (2) that redemption 'terminates' in the Son, sanctification (including the whole work of the *application* of redemption) in the Holy Spirit.

ESCHATOLOGY

‘ Credo in carnis resurrectionem et vitam æternam ’ (Apostles’ Creed).

‘ Iterum venturus est (Christus) in gloria, judicare vivos et mortuos. Expecto resurrectionem mortuorum et vitam venturi sæculi ’ (Nicene Creed).

‘ Inde venturus est judicare vivos et mortuos. Ad cujus adventum omnes homines resurgere habent cum corporibus suis, et reddituri sunt de factis propriis rationem. Et qui bona egerunt, ibunt in vitam æternam, qui vero mala, in ignem æternam ’ (Athanasian Creed).

‘ Ex cœlis autem idem ille ’ (Christus) ‘ redibit in judicium, tum quando summa erit in mundo consceleratio, et Antichristus, corrupta religione vera, superstitione impietateque omnia opplevit, et sanguine atque flamma ecclesiam crudeliter vastavit. Resurgent mortui, et qui illa die superstites futuri sunt mutabuntur in momento oculi, fidelesque omnes una obviam Christo rapientur in aëra, ut inde cum ipso ingrediantur in sede beatas sine fine victuri. Increduli vero, vel impii, descendent cum dæmonibus ad tartara, ex tormentis nunquam liberandi ’ (Expos. Simp. Conf. Helv., i.).

‘ Credimus, ubi tempus a Domino præstitutum, omnibus autem creaturis ignotum, advenerit, numerusque electorum fuerit completus, Jesum Christum e cœlo, corporaliter et visibiliter, sicuti ascendit, venturum, ut se vivorum atque mortuorum judicem declaret ; vetere mundo igne et flamma succenso, ut expurget eum. Tunc vero, omnes homines, quotquot jam inde ab initio mundi usque ad finem fuerunt, coram summo hoc judice comparebunt. Omnes autem autea mortui e terra resurgent, spiritu cum corpore proprio, in quo vixerat, conjuncto atque unito. Qui tunc superstites erunt ictu oculi a corruptione in incorruptionem mutabuntur. Judicabuntur secundum ea quæ in hoc mundo egerent, sive bona sive mala ’ (Conf. Belg., xxxvii).

‘ Omni malorum bonorumque discrimine remoto, omnes a mortuis resurgent . . . Illo die Christus de universo hominum genere judicaturus est . . . Post carnis resurrectionem nihil aliud fidelibus expectandum est nisi, vitæ æternæ præmium ’ (Cat. Rom. De Symb., cc. 12, 8, 13).

‘ Docent quod Christus apparebit in consummatione mundi ad judicandum, et mortuos omnes resuscitabit, piis et electis dabit vitam æternam et perpetua gaudia, impios autem homines ac diabolos condemnabit. Damnant Anabaptistas qui sentiunt hominibus damnatis ac diabolis finem pœnarum futurum esse. Damnant et alios qui nunc spargunt Judaicas opiniones, quod ante resurrectionem mortuorum pii regnum mundi occupaturi sunt, ubique oppressis impiis ’ (Conf. Augs., 17).

MOST branches of philosophy, as well as forms of religion, indulge in speculations respecting the final issue to which the existing constitution of things is tending. The astronomer, after calculating the motions of the planetary system, frames theories about its duration, and the possible changes which fresh concentration or combinations of matter may produce. The geologist reminds us that the present distribution of sea and land is not necessarily permanent, and that the central fires of the earth may, at some future time, burst the barriers which confine them, and involve everything in a general conflagration.

Since matter, however, is indestructible, out of the ruins a new and fairer earth may emerge. The moral philosopher asks whether the prevalence of sin and misery in the world is always to continue, and imagines a Utopia in which the destiny of the creature shall be realized, and the perplexities of life solved. Even false religions have their Eschatology; the polytheism of ancient Greece its session among the gods, Buddhism its Nirvâna, Muhammedanism its sensual paradise. But Christianity is emphatically a religion of the future. As a scheme of redemption, it pledges itself to a restoration of the Church to more than was lost by the fall; and as a divine revelation it carries on its disclosures, step by step, until the end is reached. God 'hath begotten us again unto a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, to an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled reserved in heaven' for us, and 'ready to be revealed in the last time' (1 Pet. i. 3–5).

102. *Death*

In the vegetable, animal, and rational creation, death, or the dissolution of the connecting link between the visible organization and the life that sustains it, is a fact which meets our eye everywhere and at all times. When plants, from natural causes such as age, cease to derive nourishment from the circulating sap, they pass into shrivelled husks; when the lower animals reach their appointed limit of existence, they breathe out the impersonal soul with which they are endowed, and their bodies return to the dust; and ascending to man, the crown and glory of creation, we find the same law prevailing; in due time the union of the spirit-soul with the body comes to an end, and the latter is resolved into the elements with which its several parts have an affinity. As regards the immaterial part of man, what becomes of it is a question on which, before Christ brought life and immortality to light, philosophy was dumb, or could indulge only in vague hopes or surmises. Scripture, in declaring that, with the exception of the living at Christ's second advent, death passes to and through all men (Rom. v. 12), sparing neither age, sex, or condition, adds nothing to our previous knowledge; what it does reveal is peculiar to itself, viz., the origin and eventual reversal of the law that pervades creation.

To account for the universal dominion of death is a problem which forces itself on every reflecting mind. The best uninspired writers of antiquity are fain to fall back on the inherent limitations of the creature. Change and transformation pervade the material universe; things come and go ; they appear for a time on the stage, and after having fulfilled their parts in the drama of life, they make room for their successors. In the case of human society, it is urged, such a succession is necessary to progress, which without it would be impossible or very difficult ; for while each generation bequeaths on the whole some valuable lessons to posterity, it labours under its own share of imperfection, speculative and practical, which it also transmits. These seeds of error do indeed, in any case, reappear in the next generation ; but they are more easily met and overcome, when not represented by living persons ; and thus a vantage-ground is gained for still further advances. In short, in our present state, the law of mortality is a necessary and salutary one ; as such it needs no further explanation ; death is natural to man. As an attempt to remove difficulties, the theory may claim attention ; but it fails to explain why mankind should be in a state to need so drastic a remedy ; nor does it touch the question why the law should prevail over the irrational creation, the species of which, though physically improveable, seem unable to overstep the barrier between instinct and reason, or to enter into social combination with its elevating influences.

Scripture, whether its testimony be accepted or not, assigns a positive reason for the fact of a very different kind. St. Paul, in the passage cited (Rom. v. 12–19), not only recognizes the universal sway of death, but adds that the cause of its introduction was sin ; 'as by one man sin entered the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned' ; a statement which at once disposes of the supposition that death is a law of nature. It implies that death, in its present form at least, did not exist before the fall, and is not necessary to the conception of a finite material being : if it came in through Adam's sin, it would not have prevailed but for that sin. But further, it is described as a penalty, not of a natural but of a positive character ; by one man, by the transgression of one man, it entered ; it is the consequence of that primal prevarication by which man fell. The apostle refers to the account in Gen. ii and iii, which contain all that we know on the subject. In chapter ii. 17, the penalty was to follow the sin immediately : 'In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt die' ; but that the prophecy of a Redeemer of the seed of the woman might be capable of fulfilment, the sentence was suspended—only, however, suspended ; and sooner or later, with some exceptions, every human being pays the last debt ; 'Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.'

In another sense, indeed, of the term death, the penalty was at once inflicted. The word death in Scripture bears two distinct meanings, spiritual and physical.[1] Spiritual death is alienation 'from the life of God' (Ephes. iv. 18), through a sense of guilt and the aversion of a fallen nature; and this, as we learn from the narrative, manifested itself directly after the eating of the forbidden fruit. 'They knew that they were naked,' exposed without shelter to the condemning sentence of the law; and they withdrew as far as they could from the presence of the Being with whom they had hitherto maintained happy intercourse (Gen. iii. 7, 8). But spiritual death, if the poison runs its natural course unchecked by the divinely appointed antidote, terminates in final separation from God, or eternal death. This, however, is not a distinct kind of death, but only the consummation of spiritual; and, like the penalty of bodily death, did not at once take effect as regards our first parents or their posterity.

In the absence, then, of direct information on the subject, we may thus conceive of Adam's state before the fall; he was capable of death, but not subject to it, certainly not under its present aspect. Inherent immortality belongs only to the Creator; in this sense angels are not immortal, still less a being composed of soul and body all created things depend for their continued existence on the will and sustaining power of God. But to a created being means may, under certain conditions, be vouchsafed of actual perpetuity; of a *posse non mori* if not of a *non posse mori.* In the case of the first man, he was liable to death in the same sense in which he was liable to temptation; he possessed *posse non peccare*, but not *non posse peccare.* Only the second Adam enjoyed this privilege. The condition of the first Adam's immortality was successful resistance to temptation; and the tree of life was the sacrament of his immortality.

Adam, after the fall, was inhibited from the tree of life, because it would have been of no advantage to him and his posterity, but rather the reverse, to be exempted from physical death. The holy seed could not here have been made perfect; while the progress of sin in the seed of the serpent, uninterrupted by the stroke of death, might have issued in a veritable hell upon earth. Even the lives of the antediluvians were found too long for a sinful race; and it was not merely as a penal appointment, but as an act of the divine mercy that they were gradually abridged, until the ordinary limit of human life came to be that of the Psalmist (Ps. xc. 19).

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[1] Hollaz (P. ii., c. 2, Q. 20) remarks that the common division of death into spiritual, bodily, and eternal is not quite accurate. Temporal is the proper opposite to eternal, and includes the two former divisions. Spiritual death issues, in the natural course of things, in eternal or final separation from God; but the latter is not different in *kind*, only in *degree*, from the former.

Speculations have been hazarded as to what the course of things would have been if man had not sinned. Where Scripture is silent, positive statements are out of place. But we may suppose that if even Eden was not to be the perpetual abode of sinless beings, but only the preparatory stage to a more perfect condition, the change would have been effected without any of the circumstances which render the death with which we are familiar formidable to nature. No diminution of strength, or other infirmities of age ; no pain or sickness, the present precursors of death ; no violent conflict with what Scripture describes as the last enemy, would have heralded or accompanied the transition to the heavenly paradise. Body and soul would, without separation, have reached the goal at once. By a gentle and blissful process, analogous to that by which the favoured Christians alive at the second advent will be prepared for glory, each generation, as it became ripe for the change, would have been translated. Not that even so man, sinless but unredeemed, would have reached the elevation which the members of Christ are taught to expect. The present 'vile body' is their disadvantage as compared with what we may surmise would have been the condition of Adam and his posterity if sin had not come into the world ; their peculiar and surpassing prerogative is that, notwithstanding their present humiliation, they shall be raised, or changed, into the likeness of Christ's glorified body, 'according to the mighty working whereby He is able to subdue all things to Himself' (Phil. iii. 21).

'The wages of sin is death' ; and the association of the latter with the former can never, in this life, wholly disappear. The antecedents and accompaniments of death are too striking and too solemn to allow us ever to forget its origin, or to be otherwise than formidable to nature. Even the most confirmed Christian may well shrink from it, and with St. Paul prefer 'not to be unclothed but clothed upon, that mortality may be swallowed up of life' (2 Cor. v. 3). In many instances, no doubt, death has been 'swallowed up in victory,' even on this side of the grave, and glimpses of the glory to come have been vouchsafed to the departing soul ; but to make this the rule would be to divest the event of its penal character.[1] Death to every Christian is an enemy ; encountered, indeed in the assurance of present safety and eventual triumph, but still to be encountered. Even if Christ be in us, the body is liable to death because of sin (Rom. viii. 10) ; its dissolution is indeed the gate to endless life, but also the last debt which nature pays to the violated law. Bunyan writes truly when he makes the river between this land and that afar off a dark and deep one, notwithstanding the divine presence and support. And our Church only expresses the cry of shrinking nature when it puts the prayer into our mouths, 'Suffer us not at our last hour for any pain of death to fall from thee' (Burial Service).[1]

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[1] Thus J. Gerhard : Mors non obtinet pristinam suam naturam et qualitatem quam extra Christi satisfactionem ac meritum habuit, sed mutatur piis et in Christum credentibus in suavem somnum et veræ vitæ exordium, in peccati exterminium et omnium malorum levamentum. *Loci*, xxvii., c. 2.

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[1] The question why Christians should, as a rule, be still subject to death though redeemed by Christ, is best answered by others of a similar character—Why should the fomes of sin be allowed to remain in the regenerate ? Why should Satan still have power to tempt to destruction ? Why should the Christian's life be ordinarily one of sorrow and conflict ? The kingdom of Christ is set up on earth, but it waits the consummation of all things for its full manifestation. It is the divinely appointed rule that Christians must know the fellowship of Christ's sufferings if they would reign with Him in glory (Rom. viii. 17 ; Phil. iii. 10, 11).

THE INTERMEDIATE STATE

THE Church, in her creeds and leading writers, has never failed to insist on such topics as the second advent of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, and the final judgment. But the intermediate state, the state of souls between death and judgment, has not, except under the form of the doctrine of Purgatory, received a similar measure of attention. Traces of this doctrine distinctly appear in the writings of Augustine. This father opens the portals of heaven at once to eminent saints and martyrs, and, on the principle, *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, consigns the rest of unbaptized mankind to endless torment, varying in nature and degree : between these extremes lies a class of Christians, members of the Church, but of imperfect sanctity : and to prepare these for the bliss of heaven, Augustine thinks it not improbable that an intermediate state of purgatorial cleansing may be provided.[1] Under the influence of Gregory the Great and Cæsarius of Arles, the surmises of the earliest fathers became a recognized dogma of the Church, with important results as regards its practical system. Alms, satisfactions, and masses, on the part of the living, were supposed to alleviate or shorten the pains of purgatory ; departed saints became intercessors on behalf of their militant brethren on earth. Under this point of view, no doubt, the two divisions of Christ's mystical body vividly realized their connection with each other ; but the interest in the subject there ended. Nor do the schoolmen supply the defect. Such questions as the number and nature of the receptacles of departed souls, according to age or ecclesiastical position,[2] were more congenial to the schools than an examination of what Scripture on the whole teaches respecting the unseen world.

In this state the Reformation received the topic, and practically ignored it. The doctrine of justification by faith swept away purgatory, and the abuses connected therewith ; and the divisions of Hades, the two main ones excepted, also disappeared : but nothing took their place. Death was supposed to transfer the souls of the pious at once

[1] Tale aliquid etiam post hanc vitam fieri incredibile non est, et utrum ita sit quæri potest ; et aut inveniri aut latere nonnullos fideles per ignem quendam purgatorium, quanto magis minusve bona pereuntia dilexerant, tardius citius que salvari. *Euch.*, 68.

[2] They were described as five in number : Between the heaven of the blessed and the hell of the lost were inserted, the limbus of the souls of unbaptized children, that of the ancient Fathers of the world, and purgatory. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*

to the full bliss of heaven, and those of the wicked at once to the torments of hell. The intermediate state dropped out of view. And such, to this day, is the popular belief. In proportion as it is so, the second coming of Christ with its accompaniments no longer occupies the place which it does in Scripture. Death, not the final judgment, becomes the turning-point of human destiny. As a natural result the field of New Testament prophecy remained uncultivated, or was given over to labourers in whom imagination predominated over judgment and whose interpretations have been repeatedly disproved by the event. Really interesting questions touching the state of the disembodied soul were thought of no moment. Recent times have witnessed a revival of interest in the subject, and both in England and in Germany it has become a prominent topic of discussion. If on some points the conclusions arrived at are open to criticism ; if the inquiry has not always been conducted in a spirit favourable to the attainment of truth ; it yet remains an encouraging symptom that, in a materialistic age, the things unseen, and the future prospects of the Church, are engaging the thoughts and pens of competent writers.

Two preliminary remarks may be not out of place. While Scripture directs our thoughts fully and repeatedly to the second advent and the events that follow it, it is very reticent on the intermediate state, and indeed seldom directly refers to it. The veil is occasionally lifted in part ; hints are given which it is our duty to gather up ; but the knowledge thus conveyed is extremely fragmentary. Again, prophecy enters largely into these speculations, and it is one of its characteristics to clothe its announcements in symbolical language, and not to aim at exactness of discrimination between impending events and those of analogous character at a distance. In Old Testament prophecy, deliverances from temporal calamity and the glories of Messiah's kingdom often occupy the same line of vision ; the rules of spiritual perspective are not always observed. So it may be with the prophetic element of the New Testament.

For these reasons, nothing beyond the fundamental articles of the creed can pretend to more than probability. The Apocalypse, for example, opens up to us splendid prospects of the future of the Church ; but the style of the book is highly symbolical, and it has hitherto refused to surrender its full meaning to commentators, however pious and learned. The same may be said of our Lord's prophetical discourses, and of the similar passages, few in number, which occur in the Apostolic Epistles. This does not absolve us from the duty of studying such portions of Scripture ; the ancient prophets, though much of what they were commissioned to reveal was not clear to themselves, 'inquired and searched diligently' what the Holy Spirit who prompted them intended, and at any rate were led to perceive that no temporal interpretation could exhaust these communications (1 Pet. i. 10–12); but it does warn us neither to elevate into Articles of faith what at best can only be pious surmises, nor summarily to reject such surmises as of pernicious tendency. The name of heresy has been too often applied to opinions which, even if erroneous, do not affect the fundamentals of the faith, or to interpretations of Scripture which vary from those to which we have been accustomed. We may rely upon it that the Bible has not yet spoken its last word to the Church. If we cannot, with Schleiermacher, consent to exclude Eschatology from the province of dogmatic theology, as not sufficiently testified to either by Christian experience or by Scripture, we may still admit the truth of the fact alleged, so far as to abstain from dogmatical assertion, and from branding opinions with which we may not agree with invidious names.

103. *Survival of the Soul*

The expression, immortality of the soul, is liable to objection. To God alone belongs immortality in the strict sense of the word (1 Tim. vi. 16); created beings, whether angels or men, depend for their existence on His continual presence and support, on the withdrawing of which they would relapse into nothingness. 'In Him we live and move, and have our being' (Acts xvii. 28), whether here or hereafter. And thus, if any human personality survives the stroke of death, it does so because God sustains it in life, and as long as He does so. The question then comes to this: can probable reasons be alleged for believing that the souls of the departed continue to exist, under the sustaining power of God, after their earthly tabernacle has been dissolved? It can only be entertained by those who hold that an essential distinction exists between body and spirit; that form of materialism which regards the intellectual and moral faculties as functions of the bodily organization, depending on it and expiring with it, has no interest in such inquiries. Philosophy and revelation are the sources of information within our reach.

The philosophical proofs of the existence of the soul in a separate state resemble those commonly urged for the existence of God. Thus, by Cicero, the *consensus gentium* is adduced,[1] and it is, no doubt, a fact of great importance. The most uncultivated tribes believe in a future state of being, and nature is often a better guide than philosophy. Nevertheless, exceptions occur, of which the most remarkable is

[1] Permanere animos arbitramur, consensu nationum omnium (*Tusc.*, i. 16).

Buddhism, with its doctrine of Nirvâna, or the absorption of the soul into the spirit of the universe ; and naturally, pantheism, in its various forms, favours the same conclusion. With these systems, whether of religion or philosophy, the doctrine of metempsychosis, or the migration of the soul into various bodies in succession, must not be confounded, for in all its transmigrations the soul is supposed to preserve its separate identity. Again, Cicero argues, not without reason, from the thirst for posthumous fame, which impels souls of heroic mould to 'scorn delights and live 'laborious days,' in the hope of leaving a name behind them.[1] Would statesmen sacrifice their ease, warriors risk their lives on the field, poets and scientists renounce the vulgar prizes of life, if they did not expect to know and to enjoy in a future state the veneration in which a grateful country, or mankind, holds their memory ?

The teleological argument, too, is of weight. Man evidently has capacities which do not find scope in the present life ; for what purpose were they bestowed ? It is a frequent, but not the less mysterious dispensation, that just at the moment when an individual of rare natural and acquired abilities seems about to enter on a career of beneficent activity, accident or disease cuts short the expectation, and leaves the world mourning over what seems a waste of means and opportunity. In a future life these faculties may have full scope for their exercise. Then the doctrine of retribution lends its aids. A righteous and almighty governor of the world being assumed as a fact, it is difficult to understand why virtue should so often fail of its reward and vice prosper even to the end of life. The misgivings of the psalmist (Ps. lxxiii) on this point were natural, and could not be set at rest until, under such light as he possessed, he fell back upon the hope that God would be the strength of his heart and his portion for ever (ver. 26).

None of these considerations is without force, and it may be remarked that they are of a more satisfactory nature than the metaphysical arguments on which Butler relies. As for example, that since consciousness is a single and indivisible power, the subject in which it inheres must be so also, and therefore indestructible.[2] This reasoning overlooks the fact that the soul, according to Scripture, is created no less than the body ; 'the Lord breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul' (Gen. ii. 7) ; whence it seems to follow that however simple an essence it may be and incapable of destruction by *dissolution of parts*, it may perish by the withdrawing on the Creator's part of the life which He first communicated, and the continuance of which entirely depends upon Him. The argument assumes that the soul has life in itself, whereas its life is derivative. If it is not derivative, it must be a part, in some way or other, of the Divine essence, either by emanation or by union analogous to physical union, and thus we arrive at the doctrine of the eternal pre-existence of souls, as it was taught by Origen and others. Moreover, the consciousness of the individual is not the mere abstraction which remains after separating from the soul all that makes it differ from other souls ; for example, the residuum common to the race, of reason and conscience ; but it is composed of the combination of peculiarities which the temperament, history, and natural endowments, of that particular individual have issued in, and which distinguishes him from any other man.

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[1] *De Senect.*, 22, 23.

[2] *Anal.*, P. i., c. 1.

The *individual* soul, therefore, is by no means so simple a subject as is supposed. In fact, the argument tends to annihilate personality, and especially personality as connected with the body ; and this is another reason why it cannot be deemed satisfactory. Not less open to doubt is the remark of Butler, that disease, as it advances, seems to have no effect on the mental powers. Instances, no doubt, occur in which up to the moment of departure the mind seems as vigorous as ever it was ; but, as a rule, decay of the bodily organs, especially of the organ of thought, is accompanied by a corresponding failure of mental energy. Again, that the body is not the mind is indeed proved by the changes which the former undergoes without affecting personal identity ; but, to infer thence that the relation of one to the other resembles that of foreign matter to the sentient being, as, *e.g.*, of a telescope to the faculty of vision, is pressing the analogy too far, and may lead to a depreciation of the body as equally with the soul an object of redemption. Again, the facts that we have passed through manifold changes, bodily and mental, from infancy to manhood, and that the same law holds good in the lower creation, the transformation being often such as could not have been anticipated, as when the seed becomes a plant or the chrysalis develops itself into a worm or a butterfly, *rebut any presumption* against the survival of the soul in a new state, but they hardly carry us further. To the objection that brutes may thus be proved to possess souls, and their souls to survive death, the answer is not, as Butler puts it, that for aught we know brutes may develop into rational beings as infants grow up into the exercise of reason ; or, at any rate, that the future system of the universe may require orders of irrational creatures[1] ; but that, as respects the brute creation, the permanence of the *species* does not necessarily involve that of the *individual*. The question relates to personal identity, and we may well believe that while the species survives, a soul naturally destitute of reason and conscience, or of these faculties as they belong to man, passes at death into the Nirvâna of the general life of the order to which it belongs.

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[1] 'And thinks admitted to an equal sky
His faithful dog shall bear him company.'

It is remarkable that this profound thinker (Butler) should not have referred to the facts of dreamland, so mysterious and yet significant.[1] Dreams prove that the soul can be active independently of the bodily senses, though not perhaps of the bodily organs ; a life is lived in sleep the same in kind as that of the waking state, but full of strange incongruities ; the soul can recall and combine impressions received either through the senses or the powers of reflection, but its dependence on the body is proved by the suspension of the critical faculty ; it is not sensible at the time of the absurdity of some of its combinations, but it becomes so when recalling, in a waking state, what has passed. Facts which prove both the relative independence of the soul of its bodily tabernacle, and the incompleteness of its condition, if ever (which is doubtful) that is one of absolute bodiless existence.

On the whole, these philosophical analogies may be sufficient to rebut the assumptions of the materialist, and so to clear the ground for more direct evidence ; they raise a probability that death is the destruction neither of the soul nor of its active powers ; but beyond this it is hardly safe to press them. In particular, the influence from them that not only the soul itself but its active powers may continue after death may be opposed by another analogy. A sleep without dreams, however long, seems to the sleeper but a moment on his awakening ; the mental activities during that state though not extinct were certainly suspended. We cannot, then, wonder at the avowal of Cicero's auditor, that while he was reading Plato's speculations on the subject he was inclined to assent to the soul's immortality ; but when he laid the book down his doubts returned.[2]

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[1] Not so Shakespeare :

'To die, to sleep ;—
To sleep ! perchance to dream : aye, there's the rub :
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come,
Must give us pause.'—*Hamlet*.

The alleged appearances of the departed, some of which it is not easy to put aside, are too open to controversy to be insisted on. The same may be said of the phenomena of animal magnetism and clairvoyance ; which also are not to be dismissed as mere instances of ocular delusion or imposture, unworthy of examination. Somnambulism is matter of experience, and it presents some analogy to the faculty of dreaming.

[2] Nescio quomodo, dum lego assentior ; cum posui librum, et mecum ipse de immortalitate animorum cæpi cogitare, assentio omnis illa elabitur. *Tusc.*, i. 11.

We turn to revelation. Of the Pentateuch it may be said that it contains no allusion to a future state at all ; the sanctions of the Mosaic law were purely temporal. Even the promises to the patriarchs did not extend beyond the present life. To Abraham and his seed the future possession of the land of Canaan, and that this seed should be a blessing to the world, were promised, and there the revelation stopped. The prayers in the Psalms for length of days, and thanksgivings for deliverance from death or danger, do not, as they were understood by the writers, refer to more than temporal mercies ; whatever deeper meaning, as in Ps. xvi, the Holy Spirit may have intended to convey.[1] Hezekiah's song of praise (Isa. xxxviii) is confined within the same limits. After all that has been written on the famous passage, Job. xix. 25–27, it is doubtful whether more can be found in it than an expression of faith by the sufferer, that to whatever harsh judgments his present afflictions might give occasion, God would at some future time clear up his integrity, and establish his reputation.[2] ' Let me alone,' is his cry of anguish, ' that I may take comfort a little before I go whence I shall not return, even to the land of darkness and the shadow of death, a land of darkness as darkness itself, and of the shadow of death, without any order and where the light is as darkness ' (x. 20–22).

As time went on a doctrine of sheol appears. It may have founded itself on such expressions as that of Jacob : ' I will go down into the grave to my son mourning ' (Gen. xxxvii. 35), and such narratives as that of the appearance of Samuel to Saul (1 Sam. xxviii). The Psalmist in Ps. cxxxix expects when he descends to hell, or sheol, to find the presence of God there (ver. 8). In Isaiah (xiv) the King of Babylon is represented as received by the inhabitants of sheol, the shades or Rephaim who had preceded him thither, with cries of recognition and mockery. Sheol itself is a place of silence and gloom, where no voice of praise is heard, and the active functions of life are suspended. It is described in terms very similar to those which Homer uses, when he makes Achilles in the shades declare that he had rather be a day-labourer on earth than Achilles as he was. In the later prophets, during and after the exile, a great accession to the national faith is visible. The doctrine of the resurrection of the body comes into view, and this implies the survival of the soul in its disembodied state. Such prophecies as ‘He will swallow up death in victory’ (Isa. xxv. 8), and ‘O death, I will be thy plagues ; O grave, I will be thy destruction’ (Hos. xiii. 14), and such prophetic visions as that of the dry bones (Ezek. xxxvii), must have prepared the way for the great announcement of Daniel, the first clear revelation on the subject, that ‘ Many of them that sleep in the dust shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt’ (xii).

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[1] [It is difficult to agree with Litton that a passage such as Psalm xvi. 10, 11 was not understood by the writer to refer to more than temporal mercies (cf. also Ps. xvii. 15 ; lxxiii. 24). Editor.]

[2] The passage is discussed in Runze's article ' Unsterblichkeit,' in Herzog. Ewald, H. Schultz, and Dillmann translate it thus : ' Though my sufferings become more intense than they are ; if after my skin is destroyed my body should be affected ; yet even in this life (" mine eyes shall see it, and not those of another ") I shall experience the goodness of God in restoring me to health and prosperity, and silencing my enemies.'

Thenceforward, until Christ came, uninspired teachers took up the theme, and, with the exception of the sects of the Sadducees and Essenes, there was no retrogression from the position in which prophecy had left it. The apocryphal and pseudepigraphal books of the centuries immediately preceding Christ not only teach a resurrection of the dead, but connect death with sin as a penalty, and the reversal of the penalty with expiation and satisfaction (2 Macc. vii. 32–37 ; xii. 40–45). And thus when our Lord appeared, the popular belief, as represented by the Pharisees, was on the side of a resurrection and of an intermediate state. Those who may be perplexed by the absence of clear statements in the earlier records would do well to remember that the revelation of the Gospel proceeded gradually, in sundry ways and various partitions (Heb. i. 1), and that each part of it kept pace with the rest. ‘ Life and immortality,’ in the Christian sense of the words, are the fruit of Christ’s atonement and resurrection (2 Tim. i. 10) ; until these had become facts, the disclosure of the former was necessarily postponed.

What was lacking in these earlier notices was supplied by Christ Himself in the Gospels, and by the accredited organs of the Holy Spirit after the day of Pentecost. ‘ The hour is coming when they that are in the graves shall hear His voice, and shall come forth, they that have done good to the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil to the resurrection of judgment’ ; in this announcement the doubts which neither philosophy nor the hints of the Jewish Scriptures could remove, were for ever set at rest. Hitherto the question had been a matter of debate in the Jewish schools, on which different sides might be taken without leading to a rupture with the theocracy : the Sadducees, who held that there was no resurrection, neither angel nor spirit, and the Pharisees, who confessed both, equally acknowledged the authority of Moses. But since the fuller revelation of the Gospel, the resurrection of the dead is an essential article of the Christian faith, and it carries with it the acknowledgment of a continued existence of the soul hereafter. This latter is implied in the parable of Dives and Lazarus, and in the promise to the thief on the cross, and thereby receives in the seal of Christ Himself. ‘Today thou shalt be with Me in Paradise’; the disembodied spirits both of the thief and of Christ were to survive in Hades, and whatever belongs to Christ the typical Man, belongs to His Church. But Christ, did more than announce or exemplify the fact; He showed from Scripture that so it must be, by an inference which the Sadducees themselves ought to have drawn. ‘As touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying: I am the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead, but of the living’ (Matt. xxii. 32). These patriarchs had passed from earth, but God was still with them, preserving them in the separate state until the time appointed for their resurrection. This is the true warrant for the Christian's assurance that death will not destroy the soul. God lives essentially, therefore they that are His must live. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are alive because God who is not the God of the dead but of the living, is still their God. We may confidently appropriate the Apostle's assurance, that ‘neither life nor death shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus’ (Rom. viii. 38, 39).

104. *Consciousness*

Butler draws a distinction between the destruction of the soul, or, as he calls it, the living being itself, and the destruction of its active powers by death. It is conceivable that, as in a sleep without dreams, the soul might continue to exist after death, and yet that its present powers of reflection might be suspended. This leads to the question, whether after death it remains actively conscious.

The contrary opinion has been often entertained. Certain Arabian Christians, in the third century, taught that the soul dies with the body, to be raised again with the body at the last day.[1] A modified form of the same tenet appeared in the same century, under the title of Psychopannuchia, or a sleep of the soul (without dreams) until the resurrection of the body. Tertullian mentions the opinion, only to reject it; nor did it prevail to any extent in the Church. At the Reformation, some sections of the Anabaptists appear to have revived it—against whom Calvin came forward, in a Tract on the subject found in his collected works. Luther expresses no fixed opinion. In modern times writers of some note in England and Germany have shown themselves favourable to it, among whom may be mentioned Archbishop Whately, in his book entitled *Scripture Revelations on a Future State*.

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[1] They were called Thenopsychites.

The Old Testament describes the intermediate state as one in which the active functions of life are suspended; but it does not, any more than heathen mythology, suppose it to be a state of insensibility. 'Wilt thou show wonders to the dead; shall the dead arise and praise thee?' Certainly not as God showed wonders by Moses, not as the worshippers joined in the praises of God in the temple; but from this comparative inactivity to a profound slumber is a long step. Nor does the New Testament convey such an impression. 'The night cometh, when no man can work.' Our Lord evidently was alluding to His approaching death, but we cannot suppose that the active powers of His soul were—during the three days sojourn in Hades, or paradise—in abeyance; and, indeed, if 1 Peter iii. 19 refers to this sojourn, we know that they were not so. He must have meant that the mode, or measure, of working which had hitherto been in His power, would cease at death. To the same effect St. Paul speaks in Phil. i. 22–24. The choice was present to his mind, whether to remain in the flesh, or to depart and be with Christ; it was not without hesitation that he arrived at the conclusion that the former was preferable. And the reason he gives is, that it gave opportunity for 'fruit of labour,' which the latter—though in other respects to be desired—did not.

But to be with Christ could never have been described as in itself a superior state, if it meant a state of insensibility. In that case it would have been a retrograde state. In the parable of Dives and Lazarus, Abraham and Dives are represented as recognizing each other; Dives implores relief from Abraham as the head of the chosen people, and Abraham does not repudiate his relationship. A dialogue ensues, showing on either side acquaintance with the life lived in the flesh; and nothing can be more foreign to the impression which the narrative leaves on the mind than the supposition that the soul sleeps in the intermediate state. That its imagery is not in all points to be interpreted literally may be admitted; but we must not with the shell discard the kernel. The plain gist of the parable is to teach a future state of retribution, succeeding immediately to the present life; a state in which memory is active, conscience is quickened, remorse felt, and a desire to undo, if possible, the effect of former bad example is expressed. There may be no 'fruit of labour' in such a state, but insensibility of the soul is the last thing we connect with it. Our Lord's answer to the thief, 'Today thou shalt be with Me in paradise'[1] (the best comment on St. Paul's expectation that for himself to depart would be to be with Christ) implies more than that both the Saviour and the thief would, ere the day ended, be in Hades ; whatever we are to understand by the term paradise, it must signify here not a state of bare existence, but one of conscious felicity.

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[1] To connect σήμερον with λέγω σοι, 'Today I say unto thee, thou shalt,' etc., as some ancient commentators suggested, is inadmissible.

According to the interpretation of 1 Peter iii. 19 now usually received, the spirits to whom Christ preached must have been capable of hearing and understanding what He said. The figurative character of the Apocalypse is not to be denied ; yet it seems straining the principle to suppose that the description of the great multitude before the throne clothed with white robes and palms in their hands, chanting the song of Moses and the Lamb (vii. 14), is nothing but figure ; or that the cry of the souls, remembering their sufferings on earth, and appealing to God for recompense (c. vi) is to be understood only as ' the voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto Me from the ground ' (Gen. iv. 10) is. The objection that if these souls could appear to the writer as objects of sight, clothed in white robes, etc., they were not pure spirit, but clothed with some kind of body, proceeds on the assumption that the soul in the separate state can be and is absolutely disembodied—an assumption which itself is open to doubt. On this point some remarks will be offered in the following section.

On the whole, the Scripture evidence is in favour of a state of consciousness after death. As compared with the present life, the intermediate state is one of repose, ' they rest from their labours '——of self-inspection rather than of outward activity ; the soul is thrown upon the centre of its moral being ; memory remains, furnishing food for this inward process ; intercourse with God in Christ, and with those who have gone before, seems to be carried on. In short, it is, as compared with the full restoration of personality at the resurrection, an imperfect state, but by no means one of insensibility. And the argument from analogy, that we may lose a part—and even a large part—of our bodies without any sensible effect on our mental powers, though not so cogent as regards the survival of the soul after death, is of use to confirm the conclusion that *if* it survives it may be active independently altogether of our present bodies.

For the opposite view it is urged that the New Testament writers constantly describe the death of Christians by the word sleep, and that they pass over the intermediate state as seemingly of little importance to the Christian ; that the Second Advent and the resurrection of the body are the great facts to which they direct his thoughts. It is so, as stated. ' Some,' says St. Paul, ' are fallen asleep ' (1 Cor. xv. 6) ; of Lazarus, we read in John xi. 11, ' Our friend Lazarus sleepeth, but I go to wake him out of sleep.' That the body sleeps, it is argued, cannot be supposed ; it is the soul then that is meant. But the usage is easily accounted for. The visible symptom of death is the cessation of motion and sensibility in the body ; and the nearest resemblance to that state, in the living being, is presented in sleep. Motion is suspended, and sensibility, if not lost, is less active. Sleep, therefore, in all ages, and among all writers—heathen as well as Christian—has been chosen as the most appropriate image of death,' *speculum mortis,*' as Tertullian calls it. A death-like slumber is a common expression amongst us. The inspired writers adopt the same image ; but they intended also, no doubt, to convey by it consolation to the living. Sleep to the weary is grateful, and death to the Christian is a release from earthly trial ; sleep is succeeded by an awakening, and death to the Christian is the gate to a joyful resurrection.

As to the reticence of Scripture on the state between death and the resurrection, it is accounted for by this state's being only a provisional and transitory one ; and, moreover, by the circumstance that no living generation of Christians can be sure that it will not in their day come to an end by the return of Christ to judgment—the great object of their expectation. Thus it is that St. Paul's statements in 1 Thess. iv. 15–17, which have been thought to raise difficulties respecting the limits of inspiration, may be explained. ' We which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord ' is equivalent to ' We which are alive, *if* we remain,' etc. The Church, in the Apostle's view, consists, partly of those who have fallen asleep in Christ, and partly of those who are still in the flesh ; and the Church militant may always cherish a hope that Christ will appear in its day, and therefore may always adopt the Apostle's language, ' We which are alive, if we remain,' etc. It does not follow that he enjoyed a positive assurance of remaining, or intended to convey such a meaning to those to whom he wrote. Generations have passed away since he wrote, and their hopes have not been fulfilled ; still each succeeding one might, and may, cherish the hope of being among the favoured ones who, without dying, will be caught up to meet the Lord in the air. But however scanty the revelations touching the intermediate state may be, they do not favour the hypothesis that the soul is unconscious therein.

It is not to be denied that certain passages may be made to fit in with this hypothesis. Thus when St. Paul expected to be with Christ the moment after his death (Phil. i. 23) ; that if he were absent from the body he would be present with the Lord (2 Cor. v. 8)—this, it is argued, refers to his resurrection, and presents no difficulty. For time is measured by the succession of ideas, and where there is no such succession, the longest time seems but a moment. To a sick person, unable to sleep, a single night seems intolerably tedious ; the same night to a sound sleeper is but a moment. If the soul, then, is insensible in the separate state, departure hence would be, *to the perception of the departed*, coincident with the resurrection and being with Christ. But it is not probable that St. Paul had such a refined conception in his mind when he wrote ; or that he would not, in consoling the Thessalonians for the apparent loss which their departed friends suffered, have employed so obvious an explanation. On the whole, we conclude that, though this interpretation of the Apostle's words may be tenable, it is neither necessary nor preferable. If he should depart, his soul would be with Christ ; this seems his plain meaning.

The same remarks apply, with even greater force, to the opinion expressed in the most elaborate treatise of modern times on eschatology, that of Kliefoth. The writer admits that the disembodied soul is conscious, exercises the faculty of memory, and is capable of intercourse with other souls ; but he holds that it has no connection with either time or space. At present we are only concerned with time. To be out of time, and yet to think, to remember, to rejoice or suffer, to communicate with others, seems a contradiction in terms. It is only in time, and through the succession of ideas that, as far as our experience extends, such energies are possible. In fact, the writer makes eternity commence with death, which is certainly inaccurate. We may go further, and express a doubt whether eternity, as the attribute belongs to God, can be predicated of any created being. The felicity of the saints has a beginning ; and never-ending rather than eternal seems the epithet appropriate to it. Be this as it may, there is no doubt that the intermediate state belongs to time. Practically the learned writer's theory ends in a psychopannuchia, or sleep of the soul ; for if eternity, in the strict sense of the word, sets in with death, it is difficult to understand how the soul can exist out of time and yet be conscious of impressions which can come and go only in time.[1]

105. *Development*

It has already been observed (§ 69) that by Roman Catholic writers (Bellarmine, Möhler) the necessity of Purgatory is inferred, not merely from the possibility of there being outstanding debts which have not been fully discharged in this life, but because Christians leave the world with sinful tendencies, or the remains of them, which must be finally extirpated by the purgatorial fire. Bellarmine admits that the *fomes* of concupiscence is, at death, destroyed, and therefore temptation has no longer any material to work upon, but says nothing about the effects of bad habits, the scars they may leave on the soul, and how these are to be removed. According to Möhler, Purgatory is not merely a forensic but a purifying agency.[1] Under its former aspect it directly affects the sufficiency of Christ's atonement ; under the latter it teaches that sin, in some form, accompanies the soul of the Christian into the separate state. Under either aspect it can plead no Scripture warranty. If the body is, as St. Paul seems to say, especially the seat of sin, we may well believe that with the deposition of the body all remains of sin are obliterated.

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[1] Delitzsch, too, attempts to combine, in the separate state, eternity with time and space. 'Since, therefore, eternity may be in such wise immanent in time and space (?), that these forms of existence continue after death, for the creature, the souls of the blessed are in eternity so far as it is partly the element of their life, and partly time and space are impregnated with it, and thereby lose their limiting effect.' (*Bib. Psych.*, A. vi. § 6). Is there not a confusion here between αἰώνιος in the sense of duration and αἰώνιος as denoting the life in God (John xvii. 3) ?

But while we thus reject the notion of a purgatorial purifying process, we may admit that in the intermediate state development in one direction or the other is possible. Development is the law of every created being, as long as reason and conscience continue. We never stand still, either morally or intellectually ; our habits, whether for good or for evil, are becoming daily more fixed. In the matter of sanctification progression is its life, ' we all, beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory,' from one degree of glory to another (2 Cor. iii. 18). There seems no reason why in the separate state, and indeed after the resurrection, the same law should not prevail. The ways of Providence, here often mysterious ; questions about the heathen, or infants, or the mass of the called but not chosen, so perplexing ; antinomies in the scheme of salvation not yet reconciled—problems of this kind may occupy attention, and gradually approach solution, as the soul is prepared to receive such accessions of knowledge. If the soul is to enjoy closer fellowship with Christ than was here possible, as St. Paul anticipates (Phil. i. 23), this can hardly be without a growth in love and purity. Deficiencies may be supplied, weaknesses strengthened, and yet no sin enter. In short, it would be contrary to analogy to suppose that either in the separate or the final state of the soul should remain stationary, without progress in an upward direction ; and a development in the opposite direction is also conceivable. We see in the present life frequent instances of such changes for the worse ; the conscience becoming more hardened, habits of sin more confirmed, alienation from the life of God more pronounced. This, too, may go on in the separate state and afterwards.

But as regards the blessed dead, a difficulty may suggest itself which this seems the appropriate place to notice. A bodiless spirit, it may be urged, is, as far as our experience extends, incapable of such moral development. Our bodies are, at present, the means of communication with the outer world, of receiving and transmitting its impressions ; if this outward vehicle were removed, and the soul reduced to feed upon itself without assimilating fresh materials, it might seem as if the essential conditions of improvement were absent. But the question may be raised whether even in the separate state the soul is without a body of some kind. It is, indeed, very difficult to form any conception of what a pure created spirit can be. We have no aid from experience or analogy for solving the problem. It would seem that a created spirit must occupy space, and have a local habitation ; and if so, be subject to the conditions thereto belonging, such as circumscription and a whereabouts. But this seems to imply some kind of material investiture, not only here but in the intermediate state. And Scripture, to say the least, is not against such a supposition. The difficult passage (2 Cor. v. 1–5) is susceptible of more than one interpretation, and among others it may be paraphrased thus : 'We know' (are fully assured) 'that if our earthly house of this tabernacle' (our present bodies) 'were dissolved, we have a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this' (tabernacle) 'we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven ; if' (that is, since) 'we shall be found clothed, not naked. For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened ; not for that we should be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life.' The main object of the Apostle's hope and prayer, as thus expressed by him, is that he might be spared the necessity of dying, and that the spiritual body of the resurrection might, by the change spoken of in 1 Cor. xv. 52, without death, be superinduced upon his mortal body. If, however, it should be otherwise, if his earthly house were dissolved, still at the resurrection he would receive it again in a glorified state. This is according to his usual teaching. But, though obscurely, something further seems to be implied. In the event of death we know, indeed, that we shall have (at the resurrection) 'a house not made with hands' ; but St. Paul calls this house 'a superinduction' (*ἐπενδύσασθαι*), a clothing upon a previously existing tabernacle, imperfect, indeed, as compared with that final change, but still real. 'Even in the event of death' (we may suppose him to say), 'and before the general resurrection, we shall not be found absolutely naked.' In either case, whether the Parousia finds us alive, or we shall be raised from the dead, a super-clothing will form the nature of the change, a superstructure on something already existing. That is, in effect, some kind of tabernacle is provided for the soul in the separate state, so that it shall never be reduced to a bare spiritual essence.[1]

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[1] *Symbolik*, § 23.

In confirmation of this interpretation we may refer to the parable in which Dives recognizes Abraham and Lazarus ; to the preaching of Christ to the spirits in prison, which is hardly conceivable without some kind of bodily organs in the latter ; to the promise to the thief on the cross ; to the white robes given to the martyrs (Rev. vi. 11) ; and to the great multitude clothed in such robes and with palms in their hands (*Ibid.*, vii. 9). To set down all this to poetic imagery is to push the principle of symbolism too far. To the above we may add that 'the place,' out of the 'many mansions' in His Father's house which Jesus is preparing for His people (John xiv. 2, 3), implies a literal alicubi of souls ; and that there is nothing figurative in the statement that when He comes again, 'them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring visibly with Him'[2] (1 Thess. iv. 14). The appearances of Samuel

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[1] [The meaning and connection of 2 Cor. v. 3 have sorely exercised the commentators. Usteri and Olshausen make it refer to the clothing of the believer with the righteousness of Christ—'If when He comes again we shall not be found destitute of this saving protection' ; an exposition which has little to say for itself. Delitzsch (who, however, holds that the soul after death has an 'immaterial body'), thus translates : 'We long to be clothed while yet living, although those who sleep will, at the parousia, be in no inferior condition ; they will, by being raised in new bodies, not be found naked,' which seems a truism, and to add nothing to the train of thought (*Bib. Psych.*, vi. § 5). So Reiche and others. J. P. Lange and Martensen may be cited as supporting the view taken in the text. The present ἔχομεν may, no doubt, be equivalent to the future considered as certain ; and hence no stress can be laid on it to prove an intermediate body.

[A detailed study of the Greek text of 2 Cor. v. 1 ff. leads us to the conclusion that, contrary to Litton's view, Paul envisages the intermediate state between death and resurrection as a disembodied or "naked" state, and accordingly expresses the desire to be still alive at Christ's coming so that the present mortal body may be superinvested ("clothed upon") and transformed by the body of his glorification ("that what is mortal may be swallowed up of life"). Yet for the Christian to die means to be with Christ, even though it is a state of nakedness pending the glorious consummation which the Lord's parousia will bring ; and so he is "willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be at home with the Lord", since that, though still short of the consummation, is gain for the Christian (cf. Phil. i. 21, 23). But most desirable of all is for the believer to be overtaken, while still alive, by the consummation of his redemption, for then he will experience no intervening state of nakedness. Editor.]

[2] Will bring them with Christ from heaven, to receive at the resurrection the more perfect clothing of the spiritual body.

[It should be pointed out, however, that the word "visibly" is not found in 1 Thess. iv. 14—not that we wish to contradict the visibility of those whom Christ brings with Him, but their visibility is surely due to the fact that "the dead in Christ shall rise first" (verse 16) and will at that instant be clothed with their resurrection bodies : it is in these, rather than in some supposed intermediate bodies, that they will be visible. Again, to take the visions of the Apocalypse in a literalistic rather than a symbolical sense leads to all kinds of difficulties. Even so, the great multitude of Rev. vii. 9 can surely only apply to the multitude of the redeemed *after* they have experienced the resurrection of the body ; whereas Rev. vi. 9–11 refers specifically to the *souls* of the martyrs. Likewise 1 Pet. iii. 19 speaks of the *spirits* in prison : the opinion that Christ's preaching to them "is hardly conceivable without some kind of bodily organs in the latter" seems to us quite extraordinary. Editor.]

(1 Sam. xxviii. 14) and of Moses and Elijah on the Mount, particularly of Moses, point in the same direction.

Various speculations have been put forth respecting the nature of the intermediate body, if such may be supposed to exist. Delitzsch speaks of an "immaterial corporeity,' with which the departed soul is invested. The soul, he argues, is even in this life never without an image (εἶδος, *forma, effigies*) of itself, conformable to its progress either in holiness or in sin. The soul which has entertained and improved the grace of the Holy Spirit throws itself, out into an immaterial and invisible image, which accompanies it beyond the grave, and is the pledge of the future glorified body. Here it was kept by the body of sin and death, released therefrom it will exhibit its native properties. But even here it occasionally breaks through the barrier of the flesh, as we see in Moses, when he came down from the Mount (Exod. xxxiv. 29), and Stephen, when he stood before the council (Acts vi. 15). It is by virtue of this counterpart of itself that the soul has the power, like the angels, of visibility ; it enabled Samuel to appear (though not to Saul), and Moses to be seen on the mount of transfiguration. Transferred at death to immediate proximity to Christ, the soul with this its *effigies* will be transformed more and more into Christ's likeness, until it becomes ripe for the reception of the resurrection-body. In the case of the unconverted, the process is the reverse. Their souls, too, possess an immaterial image, but defiled by sin it shines with no spiritual splendour, and in proportion as sinful habits gain the mastery, it deteriorates continually, until it is transferred to its own place in Hades.[1]

The theory is ingenious, but labours under difficulties. An immaterial corporeity, if the latter word is to be taken in a real sense, seems a contradiction in terms. The thinnest, most ethereal body must still possess the essential properties of body ; but Delitzsch denies any such to his form, or εἶδος, of the soul ; such, therefore, is a mere reflection, as in a mirror, of itself. If such a form belongs essentially to the soul, it must indeed accompany the soul into the separate state ; but how can it be considered an investiture, or clothing, of the soul ? Martensen contents himself with observing that 'a certain bodily clothing of the soul in the regions of the dead must be supposed,' without further explanation.[2] Others (*e.g.*, Rinck [3]) make the nervous system the seat of the soul ; which system quickened, in the case of Christians, by the Spirit of God, invests the soul after death with a suitable clothing, and prepares it gradually for the final change. But the nervous system, equally with every other constituent of our present body, undergoes decomposition at death, and turns to dust.

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[1] *Bib. Psych.*, vi. 5, 6.
[2] *Dog.*, § 276.
[3] *Zustand nach dem Tode*, Kap. 4.

These physical theories seem as unnecessary as they are fanciful. Scripture, though it always designates the departed by the terms *πνεύματα* or *ψυχαὶ*, does not compel us to believe them wholly out of time or space. A supernatural world of their own appears to surround them, from which they receive, and upon which they make, impressions ; apparently they recognize, and are recognized by, those who had preceded them ; the souls of the blessed enjoy closer intercourse than here below with Christ in His glorified humanity ; from all which we may infer that they are not without a clothing, whatever notion of it we may form. Now, if the resurrection-body is, as all admit, no product of nature or of self-evolution, but of an immediate exercise of almighty power, why may not the same power—and as directly—provide departed souls with a material clothing, sufficient for present needs, though only a foretaste of, or preparation for, the more perfect vehicle of communication to be afterwards bestowed ? To return to the subject of this section : development thus becomes possible, but under conditions unlike those of the present life, with its external distractions. 'They rest from their labours'—it is a state of comparative repose—but 'their works do follow them' (Rev. xiv. 13) ; the remembrance, if nothing more, of these works ; but even this furnishing materials of a searching and purifying inward process. And, thus they may even in the separate state grow in grace, and in ripeness for the full 'redemption of the body' at the appearing of Christ.[1]

106. *Probation*

The treatment of this question is so closely connected with the interpretation of the two well-known passages in the first Epistle of St. Peter (iii. 18–20, iv. 6), that no apology is needed for prefixing an examination of them. On the former some remarks have been offered in § 46 ; but singly, and in their connection, they demand a fuller inquiry.

The Revised Version runs thus : 'Christ also suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that He might bring us to God ; being put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit ;

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[1] The idea of Bengel, and some others, that the resurrection of departed saints is continually going on, as they become ripe for it, may be referred to in connection with this section.

in which also He went and preached unto the spirits in prison, which aforetime were disobedient, when the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing' (iii. 18–20). 'Who shall give account to him that is ready to judge the quick and the dead. For unto this end was the Gospel preached even to the dead, that they might be judged according to men in the flesh, but live according to God in the spirit' (iv. 6). In the first draught of the third of our Thirty-Nine Articles (1552) 1 Peter iii. 19 was quoted as referring to the descent of Christ into hell (Hades) : 'His body lay in the sepulchre until His resurrection, but His ghost departing from Him was with the ghosts that were in prison, or hell ; as the place of St. Peter doth testify.' So much controversy had arisen respecting the meaning of the passage that in Parker's revision allusion to it was omitted, and the bare fact retained, that 'it is to be believed that Christ went down into hell' (Art. iii).

The controversy turned mainly on the question whether the fact mentioned by St. Peter occurred previously or subsequently to the incarnation ; whether the Apostle refers to the preaching of Noah ('a preacher of righteousness,' 2 Pet. ii. 5), to his contemporaries, during the hundred and twenty years while the ark was a preparing ; or to a preaching of Christ Himself to the dwellers in Hades, either during the three days' sojourn in that separate state, or on some other occasion. The former interpretation is supported by the authority of Bishop Pearson, and of some distinguished names abroad, such as Von Hofmann (*Schriftbeweis*) ; the latter by Bishop Horsley, and the majority of modern commentators.[1] The reasons for it seem decisive. The subject of the chapter throughout is Christ the incarnate Son, Christ in His whole person ; it is the same Christ who suffered for our sins that is said to be quickened in spirit, and to have preached to the spirits. We know that holy men of God—Noah among others—spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost ; but we never read that Christ in His whole Person spoke through them, nor could it have been so ; and to make St. Peter affirm this is not only to beg the question, but to antedate the incarnation. It may be urged that if Noah preached by the Holy Spirit, he preached virtually by Christ, since the second and third Persons of the Holy Trinity are, as regards the Godhead, one ; but, in fact, it is more than doubtful whether by the word 'spirit' (τῷ πνεύματι) in the passage we are to understand the Holy

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[1] Archbishop Leighton is sometimes cited as favouring the Noachitic interpretation ; it has been overlooked that in a note on the passage he abandons his former opinion : 'Thus I then thought, but do now apprehend another sense as probable if not more, even that rejected by most interpreters, viz., the mission of the Spirit and preaching of the Gospel by it, after Christ's resurrection.'

Spirit. Bishop Middleton's canon[1] may admit of exceptions, but on the whole it is in accordance with the usage of Scripture. But further: it is not the usage of Scripture to attribute the resurrection of our Lord (ζωοποιηθεὶς being taken in its natural sense) to the Holy Spirit; but occasionally to Christ Himself ('Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up'), more commonly to the Father (Acts xiii. 33; Ephes. i. 20). If ἐκήρυξεν, too, is to retain its usual meaning, it will follow that Noah was commissioned not only to warn the Antediluvians of their impending danger, but to disclose to them the plan of salvation by Christ; that is, that Noah and his contemporaries enjoyed a privilege which was denied to Abraham, Moses, David, and the prophets who 'searched diligently what the Spirit of Christ that was in them did signify when it testified the sufferings of Christ and the glory that should follow' (1 Pet. i. 10); and that divine revelation was not progressive, but retrograde, the knowledge vouchsafed to the world before the flood being withdrawn from the world after the flood. And, to repeat what was remarked in § 46, the word rendered 'went' (πορευθεὶς) is no expletive, as when we say, he went and did or said so and so, but significant; He took His departure, or went on a journey, which can hardly be understood except of a personal ministration of the Saviour Himself.[2] Might we connect ποτε with ἐκήρυξεν, 'he preached once upon a time in the days of Noah,' it might furnish a ground for the Noachitic interpretation; but in fact it belongs to ἀπειθήσασι 'who once upon a time were disobedient'; which removes any remaining doubt on the subject.

The transaction then occurred between the death and the resurrection of Christ; but when, during this interval, is again matter of debate. The usual supposition is that it took place during the reposing of Christ's body in the grave, His soul preaching in Hades. There as a spirit He preached to spirits; πνεύματι πνεύμασι, *spiritu spiritibus, congruens sermo*, as Bengel remarks; and if we may assume that some kind of bodily investiture belongs to the soul in the separate state (see § 105) this interpretation is tenable; but it is hardly consistent with the natural meaning of the terms used. Christ is said to have been θανατωθεὶς σαρκὶ, put to death in the flesh, that is the body of His humiliation, the body which could suffer and die; but to have been ζωοποιηθεὶς πνεύματι, literally restored to life, or raised again, in spirit ; thus the parallelism is preserved, which is not the case with any other mode of interpretation. As regards the meaning of ζωοποιηθεὶς, the word ζωοποιέω occurs eleven times in the New Testament,[1] including the passage before us, and in none of them can it be said to have any other meaning than that of restoration to life from the dead, whether natural or spiritual death.

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[1] 'I have had occasion to signify (see on Rom. viii. 13) that there is no indisputable instance in the New Testament in which anything is said to have been done or suffered by the Holy Spirit, where πνεῦμα, whether in the genitive or the dative case, is not governed by some preposition.' Doctrine of Greek Art, 1 Pet. iii. Nevertheless a doubt may exist whether Rom. viii. 13 is not an exception to the rule.

[2] Comp. ver. 22. ὅς ἐστιν ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ Θεοῦ. πορευθεὶς εἰς οὐρανὸν.

It is impossible, of course, for those who hold that the preaching to the spirits took place between Christ's death and His resurrection to understand the word in its usual sense ; and accordingly various other meanings have been assigned to it, none of which is satisfactory. Thus it has been translated ' preserved in life,' which implies that apart from a special exercise of Divine power Christ's soul would have shared the death of His body ; which, it is presumed, few will maintain. By others (*e.g.*, Bishop Wordsworth) it is supposed that Christ's soul being liberated from the body acquired increased active powers, *e.g.*, of locomotion ; an idea not only opposed to Scripture, but of doubtful tendency as betraying a leaning to Gnosticism. Nowhere in Scripture is it affirmed to be a gain to be free from the body ; nowhere is the body represented (as the Gnostics held) as a cage from which the imprisoned soul longs to be free ; on the contrary, it is for the redemption of the body, its resurrection or its change, that Christians are said to be waiting (Rom. viii. 23). A modification of this sense is more tolerable. If we understand by πνεύματι, the Divine nature, as it seems to signify in Rom. i. 4, ' quickened in spirit ' may mean that the soul of Christ was, by virtue of its continued union with Deity, endued with extraordinary power, so, *e.g.*, as to be able to pass over the gulf which no mere human soul could do (Luke xvi. 26), and preach to the antediluvians. But this is still a departure from the usual signification of ζωοποιέω.

We are thus led to place the transaction not before but after the resurrection ; whether directly after that great event, or at some other time during the forty days sojourn on earth. It only remains to discover a fitting sense for πνεύματι. It is evidently contrasted with σαρκὶ, and since that means a body the predominant element of which was σὰρξ (not σῶμα), a body subject to infirmity, why may not πνεύματι signify a body the predominant element of which is πνεῦμα ? There is, St. Paul tells us in 1 Cor. xv. 44, a σῶμα πνευματικὸν ; and in the next verse Christ in His whole person is called πνεῦμα (ὁ ἔσχατος 'Αδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν) ; πνεῦμα so far as the predominant quality of His glorified body is spiritual And such may be the signification of the term in the clause of the series 1 Tim. iii. 16, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι. ‘God was manifest in the flesh’ (the body of humiliation); ‘was justified’ (perceived to be what He claimed to be) ‘in spirit’ (in His risen body); ‘was seen’ (in this latter body) ‘by angels, etc.’ If this meaning be allowed, the whole passage runs smoothly; Christ died in the flesh, but was raised again in a spiritual body; in which body He took a journey to Hades, and preached there.

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[1] John v. 21, vi. 63 ; Rom. iv. 17, viii. 11 ; 1 Cor. xv. 22, 36, 45 ; 2 Cor. iii. 6 ; Gal. iii. 21 ; 1 Tim. vi. 13 ; 1 Pet. iii. 18.

The passage in the next chapter is too explicit to need much comment. Christ, the Apostle says (ver. 6), is ready to judge both the quick and the dead; for with this end the Gospel was preached even to the dead, that they might be judged according to men in the flesh, but live according to God in the spirit. This can hardly refer, as some have held,[1] to departed Christians who, while alive, had heard and received the Gospel, for there would then be no contrast between ‘the living’ and ‘the dead’; these Christians might be called both living and dead, living at one time, dead at another. Nor can we understand by ‘the dead’ the spiritually dead, for the living who had been converted and had died in Christ were at one time spiritually dead, and thus again there would be no contrast. The passage seems to refer back to chap. iii. 19, and it adds the reason of the preaching of Christ to the souls in Hades. Christ is to judge all men, and that there may be material for the judgement, the Gospel must be proposed to all men for acceptance, either in this life or afterwards; the judgment will turn on their attitude towards Christ thus revealed to them. Now since the vast majority of the human race depart this life without having even heard of a Saviour, provision, the Apostle seems to say, is made in the intermediate state to redress this disadvantage. To a certain class of such sinners, the antediluvians, Christ Himself preached; whether He continues this personal ministration or delegates it to others we are not told. Nor does it appear why the antediluvians should be specially mentioned above other sinners. Perhaps to the Apostle’s mind the human race was divided into two portions by the catastrophe of the flood. Those who lived after it lived under a temporal covenant of mercy of which the rainbow was the sign; to rectify this inequality may have been the reason why the antediluvians were favoured by a message of mercy from Christ Himself.

But was it a message of mercy? The older Lutheran theologians agree on the meaning of ζωοποιηθεὶς, but they hold that the object of Christ’s preaching was to confirm the condemnation of the antediluvians. But until the close of all things the work of Christ must be presumed to be a work of mercy, and the word ἐκήρυξεν is generally employed for proclaiming the Gospel. 1 Peter iv. 6 is express to the point. '*The Gospel* was, and is, preached to the dead, in order that they might be judged according to men in the flesh, but live according to God in the spirit.' It is obvious that the former clause is not a principal but a subsidiary one ; for the Gospel is never preached that men may die. The sense is : they were preached to, in order that, although they had suffered death, the penalty of sin, after the lot and fashion of all men, yet they might live to God spiritually. As to the result of the preaching nothing is revealed.

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[1] Leighton, Commentary.

To sum up : Christ after His resurrection, that is, in His spiritual body, proceeded on an errand of mercy to Hades, the place where impenitent sinners who lived before the flood were confined, and preached the Gospel to them. He showed Himself in His resurrection body as the Lord of life to ' things in heaven ' the angels (1 Tim. iii. 16) ; to ' things on earth,' His disciples during the forty days ; and to ' things under the earth,' the shades below (Phil. ii. 10). Thus He proved that no barriers were too strong for Him to overcome, that He had ' the keys of hell and death ' to open and shut, to enter and depart as it pleased Him, and that Satan was a conquered foe. That the *disembodied soul* of Christ, during the three days, went to the place of torment in Hades is an unauthorized conjecture. But how it was occupied in that interval we are not told explicitly, but we may form a conjecture (see § 107).

And now the question remains, How do these passages of St. Peter bear upon a future probation ? That the event stands alone on the page of Scripture ; that we have no intimation of its ever having been repeated ; that the passages are capable of another interpretation ; all this must be admitted, and it follows that positive assertions on the subject are out of place. If, however, the Noachitic interpretation is, for the reasons given, hardly tenable, we have before us a revelation of great importance and significance. It is the chief one of the very few instances in which a corner of the veil which hides the unseen world from our view is lifted, and a glimpse beyond vouchsafed. To have this veil wholly drawn aside would neither be profitable nor safe for us. What we have to do here is to make use of our privileges, and fulfil our stewardship ; and the scenes beyond the grave, if fully disclosed, might be so overpowering as to indispose (as in the case of the Thessalonians) to the ordinary duties of life ; to say nothing of the superstitious or worse uses to which the information might be put. The fact, however, remains that on one occasion Christ Himself preached, with a salutary aim, to souls in Hades formerly impenitent ; that is, that in this instance at least probation did not end with this life. The universal proposition, therefore, that it does so end in all cases is met at once by this exception; and equally so the attempt to elevate this opinion into an article of faith. If, indeed, unequivocal testimony of Scripture to that effect could be produced, if would settle the question, and we should have to conclude that the passages of St. Peter must be otherwise explained. But this testimony is not forthcoming. It will not be pretended that such texts as 'where the tree falleth, there it shall be' (Eccles. xi. 3) have any bearing on the question.

Our Lord, in Matt. xii. 32, speaks of a sin 'which shall not be forgiven either in this æon, or in that which is to come.' What this sin is has been matter of debate from ancient times; but without entering into that question, we may observe that on the face of it the passage extends the possibility of forgiveness beyond the present life. The Jews, as is well known, commonly called the time before the coming Messiah *αἰὼν οὗτος* (this age), and that after *αἰὼν μέλλων* (the coming age), both limited by the present life; but as Christ had actually introduced this latter æon by His coming, His words in Matt. xii. 32 refer to a still future æon, beyond this life; and if so they seem to imply the possibility of forgiveness in it. The general impression which the parable of Dives and Lazarus conveys is not that of final separation. The term son (*τέκνον*), used by Abraham, is not consistent with such an idea; and, in fact, the sufferings of Dives appear to have broken up the crust of his selfishness, and wrought some improvement in his state of mind. There is, no doubt, a 'great gulf' between Abraham's bosom and the Hades in which the rich man found himself; impassable, indeed, to all but Christ, who appears to have traversed it, and if once, why not again?[1]

St. Paul tells us that we must all appear before the judgment-seat, to receive the things done in the body (2 Cor. v. 10); no doubt the things done in the body will come into judgment on that day, but so may what has been done or left undone in the intermediate state. It is quite in the style of Scripture to pass over this latter in silence. 'It is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment' (Heb. ix. 27); *a* judgment, beyond doubt, awaits all men immediately after death, but that this is *the* judgment is another question. In truth, however, this passage refers to the final judgment, as appears from the next verse: 'Unto them that look for Him shall He appear the second time without sin unto salvation.' Men die once, judgment awaits all at the Parousia ; again the intermediate state is passed over in silence. 'Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he reap' (Gal. vi. 7) ; the principle is unquestionable, but it is to be observed that the warning here, as all through the Epistles, is addressed to those supposed to be real Christians, and even real Christians need to be reminded that the measure of their future reward depends on the present discharge of their stewardship.

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[1] [We cannot help feeling that Litton reads into the parable of Dives and Lazarus what he wants to find in it. The "great gulf fixed" whence none may cross over to the other side (verse 26) would certainly, in the natural sense of the words, indicate that at death the great division is irrevocably made. This conclusion is confirmed by the final part of the parable, in which our Lord teaches that the man who possesses Holy Scripture possesses all that is necessary for instruction concerning his eternal destiny: the nature of his response to its message in this life determines his state hereafter. Editor.]

Scripture, then, does not compel us to believe that all probation ends with the present life ; and, therefore, does not compel us to abandon the natural interpretation of the passages of St. Peter. They stand alone, and much is wanting to fill up the outline. We cannot say that such a ministration of the Word, whether by Christ Himself or by His ambassadors, is going on in Hades ; we cannot tell whether any of those to whom Christ preached repented. But neither are we forbidden to infer that for the heathen who never enjoyed the privilege of hearing the Gospel, and even for the multitudes in Christian countries who through the fault of parents or the Church more than through their own have grown up in practical heathenism, some means may in the intermediate state be provided for bringing the question directly to them, whether they will receive or reject the salvation which, as we are told, is intended for all men. And the admonition still remains in full force, 'Behold, now is the accepted time ; behold, now is the day of salvation' (2 Cor. vi. 2). No one can tell for certain that if he here receives the grace of God in vain, another opportunity will be vouchsafed to him.

107. *Locality*

Scripture employs a variety of terms to describe the locality or the state considered as a locality, of the departed ; such as Sheol[1] or Hades, Abraham's bosom, paradise, heaven, Gehenna. In the earlier books of the Old Testament Sheol signifies the kingdom of the dead, the common abode to which, after death, both good and bad depart.[2] Thus Jacob expected to go down mourning into Sheol, to be with his son Joseph (Gen. xxxvii. 35) ; and that his gray hairs would be brought down with sorrow into Sheol (xlii. 38). The Authorized Version renders the word ' Sheol ' by the grave ; but Jacob, who imagined that Joseph was torn in pieces by a wild beast, could not have hoped to be buried in the same sepulchre with his son. The same remark applies to the promise to Abraham that he should go 'to his fathers in peace,' which cannot mean that he should be buried in the grave of his ancestors in Ur of the Chaldees, for in fact he was buried in Canaan in the cave of Machpelah. To 'go to his fathers,' to be 'gathered to his people,' means to join them in Sheol, where they were supposed to form a kind of community. The gloomy views which prevailed on the nature of Sheol, and the hope which gradually dawned on believers of deliverance from it, have already been described (§ 104). We may ask whether these gloomy views were merely subjective, that is, to the apprehension of the Old Testament saints, or whether they had a foundation in fact. It has been held by some that never since the promise of a Saviour was given did the souls of believers, even under the Old Testament, pass into Sheol as the common receptacle of good and bad, but into another place, Abraham's bosom or paradise ; and this either a division of Hades or some other locality we know not where. There they remained in comparative repose, until the resurrection of Christ opened the way to a higher stage of bliss, ' In My Father's house are many mansions.'

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[1] Commonly derived from שָׁאַל, to demand, *orcus rapax* ; but the more probable etymology is from an ancient verb, שָׁעַל, signifying to be hollow. Sheol was supposed to be a cavity or abyss (Rom. x. 7), either under the earth—the earth being supposed to be a plane (Ps. lxiii. 9), whence the expressions 'the nether parts of the earth' (Ezek. xxxi. 18), τὰ κατώτερα τῆς γῆς (Ephes. iv. 9)—or in the centre of the earth, καταχθονίων (Phil. ii. 10).

[2] Samuel, recalled from the dead at Saul's request, tells the king, 'Tomorrow thou and thy sons shall be *with me*' (in Sheol) (1 Sam. xxviii. 19).

As regards a division of Sheol into two parts, there is no trace of it in the Old Testament ; such prophecies as that of Daniel (c.xii) refer not to the intermediate state, but to that subsequent to the resurrection. The hope of the old fathers was not to find a paradise in Sheol, but to be delivered from it ; they never speak of it or any part of it, otherwise than as a valley of the shadow of death, to be dreaded, not desired. The parable in Luke (xvi. 22) describes Lazarus as carried by angels to Abraham's bosom, but it does not make this latter a division of Hades, though it does establish a separation of the good and the bad, and so far is in advance of the Old Testament. We conclude, then, that the mournful anticipations of the ancients, as regards the separate state, were founded on fact ; that their condition in Sheol, though in some respect superior to that on earth, was in others inferior ; superior in that they were in the safe keeping of God, and enjoyed an increased measure of the divine presence ; inferior in that it was a place of gloom and inactivity, of hope rather than of fruition.

All this was changed at the coming of the Saviour. His birth was, we cannot doubt, announced to the old fathers in Hades, and probably by the same ministration of angels which was employed to make it known to the shepherds of Bethlehem ; and the intelligence which transformed a promise into a fact must have essentially affected their state if not their locality ; inspiring them with a joy to which they had hitherto been strangers. It was probably on this occasion that Abraham rejoiced to see the day of Christ, saw it and was glad (John viii. 56). No record of such a revelation is found in the history of Abraham while on earth ; if such there was, it was suffered to pass into oblivion. But if the birth of Christ was made known to the patriarch, and to his spiritual seed, in Hades, the reference of our Lord is accounted for ; and the circumstance fits in well with the progressive character of revelation.[1] Notwithstanding this communication the old believers remained in Hades, because redemption had not yet been accomplished, nor the veil which hid the most holy place rent asunder.

But after the resurrection of Christ, the atonement having been effected, another change is visible. Departed saints are no longer in Hades at all, but with the ascended Saviour in heaven itself, or the vestibule of it ; the paradise to which St. Paul was caught up, and heard words not allowed to man to utter (2 Cor. xii. 4)[2] Thus Stephen, at the approach of death, sees the glory of God in heaven and Jesus there, and commends his spirit to the Saviour, which implies that he hoped on his departure to enjoy the most intimate communion with that Saviour. ' Ye are come,' we read in Heb. xii. 22–24 (even in this life, and surely hereafter), 'to Mount Zion, and unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to an innumerable company of angels, to the general assembly and church of the first-born, whose names are written (or enrolled) in heaven, and to God the Judge of all, and to the spirits of just men made perfect, and to Jesus the Mediator of the new covenant.' Not merely do Christians after their departure hence individually live to God, but they are constituted into a polity, or community, the heavenly Jerusalem, the spiritual counterpart of the earthly one. ' Our commonwealth,' St. Paul says, ' is in heaven ' (Phil. iii. 20). Similar are the visions of the Apocalypse. In chap. vi. 9–11, the souls of the martyrs are represented as ' under the altar,' the altar, it is true, of burnt-offering (*θυσιαστήριον*) in the outer court of the temple, but still the place of God's special presence ; not in Hades. In chap. vii, not merely the martyrs, but the great multitude of all nations, who had come out of great tribulation and been faithful unto death, stand before the throne of God and serve Him day and night in His temple. If it be objected that these souls of the blessed cannot be in the very place in which Christ is, since they had not, like Him, risen from the dead, be it so ; the paradise of disembodied spirits may be on the confines of the holy of holies, and yet not actually within it ('In My Father's house are many mansions') ; the Saviour may be with them and they with Him, in the sense of His appearing amongst them from time to time, and not infrequently, but still not in such continued intercourse as will be after their resurrection. So far their condition may be imperfect, but in Hades, or any division of it, they are not.[1]

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[1] [The natural significance of Christ's words in John viii. 56 is, as the response of the Jews in the next verse shows, that Abraham in his day saw joyfully, with the precognition of faith, the coming day of the Messiah ; and this is how the commentators understand it. Cf., among the more recent, the commentaries by Westcott, Bernard, Temple, C. K. Barrett, and C. H. Dodd (*The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*). Editor.]

[2] The Jews in the time of Christ are said to have held a twofold paradise ; one subterranean, to which the souls of men of average piety were at death translated ; the other above the heavens, reserved for eminent saints.

Does Scripture throw any light on this change of locality as regards the blessed dead ? Whatever we suppose to have occasioned it must be looked for between the death and the ascension of Christ. The Church has ever believed that His soul went to Hades, and so it is stated in the earliest creed. Made sin for us, it was necessary that He should share in the common lot of sinful man, even to this lowest point of humiliation. We know, too, that His soul was not left there. But how long He remained in Hades is not specified, either in Scripture or the creed. We have already seen reason to believe that the preaching to the spirits in prison did not occur in His disembodied state, but after His resurrection. We are at liberty, then, to suppose, with many of the Fathers and the Reformers, that He merely appeared in Hades, and then left it, carrying with Him the souls of the ancient believers, including that of the thief, to the paradise just described.

Some such triumphant rescue seems to be indicated in Ps. lxviii. 18, a passage which is applied by St. Paul to Christ (Ephes. iv. 8). Literally, it is 'Thou hast led captive Thy captives,'[2] and we may understand it either as 'Thou hast led captive thine (and Thy Church's) enemies' (Satan and Hades)[3] or 'Thou hast delivered Thy saints' in Hades from the bondage in which they were held. Either way interpreted, the passage favours the notion of a public emptying of Hades of its pious occupants, under the conduct of their Redeemer, not yet risen, indeed, but conquerer over their spiritual enemies. After conducting them to the heavenly paradise, and remaining with them during His disembodied state (disembodied as compared with the resurrection-body), He rose from the dead. Between His resurrection and ascension, He paid in His whole person, the visit to Hades recorded in 1 Peter iii. 18 ;

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[1] [We have already stated it as our judgment (see Note, p. 564, above) that the great multitude of Rev. vii. 9 ff. is to be understood as referring to the redeemed in the heavenly state after they have been clothed with their resurrection bodies. Editor.]

[2] *αἰχμαλωσίαν* in the LXX version, the abstract for the concrete, as in Judg. v. 12 : 'Arise, Barak, and lead thy captivity captive.'

[3] Comp. Col. ii. 15 : 'Having spoiled principalities and powers, He made a show of them openly, triumphing over them in it' (the cross).

passed the gulf which none but He could pass; and preached to the antediluvians confined there.

The question may be asked, Does Sheol, or Hades, exist now? If it was emptied by Christ of the Old Testament saints, and the New Testament saints, on their departure, never go to Hades at all but straight to the heavenly paradise, what inhabitants can Hades now have? If the preaching of Christ produced a salutary effect on some there (on which Scripture is silent), they, like the thief, could pass from it into paradise; if the offers of mercy were rejected by the majority (only too possible), these would remain in Hades, and in no state or place of enjoyment. Those of the antediluvian sinners who continued impenitent after the preaching of Christ would receive the reward of their former sins, and especially of this their impenitence, in some place of 'torment,' until, if ever, suffering had wrought a salutary change. By parity of reasoning, those who in this life had the Gospel distinctly proposed to them, and as distinctly rejected it, must be supposed to pass at death into Hades, and into some state of retribution, until, if ever, they are brought to a better frame of mind.[1]

There remains the vast mass of the heathen to whom Christ never was preached. *Extra Christum nulla salus*; properly understood, the saying is true; but by the older theologians, both before and after the Reformation, its was, like it medieval equivalent, *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, applied to establish harsh conclusions. These theologians, as a rule, ignored any intermediate state, and taught that eternal life and eternal punishment, as the case might be, followed at once upon death[2] and, since *extra Christum nulla salus*, the heathen, as a body, were consigned to endless perdition.[3] With the recognition that an intermediate state is really an intermediate one,[4] milder views have prevailed.

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[1] [Litton's conjectures here concerning those who die in wilful unbelief accord ill with our Lord's solemn warnings that " he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him ", and that not to believe in Him is to die in one's sins and to be already judged (John iii. 18, 36; viii. 24; cf. Heb. ix. 27). In the New Testament, moreover, judgment to come is always with reference to this present life, to the things done in the body (cf. Matt. xvi. 27; xxv. 31 ff.; 2 Cor. v. 10; 1 Pet. i. 17; Rev. xx. 12 f.). The question must also be asked: what of those rejectors of the Gospel who are still alive at Christ's second coming, for whom there will be no intermediate state and therefore no second chance? Editor.]

[2] Piorum animas statim, postquam a corporibus sunt separatæ, essentialem beatitudinem consequi; impiorum vero animas damnationem suam subire; credimus. Baier, *Comp.*, P. i., c. 8, § 16.

[3] To justify their decision, they maintained that, in fact, the Gospel was preached to all the heathen by the Apostles, and pleaded St. Paul's words: 'Have they not heard? Yea, verily their sound went into all the earth, and their words unto the end of the world' (Rom. x. 18); *e.g.*, to North America and Australia!

[4] The author of *Scripture Revelations*, etc. (Archbishop Whately), justly remarks that if every individual's destiny is determined at death, the day of judgment becomes merely the publication of a sentence already pronounced. L. iv.

The heathen to whom Christ was never made known do not, indeed, at death, pass into paradise, but into Hades ; but the very notion of Hades is that it is not a final state ; and if the preaching of Christ may be regarded as a specimen of what is going on there, some ministration of the word, by means unknown to us, may still be addressed to heathen souls in the intermediate state : with various results, it is true ; the hypothesis by no means involves a universal restitution. For this ministration will find differences of receptivity in Hades analogous to what we see in the present life and in Christian countries. Some heathens, as St. Paul intimates, endeavoured to live up to the light which they possessed, and some gave themselves ' over to a reprobate mind ' (Rom. i. 28). What a difference between a Scipio or a Marcus Aurelius and a Nero ! But to all, we may hope, salvation will, in some way, be offered before the final judgment. Whether many or few have accepted the offer the last day alone will disclose.

THE SECOND ADVENT

The Second Advent of Christ, not death, not the intermediate state, is, throughout the New Testament, the great object of Christian expectation. To wait for the coming of Christ, 'that blessed hope, the appearing of our great God and Saviour' (1 Cor. i. 7 ; Tit. ii. 13), sums up the proper attitude of the Church, whether militant on earth, or triumphant in paradise. For it will not only be a manifestation of Christ's essential glory, but will usher in events of surpassing moment to all beings, rational and irrational. It will bring the history of redemption to a close, and finally fix every man's destiny.

In Old Testament prophecy the first and second advents are not clearly distinguished. A day of the Lord is announced, one of vengeance on His enemies and of redemption to Israel ; the glory of the Lord shall arise on Zion, and the Gentiles share in its brightness ; a king shall reign in righteousness, and a man shall be as a hiding-place from the wind and a covert from the tempest ; the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf unstopped ; on Mount Zion the Lord will provide a feast for all people ; He will swallow up death in victory, and wipe away tears from all faces ; then shall it be said, This is our God, we have waited for Him, and He will save us (Isa. xiii, lx, xxxii, xxxv, xxv). All nature is to share in the blessing. A new heaven and a new earth will take the place of the old (Isa. lxv. 17) ; the wolf shall dwell with the Lamb, rapine and destruction shall cease ; and righteousness and peace prevail over the world as the waters cover the sea (Isa. xi). It is obvious that these glowing descriptions are applicable both to the first and to the second advent, the two events occupying, in ancient prophecy, the same line of vision. In the New Testament they fall into their proper places, the one a fact, the other an expectation ; the one the actual introduction, the other the completion of redemption.

The testimony of Christ in the Gospels, except on one point, is explicit. 'The Son of Man shall come in the glory of His Father with His angels' (Matt. xvi. 27) ; but as regards the precise time, 'of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father' (Mark xiii. 32). The Deity in Christ, by an act of condescension to our weakness, emptied itself of this knowledge in the person of the incarnate Son, the Kenosis of Phil. ii. 6, 7. When He does come, it will be to hold a final assize, and to render to every man according to his works (Matt. xxv. 31–46). His coming will be unexpected as ‘ a thief in the night,’ yet not without preliminary signs and warnings, which it is the duty of the Church carefully to note. Such are : the preaching of the Gospel throughout the world (Matt. xxiv. 14) ; the appearance of false Christs and false prophets (*Ibid.*, 24) ; the rise of Antichrist (2 Thess. ii. 3) ; great persecution of the Church (Matt. xxiv. 21) ; an extensive apostasy (*Ibid.*, 12) ; signs and wonders not of heavenly origin (2 Thess. ii. 9) ; convulsions, both in the political and the natural world, of unusual severity (Matt. xxiv. 7) ; the final conflict, ending with the destruction of Antichrist and his followers (2 Thess. i. 7–10). ‘ When these things come to pass, lift up your heads, for your redemption draweth nigh.’

The nature of these signs explains why the Second Advent has sometimes been prematurely expected, and sometimes lost sight of as an object of Christian hope. The history of the Church abounds with manifestations of evil and tribulation which have been thought to portend, each in its turn, the speedy appearance of Christ, to the disappointment of the pious but sanguine observers. Each age, in its interpretation of passing events, needs the warning of St. Paul to the Thessalonians (2 Thess. ii). On the other hand, the postponement of the Advent has sometimes produced sceptical doubts on the subject : ‘ Where is the promise of His coming ? for all things continue as they were from the beginning of creation ’ (2 Pet. iii. 4). In the nature of the signs predicted (if we except the ‘ lying wonders ’ of the last time) there is nothing unusual ; what will make them harbingers of the Parousia is the peculiar form which they will assume immediately before the event, and of which former occasions furnished no example.

In the great discourse of Christ (Matt. xxiv), recorded by the three Evangelists, His Second Coming is closely connected with the impending judgment on Jerusalem ; recalling to mind that feature of ancient prophecy above mentioned, the combination of proximate and remote events in the same prediction. That the Apostles did not, at the time, distinguish between these two events is plain from their request, ‘ Tell us when shall these things be ? and what shall be the sign of Thy coming, and of the end of the world ? ’ (ver. 3) ; but in the Epistles the events no longer appear in connection, although the coming of Christ is spoken of as possibly at hand (see on this point § 104). There is a coming of Christ now under the form of *visitation*, as in the case of Jerusalem, and in the warnings addressed to the seven churches of Asia (Apoc. ii–iii) ; there was a coming of Christ when His divine Vicar, the Holy Spirit, came down on the Church on the Day of Pentecost ; there will be a coming to judgment. The first and the last have a certain resemblance to each other, which may be the reason why in the discourse (Matt. xxiv) the lines of demarcation are not strictly drawn. It would be foreign to the province of dogmatic theology to discuss all the matters connected with the Second Advent ; in fact, it would involve an exposition of the Apocalypse. Only some salient points can be noticed.

108. *Chiliasm*

By this term is denoted the opinion, extensively prevalent in the second and third centuries of our era, and from time to time revived in the Church, that the Advent of Christ will be followed by a millennium, lasting (as the name imports) a thousand years, the main features of which will be : the personal reign of Christ on earth during that time, and a resurrection, previously to the general one, of the just, who will reign with Christ ; a binding of Satan, and the enjoyment by the Church of a measure of spiritual and temporal felicity beyond anything yet experienced ; the conversion of the Jews as a nation, and their restoration to the promised land ; the release of Satan at the expiration of the thousand years ; a fresh and terrible outbreak of Satanic agency ; and at the moment when things are at their worst, and Satan and his host are arrayed against Christ and His Church, the appearance of the Saviour, a victory over the powers of evil, and the final judgment. Subordinate differences of view may be found in different writers on the subject, but the above would probably be accepted as a correct general description of Chiliasm. What all agree in is, that the Second Advent will be a pre-millennial one—introducing, not following, the millennium ; and further, that this blissful period will be the result, not of the ordinary development of Christianity as we see it, but of some extraordinary interposition from heaven.

Chiliasm, even in its most pronounced forms, may appeal to antiquity. In the Epistle ascribed to Barnabas an analogy is drawn between the six days of creation ending in the day of sabbatical rest and the six thousand years during which the Church is to be militant, to be succeeded by the corresponding spiritual Sabbath of the millennium ; one thousand years being in God's sight but a day. According To Eusebius (*Hist.* iii. 28), Cerinthus taught that the kingdom of heaven would be established on earth, with Jerusalem as its centre, and that the millennium would consist in an unlimited indulgence of sensual delights. This noxious element has appeared more than once in the history of the doctrine, and notably at the time of the Reformation among the Anabaptists and other enthusiasts ; not without a leaning to dangerous political theories, such as the community of goods (see our Article xxviii). It led both branches of the Protestant Church formally to repudiate Chiliasm,[1] without distinguishing between the doctrine itself and the travesty of it by carnally-minded persons. The principal Protestant theologians of the seventeenth century summarily dismiss it as a dream.

To return to earlier history, Justin Martyr, admitting that some rejected the tenet, professes himself as favourable to it. Irenæus tells us that Papias, a disciple of St. John, and contemporary with Polycarp, was an advocate of pre-millennarianism ; and that he himself had been induced to adopt it by certain presbyters who professed to have seen that apostle.[2] Tertullian, while repudiating the sensual fancies of Cerinthus, intimates that, at least in its purer form, Chiliasm was the prevalent doctrine in his time, not excepting his friends the Montanists, who might have been supposed unfriendly to it.[3] It may, then, be assumed that during the first three centuries, in one form or another, the pre-millennial Advent, with the reign of the saints on earth for a thousand years, in the enjoyment of bliss only short of that of heaven itself, was the general expectation of Christians. How far it found its way into the Church, through the Jewish converts, is uncertain ; but it is not improbable that the latter did not, with their conversion, renounce the views touching the kingdom of Messiah in which they had been nurtured, and that the Gentile Christians, in order to smooth the path for such conversions, either avoided the subject or adopted the Jewish interpretation of prophecy.

The first decided opposition came, as might be expected, from the school of Alexandria. To Origen, with his platonic notions respecting the evil of matter, the idea of a physical millennium was very distasteful. His writings against it produced some ferment in Egypt, which was with difficulty allayed by Dionysius of Alexandria, who, though himself a disciple of Origen, by his prudent management reconciled the disputants. About the middle of the fourth century Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea, wrote against Dionysius, and with this the controversy in the East seems to have come to a close. In the West the popular belief held its ground, and was defended by Lactantius, and Victorinus, bishop, of Pettau. But Augustine gave it its death-blow. He avows that he himself at one time had believed in a millennium, but had abandoned it for the allegorical interpretation of Apoc. xx. 1–6, which he proceeds to explain at length. The present Christian dispensation is the millennium ; the first resurrection is the spiritual one of which St. Paul speaks

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[1] *Conf. Augs.*, P. i., 18. *Conf. Helv.* (Expos. simp.), c. xi.
[2] *Adv. hær.*, v., c. 33.
[3] *Adv. Mar.*, iii., c. 24.

(Rom. vi. 4); the binding of Satan means that by Divine grace souls are rescued from his dominion.[1] In the Middle Ages the temporal supremacy of the Church assisted to divert the thoughts of Christians from a future reigning with Christ on earth. Already the Church enjoyed this privilege: kings had become her nursing-fathers; Antichrists had confessed themselves vanquished; the saints reigned in a veritable millennium. It is only in recent times that interest in the subject has again revived. Of this England and Germany share between them the credit. Joseph Mede and J. A. Bengel, in their respective countries, were the founders of the modern pre-millennarian schools, which, agreeing in the fundamental point of a millennium yet to come and on earth, differ widely in their descriptions of it, particularly on the question whether, along with the restoration of the Jews to Canaan and their hegemony over other nations, the Jewish sacrificial institute and temple services are to be revived in Jerusalem.

As regards Scripture evidence, the weak point of Chiliasm is that Old Testament prophecy and the Apocalypse, confessedly symbolical in character, are the foundations on which it chiefly rests. Neither in the discourses of Christ nor in the Apostolic epistles is any clear trace of it to be found. The tares and the wheat, we are told, are to grow together until the harvest, and no separation is to be made until that time comes (Matt. xiii. 39–40), that is, until the end of the world. But a personal reign of Christ on earth with His risen saints seems to imply a separation before the end arrives. The second Advent is apparently followed at once by the judgment (Matt. xxv. 31), but a millennium interposes 1,000 years between the two. In 1 Thess. iv. 16 the contrast is between the departed and the living at the advent, not between the resurrection of the just and that of the rest. Such passages as 'I appoint unto you' (the Apostles) 'a kingdom as My Father hath appointed unto Me: that ye may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel' (Luke xxii. 29, 30), or 'I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine until I drink it new with you in my Father's kingdom' (Matt. xxvi. 29), can hardly, in the absence of others more explicit, sustain the theories that have been built upon them.

It is otherwise with Apoc. xx. 1–6, which, indeed, is the stronghold of Chiliasm, and it must be admitted that, except on some such hypothesis, the passage is not an easy one to explain. The event predicted is to take place after the destruction of 'the beast' and 'the false prophet' (chap. xix. 20), that is, Antichrist and his host, and therefore cannot be referred to any past epoch in the history of the Church, still less, with Augustine, to the introduction of Christianity. The period of 1,000 years may indeed signify only any complete number, but that by ‘ the first resurrection ’ is meant (according to Augustine) regeneration by the Holy Spirit, can hardly be reconciled with the statement that ‘ the rest of the dead lived not again till the 1,000 years were accomplished ’ (v. 5). Are these dead subsequently raised to be understood as merely regenerated ? If this is inadmissible, and their resurrection is to be taken literally, why not the former ? As regards the silence of the earlier Scriptures on the subject, it may be contended that revelation is progressive, and that it may have been reserved for the last book of the Canon (according to the usual date) to furnish this addition to our knowledge ; and for the extravagant or sensual pictures of it soberer interpreters may disclaim responsibility, every doctrine of Scripture, it may be urged, is liable to such perversions.

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[1] *De civit. Dei*, xx. 7–9.

Thus much may be said for the literal interpretation of the Apocalyptic passage in the main ; but attempts to fix the *times* of the great events which it describes have so often proved themselves erroneous that we may well abstain from such calculations. Nitzsch well observes : ‘ The prophecy of Scripture is an inspired vision and description of the future of the kingdom of God, always indeed occasioned by contemporary events of history, but reaching in a perspective, more or less shortened, to the consummation of the plan of redemption. The evidence of a Divine providence in temporal history, and the bearing of the latter on the fulfilment of the promise (Gen. iii. 15), not literal exactness in detail, are its proper subjects. Hence it expounds history only in its leading features, and so far as it illustrates fundamental spiritual truths ; analogy and symbolism are its appropriate methods of expression. Chronology it does not deal with ; the prophetical times are symbolical. The prophets themselves, in their most important prophecies, were ignorant of the times when these things should be (1 Pet. i. 11).’[1]

It will be wise, then, not to attempt to expound the vision of Apoc. xx. 1–6 too literally, either as regards the duration, or the details, of the state of things therein described. Nevertheless, the symbolism of Scripture is generally that of a fact, not of an idea ; and this rule applies here. We may not be able to distinguish accurately between symbol and fact, or, in view of the parables which predict a mixed state of good and bad until the end, to understand how the wheat can, before that end comes, be gathered into a garner ; or how such a serious apostasy as is described in 2 Thess. ii can be supposed to take place after the millennium ; ‘ the times or the seasons which the

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[1] *System der christlichen Lehre*, § 35.

Father hath put in his own power' it is not for us to know; still, the vision must be intended for our instruction. It seems to justify a general expectation that there awaits the Church—after its long and painful history, culminating in a special crisis of tribulation—a season of spiritual revival, of expansion of its boundaries, of victory over the powers of evil, such as has not been experienced since the Pentecostal effusion, and surpassing even that. And, moreover, that this revival will take place on earth, and before the final end arrives. If Chiliasm did nothing more than direct our attention to this prospect, it would still deserve a niche in what may be called the esoteric department of revelation. Christians are bound to inquire into the meaning of such passages as Apoc. xx. 1–6, even if the result of the examination should never pass the bounds of probability.

109. *Resurrection of the Body*

The intermediate state is an imperfect one, among other reasons especially for this: that, however the soul in that state may not be wholly 'unclothed' yet, the body with which it is invested cannot be that which, under the article of the resurrection of the body, Scripture leads us to expect. Like the state itself, it must be of an intermediate nature. In the Creed we profess what we learn from Scripture, that the body, which is sown in corruption will be raised in incorruption, that the apparent victory of death is only an apparent one, and that the conqueror must himself eventually succumb to an Almighty Deliverer, at whose summons all that are in the graves shall come forth, to a resurrection either of life or the reverse. Thus was set at rest the great question which by the heathen philosopher was treated as unworthy of consideration (Acts xvii. 32), and even among the Jews was so far a matter of doubt that the ancient saints 'through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage' (Heb. ii. 15).

In the case of the Christian his assurance of a resurrection to life rests not merely on the declarations of Scripture to that effect, but on facts which guarantee it—the resurrection of Christ the Head which is a pledge of that of the body, and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, through whom the resurrection is effected. Once revealed, the fact is seen to harmonize with the plan of redemption. Man was created not subject to death, but capable of dying; through sin death came in, not as a natural condition of humanity, but as a penalty, an interruption of the intended order of things; it is obvious that redemption would be incomplete if it did not restore the whole man, body as well as soul, to at least Adam's state before the fall. The body is equally with the soul the handiwork of God, and indeed was first created; and it was indispensable to the part which man was to fill in the newly-created world (Gen. i. 28). A redemption which should end with a purely spiritual resurrection, such as that of Hymenæus and Philetus, would fail to repair the damage caused by sin, and be anything but a full restoration of fallen man. It would reduce the hope of the Christian to the 'blessed immortality' of Deism; instead of the very definite object of St. Paul's expectation, 'we look for the Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall change our vile body into the likeness of His glorious body, according to the mighty working whereby He is able to subdue all things to Himself' (Phil. iii. 21). The Apostle here, as usual, includes himself amongst those who might expect to see the coming of Christ; but whether they shall be changed or raised, it is the same great event to which the hope of Christians is directed.

As regards the process by which the new body comes into being, Scripture gives us little information. It has already been observed (§ 105) that, however the body of the intermediate state (if such there be) may form a link between our present body and that of the resurrection, the latter, in the last resort, comes into existence by an act of Almighty power. It is only with reservations that we can accept Martensen's hypothesis, that the future resurrection of the flesh has the way prepared for it by a hidden process of natural development, here and in the separate state.[1] Still less does Delitzsch's view commend itself, that the sacraments, especially the Eucharist, implant in us a seed of immortality, an *elixir vitæ* (φάρμακον ἀθανασίας), which issues in the resurrection body.[2] The similitude used by St. Paul of the grain of corn sown in the ground and reproducing itself in the ear does indeed furnish an analogy sufficient to refute the followers of Hymenæus and Philetus, but it does not hold good on all points. The fact that the produce is the same *in kind* as the grain that was sown, seems to imply, no doubt, that in the latter there was contained a germ or type, by force of which, according to laws impressed on it by God, it reappears in the ear; but it is not the *same grain* that reappears, whereas the resurrection body is the same body that was laid in the grave, though in a glorified condition. For the Apostle's purpose it was sufficient to note the fact that the grain dies, and appears again under a new form. So, he justly argues, the body may die, and yet be raised in another condition.

An important distinction, however, is that the death of the grain is the appointed natural means of its reappearance; whereas the death of the body was not the appointed means of its transition to a higher condition ; it is *unnatural* to man to die, and therefore the restoration of the body to the disembodied soul cannot proceed in the way of natural law ; in other words, must be miraculous. And so it is represented in Scripture : ‘ They that are in the graves shall hear His voice, and shall come forth ’ (John v. 28, 29) ; ‘ the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible ’ (1 Cor. xv. 52) ; ‘ I am the resurrection and the life ’ (John xi. 25). The resurrection of Christ, the pledge and pattern of ours, is described in the same way. It was not, indeed, possible that He should be holden of death (Acts ii. 24) ; there was a meetness for and a necessity of His rising again ; and yet the event itself is ascribed to a special exercise of divine power ; it was God who ‘ raised Him up, having loosed the pains of death ’ (*Ibid*).

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[1] *Dog.*, § 276.
[2] *Bib. Psych.*, vii.

The *time* of the resurrection appears in Scripture immediately connected with the second Advent ; which, as has been observed (§ 109), is not easy to reconcile with the millennarian scheme. It seems inconsistent, too, with another opinion, that the resurrection (at least, of the saints) is a successive work, commencing with those who are said to have come out of their graves at the death of Christ (Matt. xxvii. 53), and thenceforward going on to the present time. As each soul in paradise becomes ripe for the change (so runs the theory) it is restored to its body ; and these are the risen Christians who are represented as accompanying the Saviour from heaven, and forming with the changed quick His assessors at the judgment.

The great name of J. A. Bengel is sometimes associated with this opinion ; but though he was a decided pre-millennarian, and quotes,[1] seemingly with approval, Tertullian’s remarkable words, ‘ The resurrection of the saints goes on during the millennium, sooner or later, according to their merits,’ it does not appear that he extends this continuous resurrection beyond the millennium. A certain order and succession of procedure may be thought expressed in such passages as 1 Cor. xv. 23 : ‘ Every man in his own order : Christ the firstfruits ; afterwards they that are Christ’s at His coming ; then cometh the end ’ ; 1 Thess. iv. 16, 17 : ‘ The dead in Christ shall rise first, then we which are alive and remain,’ etc. ; but that the time extends over a thousand years is another matter, and it is not the impression which the plain statements of Scripture convey. The resurrection of the saints at Christ’s death is an isolated and exceptional fact, and can hardly be taken as initiating a series.

The main question on this subject is the relation of our present body to the future one ; how far the latter will be the same body, in what respects it will agree with, and in what it will differ from, its predecessor. The view of the older theologians, Protestant and Romanist, that the resurrection-body will be the same substantially, though differing in qualities, as the body that was laid in the grave, that the particles of matter which, in the process of decomposition, were scattered far and wide and passed into many combinations, will by a miracle be collected together again, and wrought into an organization the same as that in which the soul here dwelt,[1] is encumbered with many difficulties. It is founded probably on a too literal application of the figurative language of the vision in Ezek. xxxvii. The analogies employed by St. Paul are rather against such a supposition. The ear of corn which springs from the decayed grain is not composed of the particles which went to form that grain, and is only the same in the sense of being the same *in kind*, as has been already observed. 'All flesh is not the same flesh'; that is, although the resurrection-body will be 'flesh,' as Christ's body after He rose was 'flesh and bones,' yet there are various kinds of flesh, and the flesh which turned to corruption is not necessarily the flesh of the risen body.

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[1] *Gnomon*, Apoc., xx. 5.

This is all that is necessary to the Apostle's argument, and the Apostles' Creed makes no further demand on our faith. 'I believe in the resurrection,' not of the body (*corporis*) but of the flesh (*carnis*), as against the notion of an ocular illusion, or the doctrine of Hymenæus, Philetus, and their followers, ancient and modern.[2] The particles of our present bodies are in a state of continual flux; they undergo a complete change in certain intervals; which set of particles, those in existence at death or prior combinations, would, on the supposition referred to, be the subject of the divine agency? The truth is, what is permanent in our bodies is not these changing particles, but the *elementary* substances of which they are composed, and which belong to all material bodies as distinguished from mere spirit. These remain permanent, while the particles come and go; they will be found, too, in the glorified body, but glorified and with corresponding surroundings.

This last point it is necessary to bear in mind, in order to understand the Apostle's argument. The constituents of our present body derive their nutriment from the air, earth, water, etc., of the present earth;

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[1] Resurrectio mortuorum formaliter consistit in reproductione, seu reparatione ejusdem quod per mortem cecidit corporis; ex atomis seu particulis illius corporis; hinc inde disjectis atque dissipatis; in redunitione ejusdem cum animâ. Hollaz, P. iii., § 2, c. 9, Q. 24.

[2] Credo in carnis resurrectionem (Apostles' Creed). The Nicene Creed has, 'I look for the resurrection of the dead,' and nothing more. The Athanasian is fuller: 'At whose coming all men shall rise again with their bodies'; and true it is that the soul will find itself in its old habitation, but that habitation changed and renewed.

a glorified body may in some analogous manner be nourished from without, but if so, it must be from a glorified environment. And this, fact, Scripture foretells. 'The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now,' but 'it waits for the manifestation of the sons of God,' and its expectation is not vain; for 'the creature itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God' (Rom. viii. 19–20); 'we according to His promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness' (2 Pet. iii. 13). The risen saints, then, will find a new paradise (and on this earth) prepared for them; all creation will share in the spiritual change; and the renewed *elementary* substances of their bodies will be repaired (if the particles of those bodies, too, are in a flux) from a renewed earth and heaven.[1] On the whole it appears that the future body will not be composed of the *disjecta membra* of its predecessor, and yet that it will, in the constituents which form a body, be the same, and find itself in a corresponding new world.

There will be found another point, too, of identity between the present and the future body. Each individual body now possesses a certain organization, or arrangement, of its constituent elements, whereby it is distinguished from the countless millions of other bodies around it, even as the soul which inhabits it is not a simple being, but a complex one, to which no other soul is exactly alike. It is this peculiar organization which moulds the features, the stature, the expression, into an individual whole. If it be destroyed, although the constituents of a body may remain, it is no longer the same man whom we have known, and with whom we have held intercourse. Soul and body are thus wedded together; and when the soul is, after a temporary separation, reunited to its former companion, it will find itself embodied in the same peculiar organization of which it retains the memory. It will be in its old home; in the body familiar to it by years of association, with which its history and memories are inseparably connected. This identity of organization is necessary to the mutual recognition of the blessed departed; and the heavenly state would be shorn of its glory if it were supposed that husbands and wives, parents and children, relatives and friends, would not meet there as those who had only been parted for a time, and were no strangers to each other. All such notions, therefore, as that of Origen, that the saints will be raised in the form of spheroids as the most perfect of mathematical figures; involving, of course, the demolition of distinctive organization ; must be dismissed as unscriptural.

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[1] Whether the glorified body will need such reparation may be a matter of doubt. In view of such passages as Matt. xxii. 30, 'In the resurrection they are as the angels'; and 1 Cor. vi. 13, 'Meats for the belly, and the belly for meats, but God shall destroy both it and them,' we can hardly assume that the resurrection-body will need to be replenished like ours. Yet Christ, after His resurrection, partook of natural food (Luke xxiv. 43); and though His body may not at that time have been fully glorified, it could not have been a natural body (χοϊκόν).

Thus, there are two extremes to be avoided as regards the relation of the present to the future body. It is not *de fide* that the resurrection will consist in bringing together the decomposed parts of the earthly body, and combining them into a new one ; such a miracle is indeed conceivable, but it involves great difficulties. But it is *de fide* that the new body will be one of ‘ flesh ’ of some kind or other. On the other hand, the tendency of the speculations already referred to ; as that a ‘ nerve-body ’ (*grundgestalt*, as Martensen calls it) accompanying the soul into the intermediate state is the germ of the resurrection-body, or that the soul in that state develops from itself a body, is to separate too much the resurrection-body from the present one, and to reduce the miracle to a process of nature. The risen saints will appear in their former bodies, but with new qualities and new surroundings. And such seems to be the meaning of the Apostle’s words, ‘ There is a natural body and there is a spiritual body ’ (1 Cor. xv. 44), or the same body may exist in two different states.

By the natural body he does not mean that in which Adam before the fall was created,[1] but the body which we inherit from fallen Adam, the body which is sown in corruption because it is the seat of the sin which cleaves even to the regenerate. The spiritual body, on the contrary, is the body which even here is the temple of the Holy Spirit, and which hereafter will be endued with qualities fitting it to be a perfect organ of the sinless soul. It will be raised in incorruption, not to die again ; it will be raised in glory, no longer subject to the humiliations of its present condition, or to congenital or accidental blemishes ; it will be raised in power, capable of fully responding to the volitions of the soul—volitions which are now impeded by the weakness of its instrument. Of some of the bodily organs the use will no longer exist, ‘they neither marry nor are given in marriage,’ they live an angelic life ; but, withal, the soul will feel itself no stranger in this its house from heaven.

One more illustration is used by St. Paul : ‘ There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars ; for one star differeth from another star in glory.’ As far as the argument for a resurrection is concerned, he might have contented himself with the remark that 'there are celestial bodies and bodies terrestrial,' just as there are different kinds of flesh ; but he goes on to note the fact that among the celestial bodies themselves there are differences of glory. This is an additional circumstance and seems intended to intimate that, although all Christians will rise with spiritual bodies, there will be amongst them, even as regards the body, degrees of glory, in proportion to the measure of sanctity attained, or of service rendered, in the preliminary state of probation.

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[1] ‘ The Lord God formed man of the dust of the earth, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul ’ (Gen. ii. 7). So far, even Adam, unfallen, had only a σῶμα ψυχικόν—a body animated by a natural intelligent soul, as the bodies of the lower animals are by a natural impersonal soul. He had not a σῶμα πνευματικόν.

This seems all that Scripture reveals, and all that it concerns us to know, on this subject. The ingenuity of the Schoolmen raised numerous other questions, some of which savour of vain curiosity, while others are of still more questionable character ; and to such Scripture furnishes no answer. It is enough for us to be told that 'our vile body' will be transformed into the likeness of Christs' glorious body ; a privilege which would not have belonged to Adam and his posterity even if sin had not intervened to arrest the natural progress of the race from one degree of glory to another.

110. *The Judgment*

The well-known saying, 'The world's history is the world's judgment,' contains truth so far that the history of mankind furnishes proof of a superintending Providence, which, on the whole, has shown itself on the side of virtue and against vice, which has *distinguished* (the proper meaning of judgment, κρίσις) between good and evil. But the last judgment which Christians look forward to is a matter of prophecy, not of history ; of faith, not of sight ; it is the final issue of the evolution of the kingdom of God, the manifestation of the Church in its essential glory, and the separation from it of heterogeneous admixtures. In all the creeds it appears as an article of faith.

There is a twofold spiritual judgment mentioned in Scripture ; one affecting each individual on his quitting this life, as we learn from the parable of Dives and Lazarus, retributory in character, but not final ; the other both retributory and final. The former is an individual process, is successive, and takes place in the unseen world ; the latter is public, applies to mankind collectively, occurs at one time, viz., the Second Advent of Christ, and is personally conducted by the Redeemer. So it is represented in Scripture : 'He hath appointed a day on which He will judge the world in righteousness, by that Man whom He hath ordained ; whereof He hath given assurance in that He hath raised Him from the dead' (Acts xvii. 31). 'The day of the Lord,' 'that day,' are common expressions in the Epistles, denoting that the subject was familiar to those to whom the Apostles wrote, and needed no explanation.

There is a manifest propriety in the incarnate Son's being appointed Judge. Like all other acts *ad extra*, this one is ultimately that of the whole Trinity ; but it ‘ terminates,’ in the language of the schools, in the Son. Through the Son redemption was accomplished ; through His appointment the Gospel is to be preached to all nations ; the history of the Church, and of the world too, so far as its history is connected with that of the Church, is presided over by Him (‘ All power is given unto Me in heaven and earth,’ Matt. xxviii. 18) ; who so fit, when the end comes, to announce publicly what this plan of salvation has issued in, who have accepted and who have rejected it ? To which may be added, that He who as God can institute a process of inquiry of the most searching character, ‘ bringing to light the hidden things of darkness, and making manifest the counsels of the hearts,’ will, as man, and one who knows what temptation and suffering are, be specially qualified to enter into all the circumstances of each case, and to apportion praise and blame accordingly.

But how far may this day be called a day of *judgment* ? The analogy of human tribunals must not be applied too literally. The ordinary notion we form of these is that, whereas before the trial commences the guilt or innocence of the accused party is matter of doubt, now the case is judicially investigated, evidence produced, and, after the verdict of the jury, sentence pronounced. The prisoner is assumed not to be guilty before proof, nor is he acquitted before his innocence is established. The reason is that both judge and jury are fallible men, who can neither read the heart nor possess a certain knowledge of all the facts of the case. A human trial, therefore, is strictly a process of *investigation*. But we canot ascribe this character to the so-called judgment of the quick and dead. The Judge is omniscient, and has no need of evidence to convince Him ; He presides with a perfect knowledge of the character and history of every one who stands before Him ; He has already in Himself pronounced a judgment from which there is no appeal, and respecting which there can be no mistake.

It is evident, in fact, that the great day will be rather one of *publication* and *execution* than of judgment strictly so-called. In fact, a human judge would never open his proceedings as we are told Christ will open them—‘ Come, ye blessed of My Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world ’ ; ‘ Depart from Me, ye cursed,’ etc.—because the business of a human judge is to investigate the case, not to anticipate the sentence. The Saviour will be perfectly acquainted with the ‘ work and labour of love ’ on the one hand, which he rewards, and with the neglect of Christian duty on the other, which He condemns ; and the judgment will be merely public proof that He had taken note of this diversity, unknown to the parties concerned. An ingenious writer urges in favour of the sleep of the soul in the intermediate state, that, on the other hypothesis, 'each man would not only know his final condition, but actually enter upon his reward or punishment, before the resurrection, immediately on his death ; so that the judgment would be, in fact, forestalled.'[1] But whether the soul sleeps in the separate state or not, the judgment is equally forestalled. If probation is at an end with this life, death fixes the destiny of each individual ; if it continues through the intermediate state, the judgment closes it ; so that, in either case, the judgment only publishes a foregone conclusion. To the individual himself, any doubts respecting his position are then removed ; but the Judge takes His seat on the throne with no such doubts—those before Him are in His view either blessed or cursed.

These remarks may assist us in reconciling some statements of Scripture which at first sight seem at variance with each other. The judgment is described as universal—'He will judge the world in righteousness' (Acts xvii. 31) ; 'We' (Christians) 'must all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ' (2 Cor. v. 10)—and yet the saints are spoken of as exempt from this liability, and even as assessors of Christ at the last day. St. Paul blames the Corinthians for appealing to heathen tribunals in trivial matters of dispute : 'Is there not a wise man among you ? Not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren? Do ye not know that the saints shall judge the world ? And if the world shall be judged by you, are ye unworthy to judge the smallest matters ? (1 Cor. vi. 1–3). To interpret this merely of the convincing and reproving office which the Church, by its very existence, exercises towards a sinful world, is unsatisfactory ; not to mention that the judgment in question is described as future—'the saints shall judge' (κρινοῦσι) 'the world.' Other passages, too, if not directly to the point, seem to refer to some special privilege. Such are : 1 Thess. iv. 14, 'Them which sleep in Jesus will God bring with Him' ; and ver. 17 of the same chapter, 'We which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them' (the risen saints) 'to meet the Lord in the air.' The fact is, that for neither saints nor the world is the last day one of judicial inquiry, but of promulgation and separation. The saints will have already, in this life, judged themselves ; they will have repented of their sins and accepted Christ as a Saviour, and therefore will not be judged of the Lord (1 Cor. xi. 31). These *cannot* come into condemnation. The Lord knows them that are His, whether in life or after death ; transfers them at death to paradise ; and at the last day pronounces them publicly (what, perhaps, was not known before) the blessed of His Father. But both for those on the right and those on the left hand the day will be one of public attestation. The prerogative of the saints, according to Matt. xxv is that they will *first* receive this attestation ; and then they may well be supposed as assisting at the judgment of the rest.

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[1] *Scripture Revelations on a Future State.* L. iv.

The essential feature of this final act is the separation of Christ's mystical body from all incongruous admixtures. Neither in this life, nor in the intermediate state, is this perfectly accomplished. In the latter, indeed, the departed saints, whether of the Old or the New Dispensation, occupy a locality of their own, into which evil does not enter. But at the Saviour's coming the Church militant on earth must necessarily be a mixed body, and so may be the inhabitants of Hades itself. The meaning of the judgment-day is that this state of things is no longer to continue. On that day the tares and the wheat will be not only discriminated by an unerring eye, but they will be no longer in juxtaposition. 'The Son of Man shall send forth His angels, and they shall gather out of His kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity : then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father' (Matt. xiii. 41–43). This will be the 'manifestation' (properly the revelation, ἀποκάλυψις) 'of the sons of God' (Rom. viii. 19). At present they are more or less hidden ; severed publicly from the ungodly world, whether within or outside the Church, they will *appear* with Christ in glory (Col. iii. 3, 4).[1]

111. *Apokatastasis*

The word is derived from Acts iii. 21 : 'Whom' (Jesus Christ) 'the heavens must receive until the times of restitution' (ἀποκαταστάσεως) 'of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of all His holy prophets since the world began.' It is matter of debate whether the relative ὧν refers to χρόνων or to πάντων, which immediately precedes it. If the former, we must translate, 'the times of the restitution of all things, of which times the prophets have spoken' ; and this may seem to favour the doctrine of universal restitution. If the latter, the sense will be 'the restitution of all things which the prophets declare should be restored,' which has no bearing on that doctrine. From so ambiguous a passage no positive conclusions can be drawn.

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[1] [The judgment-seat of Christ, however, before which the saints will stand (2 Cor. v. 10) is evidently a tribunal peculiar to the saints—not of justification or of condemnation, but of rewards (cf. 1 Cor. iii. 8, 10 ff.)—and is not to be confused with the great white throne of the Apocalypse before which the wicked shall stand. Editor.]

The first writer who openly taught the doctrine of the universal restitution of all was Origen, and he has had followers both in ancient and in modern times. All fallen beings, he held, not excluding the devil and his angels, will, if they do not repent under this dispensation, pass through æons of chastisement proportioned in length to their demerits; but in the end, through these sufferings and the instruction of superior spirits, they will experience a salutary change, some sooner some later, and be restored to the favour of God and a substantial measure of bliss. There will be plenty of time for these healing influences to operate, for æon will follow æon in an endless succession. Both the Gregories (of Nazianzus and of Nyssa), the latter more openly than the former, exhibit traces of the influence of Origen; and the same may be said of some teachers of the school of Antioch. Origen was condemned at the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 543, but his views continued from time to time to reappear in the Church. Scotus Erigena, in the Middle Ages, defended a theory similar in character. At the Reformation the Anabaptists adopted it, as we learn from the Augsburg Confession: 'They' (the Protestants) 'condemn the Anabaptists who think that both for devils and men there will be a termination of future punishment' (A. xxvii). About the middle of the eighteenth century in Germany a great impulse was given in this direction by F. C. Ötinger, a mystical writer, and more of a theosophist than of a theologian, but a deep thinker and remarkable for his piety, the friend and admirer of J. A. Bengel. One of his sayings has passed into a proverb, 'Corporeity is the end of the ways of God.' Relying chiefly on 1 Cor. xv. 27, 28, and Ephes. i. 9–11, he argues that all things must eventually be gathered up under one head, Christ, and every jarring discord, after serving its end, resolve itself into harmony. With such a divine purpose a permanent alienation of the creature from the Creator is incompatible. Restored at last, condemned sinners will render thanks to God for their chastisements, which they will then see to have been paternal and for their good.

As regards Bengel himself, the evidence is not so clear. His sentiments, as reported by his biographer Burk (chap. xiii) are as follows: 'The restoration of all things is not a fit subject for public disputation.[1] That the word αἰώνιος has two significations is undeniable, and thus the Scriptural expressions κόλασις αἰώνιος, ζωὴ αἰώνιος, seem to admit of unequal meaning. . . . . On the *absolute* eternity of future punishment, it is worded in the Latin edition of the Augsburg

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[1] It is doubtful whether the saying commonly ascribed to Bengel, 'He who holds the doctrine of universal restitution, and publicly preaches it, is telling tales of God out of school,' is really his, or that of his reporter. But the extract in the text from Burk's Life seems similar in sentiment.

Confession *qui statuunt*, "who determine"; but in the German it is *qui docent*, "who teach"; which latter pleases me better, for in holding this doctrine we ought to keep it to ourselves, and not to force it on others, for it is considered an undecided point. . . . "Until thou hast paid the very last mite"; there will be no remission till the last payment is made, the whole of it will be exacted and enforced. But surely the expression "until" cannot mean the same thing as absolute eternity. There are sacred truths which forbid us to insist on the eternity of hell torments with that emphasis of absoluteness which we find in the well-known hymn, "Eternity, thou thunder-word,"' etc. It would seem, then, that this eminent and pious Biblical critic rather inclined to Ötinger's views, but held it prudent to abstain from public discussion or preaching of them.

In this century [1] the greatest name on the side of universal restitution is that of Schleiermacher. He remarks in his *Glaubenslehre* that if future punishment is supposed to consist in the anguish of an awakened conscience, this would prove that the condemned are in a better frame of mind than they were while living, and give better promise of recovery (*e.g.*, Dives in the parable seems improved by his sufferings, and displays a sense of his former misconduct). Self-reproach for neglected or rejected salvation must contain in itself some idea of that salvation, and also a capability of partaking of it; the idea of it must alleviate present misery, the capability of it presupposes a salutary change of mind. To which we may add that the bliss of the saints cannot be supposed perfect as long as they know that a considerable part of mankind is consigned to endless misery; this part possibly comprising many with whom they had been here connected by ties of relationship or friendship. And that they must have this knowledge is undeniable. However distinct the abodes of the blest and the lost may be, ignorance that many are lost would hardly be compatible with a perfect state; and if it could, the announcements of the day of judgment would render it impossible. Commiseration would be heightened by the remembrance on the part of the blest of a time when they themselves were no better than others, and equally deserving of condemnation. On the whole, the milder view has as much to say for itself as the sterner, and has as much support from Scripture.[2] Such are the arguments of Schleiermacher, who, accordingly, expresses a hope that no soul will eventually be lost, the only difference being that some will be restored sooner, some later (see § 74).

The considerations urged by Origen and his followers, that sin

[1] [*i.e.* the 19th century. Editor.]

[2] *Glaubenslehre*, § 163, Anhang.

is rather a weakness, deserving of pity, than an active principle of enmity against God, and that the disproportion between endless punishment and the sins of a few years casts a reflection on the justice of God, are met by the fact that the atonement provided to do away the guilt of sin necessitated the incarnation and death of the second Person of the Holy Trinity. In presence of this stupendous fact, objections from human reason, or theosophic speculations, are reduced to silence. The question is, what does Scripture say on the subject ? It must be admitted that certain passages, especially in St. Paul's epistles, have not, on the other hypothesis, as yet received a fully satisfactory interpretation. 'As through one trespass the judgment came unto all men to condemnation, even so through one act of righteousness the free gift came unto all men to justification of life. For as through the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, even so, through the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous' (Rom. v. 18, 19). The parallelism seems to demand that 'all men,' or 'the many,' should, in both clauses, signify the same thing. In ver. 12 it is literally all mankind (πάντας ἀνθρώπους) upon whom, the Apostle says, death, in consequence of Adam's sin, passed ; and, in fact, death does so pass upon all men, even upon infants and others who cannot sin after 'the similitude of Adam's transgression' (ver. 14). That 'all men' and 'the many' (οἱ πολλοὶ) are equivalent in meaning, is proved by the substitution of the latter for the former in reference to the same fact, viz., the universal prevalence of death on account of Adam's sin (ver. 15). Why the Apostle should have used the one expression for the other we may not be able to say ; but as regards the 'judgment' on all men, it is undeniable that he does so. The 'free gift,' then, it is urged, must be equally comprehensive, and include 'all men,' eventually, if not at present, or under this dispensation.

Various modes have been suggested of removing the difficulty. It is only the redeemed Church, say some, which the Apostle has in view in ver. 19, when he says, 'the many shall be made righteous' ; but in the previous clause, 'the many were made sinners,' it is all mankind that is meant. He speaks of the Divine *intention* that all should be saved, say others ; but, again, the previous clause refers to a condemnation in fact, and not merely in intention. The offers of the Gospel, it is urged, are addressed to all ; the atonement is (objectively) *sufficient* for the whole world ; but the expression 'the many shall be made' (κατασταθήσονται) 'righteous' seems to imply more than a mere possibility of being made so, not to remark that the same word (κατεστάθησαν) previously used must signify a real participation in Adam's fall. If we limit the salvation spoken of to the elect (as the

Calvinistic expositors generally do), why should not the consequences of the fall be also limited to a portion of mankind ?

The most probable solution appears to be that a tacit condition is implied in the Apostle's statement, thus ; the many will be justified *on the supposition* that they believe in Christ ; but it cannot be called quite satisfactory. ' He must reign until He hath put all enemies under His feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. And when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then shall the Son also Himself be subject unto Him that put all things under Him, that God may be all in all ' (1 Cor. xv. 26–28) ; this passage stands alone, as regards its matter, in the New Testament, a circumstance which adds greatly to its difficulties. But in general, its purport seems to be that the mediatorial office and saving work of Christ are to continue until all ' things shall be subdued unto Him ' (ver. 28). Subdued in what sense ? It may no doubt mean that the powers of evil (Satan and his host) shall be compelled to acknowledge Christ as Lord ; and so may the passage Phil. ii. 10, 11 (which bears some resemblance to this one) be understood ' that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth, and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father ' ; yet such an unwilling acknowledgment of the supreme dominion of Christ, such a forced submission covering an unreconciled hostility, seems to have little connection with the end aimed at, that ' God may be all in all,' that God may be the ruling principle in all creatures. ' That in the dispensation of times He might gather, together all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth ' (Ephes. i. 10 ; comp. Col. i. 20) ; a great expansion of Christ's saving work, both in heaven and on earth, seems here indicated, and the expression ' all things ' apparently assigns no limit to it. In this instance, again, expositors have laboured, not with complete success, to reconcile St. Paul with other statements of Scripture. But since those statements are also part of Scripture, they must be allowed their full weight.

There are some general considerations which may well make us pause before committing ourselves positively to an interpretation of these passages in favour of a general Apokatastasis. The first is, that we might expect so very important a doctrine to be clearly revealed, instead of being left to be inferred from a few texts, and these chiefly from one inspired authority. If true, it must profoundly modify our views of sin and of redemption ; and the rule is that the more important a point is, the more prominent is it on the page of Scripture. The second is, the apparent *finality* of the proceedings of the last day. Up to this point, time and history are running their course, and no public separation of the tares and the wheat has taken place ; but with it the destiny of mankind, one way or the other, seems accomplished, and time itself will be no more. Either, then (as some have thought), the wicked will be annihilated, or there must remain a portion of the rational creation permanently alienated from its Maker. For Christ appears as a Judge, and no longer as a Saviour ; Satan and his angels are consigned to the place prepared for them ; and they who have cast in their lot with him follow him to this place. The drama seems closed, with no intimation of its revival thereafter. The third, and the most important, is that universal restitution is not according to the analogy of the method of redemption in the present life. That method is, to offer to all men salvation, and to offer, too, spiritual aid to all who seek it ; but also (see § 59) to confer special grace on some, whereby the will is inclined to accept such offers. That is, effectual calling is not universal ; were it so, there would be no such thing as election to eternal life.

Not only so, but such calling seems subject to conditions, not so much as regards the degree of criminality of the previous life, as the *duration* of an unconverted state. It is seldom that they who have passed a long life of wilful sin are brought at last to repentance ; the change is not impossible, as the case of the thief on the cross proves, but it is of rare occurrence. This amounts to saying that evil may in some cases become a *second nature*, so that even effectual grace can find no point of contact to fasten upon. The conscience may, as Scripture terms it, be seared with a hot iron, the cautery destroying life in the part affected. If even in our short life of threescore years and ten such an insensibility to the motions of the Holy Spirit may supervene, to what a measure of obstinacy they who, during the long ages of the intermediate state, continue to reject the overtures of mercy (if such are there made to them), may bring themselves, it is impossible to say. Even effectual grace works with and by the will, and presumes a scintilla of moral feeling and conscience still to exist ; but in the case supposed these traces of the image of God may be quite obliterated. The anguish which Schleiermacher makes a proof of improvement may be nothing but despair and impotent rage. To restore such a case of spiritual ruin would be almost equivalent to the creating of a new personality. This may be conceivable, but it would be turning the operations of grace, as we see them around us, into the operations of nature, working as *natura naturans*, by blind necessity and irresistible force. Free-will, a perilous prerogative but the condition of all virtue, would be annihilated. As long, then, as conversion involves, to any extent, the co-operation of free-will, and proceeds not by a law of physical necessity, so long the possibility of endless punishment exists ; on the simple ground that if the sin is endless so is the punishment.

112. *New Heavens and a New Earth*

Scripture opens with paradise lost and closes with paradise regained, and both on the present earth, though not both in its present condition. The first chapter of Genesis describes the creation of our planet out of nothing, and its preparation to be the abode of a sinless but not redeemed race of rational beings ; the last two chapters of the Book of Revelation portray new heavens and a new earth, destined, after the solemnities of the last day, to be occupied by the redeemed Church. What lies between is the history of redemption in prophecy, and in its progress from the first coming of Christ to the second ; its Pentecostal outburst, its revivals, its conflicts, with sin and Satan, and the apparent termination of its probationary character simultaneously with the end of all things.

The same reasons which lead us to see in the resurrection of the body the complement of redemption in its fulness render also a renovation of the present earth matter of natural expectation. Man was created for the earth—to rule over and replenish it ; in it was placed his paradise, and the sacrament of his immortality ; there he was to enjoy the most intimate communion with his Maker. The lower creation, in all its departments, corresponded to this exalted destiny. When the Divine Artificer surveyed the work of His hands, He pronounced all ‘ to be very good ’ (Gen. i. 31). With the fall all nature sympathized, as far as it could sympathize with it—certainly all nature shared in it. ‘ Cursed is the ground for thy sake ; thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee ; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life ’ (Gen. iii. 17, 18). The animals no longer enjoyed, under a mild rule, such happiness as they were capable of, but were transformed either into ravenous beasts of prey, to be destroyed lest they should overrun the earth, or into slaves of a tyrannical master : ‘ the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now ’ (Rom. viii. 22).

Now, if the earth is to be the scene of paradise regained, it is necessary that a reversal of the curse should take place. New heavens and a new earth must supersede the old, otherwise there would be a discrepancy between the glorified Church and its local environment. Such is the strain of ancient prophecy : ‘ Behold, I create new heavens and a new earth, and the former shall not be remembered, or come into mind : behold, I create Jerusalem a rejoicing, and her people a joy ; and I will rejoice in Jerusalem and joy in My people ; and the voice of weeping shall be no more heard in her, nor the voice of crying' ; 'They shall not labour in vain, nor bring forth for trouble ; for they are the seed of the blessed of the Lord, and their offspring with them' ; 'The wolf and the lamb shall feed together, and the lion shall eat straw like the bullock ; they shall not hurt nor destroy in all My holy mountain, saith the Lord' (Isa. lxv. 17–25 ; comp. xi).

Let it be granted that such prophecies may be *applied* to the restoration of the Jews from captivity, or to the first advent of Christ in its *intended* results ; it is another question whether such partial fulfilments *exhaust* them. Especially when we observe that the New Testament takes up the theme, with an evident reference to prophecy, and almost in the same language. We Christians, St. Peter says, should be 'looking for and hasting unto the coming of the day of God, wherein the' (present) 'heavens being on fire shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat : nevertheless we, according to his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness' (2 Pet. iii. 12, 13). This is the 'regeneration' which our Lord speaks of in Matt. xix. 28, and to which the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews alludes when he says, 'unto the angels hath He not put in subjection the world to come' (*τὴν οἰκουμένην*) 'whereof we speak' (chap. ii. 5). This is the 'restitution' (*ἀποκατάστασις*) 'of all things, which the prophets foretold should be restored' at the second coming of Christ (Acts iii. 21). And this, though described in figurative language, is the fact underlying that language which the Apocalypse (in chaps. xxi, xxii) presents to our view.

The older expositors, owing to their practical ignoring of the intermediate state, and their making heaven and Gehenna to commence at once on death, were compelled to resolve the Apocalyptic vision into an affair of pure spirit ; but 'corporeity is the end of the ways of God.' We must be careful indeed not so to understand it as to introduce under the Gospel what is inconsistent with the fundamental truths of the latter, such as the restoration of the theocracy with its system of earthly sacrifice and priesthood[1] ; but neither must we take it to be a mere poetical description, without foundation in fact. If chap. xx. 1–10 refers to a millennium of some kind, which we are not concerned to deny, plainly with verse 11 commences a new vision, representing a new stage in the history of the kingdom of God. The dead, small and great, stand before God ; the books are opened, and the dead are judged out of those things which are written in the books (verses 11, 12). Then comes the end. The first heavens and the first earth are passed away, and the New Jerusalem descends upon an earth 'delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God' (Rom. viii. 21).

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[1] Elliott, *Hor. Apoc.*, vol. iv., p. 229 ff.

By what agency the change will be affected is not left in doubt. 'The world which then was' (that is, before the Flood) 'being overflowed with water, perished'; but 'the heavens and the earth which now are, are reserved unto fire against the day of judgment' (2 Pet. iii. 6, 7). And so St. Paul: 'The Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God' (2 Thess. i. 7, 8). Both water and fire are purifying, but the latter after a far more searching manner than the former. Whether the present system is to be destroyed and a new creation to succeed it, or merely to be transformed, we are not told; but the latter is more in accordance with the corresponding change in the bodies of the saints. These will not be annihilated but changed; and the earth too, may pass through its baptism of fire, and yet remain substantially the same that it was.

'Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him' (1 Cor. ii. 9); but the inspired seer was charged to record in the vision with which he was favoured certain salient particulars respecting the life to come; under symbol, indeed, but plain enough to the discerning mind. 'Wherein dwelleth righteousness'; from the second paradise, now comprising the whole earth, sin will for ever disappear, both the sin which cleaves to the individual Christian and impedes his progress, and the sin around him in the present world and even in the Church, so often a stumbling-block and a discouragement to him. With their cause, too, the effects of sin will cease; 'there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall be any more pain, for the former things are passed away' (Apoc. xxi. 4). 'The tabernacle of God is with men, and He shall dwell with them' (*Ibid.*, 3).

It was the privilege of God's ancient people to have God dwelling in the midst of them; under earthly and typical forms indeed, the tabernacle and then the temple, the bright cloud filling the sacred edifice, the most holy place, with (as some think) the shekinah or symbol of the divine presence between the cherubim shadowing the mercy-seat, the ark of the covenant. There the divine sovereign of Israel was to be met, and from that place, through the high priest, He communicated with the people. These things were framed after 'the pattern shewed to Moses in the mount' (Heb. viii. 5); but the heavenly archetype itself now descends on earth, and fills it with a glory of which the bright cloud and the shekinah were but images. In Eden God conversed with man face to face; under the typical dispensation through a human priesthood; in the new earth again face to face, inasmuch as 'the Lamb which is in the midst of the throne,' and who 'feeds His people and leads them to fountains of living waters' (Apoc. vii. 17), is also God manifest in the flesh, God Himself under the veil of humanity, a veil which mitigates indeed the splendour of 'the light which no man can approach unto' (1 Tim. vi. 16), but allows the full measure thereof which the glorified soul can receive to transpire. Therefore St. John saw no temple there, for the 'glory of God and the Lamb are the temple of it'; and therefore the inhabitants have no need 'of candle, for there shall be no night there,' nor of 'the light of the sun, for the Lord God giveth them light' (Apoc. xxi. 22; xxii. 5). This does not mean that the revolutions of day and night or of the seasons will cease, which would amount to a reversal of the laws which govern our present system; but that spiritually there will be no night there, the beams of the Sun of righteousness, shining direct on the soul, will never be intercepted by even a passing cloud of sin or sorrow.

As to the new Jerusalem itself, 'the assembly and Church of the first-born, which are written in heaven' (Heb. xii. 23), now about to take up its abode on earth, it is in form a cube, signifying perfection,[1] has twelve gates, three towards each quarter of the world, to allow of free ingress and egress; guarded by twelve angels, not to bar the way, as in Gen. iii. 24, but to remove every impediment (comp. Ezek. xlviii. 30–35); the foundations bear the names of the twelve apostles, as, in fact, the Church is 'built upon the foundations of the apostles and prophets' (Ephes. ii. 20); the gates are of pearl, the street of pure gold, the walls adorned with precious stones; all that in the present world is valuable or beautiful lends its aid to convey some conception of the future inheritance of the saints (Apoc. xxi. 16–20). As the first Eden had its river to water the garden, and its tree of life, these are not wanting in the second; 'a pure river of the water of life, proceeding out of the throne of God and of the Lamb,' clothes the new earth with heavenly verdue, and on either side of it grows the tree of life with its monthly produce of fruit, and even its leaves endowed with salutary properties (Apoc. xxii. 1, 2). Those who live close to the tabernacle in the midst of the holy city partake of 'the fruit,' the choicest communications from heaven; but even its less advanced members, 'the nations,' have a share in the blessing; they move in a remoter orbit, but still under the attractive influence of the central sphere, and not without a measure of His beams ; ' the leaves ' are theirs, to repair what is wanting, to strengthen what is feeble, to turn their convalescence into spiritual health, and at last to prepare them for one of ' the many mansions ' nearer to the fountain of light.[1]

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[1] 'This most holy place was a room of state of equal length, breadth, and height, or a cube of about twenty cubits (near thirty foot), all overlaid with pure gold.' Lowman, *Hebrew Ritual*, c. ii.

Why, it may be asked, should the city be called ' the new Jerusalem ' ? and why should mention be made of ' nations ' in a state of things where such distinctions may be thought out of place ? Without endorsing the cruder speculations which have sometimes appeared in connection with the future of the Jewish people, it may be admitted that the prophecies of the Old Testament—such, for example, as Isa. lx, to which the Apocalypse evidently alludes—seem to extend beyond the mere incorporation into the Christian Church of ' the remnant, according to the election of grace ' (Rom. xi. 5) of the Jewish people. Jerusalem, the city over which Christ wept, bears in Scripture divers meanings ; but all such applications are founded on its original designation to be the seat of God's chosen people, the depository of prophetic revelation, the cradle of Christianity ; the foundation, in the persons of the Apostles, of the Christian Church, and in their writings ' judging ' even now ' the twelve tribes of Israel ' (Matt. xix. 28), the spiritual Israel of the New Covenant. Since ' the gifts and calling of God are without repentance ' (Rom. xi. 29), we may suppose that in ' the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of His glory,' there will exist a Jerusalem—not the old one, and yet not a purely spiritual one—occupying the same locality, and inhabited by the same race ; in no respect, as regards spiritual privileges, superior to the wild olive-tree grafted into the original stock, but still the spiritual metropolis of the renovated earth :—whither, through its twelve gates, ' the kings of the earth' shall repair, bringing with them ' their glory and honour,' and wherein ' the nations of the saved ' shall from time to time ' walk in the light of it ' (Apoc. xxi. 24).

' I must by all means keep this feast ' (the Passover ?) ' that cometh in Jerusalem ' (Acts xviii. 21) : so spake the Apostle of the Gentiles, the chosen vessel to proclaim the truth that the Gentiles should be fellow-heirs, and of the same body, and partakers of the promise in Christ by the Gospel ' (Ephes. iii. 6) ; that under the Gospel ' there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian,

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[1] Pre-millennarians understand this ' healing of the nations ' to refer to the sending of the Gospel from Jerusalem, the centre of millennial glory, to the unconverted heathen nations around it, in order to bring them into the fold of Christ. They urge that ' healing ' (θεραπεία) cannot be applied to glorified saints, who are already healed. But the word does not necessarily signify the application of medical remedies ; it may be used for strengthening, or completing the cure—for progress from a lower to a higher stage of convalescence. See Delitzsch, *Bib. Psych.*, vii., § 4.

Scythian, bond or free, but Christ is all and in all' ; who 'withstood Peter to the face' when that Apostle wavered on the essential point of the spiritual equality of Jew and Gentile (Gal. ii). Perhaps, 'in the regeneration,' which the typical Jewish feasts have given place to something analogous, the same Paul may be found leading 'the fulness' (πλήρωμα, Rom. xi. 25) of the Gentile Church through the gates of the holy city, to celebrate there the new Paschal feast (Matt. xxvi. 29), the marriage-supper of the Lamb, the pledge of eternal union with His bride.

'The nations' (τὰ ἔθνη) 'shall walk in the light of it.' Not merely shall the redeemed Church form, spiritually, one fold under one Shepherd, but as the saved of the Jews may reappear as a polity in their native land, so the saved of each Gentile nation may arrange themselves into communities under a government ('kings of the earth'), with political and social duties suitable to their glorified state. Heaven has been too often represented exclusively as a place of rest, its inhabitants having no occupation but praising God, or indulging in contemplation. Such, indeed, is the character and such the employments of that state ; but praising God comprises not merely 'singing the song of Moses and the Lamb' (Apoc. xv. 3), but active service, arduous duty—even conflict with evil, if such should be found outside the sacred precincts.[1] If the present life is a preparation and a school of training for another, that other, it should seem, must afford scope for the active habits acquired here—for the wisdom, foresight, courage, and endurance which our temporal experience is so fitted to form in us—and also furnish a field for the exercise of the moral sentiments, which Christianity does not suppress, but purifies and extends. The saints, clothed with white robes, 'serve God day and night in His temple' (Apoc. vii. 15). The family, the state, freed from all imperfection, may transplant themselves into paradise, and flourish in perpetual youth on a kindlier soil and under a purer heaven. And 'upon all the glory there shall be a defence' (Isa. iv. 5) ; the gates of the city are always open (Apoc. xxi. 25), because no enemy is to be apprehended ; and the tree of life, ever accessible, yields its fruit all the year round, the means and the pledge of endless felicity.

He that testifieth of these things saith : 'Surely, I come quickly.' The whole Church, on earth and above, responds with one voice : 'Amen. Even so come, Lord Jesus.'

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[1] [The suggestion that the heavenly service may involve conflict with evil is incompatible with the teaching of the Apocalypse that Satan and his followers, together with all evil, will have been judged and will have perished when God brings in the new heavens and the new earth, wherein righteousness dwells (2 Pet. iii. 13), and in which the whole creation will have been delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. Editor.]

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